Com. v. Jones, C.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket53 MDA 2026
JudgeSullivan
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CERAE GRACIOUS JONES : No. 53 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0001308-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Cerae Gracious
Jones’s (“Jones”) motion to suppress, finding the police lacked probable cause
to stop her motor vehicle.1 After careful review, we affirm.
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from
our review of the certified record. While on routine patrol, shortly after
midnight, on August 8, 2023, Pennsylvania State Trooper Ahmed Usman
(“Trooper Usman”) observed a white Acura, driven by Jones. See N.T.,
8/21/25, at 5-6. Trooper Usman saw the Acura “touch” the yellow center line.
Id. at 6. Trooper Usman followed the vehicle and noted three other instances
where the vehicle touched but did not cross the double yellow line. See id.
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1 The Commonwealth is permitted to appeal as of right from an order that
does not end the entire case where, as here, it certifies that the order “will
terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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at 6, 10-11, 14-16. Trooper Usman also noticed the vehicle “swaying” within
the lane. Id. at 6. Trooper Usman captured the incident on his motor vehicle
recorder.2 See id. at 5.
Trooper Usman activated his lights and siren; Jones then ran a red light
before pulling into a gas station and stopping. See id. at 6. When Trooper
Usman approached Jones, he smelled “a strong odor of marijuana.” Id.
Trooper Usman also noted Jones’s eyes were watery and bloodshot and her
eyelids “were tremoring.” Id. at 7. Trooper Usman ascertained Jones’s
driving privileges were suspended; she also did not perform well on field
sobriety tests. See id. at 7-8.
The Commonwealth charged Jones with three counts of driving under
the influence (“DUI”), disregard of traffic lanes, failing to stop at a red signal,
driving while operating privileges were suspended, and careless driving.3 See
Information, 6/12/24, at 1-2. Jones subsequently filed an omnibus pre-trial
motion to suppress arguing Trooper Usman lacked probable cause to stop her
motor vehicle. See Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 7/2/23, at 1-3. The trial court
held a suppression hearing.
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2 Although the video was played at the suppression hearing, it is not included
in the certified record. We remind the Commonwealth it was its responsibility
to ensure that the certified record contains all evidence necessary to ensure
that this Court can review its claims. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959
A.2d 362, 372 (Pa. Super. 2008); Pa.R.A.P. 1926; Pa.R.A.P. 1931.
3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), (d)(iii), (d)(2), 3309(1), 3112(a)(3)(i);
1543(a); 3714(a).
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At the hearing, Trooper Usman, the only witness, testified several times
that, while Jones touched the center line, she did not cross it, there was no
opposing traffic, and he pulled Jones over solely for alleged violations of 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1) (“Section 3309), not for possible DUI. See N.T., 8/21/25,
at 6 (Jones’s vehicle touched the center line four times); 11 (Jones’s driver-
side tire touched the center line and Trooper Usman initiated the traffic stop
for a violation of Section 3309); 12 (Trooper Usman testifying he initiated the
traffic stop for a violation of Section 3309 because she “touched” the center
line several times, and that he did not initiate the traffic stop for suspected
DUI); 13 (reiterating that Jones “touched” the center line); 14 (Jones never
crossed the center line and there was no opposing traffic); 15 (Jones touched
the center but never had the full tire on the center line); 16 (the final time,
Jones did not touch the center line but the line of a turning lane); 18 (Trooper
Usman did not suspect a DUI at the time he stopped Jones and was unaware
her driving privileges had been suspended). Moreover, the Commonwealth
conceded Trooper Usman was required to show probable cause for the motor
vehicle stop because it was for a violation of Section 3309, not for DUI. See
id. at 21-22. The Commonwealth also admitted there was no case law
supporting that there was probable cause to stop a driver for a violation of
Section 3309 when the driver had not crossed the yellow line. See id. at 22-
23.
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The trial court granted Jones’s motion to suppress. See Memorandum
Opinion and Order, at 1-2 (unnumbered). The instant, timely appeal
followed.4
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises a single issue for our review:
A. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that no probable
cause existed to stop [Jones’s] vehicle where:
(1) [Jones’s] vehicle swayed within its lane of travel
for approximately one minute; and
(2) [Jones’s] left tires touched and moved off of the
painted line demarcating the leftmost boundary
of [her] lane four times in approximately 52
seconds[?]
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
The Commonwealth’s issue implicates the grant of a defendant’s motion
to suppress. When the Commonwealth appeals a suppression order, this
Court considers only the evidence from the defense witnesses together with
the evidence of the prosecution that when read in the context of the entire
record remains uncontradicted. See Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d
807, 812 (Pa. Super. 2003). A reviewing court is bound by the lower court’s
findings of fact if they are supported in the record but conducts plenary review
to determine if the court properly applied the law to the facts. See
Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247, 252 (Pa. 2021); Dales, 820
A.2d at 812. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their
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4 The Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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testimony is solely within the province of the suppression court. See
Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 932 A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. Super. 2007). If the
facts support the suppression court’s findings, those findings are binding, and
this Court may only reverse if the suppression court drew erroneous legal
conclusions from the evidence. See id.
Trooper Usman conducted a traffic stop based on a suspected violation
of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1), which provides as follows:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all
others not inconsistent therewith shall apply:
(1) Driving within single lane.--A vehicle shall be driven as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be
moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the
movement can be made with safety.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).
To conduct a traffic stop based on an observed violation of Section
3309(1), a police officer must have probable cause. See Commonwealth v.
Cephus, 208 A.3d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Commonwealth
v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that “[i]f it is
not necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle
Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the
vehicle.” (citation omitted)).
To determine whether probable cause exists, we must
consider whether the facts and circumstances[,] which are within
the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
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warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect
has committed or is committing a crime.
Ibrahim. 127 A.3d at 824 (citation and quotation marks omitted); but see
Cephus, 208 A.3d at 1097 (acknowledging confusion and inconsistency in this
Court’s decisions analyzing the validity of stops based on violations of section
3309(1)).
The suppression court concluded that Trooper Usman lacked probable
cause to stop Jones’s vehicle for a violation of section 3309(1), because Jones
never crossed the double-yellow line. See Memorandum Opinion and Order,
12/8/25, at 1 (unnumbered).
The Commonwealth disagrees, arguing that Jones’s actions in touching
the yellow line four times were sufficient to establish probable cause.5
Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-17.
We have thoroughly reviewed the Commonwealth’s argument and do
not find it persuasive. The Commonwealth has not cited to a single case where
this Court has found probable cause to stop a vehicle that merely touched the
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5 In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues that Jones’s actions provided
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop for DUI, a claim not raised below. See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-18. We need not address this claim because, as
cited above, Officer Usman specifically testified he did not stop Jones for
suspicion of DUI. See N.T., 8/21/25, at 12, 18. Moreover, the Commonwealth
conceded the stop was for an alleged violation of Section 3309, not DUI, and,
therefore, the correct standard was probable cause. See id. at 21-22. It is
settled that an appellant cannot raise a new legal theory on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Dunham, 203 A.3d 272, 276 (Pa. Super. 2019);
Pa.R.Crim.P. 5810(H); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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center line. See id. at 13-15. Instead, in all of the cases noted by the
Commonwealth, the driver not only crossed the center line multiple times but
also engaged in other actions indicative of careless driving such as crossing
the fog line, crossing the berm, narrowly avoided hitting opposing traffic, or
nearly hit the curb and/or a utility pole. See id. None of this occurred in the
instant matter, and, while Trooper Usman mentioned Jones’s vehicle
“swayed,” this issue was not developed at the suppression hearing. See N.T.,
8/21/25, at 6. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth is insufficient
to support a showing of probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Jackson,
359 A.3d 1204 (Pa. Super. 2026) (unpublished memorandum at *3)6 (relying
on this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 36
(Pa. Super. 2016) and Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa.
Super. 2004) and concluding probable cause exists when a driver’s deviation
from a single lane is unsafe based on the circumstances but not where there
is a minor and/or momentary deviation from the single lane.
Order affirmed.
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6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2026
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