Com. v. Strait, O.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket535 WDA 2026
JudgeNichols
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
OZZY MICHAEL STRAIT :
:
Appellant : No. 535 WDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 12, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-42-CR-0000593-2024
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: November 19, 2026
Appellant Ozzy Michael Strait appeals from his judgment of sentence
following his conviction of strangulation.1, 2 On appeal, Appellant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
After careful review, we affirm.
On October 7, 2024, Appellant was charged with strangulation and other
crimes related to events that occurred in McKean County on August 21, 2024.
See Information, 10/7/24. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on April 24,
2025. At trial, the victim testified that at the time of the incident she was in
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1).
2 Appellant was also convicted of simple assault and harassment, neither of
which are implicated on appeal. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1),
respectively; see also Appellant’s brief at 5.
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a relationship with Appellant when, during an argument, Appellant pushed the
victim up against a closet. See N.T. Trial, 4/24/25 at 33-36. She further
testified that Appellant “put his hands . . . or his arm on [her] throat where
[she] couldn’t breathe[.]” See id. at 36 (some formatting altered). The victim
described yelling for help and trying to get out of the bedroom where she and
Appellant were located, and that Appellant’s hands or forearm against her
throat prevented her from breathing or being able to hear. See id. at 36-37.
The victim testified that, while unable to breathe, she had no recollection of
whether Appellant said anything to her but recalled that, ultimately, Appellant
told her that she “better get out of there before it got [] worse.” See id. at
38 (some formatting altered).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of all charged
offenses. See Verdict Order, 4/25/25. On May 12, 2025, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to thirty-two to sixty-four months’ incarceration for
Appellant’s strangulation conviction, which was an aggravated-range
sentence. See Sentencing Order, 5/12/25; see also N.T. Sentencing Hr’g,
5/12/25, at 25. Appellant filed post-sentence motions which were denied on
June 30, 2025. See Trial Ct. Order, 6/30/25. Appellant did not file a direct
appeal in the 30-day period following the entry of judgment of sentence.
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Appellant filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act3 (PCRA) on September 22, 2025. The PCRA court appointed counsel
to represent Appellant, and Appellant filed a counseled amended PCRA petition
on February 13, 2026, wherein he, inter alia, sought to have his direct appeal
rights reinstated nunc pro tunc. See Amended PCRA Pet., 2/13/26, at ¶ 12.
The PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc on
March 12, 2026. See PCRA Ct. Order, 3/13/26. Appellant filed a timely notice
of direct appeal nunc pro tunc and both Appellant and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether the lower court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal regarding insufficient
evidence of Appellant’s mens rea?
2. Whether the lower court erred in sentencing Appellant in
the aggravated range?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some formatting altered).
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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
4 We note that the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) statement consists of two
paragraphs and that, therein, its statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed is: “[T]he court imposed a legal sentence within the sentencing
guidelines, which accounted for the serious nature of the crime, [Appellant]’s
lack of remorse, and [Appellant]’s criminal record.” Rule 1925(a) Stmt.,
6/22/25 (some formatting altered). Rule 1925(a) mandates that the trial
court “shall . . . file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the
order, or for the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in
writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a).
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In his first claim, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
establish the mens rea element of intent to commit strangulation. See id. at
13-17. Specifically, while the victim testified that Appellant had either his
hands or his arm on her throat during the incident, Appellant notes that the
victim failed to testify that “she told Appellant he was restricting her airway”
while he was strangling her, even though the victim was “yelling throughout
the incident.” Id. at 16. Appellant argues that, because the victim failed to
make such a statement during the incident, the jury therefore had insufficient
evidence to find the requisite intent element of the statute, specifically that
he knowingly or intentionally impeded the breathing of another. See id. at
14-15. Appellant argues that, at most, the Commonwealth’s evidence
established that he acted recklessly rather than intentionally, and thus the
mens rea element of intent was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. at 17.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence presents
a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 347 A.3d 689,
699 (Pa. Super. 2025). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, drawing all reasonable inferences in the
Commonwealth’s favor, to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to
enable the fact-finder to find every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa.
2000). In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we need only address the elements
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of the crime specifically challenged by the appellant. See Commonwealth
v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. See
Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A person commits the offense of strangulation when “the person
knowingly or intentionally impedes the breathing or circulation of the blood of
another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck.” See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2718(a)(1).
After our review of the record, we conclude that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant was guilty of strangulation. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at
751; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1). The victim’s testimony established that
Appellant “put his hands . . . or his arm on [the victim’s] throat where [she]
couldn’t breathe.” See N.T. Trial, 4/24/25, at 36 (some formatting altered).
The jury, as fact finder, was free to credit the victim’s testimony to determine
that Appellant’s conduct constituted a knowing or intentional act effectuating
the strangulation of the victim. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751; Cahill, 95
A.3d at 300; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1). Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency
claim challenging the intent element of the offense is without merit. See id;
see also Cain, 906 A.2d at 1244.
In his second claim, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-19. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the trial court sentenced him in the aggravated range
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for his conviction without providing the required “contemporaneous written
statement of the reason or reasons” for the deviation from the sentencing
guidelines. See id. at 17-18. Appellant further argues that the reasons
provided by the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion – Appellant’s criminal history,
lack of remorse, and the severity of the convicted offense – were already taken
into consideration in the guidelines and cannot then again be relied on to
impose sentence in the aggravated range. See id. at 18.
Appellant’s claim implicates the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014).
“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,
991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such
claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.
Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised
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for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,
1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal”).
Here, are noted above, Appellant filed a timely nunc pro tunc notice of
direct appeal. See Not. of Appeal, 4/13/26. Appellant also included a Rule
2119(f) statement in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-12. Next, we look
to determine whether Appellant raises a substantial question. “The
determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 1086, 1090
(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when
the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant’s claim raises a claim that his sentence was
excessive and such a claim raises a substantial question regarding the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97
A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that “an excessiveness claim
raises a substantial question when [it] sufficiently articulates the manner in
which the sentence violates [] a specific provision of the sentencing scheme
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set forth in the Sentence Code” (formatting altered) (citing Commonwealth
v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002)).
Our standard of review of sentencing claims is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
(d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].
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(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54 (citation omitted).
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), . . . [including] the protection of the
public, [the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on [the] victim and
community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted and formatting altered). “A sentencing court need not undertake a
lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically
reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the
sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the
offender.” Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by, Commonwealth v.
Seals, 353 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2026). Additionally, the trial court “must
consider the sentencing guidelines.” Fullin, 892 A.2d at 848 (citation
omitted). Further, “where the trial court is informed by a PSI [report], it is
presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and
considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion
should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 638
(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
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“A sentencing court may consider any legal factor in determining that a
sentence in the aggravated range should be imposed.” Commonwealth v.
Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). A
sentence that falls within the aggravated range is within the guidelines, and
this Court reviews such a sentence to determine whether the sentence was
“clearly unreasonable,” not merely “unreasonable.” Id. at 1124 (citations
omitted). In reviewing an aggravated range sentence, Bowen noted that it
is “appropriate for a trial court to consider a defendant’s lack of remorse as a
factor at sentencing, provided that it is specifically considered in relation to
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the defendant’s
rehabilitative needs.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
The balancing of the sentencing factors is within the sole province of the
sentencing court, which had the opportunity to observe the defendant and all
witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.
Super. 2023), aff’d, 348 A.3d 133 (Pa. 2025). In conducting appellate review,
this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place
of [the] sentencing court where [the] lower court was fully aware of all
mitigating factors.” Id. (citation omitted).
Following our review of the record, we do not find a “clearly
unreasonable” sentence illustrating an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253; see also Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1124. The record
reflects that the trial court ordered a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to
sentencing. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 5/12/25, at 20, 24-25. Therefore, we
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presume that the trial court was fully aware of the mitigating and aggravating
factors and considered them when imposing Appellant’s sentence. See
Edwards, 194 A.3d at 638; see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. The record
also reflects that the trial court considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, in
addition to other aggravating factors, mitigating factors, and public safety
needs. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 5/12/25 at 25; Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1122.
Ultimately, we conclude that the trial court did not impose a “clearly
unreasonable” sentence for Appellant’s strangulation conviction. See id. at
25-26; Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1122, 1124-25. Accordingly, we will not re-weigh
the trial court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors on appeal.
See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant
is not entitled to relief on his sentencing claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DATE: 11/19/2026
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