Com. v. Artillio, D.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket1125 EDA 2025
JudgeNichols
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-S08040-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DEAN SCOTT ARTILLIO :
:
Appellant : No. 1125 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 4, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0004831-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Appellant Dean Scott Artillio appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his bench trial convictions for stalking, harassment,
terroristic threats, and disorderly conduct.1 On appeal, Appellant argues that
the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation and challenges the timing
of the trial court’s sentence. We affirm.
By way of background, Appellant was charged with multiple offenses
based on allegations that he engaged in a course of conduct involving
harassment and threatening behavior towards his ex-girlfriend, Carol
Holbrook (the Victim). At trial, the Victim testified that she had been dating
Appellant “on and off” since December of 2020. See N.T. Trial, 12/3/25, at
9. She explained that at the end of June in 2021, she and Appellant had a
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709.1(a)(1), 2709(a)(4), 2706(a)(1), and 5503(a)(1),
respectively.
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“falling out” after which Appellant “became a little bit . . . unhinged” as they
tried to resolve issues concerning the return of their respective personal items.
Id. at 10.
After the Victim testified that she had communicated with Appellant via
text messages, defense counsel raised an objection under the best evidence
rule and also claimed that the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation
by failing to provide the defense with a copy of the text messages prior to
trial. Id. at 10. The Commonwealth responded that the case file contained a
notation from a prosecutor who had previously handled the case, indicating
that discovery had been passed to the Public Defender’s office. Id. at 13.2
Ultimately, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objection, but indicated
that it would not “allow the text messages per se to come in”; however, the
court also stated that it would allow the Victim to “testify as to the tenor and
character of the text messages” and that testimony would be subject to cross-
examination. Id. at 13-14. The trial court also granted Appellant’s request
for a brief recess to review the seven-page document containing the
messages. Id. at 13-18.
When trial proceeded, the Victim testified that she eventually blocked
Appellant after she received constant phone calls and text messages from him.
Id. at 23-24. The Victim also stated that Appellant sent her a threatening
____________________________________________
2 The Commonwealth noted that, from 2021 through to trial, Appellant had
been represented by four different attorneys from the Office of the Public
Defender. See N.T. Trial at 13.
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handwritten letter and later approached her in person, at which point he
screamed at her, blocked her car into a parking spot, slammed his fist into
her windshield, and made additional threats of physical violence. Id. at 20-
40.
At the conclusion of the bench trial on December 3, 2024, Appellant was
convicted of all charges. Id. at 124. After a sidebar with counsel, the trial
court indicated that it would schedule sentencing for January 6, 2025, to allow
time for Appellant to update the letters of support that he wished to present
to the trial court. Id. at 125.
On March 31, 2025, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At
the outset of the hearing, Appellant objected to proceeding with the hearing,
as it was being held twenty-nine days after the 90-day deadline set forth in
Pa.R.Crim.P. 704 had passed. N.T. Sentencing, 3/31/25, at 3. In support,
Appellant argued that his case had been “hanging over his head since July of
2021,” which affected his mental health, ability to travel, and the ongoing PFA
with the Victim. Id. at 3-4. Appellant argued that “[w]hile this has been
pending, [he] would be about a third of the way done with first year of any
sort of probationary sentence” that would be imposed. Id. at 4.
The trial court noted that Appellant’s trial was held on December 3,
2024, at which time the trial court had been prepared to proceed directly to
sentencing. Id. at 5. However, the trial court explained that, because
Appellant had requested additional time for the preparation of a mitigation
report, the trial court scheduled sentencing for a later date, which ultimately
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benefited Appellant. Id. The Commonwealth explained that between the trial
and sentencing that Appellant had requested a continuance and, further, the
case had been administratively moved to another judge and then eventually
reassigned to the same judge who had tried Appellant. Id. at 4-5. After
hearing arguments, the trial court concluded that Appellant did not suffer any
prejudice from the additional twenty-nine-day delay and proceeded to
sentencing. Id.
Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of
restrictive probation, including electronic monitoring for ninety days,
probationary supervision, and various special conditions including no contact
with the Victim and compliance with all electronic monitoring and probation
program requirements. Id. at 15-16.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing
Appellant’s claims.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing
the prosecution to offer text messages that it first supplied to
the defense after trial commenced since that evidence
constituted mandatory discovery under Pa.R.Crim.P.
573(B)(1), and its introduction violated [Appellant’s] state and
federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial?
2. Whether the [trial court] erroneously denied the defense’s
motion for dismissal, where it failed to timely impose its
sentence within ninety days of the verdict’s entry, and the
delay without good cause prejudiced [Appellant] and violated
his state and federal due process rights?
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Appellant’s Brief at 5.3
Evidentiary Claim
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth “withheld crucial evidence
that it knew about since July [of] 2021 until after the December 2024 trial was
already in progress, notwithstanding its file note about forwarding unspecified
discovery to a prior lawyer.” Id. at 16. Specifically, Appellant refers to text
messages he exchanged with the Victim and contends that “[t]he
prosecution’s ambush highly prejudiced [him] since his counsel did not have
these text messages and never had a chance to review any of [them], and
they were not provided to [his] office after an inquiry.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Appellant claims that, although the trial court concluded that
Appellant had equal access to the text messages sent from his phone, there
was “insufficient evidence that [Appellant] maintained the texts more than
four years after police filed charges.” Id. at 17. Finally, Appellant asserts
that “the momentary break in the middle of trial was unreasonable and did
not afford defense counsel adequate time to review or investigate the
evidence.” Id. at 19. Therefore, Appellant claims that he is entitled to
discharge or a new trial. Id.
____________________________________________
3 We note that Appellant raised additional claims in his Rule 1925(b) statement
that he does not include in his brief. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/8/25.
Therefore, those claims are abandoned for purposes of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in
the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”).
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“Decisions involving discovery matters are within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error
of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
The rights and duties concerning pretrial discovery in criminal cases are
governed by Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.
(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the
defendant, and subject to any protective order which the
Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the
Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's attorney all
of the following requested items or information, provided
they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth
shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to
inspect and copy or photograph such items.
(b) any written confession or inculpatory statement, or the
substance of any oral confession or inculpatory statement,
and the identity of the person to whom the confession or
inculpatory statement was made that is in the possession or
control of the attorney for the Commonwealth;
* * *
(f) any tangible objects, including documents, photographs,
fingerprints, or other tangible evidence.
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* * *
(D) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If, prior to or during trial,
either party discovers additional evidence or material previously
requested or ordered to be disclosed by it, which is subject to
discovery or inspection under this rule, or the identity of an
additional witness or witnesses, such party shall promptly notify
the opposing party or the court of the additional evidence,
material, or witness.
* * *
(E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the proceedings
it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit
discovery or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit
such party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than
testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1), (D), and (E).
The purpose of the discovery rules is to prevent a ‘trial by ambush’ that
would violate a defendant’s right to due process. Commonwealth v. Ulen,
650 A.2d 416, 418-19 (Pa. 1994) (discussing the prior version of Pa.R.Crim.P.
573). However, this Court has explained that even if the Commonwealth
violates the disclosure requirements of Rule 573,
[t]he trial court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate
remedy for a discovery violation. . . . A defendant seeking relief
from a discovery violation must demonstrate prejudice. A
violation of discovery does not automatically entitle [an] appellant
to a new trial. Rather, [the defendant] must demonstrate how a
more timely disclosure would have affected his trial strategy or
how he was otherwise prejudiced by the alleged late disclosure.
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
omitted and some formatting altered).
In most cases, “a continuance will be an adequate remedy [and] . . .
appropriate where the undisclosed statement or other evidence is admissible
and the defendant’s only prejudice is surprise.” Commonwealth v. Smith,
955 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Further,
this Court has held that, “[w]here the evidence is equally accessible or
inaccessible to both the Commonwealth and the defense, the defense cannot
use the discovery rules against the Commonwealth for its failure to produce
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 647 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court explained:
The [Victim] testified that after blocking [Appellant], she
continued to receive threatening and degrading text messages,
which were persistent in volume and menacing in tone. N.T.,
12/3/25, at 24. The Commonwealth provided screenshots of the
text messages and authenticated them through the [Victim’s]
testimony. [Id.] at 14. She confirmed that she had preserved
the texts on her device and that she had not altered them. [Id.]
at 37. Th[e trial] court recessed to allow defense counsel time to
review the material and subsequently allowed the content into
evidence over objection. [Id.] at 16.
* * *
. . . Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1) requires the Commonwealth to
disclose, upon request, any inculpatory statements and tangible
evidence in its possession that are material to the case. [Rule]
573(D) imposes a continuing duty to disclose newly discovered
material “prior to or during trial. However, the duty only applies
to evidence uniquely within the prosecution’s possession or
knowledge. See [Miller, 172 A. 3d at 647]. Pennsylvania courts
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have made it clear that no discovery violation occurs when the
evidence is not uniquely within the Commonwealth’s control. Id.
As the Superior Court explained: “Where the evidence is equally
accessible to both the Commonwealth and the defense, the
defense cannot use the discovery rules against the
Commonwealth for its failure to produce that evidence.” Id.
In the instant case, testimony was limited to a general description
of the volume and tone of the communications. [Id.] at 13-14.
Th[e trial] court initially overruled the defense’s objection under
the best evidence rule, noting that both parties had equal access
to the messages and that the actual texts had not been offered.
[Id.] at 15. When it later emerged that defense counsel had not
previously seen the screenshots, this court precluded their
admission, offered a recess for review, and limited further
testimony accordingly. [Id.] at 16.
Moreover, because the messages were exchanged between
Appellant and [the Victim], both parties had access to the content.
The record does not establish that the prosecution intentionally
withheld the evidence. Indeed, the messages appear to have
been produced as soon as they became available. That timing
satisfies Rule 573(D)’s continuing disclosure requirement. As in
Miller, when both parties have equal access to the information,
the defense cannot use discovery rules against the
Commonwealth for its failure to produce that evidence. [See]
Miller, 172 A.3d at 647.
Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4, 8 (some formatting altered).
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Santos, 176 A.3d at 882. As noted, even if the
Commonwealth violated Rule 573, Appellant’s claims of surprise and prejudice
do not merit relief. See Brown, 200 A.3d at 993; see also Smith, 955 A.2d
at 395. The fact that Appellant was, or should have been, aware of the text
messages he himself sent to the Victim belies Appellant’s claim of unfair
surprise or ambush. Moreover, Appellant did not request a continuance to
review the additional evidence, and instead requested a brief recess, which
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the trial court allowed. Cf. Smith, 955 A.2d at 395. Lastly, Appellant does
not explain how the timing of the disclosure of the text messages adversely
affected his trial strategy or how he was otherwise prejudiced by the allegedly
late disclosure. See Brown, 200 A.3d at 993. Under these circumstances,
we conclude Appellant has failed to establish that that allegedly late disclosure
of the text messages he exchanged with the Victim constituted reversible error
under Rule 573. See Santos, 176 A.3d at 882. Therefore, he is not entitled
to relief on this issue.
Discretionary Sentencing Claim
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing his sentence 119
days after the verdict, which was twenty-nine days after the deadline for
sentencing set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant
claims that he was prejudiced by the delay, as it “affected his emotional well-
being, restricted his freedom to travel, and impacted related domestic
proceedings.” Id. (some formatting altered). Therefore, Appellant argues
that he was entitled to discharge. See id. at 19.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to deny a speedy sentence
motion for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192
A.3d 184, 192 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our scope of review is limited to the
evidence presented at the hearing on a defendant’s motion for discharge. See
id. at 193.
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
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[T]he delay [in sentencing was due to] a defense-requested
continuance and [changes concerning the original judge’s] court
assignment. Moreover, to the extent the delay is framed as a due
process violation, dismissal was still inappropriate under the
heightened standard requiring a showing of both prejudice and
fundamentally unfair state conduct.
Under Pa.R.Crim.P 704(A)(1), “except as provided by 702(B),
sentence in a court case shall ordinarily be imposed within 90 days
of conviction.” [Rule] 704(A)(2) allows sentencing to occur
beyond that period for good cause shown, provided the judge
includes on the record the specific time period of the extension.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(2).
[Because] Rule 704 itself does not contain a specified remedy, . .
. a violation of Rule 704 does not automatically entitle an appellant
to discharge. In Anders, [our Supreme] Court explained that
discharge is warranted “only if the appellant can demonstrate that
the delay in sentencing is prejudicial. Commonwealth v.
Anders, [725 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. 1999)]. The [Anders] Court
emphasized that prejudice is not presumed, and courts must
assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
violation occurred. Id. at [173]. Factors in that analysis include
the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and whether
the appellant suffered actual prejudice as a result. See also
Commonwealth v. Lee, [440 A.2d 574, 596 (Pa. Super. 1982)]
(delay “condemned,” but harmless where no prejudice shown).
Furthermore, when a delay is framed as a violation of due process,
the burden is even greater. . . . [See Anders, 725 A.2d at 171
(reiterating that “[n]ot only must the appellant prove his cause
was prejudiced by the delay, but he must also prove that the
state’s action in causing or allowing the delay was ‘fundamentally
unfair,’ not merely undesirable, in order to establish a due process
violation” (citation omitted))].
In this case, sentencing occurred 119 days after the December 3,
2024, bench trial, which exceeds the presumptive ninety-day
timeline set by Rule 704(A)(1). N.T., 3/31/2025, at 3. Defense
counsel objected on the record and cited Anders, arguing that the
delay caused prejudice to Appellant’s mental health, freedom of
movement, and general well-being. [Id.] at 4. While the defense
did raise the issue of prejudice, their argument did not fully apply
the Rule 704 framework because it failed to analyze the reasons
for delay and did not meaningfully address the totality of the
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circumstances, an essential component of the Anders test.
Anders, [725 A.2d at 173].
Specifically, the record confirms this court was ready to sentence
immediately following the bench trial. N.T., 3/31/2025, at 5.
However, a significant portion of the delay was due to a defense-
requested continuance to allow time for a mitigation report. Id.
This constitutes good cause on the record, expressly contemplated
by Rule 704(A)(2). An additional short delay resulted from a
neutral judicial reassignment, a factor wholly outside either
party’s control. Th[e trial] court [judge] experienced a crossover
from criminal judicial practice to civil, and the case was reassigned
to the Honorable Judge Kr[u]ll. [Id.] at 4. However, this [matter]
was reassigned back to this [trial] court [judge] to ensure
sentencing continuity. This reflects administrative necessity, not
prosecutorial misconduct or strategic delay. Th[e trial] court
found that Appellant did not suffer actual, case-impairing
prejudice as required under Anders. He was not subject to
supervision during the delay and suffered no harm to his legal
position. In fact, . . . Appellant may have benefited by avoiding
early imposition of sentence or monitoring conditions. [Id.] at 5.
Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (some formatting altered).
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Neysmith, 192
A.3d at 192. Although Appellant claimed that he was prejudiced by the
sentencing delay, he did not address the factors set forth by our Supreme
Court’s decision in Anders. See N.T. 3/31/2025 at 4; see also Anders, 725
A.2d at 171 (reiterating that “[n]ot only must the appellant prove his cause
was prejudiced by the delay, but he must also prove that the state’s action in
causing or allowing the delay was ‘fundamentally unfair,’ not merely
undesirable, in order to establish a due process violation”) (emphasis
added). Therefore, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 11/19/2026
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