Full Opinion

J-S26025-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAY HUFF : : Appellant : No. 785 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 5, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001123-2023 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 Appellant Jay Huff appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for exceeding maximum speed limits and careless driving.1 Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders/Santiago brief.2 After careful review, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence. On May 5, 2025, after a non-jury trial where the trial court convicted Appellant of exceeding maximum speed limits and careless driving.3 The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fines and costs. See Verdict Order, ____________________________________________ 1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(3), and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a), respectively. 2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009) 3 The trial court acquitted Appellant of driving under the influence of a controlled substance. See Verdict Order, 3/25/25. J-S26025-26 3/25/25; Sentencing Order, 5/5/25. The charges stemmed from a traffic stop on July 23, 2022 on State Route 61 in Mount Carmel Township. See N.T. Trial, 3/25/25, at 5-6. Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Aaron Brown testified at trial that he observed and followed a dark colored Chevrolet truck traveling at a high rate of speed after making a right-hand turn onto State Route 61. See id. Trooper Brown, using his speedometer, testified to clocking Appellant’s vehicle traveling 55 miles per hour in a 40 miles per hour zone after trailing the vehicle for three-tenths of a mile. See id. at 6. The speedometer’s accuracy and calibration testing certification was provided by the Commonwealth. See id. at 6-7. Trooper Brown testified that he then engaged his emergency lights, initiated the traffic stop, and conducted multiple sobriety and impairment-related field tests and observed multiple indicators of impairment. See id. at 7, 10, 15-16. For example, Appellant’s hands were shaking uncontrollably when handing over requested documents; Appellant’s eyes appearing dilated, watery, and bloodshot; Appellant was unable to maintain his balance; and Appellant had eyelid and leg tremors. See id. at 8, 10-12, 14-16. Trooper Brown then placed Appellant under arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence. See id. Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw On appeal, Counsel filed an Anders/Santiago brief with this Court. “When faced with a purported Anders[/Santiago] brief, this Court may not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d -2- J-S26025-26 379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the technical requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant of the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). In an Anders/Santiago brief, counsel must set forth the issues that the defendant wishes to raise and any other claims necessary to effectuate appellate presentation of those issues. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005). Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established in Santiago, namely: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly -3- J-S26025-26 frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Here, Counsel complied with the procedural requirements by filing a petition to withdraw, providing Appellant with a letter via email explaining his appellate rights, informing Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with private counsel, and supplying Appellant with a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief. See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290; see also Counsel’s Ltr., 3/21/26; Counsel’s Appl. to Withdraw, 3/21/26, at 1. Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief also includes a summary of the relevant facts and procedural history, identifies two claims Appellant wished to raise on appeal, refers to portions of the record that might arguably support Appellant’s claims, a review of those claims, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361; see also Anders/Santiago Brief at 4-13. Accordingly, Counsel has met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. We now proceed to address the issues identified in Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief. On appeal, Counsel identifies the following issues: 1. Whether the verdict of the [trial court] is supported by sufficient evidence? 2. Whether the verdict of the [trial court] is against the weight of the evidence? -4- J-S26025-26 Anders/Santiago Brief at 3. Sufficiency of Evidence The first potential claim that Counsel identifies on appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 6. Ultimately, Counsel concludes that this claim is frivolous. See id. at 11-12. Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. A challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence presents a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 347 A.3d 689, 699 (Pa. Super. 2025). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, drawing all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth’s favor, to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). In applying this test, we may not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014). Section 3362(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code prohibits a person from driving a vehicle at a speed in excess of any posted speed limit. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(3); see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(b) (setting forth requirements for posted speed limits). Here, Trooper Brown testified that a speedometer reading confirmed that Appellant drove over the speed limit. See N.T. Trial, -5- J-S26025-26 3/25/25, at 6-7. Specifically, Trooper Brown observed Appellant driving 55 miles per hour in an area in which the posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour. See id. at 6. The offense of careless driving occurs when a defendant “drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714. Generally, “a police officer who has perceived a defendant’s appearance and [conduct] is competent to express an opinion as to [a defendant’s] state. . . and [their] ability to safely drive a vehicle.” See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223, 228 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted and some formatting altered). In addition to observing Appellant driving in excess of the speed limit as described above, Trooper Brown observed Appellant’s hands shaking uncontrollably, the presence of leg and eyelid tremors, dilated, watery, bloodshot eyes, as well as a general inability to maintain balance. See N.T. Trial, 3/25/25 at 8, 10-12, 14-16. Following our review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that Appellant’s sufficiency challenge to both convictions has no merit. See Boyer, 347 A.3d at 699; Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751; Cahill, 95 A.3d at 300. For the reasons stated above, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant convictions of maximum speed limits and careless driving. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3362(a)(3), 3714(a); Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 885 A.2d 1025, 1026- 1027; Palmer, 751 A.2d at 228. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief. -6- J-S26025-26 Weight of the Evidence The second potential claim that Counsel identifies on appeal is a challenge to the weight of the evidence. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 6. Ultimately, Counsel concludes that this claim is frivolous. See id. at 11-12. Preliminarily, a defendant raising a challenge to the weight of the evidence must raise the claim with the trial judge in the first action. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). “An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim.” See Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted). Here, Appellant claims that “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.” See Anders/Santiago Brief at 6. Our review confirms that Appellant nor Counsel preserved a challenge to the weight of the evidence by filing either a written motion before sentencing or a post-sentence motion. Additionally, our review of the sentencing hearing transcript confirms that a weight challenge was not raised orally prior to sentencing. Therefore, Appellant failed to preserve a weight claim for appellate review and it is, accordingly, waived and, therefore, frivolous. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)- (3); see Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (concluding that waiver renders a claim frivolous on direct appeal). After our review of the record, we agree with Counsel’s determination that Appellant’s claims challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence would be frivolous. Additionally, our independent review of the record does -7- J-S26025-26 not reveal any additional non-frivolous issues that Appellant could raise on direct appeal. See Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250; see also Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291. For these reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/22/2026 -8-