Com. v. Rawls, M.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket788 EDA 2025
JudgeNichols
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A17020-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MACHI RAWLS :
:
Appellant : No. 788 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 26, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004566-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Appellant Machi Rawls appeals from a judgment of sentence convicting
him of two counts of robbery, two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery,
and one count of carrying a firearm without a license. 1 Appellant challenges
the denial of his decertification motion by the trial court, which was entered
by Hon. Barbara A. McDermott.2 Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial
court displayed bias and prejudice, relied upon ex parte inadmissible evidence,
and failed to consider that Appellant established that public interest would be
served by a transfer. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided a thorough review of the facts in this matter:
On May 11, 2024, at around 3:50 p.m., [Appellant, age 17], along
with his three co-defendants, robbed two juveniles at gunpoint on
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1); 903; and 6106(a)(1), respectively.
2 We note that Judge McDermott passed away on August 11, 2026.
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the SEPTA “L” train near 2600 Kensington Avenue in Philadelphia.
The defendants, all masked, surrounded the fourteen and fifteen-
years-old juveniles and stole their sneakers, a sweatshirt, and a
ski-mask hat. The juveniles reported the incident to the police,
and within an hour, [Appellant] and his co-defendants were
caught with the stolen property. [Appellant] had a 9mm handgun
in his possession at the time of his arrest.
On October 22, 2024, [Appellant] appeared before [the trial court]
for a decertification hearing. Prior to this hearing, [the trial court]
had reviewed materials submitted by the defense. At that time,
[the trial court] was informed that the Commonwealth was
agreeing to remand the case to juvenile court. [The trial court]
felt that it needed more information about the [Appellant] in order
to accept the agreement. Defense counsel permitted the [trial
court] to discuss the incident with [Appellant], during which he
admitted that robbing the two juveniles was an impulsive decision.
[Appellant] told the [trial court] that he had a good support
system, and his prior placement taught him how to do the right
thing. However, [Appellant] blamed his behavior that day on his
peers, claiming that they didn’t have his best interest. [The trial
court] held the matter under advisement for further thought.
At the next case listing on November 27, 2024, [the trial court]
was notified telephonically that there had been an incident
between [Appellant] and a deputy sheriff at the prison and that
[Appellant] would be late arriving to court. [Appellant] had
appeared at the prison processing unit without wearing his
mandatory identification wristband and had hidden unpermitted
clothing on his person. The deputy sheriff described [Appellant]
as highly combative. While waiting for [Appellant] to arrive, [the
trial court] offered to have the deputy sheriff testify under oath to
the specifics of the incident. Both sides declined. When
[Appellant] appeared in court, he acknowledged that he was not
wearing his wristband and was breaking the rules, but attempted
to justify his decision as a mere misunderstanding. Rather than
proceed with the decertification hearing at that moment, the [trial
court] continued it for six weeks.
On January 7, 2025, after a hearing [the trial court] denied
decertification.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 1 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).
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On February 26, 2025, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of
robbery, two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, and carrying a firearm
without a license. Appellant was sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-
three months of incarceration followed by two years of probation. Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal and both Appellant and the trial court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues:
1. Did a trial judge improperly refuse to recuse herself from
presiding over a decertification hearing after she had
engaged in plea bargain negotiations with the parties, had
multiple conversations with [Appellant], learned ex parte of
prejudicial information regarding [Appellant]'s conduct
while in custody, rejected the tendered negotiated plea
bargain, and made a pre-determination regarding her ruling
on the decertification motion?
2. Did the lower court improperly deny Appellant's motion to
decertify his case to the Family Court, Juvenile Division,
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322 because the court considered and
significantly relied upon inadmissible and non-record
evidence involving Appellant's statements made during his
plea discussions, and vague, unsubstantiated, and non-
record hearsay evidence that Appellant engaged in violence
while in adult custody; in violation of Pa.R.E. 410, his right
to silence under the Fifth Amendment and Article 1 Section
9, and his state and federal due process rights?
3. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying transfer
because the evidence compellingly demonstrated that his
decertification would serve the public interest where the
Commonwealth did not present evidence disputing
Appellant's position?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).
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First, we must address whether Appellant’s guilty plea waives his right
to appeal the denial of his decertification. We have previously held that “[t]he
issue of certification between the juvenile and criminal divisions is
jurisdictional and, therefore, not waivable.” See Commonwealth v.
Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we find that Appellant’s claims are not waived.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for recusal because the trial court displayed bias and prejudice
towards Appellant. See Appellant’s Brief at 25. Specifically, Appellant
references multiple comments that the trial court made throughout the
decertification hearing demanding that Appellant convince the trial judge that
he has “‘gotten it,’ accepts responsibility for ‘what [he has] done’ and that
he’s ‘earned the right to have [a spot in the juvenile facility] versus a spot in
prison.’” See id. at 26 (citing N.T. Hr’g, 10/22/24, at 10, 16). Additionally,
Appellant believes that the trial court was prejudiced against him, due to its
reliance upon statements made by the sheriff’s department “about supposed
conduct occurring at the adult prison on November 27, 2024.” See id. at 41-
42. Appellant highlights that the trial court interrupted Appellant’s counsel to
insert the sheriff’s department version of events. See id. Appellant claims
that none of the statements were “properly entered into the record, and
counsel specifically objected to it.” Id. at 42.
We have previously held that:
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Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to recuse is for
an abuse of discretion. The standards for recusal take into
account a subjective determination of the trial court regarding its
ability to preside impartially and an objective, community-based
determination of the trial court that its involvement would not
create the appearance of impropriety.
The standards for recusal are well established. It is the burden of
the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing
bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as
to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. In considering a
recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious
determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an
impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome.
The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued
involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety
and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist
can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and
dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will
not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion. In
reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, we recognize that
our judges are honorable, fair and competent.
We assume that a jurist will possess interests and relationships
that might conceivably influence their judgment but, in the normal
course of events, the mere presence of an interest or relationship
that could theoretically affect a judicial decision does not create a
presumption of partiality.
Rather, recusal is required wherever there is substantial doubt
as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. A jurist's
impartiality is called into question whenever there are factors or
circumstances that may reasonably question the jurist's
impartiality in the matter. Thus, in order for the integrity of the
judiciary to be compromised, we have held that a judge's behavior
is not required to rise to a level of actual prejudice, but the
appearance of impropriety is sufficient. In this regard, the
appearance of impropriety sufficient to disqualify a judge exists
when a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably
question the court's impartiality.
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Commonwealth v. Martin, 360 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations
omitted and some formatting altered).
We have also held that:
Not establishing bias or partiality . . . are expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are
within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after
having been confirmed as [ ] judges, sometimes display. A
judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern
and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration—remain immune.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 61 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis
removed).
Here, the trial court explained:
As [Appellant’s] counsel was aware, after parties reach an
agreement and prior to [the trial court] accepting an agreement,
[the trial court] will frequently have a conversation with the
juvenile to in order to better assess the juvenile’s credibility and
to learn if the juvenile has matured from the time between his
arrest and the hearing. [Appellant] offers no evidence to
substantiate the claim that [the trial court] was prejudiced by its
conversations with the [Appellant], or that the conversations
would impact on [the trial court]’s ability to preside impartially
over the decertification hearing.
[Appellant]’s allegation that [the trial court] was prejudiced after
it learned of [Appellant]’s confrontation with a deputy sheriff is
meritless. Upon learning of [Appellant]’s poor conduct at the
prison, [the trial court] did not reject the negotiated agreement
and did not rule on the decertification motion. Instead, [the trial
court] continued the matter to a later date, which allowed the
court to further deliberate and provided ample time for
[Appellant’s] counsel to challenge the sheriff’s department’s
narrative of events following [Appellant]’s inconsistent account of
the incident.
[Appellant] offers no evidence to support his claim that [the trial
court] prejudged [Appellant]’s amenability to treatment or
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predetermined the disposition of the decertification motion. [The
trial court] initially mistakenly believed that the hearing had
already occurred because of its previous conversations with
[Appellant] and prior review of [Appellant]’s mitigation
documents. When brought to [the trial court]’s attention, [the
trial court] immediately realized that the hearing had not occurred
and then proceeded to hear all evidence and argument in an
objective manner.
[The trial court] duly denied [Appellant]’s motion to recuse after
it determined that it was capable of impartially presiding over the
decertification hearing, and that [the trial court]’s continued
involvement would not create the appearance of impropriety or
risk public confidence in the judiciary. [Appellant] fails to offer
any evidence to the contrary.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 3-4 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).
Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. See Martin, 360 A.3d
at 961. As the trial court stated, it
initially mistakenly believed that the hearing had already occurred
because of its previous conversations with [Appellant] and prior
review of [Appellant]’s mitigation documents. When brought to
[the trial court]’s attention, the court immediately realized that
the hearing had not occurred and then proceeded to hear all
evidence and argument in an objective manner.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 4 (citation omitted). We find that the trial court’s
expressions “of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” are
“within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been
confirmed as [] judges, sometimes display.” See Kearney, 92 A.3d at 61.
For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to recuse. See Martin, 360 A.3d at 961; Kearney, 92
A.3d at 61.
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Next, Appellant argues that the trial court’s “[reliance] on improper facts
and factors in making her determination under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322 requires
reversal.” Appellant’s Brief at 46 (formatting altered). Appellant argues that
“consideration of inadmissible evidence and improper factors is an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 47. Appellant contends that once the hearing started, his
counsel “moved in the only evidence of record.” Id. at 49. Appellant states
that this did “not include any notes from previous hearings or affidavits or
testimony from prison or court officials.” Id. Appellant highlights that when
the psychologist stated that Appellant “is low risk for future violence,” the trial
court interjected stating “How can he be low risk when he engaged in violence
in the prison?” Id.; see also N.T., 1/7/25 at 20. Appellant also claims that
during the trial court’s findings and conclusions, the trial court referred to what
happened at the prison as one of her reasons for denying the decertification.
Id. at 50. Appellant contends that “none of this ‘evidence’ was properly before
the court” and should not be considered. Id. Appellant also argues that the
comments made violate the “Rule of Evidence 410, the Fifth Amendment, and
Pennsylvania case law.” Id. at 34. Appellant contends that the comments
made during the decertification hearing violated Pa.R.E 410 because
“statements made during plea discussions were inadmissible against him at
the transfer hearing.” Id. Appellant claims that the discussions on October
22 and November 27 “were made during a proceeding in which the parties
were seeking the court’s acceptance of the tendered plea under Pa.R.Crim.P.
590.” Id. at 35. Appellant admits that the “plea would not ultimately have
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been entered by [the trial court], [the trial court] had to accept the agreement
to enter a transfer order without a formal hearing.” Id. Appellant explains
that he only talked to the trial court “solely for the purpose of trying to
convince her to accept the plea.” Id. Appellant also contends that the “Fifth
Amendment and Article 1 Section 9 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution [] bar
admission and consideration of the statements at the transfer hearing.” Id.
at 36. Appellant argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
“a defendant’s right to silence operates to preclude a court at a transfer
hearing from considering whether the minor expresses remorse or otherwise
refuses to comment on his case.” Id. (referring to Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 230 A.3d 1050, 1071 (Pa. 2020).
The Commonwealth contends the trial court’s discussion with Appellant
did not violate Pa.R.E. 410 because the statements were not made “during
the course of a plea negotiation or guilty plea hearing.” Commonwealth’s Brief
at 12. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s Fifth
Amendment rights were not violated because Appellant was “not compelled
by the court to admit guilt.” Id. at 13. Furthermore, the Commonwealth
contends that the “record demonstrates that [Appellant] willingly participated
in discussions with the [trial court]” and was not forced into answering the
trial court’s questions. Id.
We have previously held that:
Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be overturned
absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or
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overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable
judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some
formatting altered and citations omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 410(a)(3) states:
In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not
admissible against the defendant who made the plea or
participated in the plea discussions: . . . (3) a statement made in
the course of any proceedings under Rule 311, 409, 414, 424,
550, or 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a comparable
rule or procedure of another state. . .
Pa.R.E. 410(a)(3).
The trial court explained:
[Appellant] offers no evidence to substantiate the allegation that
[the trial court] improperly relied upon [Appellant]’s statements
made regarding the proposed agreement. Although the parties
proposed a negotiated plea agreement, by which [Appellant]
would plead guilty in Family Court in exchange for a two year
placement, it is always [the trial court]’s obligation to evaluate
whether the agreement serves the interests of justice.
[Appellant]’s allegation that [the trial court] considered non-
record evidence is unfounded, as the defense accepted the
information conveyed to them. [The trial court] deliberately did
not decide whether to accept the negotiated plea agreement after
it learned of [Appellant]’s combative and disruptive behavior at
the prison, instead continued the matter. At no point did
[Appellant] avail himself of the opportunity to challenge the
narrative provided by the Sheriff’s Department.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25 at 5 (citations omitted and formatting altered).
Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. See Ramos, 920 A.2d at 1257. We agree with the
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Commonwealth that Appellant’s reliance on Pa.R.E. 410 is misguided as the
statements were not made during a plea negotiation or guilty plea hearing.
Rather, the statements were made during a decertification hearing.
Furthermore, Appellant has not provided this Court with any case law showing
that Pa.R.E. 410 applies to decertification hearings. For these reasons, we
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See id.
Lastly, Appellant argues that he “[d]emonstrated through his evidence
that he was amendable to treatment and transfer would serve the public
interest.” Appellant’s Brief at 51. Appellant highlights that he was “the only
party to present evidence as the Commonwealth declined to introduce
additional evidence or call any witnesses.” Id. Additionally, he presented
letters of support, “but also a detailed psychosocial evaluation which showed
him to be low risk of future violence and amendable to rehabilitation.” Id.
Appellant contends that the report showed that he accepted responsibility for
his actions and that he had a supportive mother who was “willing to involve
herself in these treatments.” Id. at 52. Appellant also claimed that he
attended the Institute for the Development of African American Youth’s
program3 and “fully engaged and a became a teen leader.” Id. Appellant
highlights that he only attended “one short stint of therapy when attending
the IDAAY program.” Id. Appellant also gained technical training certificates
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3 The Institute for the Development of African American Youth’s (IDAAY)
Don’t Fall Down in the Hood” program, includes “community service,
roundtable discussions on youth and gun violence, anger management
treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 7-8.
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and applied to attend the Community College of Philadelphia. Id. Appellant
contends that the “court’s analysis is weak and ignores the evidence actually
presented and the requirements of Section 6355.” Id. at 53. Appellant argues
that the evidence actually presented “overwhelmingly favor[s] transfer to
juvenile court.” Id. (some formatting altered).
We have previously held that:
Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be overturned
absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or
overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable
judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will.
Ramos, 920 A.2d at 1257 (citation omitted and some formatting altered ).
A juvenile may request treatment through the juvenile system through
the transfer process of decertification. Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 10 A.3d
336, 338 (Pa. Super. 2010); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322(a). “It is well established that
a juvenile seeking decertification has the burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence that the transfer to juvenile court is
warranted.” Ramos, 920 A.2d at 1258 (citations omitted). “[The trial] court
shall consider the factors contained in section 6355(a)(4)(iii)” in order to
determine whether the juvenile has satisfied his or her burden of “establishing
that the transfer will serve the public interest[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322(a). The
factors include:
(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
(B) the impact of the offense on the community;
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(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed
by the child;
(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly
committed by the child;
(E) the degree of the child's culpability;
(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives
available under this chapter and in the adult criminal justice
system; and
(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or
rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following factors:
(I) age;
(II) mental capacity;
(III) maturity;
(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
child;
(V) previous records, if any;
(VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent history,
including the success or failure of any previous attempts by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child;
(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;
(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
(IX) any other relevant factors;
42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A)-(G).
Furthermore,
Although the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court
consider all of the amenability factors, it is silent as to the weight
that should be assessed to each factor. The ultimate decision of
whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the
sole discretion of a decertification court. A decertification court
must consider all the facts set forth in § 6355 of the Juvenile Act,
but it need not address, [] the applicability and importance of each
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factor and fact in reaching its final determination. . . The
presumption in this Commonwealth remains that if a court has
facts in its possession, it will apply them.
Ruffin, 10 A.3d at 339 (citations omitted and some formatting altered.
The trial court explained:
After carefully considering and weighing all the required factors,
including [Appellant]’s psychological evaluation, psycho-social
summary, medical records, letters of support, and the preliminary
hearing notes, [the trial court] determined that decertification
would not serve the public interest.
Previous attempts by the juvenile system to rehabilitate
[Appellant] failed. [Appellant] was arrested and adjudicated
delinquent in August of 2022 for possession of a firearm by a
minor (“VUFA 6110.1”), carrying a firearm on the public street in
Philadelphia (“VUFA 6108”), possession of instrument of a crime
with intent (“PIC”), firearms not to carried without a license
(“VUFA 6106”), conspiracy-VUFA 6106, as well as intentional
possession of a controlled substance. [Appellant] was
subsequently held at the JJSC from August 29, 2022 until
December 8, 2022, when he was released on probation with GPS
monitoring, to be supervised by the Violence Prevention Probation
(VPP) Unit, which provides specialized supervision for juveniles
with firearms-related offenses. [Appellant] returned to the JJSC
just three months later following a violation of probation after
testing positive for marijuana, and was held from March 3, 2023,
until April 5, 2023.
[Appellant] consistently neglected his academic commitments
throughout his probation. He struggled with completing his work
and incurred a poor attendance record. When he did attend
school, [Appellant] often arrived late or left early without
permission. According to [Appellant]’s Individualized Education
Program, while [Appellant] was on probation, [Appellant] was not
on track to be promoted to the next grade in school as a result of
his persistent disregard for his schooling.
The programming offered through the juvenile system failed to
rehabilitate [Appellant], and [Appellant] offered [the trial court]
no reason to believe that he would now be amendable to
treatment. While on probation, he was given the benefit of
participating in programming through the Institute for the
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Development of African American Youth’s (IDAAY) Don’t Fall Down
in the Hood” program, including community service, roundtable
discussions on youth and gun violence, anger management
treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment.
Despite the programming, and despite the specialized supervision
for firearm-related offenses, [Appellant] quickly returned to
criminal activity. In fact, after being on probation for
approximately one year and five months, just four months later,
[Appellant] chose to engage in a violent crime, with others, on a
public subway train.
[Appellant] completed his probation in January of 2024 and was
arrested on May 11, 2024, after he coordinated with three others
to mask-up, surround two juveniles, and rob them while riding
public transportation. [Appellant]’s actions traumatized the two
juvenile victims, fourteen-and fifteen-year old cousins, who were
riding the SEPTA train to meet their friends that day. He
threatened the lives of every person riding the SEPTA train, any
of whom could have been shot and killed if the gun was used, if
the juveniles tried to defend themselves, or if anyone on the
trained intervened in the incident. [Appellant] was given the
opportunity to understand how dangerous guns are and the
harmful impacts of gun violence on individuals and the
community. Yet, [Appellant] completely ignored all the
programming and immediately obtained a gun following the
completion of his probation.
The duration of supervision by the juvenile system would have
been insufficient for rehabilitating [Appellant]. When [Appellant]
appeared before [the trial court] for his decertification hearing he
was already eighteen years old. [The trial court] was convinced
that [Appellant] would need more than three years of treatment
in the juvenile system to rehabilitate him given the total failure of
previous efforts by the juvenile system and the escalation in
[Appellant]’s behavior. While [the trial court] was considering
decertification, which [Appellant] knew, he chose to defy authority
and break the rules by not wearing his wristband at the prison and
bringing unpermitted clothing to court.
[The trial court] had no reason to believe [Appellant] would
benefit from the special features and programs of the juvenile
system. [Appellant] endangered the lives of the victims and
community members and threatened public safety by committing
his crimes on a SEPTA train in the middle of the afternoon. Prior
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attempts by the juvenile system to rehabilitate [Appellant] failed,
and there was inadequate time for treatment to rehabilitate
[Appellant]. Accordingly, [the trial court] determined that
transferring [Appellant] to the juvenile system would not serve
the public interest and duly denied decertification.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25 at 6-9 (some formatting altered).
Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s decertification. Ramos, 920 A.2d
at 1257. The record reflects that the trial court properly considered the
statutory factors and demonstrated understanding of the expert evidence
presented by the parties. The trial court highlighted that the previous
attempts to rehabilitate the Appellant failed, which is a factor that courts may
consider. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A)-(G). Specifically, the trial court
highlighted that Appellant attended the IDAAY program during probation and
four months later returned to criminal activity. Appellant argues that the
factors “overwhelmingly favor transfer to juvenile court”, however the weight
to be assigned to each of the statutory factors is reserved for the
decertification’s court’s discretion. Ruffin, 10 A.3d at 339. For these reasons,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s motion to transfer this case to juvenile court. Ramos, 920 A.2d
at 1257; Ruffin, 10 A.3d at 339.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Date: 11/19/2026
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