D. Peak v. PPB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Darnell Peak, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 954 C.D. 2025 : Pennsylvania Parole Board, : Submitted: July 24, 2026 Respondent : OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: October 26, 2026 Darnell Peak (Petitioner) pro se petitions this Court for review and remand of the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s (Board) decision mailed on June 26, 2025. Therein, the Board denied Petitioner’s request for administrative relief from its April 8, 2025 decision (mailed April 16, 2025), which recommitted him as a convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve twelve months’ backtime,1 recalculated his maximum sentence date, and denied him credit for time spent at liberty on parole.2 After careful review, we affirm the Board’s decision. I. Factual and Procedural Background On February 19, 2019, Petitioner was convicted of drug charges in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and sentenced to a period of three to six 1 “Backtime” is defined as “the unserved part of a prison sentence which a convict would have been compelled to serve if the convict had not been paroled.” Section 61.1 of the Board’s regulations, 37 Pa. Code § 61.1. 2 The time a parolee spends at liberty on parole is also referred to as “street time.” Dorsey v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 854 A.2d 994, 996 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). years’ incarceration. His original maximum sentence date was January 25, 2026. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 1-3.) On February 1, 2023, Petitioner was released on parole. Id. at 6. On January 31, 2023, he signed a document informing him that “[i]f you are convicted of a crime committed while on parole/reparole, the Board has the authority, after an appropriate hearing, to recommit you to serve the balance of the sentence or sentences which you were serving when parole/reparole with no credit for time at liberty on parole.” Id. at 8. On April 13, 2024, Petitioner was arrested in Allegheny County and charged with various offenses, including Receiving Stolen Property, Evading Arrest or Detention on Foot, and Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Officer. Id. at 17, 19. On the same day, the Department of Corrections (DOC) issued a warrant to commit and detain him. Id. at 16. Bail was set in the amount of $20,000, which was not posted. Id. at 47. On June 24, 2024, the Board issued a decision to detain Petitioner pending disposition of the new criminal charges arising from his April 13, 2024 arrest. Id. at 17. Petitioner was found guilty in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas of receiving stolen property, and evading arrest and attempting to elude an officer and was sentenced to an aggregate of eighteen (18) months’ probation on February 27, 2025. Id. at 44, 45, 48. On March 24, 2025, the Board issued a Notice of Charges and Hearing to Petitioner setting forth his new convictions. Id. at 19. A parole revocation hearing was conducted on March 31, 2025. At the hearing, Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, admitted to the new convictions. Id. at 21, 29, 35, 61, 66. When asked at the hearing about his adjustment while on parole, Petitioner stated that he was “mad at myself for putting myself back in this predicament . . . .” Id. at 38. He further stated that he knew his supervision history wasn’t good the last time he was on parole, but that he made strides this time to become a better person. Id. at 39. In addition, he testified that during his most recent period of parole, he had gotten a job and kept it. 2 Id. When the Hearing Examiner asked Petitioner if he had anything else he wished to say before the hearing record closed, he responded that he did not. Id. at 41. On April 8, 2025, the Board issued a decision that recommitted Petitioner as a CPV to serve a recommitment period of twelve months. The Board noted that in making its decision, it had relied on the testimony of Agent McConnell, the stand-in parole agent, Petitioner’s testimony and his acknowledgment of the convictions, as well as all state and defense exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing. Id. at 88. The Board’s decision also stated that it was denying him credit for the time he was at liberty on parole because he had a “history of supervision failures.” Id. at 89. Petitioner appealed the Board’s decision by filing an Administrative Remedies Form which the Board received on May 8, 2025. Id. at 90-95. Specifically, Petitioner alleged in his appeal that (1) the Board’s decision to not award him credit for time spent at liberty on parole constituted an abuse of discretion, (2) the Board denied him his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause by not having his parole agent, Agent Baldonieri, present at his revocation hearing while relying on a report authored by Agent Baldonieri, and (3) his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to hearsay evidence presented at his revocation hearing. Id. at 91-93, 94. In its response to Petitioner’s request for administrative relief, issued on June 26, 2025, the Board denied his request and affirmed its April 8, 2025 recommitment decision. The Board’s response stated as follows: The Board has the statutory authority to recalculate the max dates of CPVs to reflect that they received no credit for time spent at liberty on parole. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2). The Board advised you of this potential penalty on the parole conditions you signed on January 31, 2023. You also had constructive notice of this penalty via the statute. Additionally, the ability to challenge the recalculation decision after it is imposed satisfies your due process rights. As such, the recalculation of your max date does not violate any constitutional 3  provisions, including Double Jeopardy. Young v. Commonwealth, 409 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1979). The decision on whether to grant or deny a CPV credit for time at liberty on parole is purely a matter of discretion. The Prisons and Parole Code [(Parole Code)] authorizes the Board to grant or deny credit for time at liberty on parole for certain criminal offenses. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pittman [v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 159 A.3d 466 (Pa. 2017),] the Board must articulate a basis for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on parole. In this case, the Board articulated that you were denied such credit because you have a history of supervision failure(s) in Probation and/or Parole that warrant denying credit for time at liberty on parole. You are currently serving your second institution number. You were paroled on two occasions, and have one prior recommit as a CPV. You incurred a new felony conviction that involved fleeing from the police. Thus, the reason provided for denying you credit for the time spent at liberty on parole is sufficient. .... You claim that you had ineffective hearing counsel because you say the [a]ttorney did not object to the report made by Agent Baldonieri. Your claim is insufficient to substantiate a finding of ineffective counsel. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, you must show: (a) that your counsel made errors so serious that he/she was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed under law AND (b) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced your defense. Prejudice means there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Your claim that counsel was ineffective does not establish the necessary prejudice in this case. Id. at 96-98. 4  On July 28, 2025, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court. II. Issues Petitioner raises three issues for our review. First, he argues that the Board abused its discretion by not awarding him credit for time he spent at liberty on parole. Second, he maintains that at his revocation hearing, the Board denied him his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his Counsel was ineffective at his parole revocation hearing because Counsel did not object to a report authored by his parole officer, Agent Baldonieri, which allegedly contained hearsay. He contends that the report was hearsay because Agent Baldonieri did not attend the hearing and the report was presented at the hearing by a stand-in parole officer, Agent McConnell. III. Discussion A. Whether the Board Erred When it Denied Petitioner Credit for his Time Spent at Liberty on Parole On appeal,3 Petitioner maintains that the Board abused its discretion by not following the rules set forth in Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code, and by not following the decisions in Pittman and Young when it denied him credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole. (Petitioner’s Br., at 6-7.) In response, the Board asserts that the Board based its decision in Petitioner’s case on substantial evidence entered at the revocation hearing. (Board’s Br., at 5.) 3 Our review is limited to determining whether the Board erred as a matter of law, made findings unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Fisher v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 62 A.2d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). When presented with a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Pittman, 159 A.3d at 473. 5  In determining whether an abuse of discretion has been committed by a tribunal, our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the [tribunal] has made ‘not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.’” Moss v. SCI-Mahanoy Superintendent Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1133 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code “unambiguously grants the Board discretion to award credit to a CPV recommitted to serve the remainder of his sentence,” subject to certain enumerated exceptions. Plummer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 216 A.3d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (Plummer II) (quoting Pittman, 159 A.3d at 473). This provision states, in relevant part, as follows: (2.1) The Board may, in its discretion, award credit to an offender recommitted under paragraph (2) for the time spent at liberty on parole, unless any of the following apply: (i) The crime committed during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole is a crime of violence or a crime listed under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to the registration of sexual offenders) or I (relating to continued registration of sexual offenders). (ii) The offender was recommitted under section 6143 (relating to early parole of offenders subject to Federal removal order). 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a) (2.1) (i)-(ii) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). There are two listed exceptions to the Board’s discretion to award credit. As Petitioner notes, neither of these exceptions apply in his case. Petitioner appears to misunderstand the language of this provision of the Parole Code. While the statute allows the Board, in its discretion, to award credit to 6 parolees in Petitioner’s situation, the statute does not require the Board to do so in cases in which subsections (a)(2.1)(i) and (ii) do not apply. Instead, the statute provides that the Board’s decision regarding whether to grant a parolee credit for time spent at liberty on parole is clearly discretionary. Soto v. Pennsylvania Parole Board, 311 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (holding that “[g]enerally, an administrative agency’s exercise of discretion will be upheld so long as it is authorized by statute”) (citing Eckhart v. Department of Agriculture, 8 A.3d 401, 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). In Pittman, our Supreme Court held that when exercising its discretion with respect to whether to grant or deny credit for “street time,” the Board must provide a contemporaneous statement explaining the basis for its decision. Pittman, 159 A.3d at 475. In that case, the Court observed that the Board’s statement need not “be extensive, and a single sentence is sufficient under most circumstances.” Id. at 475 n.12. The Pittman Court further held that the Board abuses its discretion when it fails to conduct “an individual assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding [a parolee’s] parole revocation.” Id. at 474. Finally, we note that the Board’s stated reason or reasons for denying credit also must be “documented by the record.”4 Plummer II, 216 A.3d at 1212. “Here, because [Petitioner] was not convicted of a crime of violence, did not commit a crime requiring sex offender registration, and was not subject to a federal removal order, the Board had discretion to deny [him] credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole, but was required to articulate a reason for its denial.” Barnes v. 4 In the event the Board’s stated reason for denying credit is inconsistent with the record, such that it is “an insufficient articulation of” a reason to deny credit, a “remand to the Board for the limited purpose of explaining its exercise of discretion in its credit determination [ ] and to correct any error in exercising that discretion based on the facts and circumstances of [the parolee’s] parole revocation” is appropriate. Marshall v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 200 A.3d 643, 651-52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (footnote omitted). 7 Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 203 A.3d 382, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). The Board provided a contemporaneous statement explaining its decision to deny Petitioner credit for his street time when it stated that “the offender has a history of supervision failure(s) in probation and/or parole to warrant denying credit for time at liberty on parole.” (C.R. at 89.) Because this Court has previously held that a history of supervision failures is a valid ground for denying a parolee credit for time spent at liberty on parole, we find the Board’s stated reason for denying parole in this case to be valid. See Plummer II, 216 A.3d 1207, 1212 (deeming stated reason for credit denial, “prior history of supervision failures,” to be legally sufficient); Sherman v. Pennsylvania Parole Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 129 C.D. 2021, filed Aug. 27, 2021), slip op. at 2 n.1 (stating “[i]ndeed, a history of suspension failures and abscondments constitutes adequate grounds for denying credit for time spent at liberty on parole”); Lane v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 299 C.D. 2019, filed Jan. 23, 2020), slip op. at 3 (finding statement “prior supervision history” satisfied Pittman standard.); Lee v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 333 C.D. 2020, filed March 26, 2021); Faircloth v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 796 C.D. 2019, filed Jan. 27, 2020); Vann v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1067 C.D. 2017, filed April 10, 2018), slip op. at 8.5 It is also clear in this case that the Board’s denial of credit for Petitioner’s street time was based on “an individual assessment of the facts and circumstances” related to Petitioner’s case and that its stated reason for denying such credit is “documented by the record.” In the instant case, a review of the record reflects 5 This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited for their persuasive value, but not as binding precedent. Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a.) 8 supervision failures. In its response to his administrative remedies form, the Board stated: Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pittman [ ] the Board must articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time spent at liberty on parole. In this case, the Board articulated that you were denied such credit because you have a history of supervision failure(s) in Probation and/or Parole that warrant denying credit for time at liberty on parole. You are currently serving your second institution number. You were paroled on two occasions, and have one prior recommit as a CPV. You incurred a new felony conviction that involved fleeing from the police. Thus, the reason provided for denying you credit for the time spent at liberty on parole is sufficient. (C.R. at 96.) In addition, Petitioner admitted at his revocation hearing that his supervision history had not been good the last time he was on parole. Id. at 39. Further, the Board’s Revocation Hearing Report and Petitioner’s Supervision History both refer to his previous history of supervision failure while on parole. Id. at 25-28, 64, 69. Thus, the reason given by the Board for denying Petitioner credit for his street time is both “documented by the record” and based on an “individual assessment” of the relevant facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s particular situation. Plummer II, 216 A.3d at 1212. Petitioner next claims that the Board violated our Supreme Court’s decision in Young, when it rescinded credit for street time he was previously awarded that is unrelated to his most recent period of parole. (Petition for Review at 9-10; Petitioner’s Br., at 11-12.) In Young, the Court held that the Parole Code “does not authorize the Board to withdraw an award [of street time] previously granted pursuant to Section 6138(a)(2.1).” 225 A.3d at 814. Petitioner’s argument lacks merit because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the Board withdrew a previous grant of credit for street time awarded to 9 Petitioner. In the case sub judice, Petitioner was free on parole from February 1, 2023, until he was arrested and detained on April 13, 2024. (C.R. at 16.) The Board’s Revocation Hearing Report indicates that both the Hearing Examiner and the Board member on the panel recommended that the Petitioner be denied credit for his current period at liberty on parole. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). In addition, in calculating Petitioner’s maximum date, the Board did not consider any prior street time credit awarded to him before his current period of parole. Id. at 85. Finally, the Board’s response to Petitioner’s request for administrative review states that after his current recommitment, the total days remaining on his sentence were the same as the total days remaining on his sentence at the time of his most recent parole on February 1, 2023. This fact reflects that he was only denied credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole with respect to his most recent period of parole. Id. at 97. Therefore, the Board did not err when it exercised its discretion to deny Petitioner credit for his most recent time period at liberty on parole. B. Whether Petitioner was Denied his Constitutional Right to Confront Witnesses Against Him at his Revocation Hearing Petitioner claims that he was denied his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him because a report authored by his parole officer, Agent Baldonieri, was entered into evidence and attested to by Agent McConnell, a stand-in parole agent.6 Agent Baldonieri was not present at the hearing. Petitioner asserts that because he had no opportunity to cross-examine Agent 6 Petitioner’s Brief also alleges that his right to confront the witnesses against him was further abridged when other hearsay evidence was admitted in the course of his parole revocation hearing, such as a urinalysis report. (Petitioner’s Br., at 16, 20.) However, the record demonstrates that these arguments were not raised before the Board in Petitioner’s Administrative Remedies Form. (C.R. at 94.) Issues not raised before the Board are waived and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a); Pa.R.A.P. 1551(a); McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 631 A.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 10 Baldonieri, the Board deprived him of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. He also avers that this deprivation “resulted in his parole having been revoked entirely on hearsay evidence.” (Petitioner’s Br., at 20-21.) Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Board’s regulations provide that parolees have “the right to confront and cross[-]examine witnesses at state parole revocation hearings,” unless a finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation is made by the Board. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); 37 Pa. Code § 71.2(11)(iv). However, in Pennsylvania, the rules of evidence do not strictly apply in revocation proceedings. Majors v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 808 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). See 2 Pa.C.S § 505 (stating in part, “Commonwealth agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence at agency hearings, and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may be received.”) This Court has held that the right to confrontation and cross-examination can be waived if no objection is made to the introduction of hearsay evidence at the parole revocation hearing. Sinwell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 406 A.2d 597, 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979); Maxfield v. Board of Probation & Parole, 538 A.2d 628 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). In Sinwell, this Court stated: The right to confront and cross-examine . . . can be waived . . . and, if no objection is voiced to the introduction of hearsay evidence at a revocation hearing, a parolee cannot later challenge its admission . . . . Indeed, it is not the introduction of hearsay evidence at a revocation hearing which is error but the admission of hearsay over objection and without a finding of good cause. We believe, therefore, that the petitioner cannot succeed without a plea that he objected to the admission of the hearsay evidence and that it was admitted over his objection without a finding of good cause. And, because the petitioner here has not alleged any objection to the admission of the hearsay, we believe that he has failed to state a cause of action. 11 406 A.2d at 599 (citations omitted). We find Sinwell to be dispositive of the issue here.7 Because Petitioner admits that his Counsel did not object to the introduction into evidence of the report authored by Agent Baldonieri at his revocation hearing when Agent Baldonieri was not present, we find Petitioner has waived his right to confront and cross-examine the author of this report. This finding, however, raises the issue of whether Petitioner’s Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of this evidence at Petitioner’s parole revocation hearing, without the presence of Agent Baldonieri. C. Whether Petitioner’s Counsel was Ineffective Petitioner asserts that his Counsel was ineffective at his parole revocation hearing because Counsel did not object to a Supervision History report authored by Agent Baldonieri, who was not present at the hearing, being admitted into the record by a stand-in parole agent. Petitioner maintains that his Counsel’s failure to object to this evidence resulted in the revocation of his parole “based solely on hearsay evidence.” (Petitioner’s Br., at 20) (emphasis added). Petitioner states that after he read the relevant report, he pointed out errors in the report to his Counsel and requested that his Counsel object to it as hearsay. His Counsel then replied that he would not object to the report because “it wasn’t important for this hearing.” Petitioner asserts that without the admission of the report, the Board would have been unable to prove a violation of his parole by the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 21. In response, the Board maintains that Petitioner fails to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel because he has failed to establish that the course of action taken by his Counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests. (Board’s Br., at 6.) The Board contends that even if the report constituted 7 As we discuss below, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that his parole was revoked solely on the basis of hearsay evidence. 12 hearsay in a strict legal sense, there was an abundance of evidence presented at Petitioner’s revocation hearing, including Petitioner’s admissions regarding his convictions and official sentencing records from the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, to support his recommitment as a CPV. Thus, Petitioner has failed to prove that the outcome of the hearing would have been different if his Counsel had objected to the report or if Agent Baldonieri had been present at the revocation hearing and available to be questioned. Id. at 7. In Pennsylvania, a parolee such as Petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel at his revocation hearing. Mesko v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 245 A.3d 1174, 1180 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). In Adams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 885 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), this Court recognized that a parolee’s statutory right to counsel includes the right to have that counsel’s assistance be effective. In that case, we adopted a two-part test for determining whether a parolee is entitled to relief based upon his or her counsel’s alleged ineffective performance. Under this test, a parolee must show: (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by law; and (2) counsel’s errors were so serious that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 885 A.2d at 1125. We also note that “the parolee bears the burden of showing counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 515 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). In addition, our Supreme Court has held that courts will give deference to counsel’s trial strategy in evaluating the seriousness of the error committed, if an error was committed at all. Commonwealth v. Dunbar, 470 A.2d 74, 77 (Pa. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 431 A.2d 233, 234 (Pa. 1981) (stating that “[b]efore a claim of ineffectiveness can be sustained, it must be determined that, in light of all the alternatives available to counsel, the strategy actually employed was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen it.”). 13  Counsel’s alleged error is that he failed to object to the admission of a report which Petitioner contends constituted hearsay because its author was not present at the hearing to testify. Petitioner further contends that his Counsel’s failure to object to this report “resulted in his parole having been revoked entirely on hearsay evidence.” (Petitioner’s Br., at 20-21.) We have held that “[w]here counsel’s error consists of a failure to assert an objection, we must first ascertain whether there existed reasonable grounds on which to assert the omitted objection; if there was arguable merit to the omitted objection, we must then ascertain whether counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to assert the objection.” Vereen, 515 A.2d at 640-41. In this case, the report authored by Petitioner’s parole agent constituted hearsay evidence since it was in- hearing evidence of out-of-hearing assertions offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-hearing assertions. Id. In Vereen, this Court stated: While hearsay evidence is admissible in parole revocation proceedings, it is only admissible over the parolee’s objection upon a specific finding of good cause so as to deny the parolee the right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness. We have also held that a parole revocation order based entirely upon hearsay evidence violates the principles of due process and cannot be upheld. Id. at 641 (citations omitted). Because the report constituted hearsay, we conclude that the omitted hearsay objection in this case was of arguable merit. This leaves us to determine whether Counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting to the report. Here, we find that Counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting to the report. At the revocation hearing, Counsel told the Hearing Examiner: “we’re acknowledging conviction. We’re here for dispositional purposes.” (C.R. at 35.) In support of his strategy, Counsel thereafter provided the Hearing Examiner with two letters from individuals who wished to provide character references for Petitioner and asked that the letters be made part of the record. The letters described Petitioner’s 14 aspirations, work ethic and positive relationships with family and others. Id. at 37. Counsel then had Petitioner testify regarding his adjustment on parole, his plans moving forward, and anything else Petitioner wished the Board to know about him. Id. at 38-41. During his testimony, Petitioner both admitted his convictions and stated that “my supervision history hasn’t been good the last time I was on parole.” He also expressed remorse over having made bad decisions in the past. Id. at 39. The primary purpose of the revocation hearing was to determine whether Petitioner had committed an additional crime or crimes making it appropriate for the Board to recommit him as a CPV. In this case, the Board entered into the hearing record copies of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas’ Criminal Docket evidencing Petitioner’s new convictions. This Court has previously stated, “certified copies of [a parolee’s] [ ] convictions are sufficient, by themselves, to support his recommitment as a convicted violator . . . .” Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 484 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). In addition, Petitioner also admitted to his new convictions at the hearing. In Pickert v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 514 A.2d 252, 253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), this Court held that counsel’s alleged failure to object to documents allegedly containing hearsay was reasonable and did not constitute such a serious error that he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed under law when the inmate had admitted to his violations. See also Heckrote v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 465 A.2d 118, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (holding that a parolee’s admission of his conviction supported his parole revocation.); Pitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 514 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). Here, Counsel’s strategy for the revocation hearing was to have Petitioner acknowledge his convictions while also presenting positive evidence regarding the character of his client in the hope of obtaining a more favorable disposition. Because his client admitted to his new convictions, as well as to his problematic supervision 15 history during his time on parole, there is no evidence to suggest that the outcome of Petitioner’s revocation hearing would have been any different if his Counsel had objected to the report authored by Agent Baldonieri. We have previously held that Counsel’s failure to object to hearsay at his client’s parole revocation hearing “is not so serious an error as to constitute representation short of that guaranteed by law.” Helvy, 526 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). This is especially true when a parolee’s recommitment as a CPV is supported by both his own admission of his convictions and by certified copies of trial court records evidencing those convictions, as in this case. Chapman, 484 A.2d 413; Heckrote, 465 A.2d 118. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to meet the two part test set forth by this Court in Adams for a parolee to establish that his counsel was ineffective. Petitioner has not shown that his Counsel made errors so serious that Counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by law. Nor has he established that Counsel’s errors were so serious that there is a reasonable probability that, but for Counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Adams, 885 A.2d at 1125. For the above-stated reasons, we find that had Petitioner’s Counsel objected to the report authored by Agent Baldonieri as hearsay, his doing so would not have changed the result of the revocation proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner was not denied his due process right to effective assistance of counsel by his Counsel’s failure to object to alleged hearsay at his revocation hearing. 16  IV. Conclusion Because the Board made findings supported by substantial evidence in the record and did not err as a matter of law nor violate any constitutional rights, we affirm.8 8 On August 21, 2026, Petitioner filed with this Court an “Application for Prohibitory Injunction.” He claims that the Board violated the “the Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole,” the “Special Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole,” “Inmate Rights at Parole Hearing,” and Section 71- 3(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7) & (8) of the Board’s rules. He asks that he be granted “the issuance of a prohibitory injunction, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531” and to enjoin and restrain the Parole Board from further violations. After consideration, we will deny the Application. This is an appellate jurisdiction matter to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply. The injunctive relief Petitioner seeks falls outside of this jurisdiction, and, to the extent he seeks to raise new issues which were not first raised before the Board, these issues are waived. 17  IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Darnell Peak, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 954 C.D. 2025 : Pennsylvania Parole Board, : Respondent : PER CURIAM ORDER AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2026, the April 8, 2025 order of the Pennsylvania Parole Board is hereby AFFIRMED. And upon consideration of Petitioner’s Application for Prohibitory Injunction, and in accord with footnote 8, the application is hereby DENIED.