Com. v. Rowe, C.

J-A18039-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER GEORGE ROWE : : Appellant : No. 674 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000317-2021 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: October 21, 2026 Christopher George Rowe appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury convictions of murder in the first degree1 and related offenses.2 We affirm. The Commonwealth charged Rowe with the first-degree murder of his paramour, Kaylene Roedel (the “Victim”), and related offenses. Rowe filed a seventy-nine page amended omnibus pre-trial motion, challenging the admission of various evidence, discussed infra. The trial court held several ____________________________________________ 1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a). 2 Rowe purported to appeal from the sentence initially imposed on January 9, 2025. The trial court imposed an amended sentence on January 13, 2025. The appeal properly lies from the amended judgment of sentence, and we have amended caption accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2010). J-A18039-26 evidentiary hearings, and the parties filed court-ordered memoranda of law. Ultimately, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Rowe’s motion. This matter proceeded to a six-day jury trial in November 2024. The trial court reviewed the trial evidence in detail as follows. In June 2016, the victim, Kaylene Roedel (the “Victim”), reported to police that her paramour, Rowe, choked her and punched her in the face and head. As a result of these allegations, Rowe was incarcerated in county prison. While incarcerated, Rowe phoned the Victim[3] several times in July 2016[,] requesting that she appear at his bond hearing and testify favorably for him. During these conversations[,] the Victim informed Rowe that she intended to end their relationship; that he could no longer control her; that he assaulted her; and [that] she was aware he told others he would kill her after his release. The Victim did attend the bond reduction hearing and Rowe’s bond was reduced and he released August 1, 2016. Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/25, at 4. At trial, the trial court admitted recordings of ten telephone calls between Rowe and the Victim, over Rowe’s objections. The trial court summarized the ensuing factual history: [The evening after Rowe’s release from county prison, on] August 2, 2016, the Victim was working as a stripper at Cheaters Bar . . . in New Alexandria, when Rowe entered the bar, began watching her, and threaten[ed] her. Rowe continued to make a disturbance and was . . . removed from the premises. In the early morning hours of August 3, 2016, the Victim finished her shift and went home . . . . At 2:45 a.m. [the Victim called the Blairsville Police Department and] reported that Rowe had followed her home, confronted her, [and] refused to leave, and she [used] mace spray on him which did not deter him. Rowe ____________________________________________ 3 For ease of review, we have amended the trial court opinion’s references to Roedel to the “the Victim.” -2- J-A18039-26 eventually fled when the Victim called the [police. The police] were unable to locate Rowe[. He] eventually returned to the Victim’s residence at 4:00 a.m. The Victim let him in as she did not want him to cause another scene. The Victim left for work at Cheaters around 5:40 p.m. that day. The Victim was last seen on August 4, 2016, at 2:10 a.m. [T]he bartender at Cheaters reported that she observed the Victim leave work alone and drive away in her Chevy Blazer. Surveillance video . . . showed [the] Blazer turning onto Riders Road in Johnstown at 2:03 p.m. Rider’s Road is a dead-end street that runs next to the Honan Avenue Hiking Trail (“Honan Trail”). The same surveillance video show[ed] the Blazer leaving the area approximately 17 minutes later[,] again entering Riders Road on August 6, 2016, at 2:40 a.m.[, and leaving the area 26 minutes later.] [At this time, Rowe had a girlfriend, Denise Walker (“Girlfriend.”)4] Cell phone records indicated that at approximately 3:10 a.m.[, Girlfriend’s] cell phone hit[] a cell tower . . . near where the Victim’s body was [ultimately] found. Cell phone records further showed that Rowe’s cell phone was forwarding calls to [Girlfriend’s] cell phone during this period of time. [Girlfriend] verified that Rowe was using her phone and he had left her residence in the early morning hours of August 6th. At approximately 3:30 p.m. on August 6th, the Victim’s family filed a missing person report after she did not come to pick up her son. At approximately 10:39 p.m.[, the police] were dispatched to the Victim’s residence, where Rowe, [Girlfriend], Bobby Griffin (“Griffin”), and Jay Smith (“Smith”) were located with the Victim’s Blazer and a U-Haul in the process of removing Rowe’s belongings from her residence. Id. at 4-5 (paragraph breaks and quotation marks added). On the afternoon of August 7, 2016, a police officer found the deceased Victim’s body near the Honan Trail. The Victim “was lying supine . . . , her ____________________________________________ 4 For ease of review, we have amended the trial court opinion’s references to Denise Walker to the “Girlfriend.” -3- J-A18039-26 legs were spread apart[, and her] shirt, shorts, and underwear[] were cut down the middle and laid to the side exposing her body.” Id. at 3-4. “[A]n autopsy was conducted on” the Victim the following day. Id. at 4. Rowe told officers that he was living at Girlfriend’s residence in Johnstown. Officers found the Blazer at this residence “and observed that only the back seat appeared to have been recently cleaned and vacuumed.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/25, at 6. At trial, Girlfriend testified to the following: [O]n August 6th, Rowe told her that . . . he killed [the Victim] with his bare hands, drove around with her body in the back seat, and placed it near the Honan Trial. Girlfriend also reported that Rowe took her to the site where the Victim’s body was found and told her she would be the next one they would find there if she ever told anyone. As a result of her fear of Rowe, Girlfriend initially provided an alibi for Rowe but ultimately told investigators the truth in an interview[.] Id. The trial court further summarized the trial testimony of Matthew Stockdill (“Stockdill”) and James Burkett (“Burkett”), who were inmates at the county prison with Rowe: Stockdill testified that Rowe became increasing[ly] angry during his phone calls with the Victim[,] often . . . yelling at her[, and] after when speaking to Stockdill about the call [sic]. [Stockdill testified that upon Rowe’s] learning that the Victim was working as a stripper,] Rowe became very upset and it was not a pretty sight. Finally, Stockdill testified [that] while working in the kitchen with Rowe[,] he told him on a number of occasions that he was going to kill the Victim when he was released. Burkett testified that Rowe told him that he was unhappy the Victim was working at Cheaters as a stripper because he did -4- J-A18039-26 not like people looking at his property and that he would stop it when he was released. In addition, Burkett testified that Rowe admitted to choking the Victim into unconsciousness on numerous occasions and otherwise being abusive towards her. Id. The Commonwealth also played, over Rowe’s objections, two interviews between Rowe and Pennsylvania State Trooper Scott Urban (“Trooper Urban”). By way of background, we reiterate that a police officer discovered the Victim’s body in August 2016. Local law enforcement interviewed Rowe several times — shortly after the Victim’s body was discovered, as well as in 2017 and 2020. Trooper Urban was not involved in this investigation. The Commonwealth did not charge Rowe with the Victim’s murder until July 2020. The trial court summarized the circumstances leading to the additional interviews and Rowe’s statements as follows. Following his arrest in July [2020], Rowe reached out to [Trooper Urban] and requested to speak with him. Urban conducted a first interview with Rowe on August 24, [2020]. Rowe placed the blame for the Victim’s death on Girlfriend. Rowe stated that he was upstairs at the Victim’s residence when he heard a disturbance downstairs, he went to see what was happening and found Girlfriend and the Victim[.] Girlfriend was holding the Victim in a reverse naked strangle hold [sic] and when she released her[,] the Victim fell onto the floor dead. Rowe gave specific details of how the Victim’s body reacted to the strangle hold. After [the Victim’s] death[,] Girlfriend and Griffin forced [Rowe] to move the Victim’s body to the back seat of her Blazer and they, along with Smith,[5] who was outside the residence, drove to the Honan Trail to hide the body. ____________________________________________ 5 Griffin and Smith were the two individuals with Rowe and Girlfriend, removing Rowe’s belongings from the Victim’s residence with a U-Haul the day before the police discovered the Victim’s body. -5- J-A18039-26 Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/25, at 7. Subsequently, Rowe sent Trooper Urban a letter, “indicating that [he] had lied about some things in the first interview.” Id. Trooper Urban thus conducted a second interview on September 9, 2020. At this interview: Rowe was consistent that Girlfriend was the Victim’s killer but changed his explanation of how her body ended up on the Honan Trial. . . . Rowe stated that Girlfriend, Griffin, and Smith left the residence after Girlfriend killed the Victim[,] leaving him alone with her body. Rowe stated that he had to hide the Victim’s body and that he placed her in the back seat of her Blazer and drove to the Honan Trail where he left the body. Id. at 7-8. However, at trial Griffin and Smith testified that they were only present at the Victim’s residence one time on August 6, 2016, to help Girlfriend and Rowe move him out of there and into Girlfriend’s residence. Both Griffin and Smith denied any involvement in the Victim’s death or in hiding her body. Id. at 8. Meanwhile, we summarize, the day after police discovered the Victim’s body, Ashley Zezulak (“Dr. Zezulak”) conducted an autopsy and concluded the cause of death was “undetermined.” N.T., 11/15/24, at 16. In October 2018, the Commonwealth’s expert witness in forensic pathology, Kevin Whaley, M.D. (“Dr. Whaley”), reviewed Dr. Zezulak’s report, more than ninety autopsy photographs and 100 crime scene photographs, an entomology report, and a toxicology report. [Dr.] Whaley . . . ultimately determined the Victim died of homicidal violence of undetermined etiology and noted that there were signs of strangulation. [Dr.] Whaley included the finding [of] -6- J-A18039-26 possible strangulation based on physical evidence including frothy blood in the Victim’s mouth and lungs and a particular discoloration in her facet that is consistent with strangulation or asphyxia. [Dr.] noted that he could not confirm strangulation due to [Dr.] Zezulak not layering the neck to expose the internal structure and muscles. [In November] 2019, [the Cambria county coroner] issued a death certificate indicating the Victim’s cause of death was homicidal violence of undetermined etiology. [In November] 2024, [Dr.] Whaley authored a supplemental report after reviewing post-arrest statements made by Rowe[. Dr. Whaley] concluded that . . . he was medically certain that the Victim suffered strangulation before death. [Dr.] Whaley explained that the description Rowe offered of how the Victim reacted to being in a choke hold and the sequence of physical reactions was extremely accurate and outside the knowledge of most laypersons who had not observed someone who was in a choke hold for an extended period. Notably, [Dr.] Whaley did not alter his finding as to the Victim’s cause of death[,] which remained homicidal violence of undetermined etiology. Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/25, at 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Rowe did not testify in his own defense, but called Trooper Urban, as well as a police officer and a police chief, to testify. The jury found Rowe guilty of murder in the first degree, aggravated assault, and fictitious reports to law enforcement authorities.6 On January 9, 2025, the trial court initially imposed a sentence of life without parole on the murder in the first degree charge, and sentences on the other two charges. On January 13, 2025, however, the court vacated the aggravated assault sentence on the grounds of merger, but the overall sentence of life imprisonment remained the same. ____________________________________________ 6 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 4906(b)(1). -7- J-A18039-26 Rowe filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, and he and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Rowe presents four issues for our review: A. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted improper Rule 404(b) material to be admitted as evidence at trial? B. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted the statements and interviews of [Rowe] to the Pennsylvania State Police dated August 24, 2020 and September 9, 2020 to be admitted as evidence at trial? C. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted recorded prison telephone calls between [Rowe] and the Victim to be admitted as evidence at trial? D. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Rowe’s] Motion to Dismiss — or in the alternative, erred by not providing a jury instruction on the issue of spoliation — where the Commonwealth spoliated evidence and/or committed a Brady[7] violation by wholly consuming and/or destroying physical evidence including blood draws, tissue samples, entomological evidence, and the body of the . . . Victim? Rowe’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Preliminarily, we note that while Rowe sets forth four issues in his statement of questions involved, he raises numerous theories under each, resulting in a large number of discrete claims. We note with displeasure, however, that his counsel fails to cite the place in the record where he preserved any of these claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring statement ____________________________________________ 7 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). -8- J-A18039-26 of case to specify state of proceedings at which issue sought to be reviewed on appeal was raised), 2119(e) (requiring same of argument section of appellate brief). Our review of the voluminous record has revealed that Rowe did not raise some of the issues infra in his omnibus pre-trial motion or at the pre-trial hearings cited in his brief, but instead raised them for the first time in his post-hearing, seventy-eight page memorandum of law. We remind counsel that this Court may find an issue waived for an appellant’s failure “to point to the location in the record where the claim was preserved, and [where] ‘the transcripts in [a] case are voluminous, . . . it is not the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate review”). Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 492 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, as we have been able to determine Rowe has raised each of his issues at least once in the proceedings below, we decline to find waiver. In his first issue, Rowe avers the trial court’s admission of the ten record prison telephone calls between him and the Victim violated Pa.R.E. 404(b). “It is well settled that ‘[t]he admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion.’” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 224 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: -9- J-A18039-26 (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). This Court has explained: [Rule 404(a)’s] general proscription against admission of a defendant’s distinct bad acts is subject to numerous exceptions if the evidence is relevant for some legitimate evidentiary reason and not merely to prejudice the defendant by showing him to be a person of bad character. Exceptions that have been recognized as legitimate bases for admitting evidence of a defendant’s distinct crimes include, but are not limited to: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design such that proof of one crime naturally tends to prove the others; (5) to establish the identity of the accused where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other; (6) to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his trial; (7) situations where defendant’s prior criminal history had been used by him to threaten or intimidate the victim; (8) situations where the distinct crimes were part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development (sometimes called “res gestae” exception). This list is by no means exhaustive. - 10 - J-A18039-26 Hicks, 151 A.3d at 225 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The res gestae exception permits “the admission of evidence of other crimes or bad acts to tell ‘the complete story.’ ‘Such evidence may be admitted, however, ‘only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.’” Id. at 226. Lastly, we note: “It is axiomatic in a criminal trial that all evidence offered by the prosecution will be prejudicial to the defendant. Were mere prejudice the standard, virtually all evidence could reasonably be excluded.” Id. at 224 (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained: Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. [I]t is not “required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” Moreover, we have upheld the admission of other crimes evidence, when relevant, even where the details of the other crime were extremely grotesque and highly prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). On appeal, Rowe presents several theories in support of his claim that the trial court erred under Rule 404(b) in admitting the telephone calls. First, he contends the evidence did not fall under the res gestae exception. Rowe acknowledges the Commonwealth’s offer of proof — that the telephone conversations would “tell the complete story,” by “establish[ing] a ‘deteriorating relationship’ and . . . vague, unsubstantiated ‘abuse’ [the Victim] allegedly suffered at [Rowe’s hands] sometime prior to her death.” - 11 - J-A18039-26 Rowe’s Brief at 34. However, Rowe asserts that “here, unidentified, unsubstantiated allegations of past abuse, however distant, [are] not ‘so clearly and inextricably mixed up with the history’ of this alleged homicide . . . that it would ‘form part of one chain of relevant circumstances.’” Id. at 36. Rowe also asserts that the evidence, that he abused the Victim on prior occasions, was prejudicial. He avers that the “prejudice could not be cured at trial and was not outweighed by any probative value.” Id. at 32. In denying Rowe’s omnibus pre-trial motion on this issue, the trial court found the telephone calls were admissible under the res gestae exception of Rule 404(b). It reasoned: Here, the evidence of Rowe’s actions against the Victim during [and following] their relationship . . . is a part of the chain of events that led to the Victim’s murder and [form] the natural development of the facts and the Commonwealth’s theory of the case. See . . . Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, [371 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1977)] (“[E]vidence concerning the previous relations between a defendant and a homicide victim is relevant and admissible for the purpose of proving ill will, motive or malice. Evidence of prior occurrences in which the accused threatened, assaulted, or quarre[l]ed with the decedent may be admissible for this purpose.”). Trial Court Opinion & Order, 8/24/23, at 10-11. After review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the telephone calls under the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b). See Hicks, 151 A.3d at 224. On appeal, Rowe concedes that the Commonwealth’s offer of proof was that the telephone conversations would “tell the complete story” of his relationship with the Victim, including - 12 - J-A18039-26 alleged past abuse. Rowe’s Brief at 34. To the extent that the past acts of abuse were “unsubstantiated,” Rowe made this argument at the pre-trial hearings — that the Victim “never reported” these acts to the police, “none of these were charged,” and there was no “indicia of reliability.” N.T., 7/7/22, at 84, 91 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The Commonwealth responded correctly, however, that Rule 404(b) does not include any requirement “that the person [has] to be charged.” Id. at 91; see also Pa.R.E. 404(b) (addressing the admission of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act”). Finally, by arguing that the alleged prior acts were not “clearly and inextricably mixed up with the history” of this homicide, Rowe ignores that in several telephone calls, the Victim stated Rowe had previously held her in “choke hold[s],” and she was aware that Rowe “told others he would kill her after his release” from prison. Amended Omnibus Pre-Trial Motions, 6/16/22, at 27 (quoting telephone calls of July 4, 23, 28, 2016). In fact, the evidence at trial established that: (1) one day after his release from prison, Rowe went to the Victim’s workplace and threatened her, such that he was “removed from the premises;” (2) later that same night, police responded to the Victim’s residence following her reports “that Rowe had followed her home, confronted her, [and] refused to leave;” (3) despite the police officers’ arrival, Rowe returned to the Victim’s residence within hours; (4) three days later, the police found the Victim’s deceased body; and (5) the Commonwealth’s expert - 13 - J-A18039-26 witness, Dr. Whaley, opined “he was medically certain that the Victim suffered strangulation before death,” and that Rowe’s description of the Victim’s physiological response to strangulation “was extremely accurate and outside the knowledge of most laypersons who had not observed someone who was in a choke hold for an extended period.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/25, at 4- 5, 8-9. On appeal, Rowe ignores this evidence. We conclude the trial court did not err in finding the telephone calls showed “part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development.” Hicks, 151 A.3d at 225. Additionally, we reject Rowe’s claim that the evidence was unduly prejudicial. We reiterate “that all evidence offered by the prosecution will be prejudicial to the defendant,” and a court is not “required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” Dillon, 925 A.2d at 141 (emphasis added); see also Hicks, 151 A.3d at 224. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s admission of the telephone calls under the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b). In the remainder of Rowe’s first issue, he sets forth additional bases why the trial court allegedly erred in admitting the telephone calls under Rule 404(b). Briefly, he avers the telephone calls did not establish intent or motive. - 14 - J-A18039-26 See Rowe’s Brief at 21 (reasoning that the Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that he killed the Victim because he was “a scorned lover,” but the Commonwealth did offer the telephone calls on the same basis, and instead sought to show that he “abused [the Victim] on other occasions where she declined to be in a relationship with” him). Rowe also asserts that the evidence of the telephone calls did not establish a common scheme, plan, or design. See id. at 25 (asserting that while the evidence might have established “a pattern of domestic abuse with a romantic partner, the Commonwealth [did not] establish any . . . pattern of conduct . . . so unusual and distinct as to constitute a ‘signature’”).8 In light of our disposition above, we determine no relief is due on these remaining Rule 404(b) arguments. ____________________________________________ 8 While this appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued Commonwealth v. Walker, 350 A.3d 54 (Pa. 2026). The Court reviewed in detail our jurisprudence on the common plan, scheme, and design exception to Rule 404(b). See id. at 61-69. In particular, the Court abrogated the “logical connection” or “sufficient similarities” test, which had evolved and “watered-down” over time and provided that, to determine the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, a court shall consider “the elapsed time between the crimes, the geographical proximity of the crime scenes, and the manner in which the crimes were committed.” Id. at 64-65. Instead, the Court “return[ed] to the origin of the common plan, scheme, or design exception” and announced the proper test: When the admissibility of the defendant’s other bad acts is premised upon the common plan, scheme, or design exception, the Commonwealth must establish either: (1) the offenses constitute “signature crimes” — that is, they are so unique and distinctive that they must have been committed by the same perpetrator — or; (2) the offenses were linked to achieve a common goal. (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 15 - J-A18039-26 Finally, within his first issue, Rowe addresses another piece of evidence, “a 911 telephone call placed by [the Victim] in which she accuses [Rowe] of prior bad acts.” Rowe’s Brief at 38. Rowe claims the Commonwealth failed to provide proper notice of its intent to introduce it. Rowe did not include this claim in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, and thus he has waived it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement . . . are waived”); see also Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 249 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that defendant/appellant “waived his first issue by failing to include it in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) Statement”). For all the foregoing reasons, we determine no relief is due on Rowe’s first issue. In his second issue, Rowe challenges the trial court’s admission of the prison telephone call recordings on other grounds — hearsay. As noted above, “[t]he admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion.” Hicks, 151 A.3d at 224. Our Rules of Evidence ____________________________________________ Id. at 75 (emphasis added). On appeal, Rowe refers to Walker in one citation only, summarizing that it “expressly limit[ed] the admission of 404(b) evidence to ‘those cases involving a common goal [ . . . ] or a signature crime.’” Rowe’s Brief at 28. Because we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the telephone calls under the res gestae exception, we do not consider Rowe’s common plan, scheme, or design argument. - 16 - J-A18039-26 define hearsay as a statement that: “(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)- (2). Generally, hearsay is not admissible. See Pa.R.E. 802. However, “an out-of-court statement is not hearsay when it has a purpose other than to convince the fact finder of the truth of the statement.” Commonwealth v. Weeden, 253 A.3d 329, 337 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has held: “Out-of-court statements by a murder victim may be admitted to establish the motive of the defendant when those statements are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130, 140 (Pa. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2010). In Fisher, the defendant fatally shot his girlfriend, the victim, after the victim reported to police that the defendant “had been harassing her regarding her earlier statements to the police [about] their investigation of the murder of Nigel Anderson.” Fisher, 681 A.2d at 134. The police had also questioned the defendant regarding the Anderson murder case. See id. At trial, the Commonwealth offered evidence that [the victim] alleged, truthfully or untruthfully, that [the defendant] had harassed and assaulted her because of her cooperation with authorities in the Anderson murder investigation and that [the victim’s] allegations, true or untrue[,] were communicated to [the defendant]. Evidence that [the victim] believed that the [defendant] was harassing and assaulting [her] because of her cooperation in the Anderson murder, whether or not [the - 17 - J-A18039-26 defendant] did, in fact, harass Rowden, is clearly relevant to the Commonwealth’s argument that [the defendant] killed [the victim] in retribution for and in order to stop her cooperation with authorities in the Anderson investigation. Fisher, 681 A.2d at 140 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The Court reasoned that “the Commonwealth could have successfully argued that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted.” Id. On appeal, Rowe first asserts the trial court erred in applying the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exception at Rule 804(b)(6). See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6) (providing that “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused — or acquiesced in wrongfully causing — the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”9 Rowe reasons that the Commonwealth did not show that his alleged past conduct toward the Victim “was done with the intention of making [her] unavailable to testify.” Rowe’s Brief at 53. Additionally, Rowe asserts the prison telephone calls were not admissible under any of the hearsay exceptions set forth at Rule 803. He asserts the present sense exception did not apply because none of the Victim’s statements during the telephone calls described any condition occurring while or immediately after she perceived the event. See Pa.R.E. 803(1). Rowe also ____________________________________________ 9 Here, it was not disputed that the Victim was unavailable as a trial witness. See Pa.R.E. 804(a)(4) (providing that “[a] declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if [they] cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death”). - 18 - J-A18039-26 avers the excited utterance exception did not apply because the Victim’s telephone statements “were made . . . long after the alleged . . . events.” Rowe’s Brief at 60; see also Pa.R.E. 803(2). Next, Rowe claims the then- existing mental, emotional, or physical condition exception did not apply because the Victim’s state of mind was not at issue in this case. See Pa.R.E. 803(3). Instead, Rowe reasons, the Commonwealth presented the telephone calls to show his motive and intent to kill her. Here, the trial court reasoned, inter alia, that the telephone calls were not hearsay because the Commonwealth did not offer for them for the truth of the statements — whether Rowe in fact committed the prior acts alleged by the Victim in the telephone conversations. The court cited Fisher and reasoned that the Commonwealth presented the telephone calls to establish Rowe’s motive in later killing her. Trial Court Opinion,8/24/23, at 6-7 (citing Fisher, 681 A.2d at 140). After careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the telephone calls did not constitute hearsay. Similar to the facts in Fisher, here, the Commonwealth did not seek to establish the truth of the Victim’s telephone statements — that Rowe in fact previously abused her or held her in a chokehold. Instead, as discussed in the first issue above, the Commonwealth sought to establish a complete story, by showing “a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development.” Hicks, 151 A.3d at 225. - 19 - J-A18039-26 Rowe does not address this analysis by the trial court. Given the lack of a challenge to the trial court’s reasoning, we determine no relief is due on Rowe’s second issue. In his third issue, Rowe avers the trial court erred in admitting the statements he made to Trooper Urban, without the benefit of his counsel’s presence, on August 24 and September 9, 2020. We consider the applicable standard of review: An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review. A confession obtained during a custodial interrogation is admissible where the accused’s right to remain silent and right to counsel have been explained and the accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. The test for determining the voluntariness of a confession and whether an accused knowingly waived his or her rights looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda[10] rights. ____________________________________________ 10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). - 20 - J-A18039-26 When deciding a motion to suppress a confession, the touchstone inquiry is whether the confession was voluntary. Voluntariness is determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. The question of voluntariness is not whether the defendant would have confessed without interrogation, but whether the interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free and unconstrained decision to confess. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Smith, 277 A.3d 595, 602 (Pa. Super. 2022