Com. v. Pointer, D.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2504 EDA 2025
JudgeOlson
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAESHON POINTER :
:
Appellant : No. 2504 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 27, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005022-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Appellant, Daeshon Pointer, appeals from his judgment of sentence
entered May 27, 2025 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
We affirm.
The trial court laid out the facts as follows:
On September 24, 2020, Rymeek Martin was shot in the back of
the head and killed in broad daylight in a laundromat [along] Vine
Street [in] Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Police recovered and
reviewed surveillance footage of an individual shooting the victim
in the head in front of a dozen civilians around 4:24 p.m., and
subsequently fleeing the crime scene. Based on the footage,
identifying witness testimonies, and other digital surveillance,
police identified Appellant as a potential suspect[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/2026, at 2-7.
On October 15, 2024, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. N.T.,
10/15/2024, at 1. That same day, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress certain statements, as well as his motion in limine to preclude
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testimony regarding his gang affiliation. N.T., 10/15/2024, at 18; N.T.,
10/16/2024, at 7. On October 17, 2024, at the conclusion of Appellant’s bench
trial, the trial judge found him guilty of murder in the third degree, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c) and persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§-6105(a)(i). On May 27, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence
of 24½ to 50 years’ incarceration.1 N.T., 5/27/2025, at 14-20.
On May 28, 2025, new counsel filed a post-sentence motion on
Appellant’s behalf. Appellant argued that his sentence constituted an abuse of
discretion and that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. See
Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 5/28/2025, at 2-3. The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion on September 26, 2025, and this appeal followed. 2 On
appeal, Appellant argues that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Appellant’s motion to suppress allegedly involuntary statements; 2)
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion in limine to
preclude Rule 404(b) evidence relating to Appellant’s gang affiliation; and 3)
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1 More specifically, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 22½ to 50
years’ incarceration for his bench trial convictions. Due to several outbursts
during his sentencing hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of four
counts of direct criminal contempt and added two years to his minimum
sentence. Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/2026, at 1 n.1.
2 Appellant filed his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on October 15, 2025. The trial court issued its
Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 7, 2026.
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Appellant’s conviction was against the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s
Brief at 4.
Appellant first challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress statements he made during a police interview following his arrest.
Appellate review of such a challenge proceeds as follows:
[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are
bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they
are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions
of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant [appeals] the
ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Graham, 353 A.3d 225, 229-230 (Pa. Super. 2026)
(internal citations omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d
503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (additional citations omitted).
Statements given without the proper Miranda3 warnings are presumed
involuntary and uttered in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s proscription
against compulsory self-incrimination. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782
A.2d 574, 579 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 806 A.2d 858 (Pa. 2002).
Here, however, the trial judge found that proper Miranda warnings had been
provided. N.T., 10/15/2024, at 18. Where Miranda warnings have been given
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3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and challenged statements no longer can be presumed to be involuntary,
Appellant’s statements may still be deemed coerced if “the interrogation was
so manipulative or coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability to
make a free and unconstrained decision to confess.” Commonwealth v.
Foster, 332 A.3d 1187, 1195-1196 (Pa. 2025), citing Commonwealth v.
Nester, 709 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1998). Courts weigh the following factors:
[T]he duration and means of the interrogation; the defendant's
physical and psychological state; the conditions attendant to the
detention; the attitude exhibited by the police during the
interrogation; [] the accused's age and level of education and
experience; [the] extent of [his] previous experience with the
police; whether the accused was advised of his constitutional
rights; whether he was injured, ill, drugged, or intoxicated when
he confessed; whether he was deprived of food, sleep or medical
attention, and whether he was abused or threatened with abuse.
Foster, 332 A.3d at 1196, citing Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 525.
Appellant claims his statements were involuntary solely because he was
not informed, prior to commencement of police interrogation, that he was a
prime suspect in a murder investigation.4 Appellant’s Brief at 11. Our Supreme
Court recently denied a similar challenge wherein a suspect was affirmatively,
but falsely, told he was not a suspect. Foster, 332 A.3d at 1189-1190. Thus,
in the absence of coercive circumstances, Foster compels us to reject
Appellant’s claim.
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4 Appellant makes a passing, but undeveloped, comment that he “was not
fully apprised” of his rights under Miranda, see Appellant’s Brief at 9, but
the trial judge found that Appellant received Miranda warnings and nothing
in the record refutes this conclusion.
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The record provides no suggestion that coercive circumstances were
present. Moreover, none of the factors courts weigh in making a voluntariness
determination, see Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 525, appear in the record, nor
does Appellant allege they were present. The trial judge made an
uncontradicted finding that Appellant’s police interview presented no
psychological coercion. N.T., 10/15/2024, at 18. Additionally, Appellant was
22 years old and had prior experience with the police. Trial Court Opinion,
4/7/2026, at 13-14. In light of the foregoing, classifying Appellant’s
statements as voluntary did not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
Appellant next challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion in limine
to preclude Rule 404(b) evidence relating to his affiliation with gangs.
Appellant’s Brief at 12. We review pre-trial evidentiary rulings to determine
whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Bidwell,
195 A.3d 610, 616 (Pa. Super. 2018), citing Commonwealth v. Arrington,
86 A.3d 831, 842 (Pa. 2014). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error
of judgment, but [instead involves] . . . the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,
as shown by the evidence of record.” Bidwell, 195 A.3d at 616 (citation
omitted).
The following principles govern our examination of the trial court’s Rule
404(b) assessment.
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In general, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. Pa.R.E.
402. “Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a material fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 519 (Pa. Super.
2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 398
(Pa. 2015); see Pa.R.E. 401. In a criminal case, evidence of
motive is always relevant. Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 442
A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982), citing Commonwealth v. Faison, 264
A.2d 394 (Pa. 1970).
Rule 404 provides for the exclusion of certain evidence that
otherwise meets the test for relevance:
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character
or trait.
***
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2). Under this rule, the Commonwealth
may not introduce evidence solely to show that the defendant has
a “propensity for committing criminal acts.” Commonwealth v.
Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 665 (Pa. 2014), citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)
and Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491 (Pa. 1988).
However, subject to the balancing test of Rule 404(b)(2), evidence
of a defendant's other acts can be admitted if it is relevant for
another purpose, including motive and the “res gestae exception.”
Id.
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Commonwealth v. Flowers, 303 A.3d 777, *7 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision).
Here, the trial judge relied upon two cases that supported his decision
to admit evidence of Appellant’s gang affiliation. N.T., 10/16/2024, at 6-7.
Both cases conclude, in circumstances similar to those presented in
Appellant’s case, that “[g]ang membership is relevant to prove motive to
kill[.]” Flowers, 303 A.3d at *7, citing Gwaltney, 442 A.2d at 241.
Additionally, “it is well-settled that ‘[e]ven if prejudicial information was
considered by the trial court, a judge, as fact-finder, is presumed to disregard
inadmissible evidence and consider only competent evidence.’”
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 61 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted). Thus, because evidence of gang activity was admissible to prove
motive and because it was submitted to a judge as the factfinder, the trial
court’s decision to admit that evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
Appellant’s final argument is that his conviction was against the weight
of the evidence because: 1) his identity as the perpetrator was established
by body build alone; 2) cellular telephone tower data, on its own, did not
establish Appellant’s presence at the scene of the shooting; 3) surveillance
video evidence of the crime, when compared to Appellant’s social media
photographs, was inconclusive with regard to the red bracelet worn by
Appellant; and, 4) the Commonwealth’s theory as to motive was speculative.
Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim may only be raised on direct appeal
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if he preserved it in the trial court through an oral or written motion before
sentencing or a written post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(a). Because
Appellant filed a timely, but unsuccessful, post-sentence motion challenging
the weight of the evidence, see Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 5/28/25,
at 3-4, he has preserved his claim for appellate review.
A weight of the evidence claim, in contrast to a sufficiency of the
evidence claim, admits that sufficient evidence was produced to prove each
element of the crime, but contends that the trial court weighed that evidence
improperly. Commonwealth v. Richard, 150 A.3d 504, 516 (Pa. Super.
2016). Reviewing a weight of the evidence claim on appeal “is a review of the
[trial court’s] exercise of discretion, not the underlying question of whether
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Stefanowicz, 315 A.3d 162, 169 (Pa. Super. 2024), citing Commonwealth
v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). “[O]nly a palpable abuse of
discretion will cause us to overturn the court’s action.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1190 (Pa. 1994) (citation omitted). Relief is available
only where a verdict is “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense
of justice[.]” Id. at 1191. Because a trial court is uniquely positioned to
observe witness testimony and assess credibility, “the [trial] court’s conviction
that the verdict . . . was not against the weight of the evidence” is “one of the
least assailable reasons for . . . denying a new trial[.]” Commonwealth v.
Garcia Arce, 352 A.3d 495, 508 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted).
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Appellant’s fragmented challenge to the evidence introduced at trial
asserts that each piece of evidence, taken alone, is not sufficiently credible to
sustain his conviction. Appellant first argues that identification based solely
upon his broad shoulders is too general. Appellant’s Brief at 19. However, the
body-type testimony did not stand alone. As discussed infra, Appellant’s
identification as the shooter was supported by cellular telephone location data
and the red bracelet Appellant wore. N.T., 10/16/2024, at 35, 39-65.
Moreover, even if evidence of Appellant’s broad shoulders stood alone, two
witnesses familiar with Appellant testified that they recognized him in the
video recording of the crime scene based upon his broad shoulders. 5 See id.
at 79-80 and 103. The physical aspect of the identification evidence was
therefore premised on a uniquely identifiable feature of Appellant’s frame and
supported by two additional types of evidence that established Appellant’s
identity as the shooter. The trial court’s decision to credit that testimony does
not shock one’s sense of justice.
Appellant next argues that testimony regarding cellular telephone tower
data, on its own, did not demonstrate Appellant’s presence at the crime scene.
Appellant argues that the cellular telephone tower evidence did not place
Appellant’s location precisely at the shooting site, but only generally in the
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5 The record reflects that Appellant had the nickname, “Broad Dae,” which
referred to his unique body build. See N.T., 5/27/2025, at 6 (explaining
stipulation testimony presented at trial).
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vicinity of the shooting. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant’s argument fails. The
evidence presented at trial established that location data corresponding to
Appellant’s cellular telephone was consistent with an individual traveling from
South Philadelphia towards the crime scene in West Philadelphia just before
the shooting, stopping at the crime scene at the time of shooting, stopping
again for about half an hour roughly midway between the crime scene and
South Philadelphia, and then traveling back to South Philadelphia and settling
in the area in which Appellant resided. N.T., 10/16/2024, at 57. The
Commonwealth did not introduce the cellular telephone tower data to
definitively locate Appellant’s cellular telephone. Instead, the Commonwealth
argued that Appellant’s general location could be inferred from the locational
tower data and that said inference was consistent with the Commonwealth’s
theory at trial—that Appellant committed the murder. Such an inference is
reasonable and supported by the record evidence.
Appellant’s third challenge is that the red bracelet worn by the shooter
in the video recording of the shooting, when compared to photographs of
Appellant’s social media posts in which he is depicted with a red bracelet, was
inconclusive because the photographs showed multiple individuals wearing a
similar bracelet. Appellant does not explain why the surveillance video of the
shooting was inconclusive with regard to the bracelet. Moreover, although
Appellant is correct that social media photographs show other individuals
wearing a similar bracelet, Appellant was the only individual who fit the precise
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description of the shooter and who used a cellular telephone near the crime
scene at the time of the shooting. Inferring Appellant’s identity as the
perpetrator through both body-type testimony and cellular telephone tower
records demonstrated that the trial court’s decision to credit the imagery
showing Appellant with a red bracelet similar to the bracelet worn by the
shooter in the surveillance video cannot be said to shock one’s sense of justice.
Finally, Appellant challenges the Commonwealth’s theory as to motive,
which was introduced at trial through stipulated evidence. N.T., 10/16/2024,
at 112-113. The Commonwealth and defense counsel agreed that Corporal
Andrew Martin, if called to testify, would have stated that Appellant was
affiliated with a South Philadelphia street gang, the ‘234,’ which was engaged
in an ongoing conflict with the victim’s gang, ‘M-16.’ Id. Appellant’s entire
argument is that “the entire motive narrative was speculative and obtained
under false pretenses.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. He does not explain why
motive based upon gang membership was speculative and there is no
suggestion in the record of contradictory evidence that offered countervailing
facts which the trial court should have considered. Evidence that the shooting
was motivated by a gang conflict aligned with other unchallenged evidence
that the Commonwealth presented at trial. 6 Moreover, defense counsel sought
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6 As previously noted, Appellant also argues that the motive “narrative” was
obtained under false pretenses. Without further elaboration by Appellant, we
are left to assume that this argument is based upon the voluntariness of
Appellant’s statements—a claim rejected above.
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to exclude evidence of Appellant’s gang affiliation because of its lack of
relevance; not because Appellant’s membership in a gang was contrary to the
facts. See N.T., 10/15/2024, at 28-29. Based upon the foregoing, nothing in
the record undermined the Commonwealth’s evidence showing that Appellant
committed the shooting. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that the verdict aligned with the weight of the evidence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins this Memorandum.
Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.
Date: 11/18/2026
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