Com. v. Mickey, Q.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2433 EDA 2025
JudgeLazarus
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
QUINZELL CHUCKY MICKEY :
:
Appellant : No. 2433 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0002507-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Quinzell Chucky Mickey appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, imposed following his
convictions of one count each of first-degree murder,1 person not to possess
a firearm,2 and carrying a firearm without a license. 3 After careful review, we
affirm.
Mickey was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing
William Stafford in the early morning hours on April 15, 2023, at Park Springs
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
2 Id. at § 6105(a)(1).
3 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).
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Apartments4 on Park Springs Boulevard, East Vincent Township, Chester
County. We provide the following chronological factual summary gleaned from
testimony and exhibits entered at Mickey’s second jury trial. 5
On April 14, 2023, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Mickey and Stafford
left Park Springs Apartments in a white Ford Taurus and traveled to the 200
block of Bridge Street in Phoenixville. The two men proceeded to travel
between various bars whilst drinking together. During this time, Stafford was
texting his long-time girlfriend, Nichelle Hockaday, with whom he lived in Unit
511 of the apartment complex.
During the early morning hours of April 15, 2023, Mickey and Stafford
returned to the white Ford Taurus and began traveling back to the Park
Springs Apartments. The two men stopped at the Citgo gas station near the
Park Springs Apartments, where the two men interacted with several other
customers. Additionally, Stafford is depicted on Citgo’s surveillance footage
stealing multiple vape cartridges from behind the counter.
____________________________________________
4 The Park Springs Apartments is a Section 8 housing development. See N.T.
Jury Trial (Day 1), 6/16/25, at 85-86. The Park Springs Apartments consists
of 13 buildings with a total of 150 units and approximately 425 residents. Id.
at 86.
5 We note with displeasure that neither of the parties provided us with a
complete factual summary. We remind the parties that a proper statement of
the case includes a factual summary. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(5).
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The men returned to the 100 block of Park Springs Apartments at
approximately 2:30 a.m.6 The white Ford Taurus was parked in the driveway
of the 100 block of Park Springs Apartments. Stafford exited the passenger
seat, leaned back into the car, and, after a couple of minutes, closed the
passenger door. Mickey exited the driver’s side door and both men walked
towards the rear of the car. After a few moments, Stafford closed the trunk,
returned to the front passenger side of the vehicle and Mickey returned to the
driver’s seat. Stafford threw a bag onto the grass near the car. 7 Mickey
immediately exited the driver’s side, aimed a handgun over the top of the
vehicle and began to walk around the rear of the car towards Stafford. Mickey
shot Stafford, in the chest, from across the car and Stafford collapsed next to
the passenger side of the car. Stafford’s body rolled towards the curb and
Mickey, with the gun still aimed at Stafford, continued to walk around the car.
Mickey stood over Stafford and shot him multiple times until his gun broke, at
____________________________________________
6 These events are captured fully on the Park Springs Apartments surveillance
system, which was recovered, reviewed, and summarized by Detective
Jonathan Shave. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 6/18/25, at 10-30 (Detective
Shave summarizing Park Springs Apartments surveillance); see also
Commonwealth Exhibit 12 (Park Springs Apartments surveillance depicting
shooting). Additionally, we note that the Park Springs Apartments
surveillance videos did not record audio. See id. at 93 (Nelligan testifying
surveillance videos do not have sound).
7 Police later recover this bag, which contained the partially consumed tequila
Stafford had purchased earlier on April 14, 2023. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3),
6/18/25, at 10-11.
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which point Mickey returned to the driver’s seat. After another five seconds,
Mickey exited the vehicle again, walked around the front of the car, and
repeatedly bludgeoned Stafford, who was still on the ground, with the broken
gun. After bludgeoning Stafford, Mickey searched Stafford’s body before
searching the passenger seat of the car. Mickey searched Stafford’s body
again, returned to the driver’s seat, turned off the car, and fled the scene on
foot.
Multiple residents of the 100 block of Park Springs Apartments were
awoken by two men arguing loudly, followed by a gunshot, a scream, and two
more gunshots. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 6/16/25, at 79 (100 block
resident Sharhonda Anderson, testifying about argument and shooting); 8 N.T.
Jury Trial (Day 2), 6/17/25, at 102-07 (C.C., 13-year old child residing at
grandmother’s home on 100 block, testifying he heard Stafford and another
man arguing, heard gunshots, saw Mickey standing over Stafford’s body, and
watched Mickey bludgeon Stafford’s body with an object); id. at 114-23 (100
block resident Laura Anderson, testifying she and her daughter heard
argument and multiple gunshots). Laura called 911 and ran outside to check
on Stafford.
____________________________________________
8 There are multiple witnesses in this case with the last name Anderson. The
record does not specify any relation between these individuals and we
presume none. Accordingly, we refer to each of them by their first name when
necessary.
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Police Officer Karl Jones of the East Vincent Township Police Department
was on patrol in the early morning hours of April 15, 2023. At approximately
2:30 a.m., Officer Jones responded to a report of a shooting at the 100 block
of the Park Springs Apartments. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 6/16/25, at 57-
74 (Officer Jones’ testimony). Upon arrival, Officer Jones observed a white
Ford Taurus in the driveway of the 100 Building, with Stafford’s body lying
face-up next to the front passenger side of the vehicle. Officer Jones also
encountered Laura next to Stafford’s body. Laura explained to Officer Jones
that she saw a heavyset, bald, black male with a partial beard running from
the scene before she found Stafford’s body.
Officer Jones radioed for paramedics and additional officers. While
canvassing the area, Officer Jones located a black grocery bag, two fired
cartridge casings (FCCs), approximately $5.00 in cash near Stafford’s body,
and a set of keys between the rear of the white sedan and the curb. Officer
Jones did not locate a firearm or any weapons. Officer Jones ran the white
Ford Taurus’s vehicle registration and discovered it was registered to Macy
Green, who lived at the Park Springs Apartments in Unit 902. Green was
Mickey’s long-time girlfriend and the mother of his children.
Paramedics arrived and pronounced Stafford dead at the scene. The
officers secured the scene, taped off the block, and began taking statements.
Police Chief Matthew Williams of the East Vincent Township Police Department
and Police Officer Rob Catrin of the Phoenixville Police Department learned
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that the Park Springs Apartments had a security camera system. Chief
Williams spoke with Louie Valladares, the Park Springs Apartments
superintendent, and requested access to the surveillance system. Valladares
informed Chief Williams that only the community manager, Heidi Nelligan, had
access to the surveillance system. Shortly thereafter, Nelligan arrived at the
Park Springs Apartments. Chief Williams, Officer Catrin, Nelligan, and
Valladares watched the surveillance footage of the shooting together. Nelligan
immediately recognized the shooter as Unit “902’s boyfriend.” See id. at 98
(Nelligan testifying she did not know shooter’s name but knew him to be
dating Green in Unit 902). Valladares, who lived in Unit 901, identified the
shooter as one of his neighbors who lived in Unit 902. See id. at 111-13.
Nelligan and Valladares both knew of Stafford and Mickey by appearance
but did not know either man personally. See id. at 98-99, 113-14. Nelligan
and Valladares had previously seen Stafford and Mickey jogging and kick
boxing together, and, thus, believed that Stafford and Mickey were training
together. See id. Neither Nelligan nor Valladares saw any prior altercations
between Stafford and Mickey. See id. Different police officers and detectives
continued to view the shooting footage for the rest of the morning. Ultimately,
Nelligan provided police with copies of the relevant surveillance footage.
At some point, Detectives Jonathan Shave, Gary Lynch, and Christopher
Bucci, of the Chester County Detectives, responded to the scene. Upon
arrival, the Detectives spoke with the responding officers and began marking
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and photographing evidence. The Detectives discovered much of the same
evidence as Officer Jones. They also located the following evidence: a cell
phone between Stafford’s legs, multiple blood stains near Stafford’s body,
bullet strike marks on the pavement, a brown bag containing a partially
consumed bottle of tequila, a black canvas bag containing marijuana and drug
paraphernalia, an additional FCC, a live bullet in Stafford’s hand, a sear and
sear spring on Stafford’s body,9 and Stafford’s wallet in his pants pocket.
At 5:33 a.m., the Chester County Deputy Coroner, Brittany Gavin,
responded to the Park Springs Apartments. Gavin took custody of Stafford’s
____________________________________________
9 Detective Mark Wilusz of the Chester County Detectives, an expert in
firearms examination, testified that the sear and sear spring recovered are
parts of a firearm that “holds the firing pin rearward, . . . in the cocked or
ready position.” N.T Jury Trial (Day 2), 6/17/25, at 86. Detective Wilusz
continued that “the trigger is connected to the trigger bar, which would then
push on the cam, which would then pull down the sear, which would then allow
the firing pin to snap forward under spring tension and fire the firearm.” Id.
Detective Wilusz testified that these specific parts were consistent with
“Highpoint-type pistols.” See id. at 85-86. Detective Wilusz explained that
Highpoint is a manufacturer of pistols and makes a 40-caliber pistol capable
of firing Smith and Wesson ammunition, which matches the ammunition
recovered from the scene. See id. at 87-88. Further, Detective Wilusz
testified that if a Highpoint pistol did not have a sear or sear spring, it would
be incapable of firing. See id. Detective Wilusz opined that these parts can
come out of a Highpoint during discharge “due to the placement of the sear in
the firearm itself, either the slide retainer pin would not have to be installed,
or some sort of catastrophic breakage to either that pin or slide retainer that
would then cause the slide to lift up off the frame.” Id. at 88-89. Thus, the
Detectives concluded that Mickey’s firearm broke while he was shooting
Stafford and hypothesized that the sear and sear spring came out of the gun
during discharge, or when Mickey bludgeoned Stafford with the gun. Notably,
the firearm was never recovered.
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body at 8:07 a.m. and transported Stafford’s body for an autopsy. At this
point, the Detectives located another bullet, matching the same firearm,
underneath Stafford’s body.10
Later that same morning, the Detectives interviewed Green at Unit 902,
but Mickey was not present. Green told the Detectives that she and Mickey
had two children together. Mickey lived in Philadelphia but would often travel
to Green’s home and help her take care of the children. Green owned a white
Ford Taurus, but she routinely let Mickey drive it to his job at the Giant
Supermarket in Royersford.
Police, including the Chester County Detectives and United States
Marshals, attempted to locate Mickey for several months, to no avail. See id.
at 34-36 (Detective Shave describing multi-agency manhunt). Mickey was
not seen again until August 18, 2023, when he turned himself in at the 18 th
Police District in Philadelphia. See id. at 33-34, 36.
Gary Collins, M.D., a forensic pathologist and the Chief Medical Examiner
of the Delaware Division of Forensic Science, conducted Stafford’s autopsy.
Doctor Collins noted six distinct gunshot wounds to Stafford’s body including
“to his chest, [] left thigh, [and] right hand and [] forearm.” N.T. Jury Trial
(Day 2), 6/17/25, at 15.
____________________________________________
10 At some point, police ordered a tow of the white Ford Taurus and it was
taken back to the police station. Officer Jones followed the tow truck to the
police station.
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Doctor Collins listed the gunshot wounds in order of severity and
explained that the first gunshot wound, to Stafford’s chest, was a perforating
wound that entered Stafford’s body just below his collar bone on the left side
of his chest. See id. at 18-20. The same bullet exited the middle-left side of
Stafford’s back. Doctor Collins explained that the bullet traveled downwards
from Stafford’s upper left side chest to the middle-left exit wound on his back,
which indicated that Stafford was facing the firearm and that the shooter
either had an elevated position or Stafford was bent forward at the time he
was shot. See id. at 20-25. Doctor Collins’ examination revealed that the
perforating bullet to Stafford’s chest punctured Stafford’s heart and his left
side lung. See id. at 25. Doctor Collins concluded that this bullet, alone, was
fatal. See id. at 25-26 (Doctor Collins explaining the chest gunshot would
result in Stafford losing ability to breathe and pump blood).
Next, Dr. Collins documented the second gunshot wound to the right
side of Stafford’s chest as another entrance wound. See id. at 26-27. Doctor
Collins recovered that bullet from Stafford’s chest cavity. See id. at 27-29.
Doctor Collins concluded that this bullet traveled through Stafford’s right-side
lung and his liver, which is located below the lung. See id. at 29. Based on
the second bullet’s trajectory through Stafford’s body, Dr. Collins concluded
that the firearm would have been “fired from the front and to the right side of
[] Stafford.” Id. at 29-30. Doctor Collins concluded that the second gunshot
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was also likely fatal due to loss of breathing and that the damage to the liver
would have resulted in significant blood loss. See id.
Doctor Collins then described the third gunshot wound as a perforating
gunshot wound to Stafford’s right forearm. See id. at 30-31. Doctor Collins
explained that the third bullet entered the back of Stafford’s forearm and
exited the front. See id. Doctor Collins concluded the trajectory of this bullet
was consistent either with Stafford’s arm being in front of his body while he
was shot from the front, or with the arm being down and Stafford being shot
from behind. See id. at 31, 33. Doctor Collins further explained that it “is
entirely possible” this third gunshot wound is related to either of the first
gunshot wounds. See id. at 33-35 (Doctor Collins explaining possible body
positions and bullet trajectories that may result in third gunshot would being
same bullet from either first or second gunshot wound).
Next, Dr. Collins explained the fourth gunshot wound was a perforating
wound to Stafford’s right hand. See id. at 35-36. Doctor Collins stated that
it is nearly impossible to tell where the bullet would have traveled after exiting
Stafford’s hand, and that the damage to the hand was not fatal. See id. at
36-37.
The fifth gunshot wound was a perforating wound to Stafford’s left thigh,
which entered the leg through the outer thigh and exited the anterior upper
left thigh. See id. at 38. Doctor Collins explained that this bullet, unlike
gunshots one and two, had an upwards trajectory. See id. at 39. Thus, Dr.
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Collins concluded that if Stafford was standing at the time he sustained this
wound, then the firearm would have to have been positioned below Stafford
on his left side. See id. Alternatively, Dr. Collins explained, Stafford could
have been on the ground with the firearm located above him shooting
downwards, which would result in an “upward” trajectory through the body.
See id. Doctor Collins concluded that this wound was not fatal. See id.
The sixth and final gunshot wound was a perforating wound to Stafford’s
right ankle. See id. at 40. Doctor Collins determined that this bullet, much
like the fifth gunshot wound, had an upwards trajectory. See id. at 42. Thus,
just like with the fifth gunshot wound, the firearm was either beneath Stafford
while he was standing, or was shot at an angle from above whilst Stafford was
on the ground. See id. (Doctor Collins explaining various hypothetical
trajectories comparable to fifth gunshot trajectories).
Next, Dr. Collins noted lacerations, bruising, and scrapes to the back of
Stafford’s head and abdomen. See id. In particular, Dr. Collins concluded
that the lacerations and bruises to Stafford’s head were consistent with blunt
impact caused by a hard object striking the head. See id. at 43-45. He
further determined that the bruising to Stafford’s abdomen was also caused
by blunt trauma. See id. at 45.
As part of the autopsy, Dr. Collins took blood samples for toxicology
tests, which were conducted by toxicologist Kristopher Graf. The toxicology
tests revealed that Stafford was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana
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at the time of his death. Ultimately, Dr. Collins determined that Stafford died
from the gunshot wounds to his chest.
On January 27, 2025, Mickey proceeded to a multi-day jury trial that
ultimately resulted in his conviction of carrying a firearm without a license.
However, after several days of deliberation, the jury was unable to reach a
unanimous decision as to first-degree murder. As a result, the trial court
declared a mistrial, and subsequently scheduled Mickey’s retrial. See N.T.
First Trial, 2/3/25, at 39-42.
On February 28, 2025, Mickey filed a pre-trial motion wherein he sought
to have M.M., his daughter, declared unavailable pursuant to the Tender Years
Act11 and admit her prior out-of-court statements into evidence. See Pre-
Trial Motion, 2/28/25, at 1-3 (unpaginated). In particular, Mickey asserted
that M.M.’s statements to Detective Christine Bleiler 12 at the CAC should be
admitted due to M.M.’s unavailability. See id. at 1. Mickey posited that M.M.
was unavailable pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a)(1)(ii) because testifying
at trial would cause M.M. to suffer serious emotional distress. See Pre-Trial
Motion, 2/28/25, at 2-3.
On March 6, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mickey’s pre-
trial motion at which Green testified. See N.T. Pre-Trial Hearing, 3/6/25, at
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11 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1.
12 On April 17, 2023, Detective Bleiler interviewed M.M. at the Chester County
Child Advocacy Center (CAC).
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27-41. At the close of the hearing, the trial court deferred its decision pending
briefs. See id. at 41-43. On June 9, 2025, the trial court found that M.M.
was not unavailable pursuant as set forth in section 5985.1(a)(1)(ii) of the
Tender Years Act and denied Mickey’s pre-trial motion. See Order, 6/9/25, at
1. Ultimately, Mickey did not call M.M. to testify at his second trial.
On June 16, 2025, Mickey proceeded to a second jury trial, after which
he was found guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court deferred
sentencing. On September 2, 2025, the trial court sentenced Mickey to the
mandatory term of life imprisonment for his conviction of first-degree murder,
a concurrent sentence of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment for his conviction of
person not to possess a firearm, and no further penalty for his conviction of
carrying a firearm without a license.
On September 10, 2025, Mickey’s counsel filed a timely post-sentence
motion arguing, inter alia, that his convictions were against the weight of the
evidence. On September 23, 2025, the trial court denied Mickey’s post-
sentence motion. Mickey filed a timely pro se notice of appeal13 and a
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13 We observe that Mickey filed his pro se notice of appeal on September 17,
2025, while his counseled post-sentence motion was still pending before the
trial court. First, despite our prohibition against hybrid representation, a pro
se notice of appeal is an exception and this Court will accept a pro se notice
of appeal even where the appellant is represented by counsel. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623-24 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(explaining pro se notice of appeal protects constitutional right to appeal
pursuant to Pennsylvania Constitution and, thus, is distinguished from other
forms of hybrid representation) (citing Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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counseled court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal.14 Mickey now raises the following claims for our
review:
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1137 (Pa. 1993)). Second, Mickey’s pro se and premature notice of appeal
does not preclude our review pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5), which provides
that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but
before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such
entry and on the day thereof.” Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5). Therefore, we accept
Mickey’s pro se and premature notice of appeal and treat it as though it was
timely filed on September 23, 2025. See Williams, supra; Pa.R.A.P.
905(a)(5). Accordingly, Mickey’s notice of appeal is timely and we address
the merits of his appeal.
14 The trial court indicated, in its opinion, that Mickey’s counsel filed the Rule
1925(b) concise statement one day late. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at
3-5. Thus, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3), Mickey’s concise statement is
untimely and all claims within are waived. See id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998). However, we note that
the trial court has amply addressed all of Mickey’s claims in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 1-52.
In certain situations, this Court has found that “where the trial court addresses
the issues raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we need not remand
but may address the issues on their merits.” Commonwealth v. Brown,
145 A.3d 184, 186 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Burton,
973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]f there is an untimely
filing, this Court may decide the appeal on the merits if the trial court had
adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion addressing the issues raised on
appeal.”). Notably, the exceptions in Brown and Burton apply specifically to
counseled Rule 1925(b) concise statements because Rule 1925(c)(3) allows
this Court to find counsel per se ineffective for filing untimely Rule 1925(b)
statements. See Commonwealth v. Boniella, 158 A.3d 162, 164 (Pa.
Super. 2017). Consequently, in the interests of judicial economy, this Court
may consider untimely counseled Rule 1925(b) concise statements. See id.
Instantly, as described above, counsel filed Mickey’s Rule 1925(b) concise
statement one day late. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 3-5. Thus, we
could remand pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(3) and for the trial court to prepare
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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1. Did the trial court err in finding child witness M.M. not
“unavailable” for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[ ]5985.1(a)(1)(ii)?
2. Did the trial court err in omitting the language “in heat of
passion following serious provocation” from P[ennsylvania] jury
instruction 15.2503(a)(1), voluntary manslaughter-murde[r] in
issue?
3. Did the trial court err in omitting the language “under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the
victim” from Pennsylvania jury instruction 15.2503[(a)(2)],
voluntary manslaughter-murder in issue?
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury with regard
to the heat of passion Pennsylvania Jury Instruction
15.2503(a)(3)-(4), voluntary manslaughter-murder in issue?
5. Was the jury’s verdict on first-degree murder against the
weight of the evidence presented?
Brief for Appellant, at 4 (cleaned up).
In his first argument, Mickey contends that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to find M.M. unavailable and admit M.M.’s pre-recorded
statements and, instead, found that M.M. was available to testify. See id. at
20-28. Mickey argues that Green testified that M.M. would suffer serious
emotional distress if called to testify. See id. at 21-24. Mickey asserts that,
based upon Green’s testimony, the trial court’s finding M.M. was available
under section 5985.1 was manifestly unreasonable. See id. at 25-26. Mickey
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an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3). However, the trial court has already
prepared an opinion, in which it thoroughly addressed the claims raised in
Mickey’s Rule 1925(b) statement and, in light of the interests of judicial
economy, we see no need to remand pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(3).
Accordingly, we decline to find Mickey’s claims waived on this basis.
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posits that the trial court’s reliance on Green’s word choice, which included
“like,” “you know,” and “maybe,” constituted error where Green’s testimony
was not equivocating but rather a “common speech habit.” See id. Thus,
Mickey alleges that Green did not waver in her testimony and the trial court’s
finding to the contrary was error. See id. Consequently, Mickey asserts the
trial court misapplied the law under section 5985.1 and the rules of evidence.
See id. at 27-28. We disagree.
The standard of review employed when faced with a challenge to
the trial court’s decision as to whether or not to admit evidence is
well[-]settled. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence
lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing
court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse
of discretion. Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but rather whether the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or whether the
record shows that the action is a result or partiality, prejudice,
bias[,] or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
“Generally, an out-of-court statement is inadmissible at trial unless it
falls into one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v.
Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 510 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also Pa.R.E. 801(c)
(defining “hearsay” as statement that “(1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”); Pa.R.E. 802
(“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules
prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.”).
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The Tender Years Act provides as follows:
(1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness,
who at the time the statement was made was 16 years of age or
younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated[], not
otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible
in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:
(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the
evidence is relevant and that the time, content[,] and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(ii) the child either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a).
To make a finding that the child is unavailable as a witness, “the court
must determine, based on evidence presented to it, that testimony by the
child as a witness will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
that would substantially impair the child’s ability to reasonably communicate.”
Id. at § 5985.1(a.1). Pursuant to the statute, in making this finding, the trial
court may “[o]bserve and question the child, either inside or outside the
courtroom.” Id. at (a.1)(1). The court may also rely on testimony “of a
parent or custodian or any other person, such as a person who has dealt with
the child in a medical or therapeutic setting.” Id. at (a.1)(2). “These possible
avenues of inquiry are merely advisory, not mandatory.” Fidler v.
Cunningham-Small, 871 A.2d 231, 237 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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The admissibility of this type of hearsay is determined by
assessing the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
surrounding the circumstances under which the statements were
uttered to the person who is testifying. To determine whether a
child’s out-of-court statements are admissible under the [act], a
trial court must assess the relevancy of the statements and their
reliability in accordance with the test enunciated in [Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)]. Although the test is not exclusive,
the most obvious factors to be considered include the spontaneity
of the statements, consistency in repetition, the mental state of
the declarant, use of terms unexpected in children of that age[,]
and the lack of a motive to fabricate.
Commonwealth v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442, 451 (Pa. 2014) (formatting altered,
quotation marks and citations omitted).
The trial court addressed this claim in its opinion as follows:
The statements of M.M. . . . were sought to show [Mickey]’s
demeanor on the night murder because M.M. observed [Mickey]
when he returned to [Green]’s house after the shooting.
***
[Green] used a lot of equivocal words such as “like[,”]“you
know[,”] and “maybe” in her testimony. She contradicted herself
by testifying on direct that [M.M.] “shuts down” and doesn’t want
to talk about the surrounding circumstances of the shooting but
later stating that [M.M.] is willing to talk about details of the
evening in question that she remembers. [Green] testified that
she ha[d not] spoken to M.M. about the court proceedings, either
about [Mickey]’s first trial or his then-impending second trial.
[Green] said that M.M. was unaware of any of the court
proceedings.
[Green] made conclusory, boilerplate comments that M.M. would
not be able to “communicate effectively” when it comes to anyone
asking [M.M.] questions. [Green]’s testimony was contradictory
to her prior assertion that M.M. can effectively communicate with
people.
[Green] replied “maybe[,”] when asked if M.M. needs to have her
mother near her in order to feel comfortable enough to talk to
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strangers. When asked if M.M. would be able to communicate to
the court without [Green] being present, [Green] said “No.”
[Green’s] reason for this conclusion was, “I just know her.”
[Green] testified that she ha[d] never discussed with M.M.
whether she would be willing or able to answer any questions in
court. [Green] admitted that M.M. was able to communicate with
law enforcement in the days following the shooting. [Green]
reiterated that M.M. is able and does[,] in fact[,] talk to [Green]
about her recollections of the night in question.
[Green] testified that M.M. has an I.E.P. for her academics, sees
a school psychologist[,] and has an emotional support therapist at
school. [Green] testified that she recommended that M.M. attend
therapy to help resolve her alleged trouble communicating her
feelings to [Green]. [Green] attributed M.M.’s need for therapy to
the changes in M.M.’s behavior in the aftermath of her father’s
crimes. M.M. was approximately [10] years old when the shooting
occurred; at the time of the [March 6, 2025] hearing, M.M. was
approximately [12] years old.
[Green] testified that M.M., understandably, misses her dad,
[Mickey], and experiences emotional distress as a result.
However, the standard we are constrained to apply here is not
mere sadness or emotional distress, but “severe emotional
distress that would substantially impair the child’s ability to
reasonably communicate.” 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 5985.1(a)(a.1).
[Green]’s equivocal language and internally inconsistent
statements, along with her boilerplate, uncorroborated, and
conclusory assumptions concerning M.M.’s ability to communicate
at trial, in light of the fact that she had never broached the subject
with M.M. prior to the hearing or even talked to M.M. about the
fact that there were court proceedings involving [Mickey], did not
imbue the court with confidence in [Green’s] testimony regarding
M.M.’s mental state vis-à-vis testifying on behalf of [Mickey] in
court. We were unable to place trust in or embrace [Green]’s
opinions as to M.M.’s communicative skills as a witness for
[Mickey].
***
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Accordingly, we determined that M.M. was not unavailable and, if
the defense wished to have her testify in court, they would be
required to call [M.M.] as a witness.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 6-11 (emphasis added; some citations
omitted).
Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned and sound
determination that M.M. was not unavailable under the language of the Tender
Years Act. See id. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion and we
afford Mickey no relief.
Mickey addresses his second, third, and fourth claims together and, for
ease of disposition, we do as well. These claims all pertain to the trial court’s
jury instructions regarding homicide and, specifically, the trial court’s alleged
failure to issue a heat-of-passion instruction. See Brief for Appellant, at 29-
40. Upon review, we conclude that these claims are waived.
Mickey implies that he raised his objections during an off-record
charging conference;15 however, Mickey did not raise any of these objections
on the record at trial and, consequently, they are waived. See
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 317 n.18 (Pa. 2014) (implications
that objection may have occurred off record during in camera discussions will
____________________________________________
15 Mickey states that he preserved these claims prior to closing arguments.
See Brief for Appellant, at 16-18 (statement of places raising or preserving
issues). Specifically, he quotes a brief on-the-record exchange, which we also
quote below, during which the trial court refers to an off-the-record exchange
and allows defense counsel to place his argument on the record. See id.
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not preserve jury instruction objection where counsel objection does not
appear of record); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(b) (“A general exception to the
charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for appeal. Specific exception
shall be taken to the language or omission complained of.”) (emphasis
added); Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“No portions of the charge nor omissions from
the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made
thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.”).
Notably, prior to closing arguments, the trial court conducted a charging
conference, at which it allowed the parties to argue regarding the heat of
passion charge. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 6/20/25, at 2-5 (trial court
conducting charging conference prior to closing arguments). The following
exchange occurred:
[Trial Court]: Any of you believe I should not give any of the
proposed instructions?
[ADA]: No.
[Trial Court]: Are you satisfied with the list?
[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
[ADA]: Yes.
[Trial Court]: Defense, I think you already made your argument,
but I will allow you to restate it here with regard to my instruction
on voluntary manslaughter with murder in issue, which is
15.2503.A. We have had much discussion about whether to
include both options, the self-defense, be it reasonable or not,
coupled with the other option, which is the provocation case. You
can make your record now with why you think the provocation
piece should also stay in.
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[Defense Counsel]: I think the record supports the fact there was
arguably serious provocation that would allow such an instruction
to be read to the jury and I think it should stay in, that’s all.
***
[Trial Court]: . . . I do not believe that the evidence is of record
to support giving both parts of that instruction. So, counsel, your
request is noted for the record . . . but the provocation piece is
removed from that standard instruction. There were some
alterations made by agreement to th[at] instruction relating to
prior testimony. Both sides have had an opportunity to see the
in