Com. v. Autery, J.

J-S32043-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JONATHAN LEE AUTERY : : Appellant : No. 2598 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001494-2022 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2026 Appellant Jonathan Lee Autery appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder. The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his first-degree murder conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove he possessed the specific intent to kill in light of his voluntary intoxication; (2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence for the same reason; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting several exhibits without proper authentication. After careful review, we affirm. ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S32043-26 Appellant was initially charged in 2022 with first-degree murder, third- degree murder, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, and related charges in connection with the death of Martin Vera Felix (“the victim”). Appellant proceeded to a jury trial held on May 20, 2025, where the Commonwealth proceeded on the charges of first-degree murder and third- degree murder and withdrew the remaining charges.1 The following background was developed at trial. The prosecution presented the eyewitness testimony of Shronda Dudley (“Dudley”), who indicated that on the morning of February 1, 2022, Appellant, who was her boyfriend at that time, was driving Dudley’s gray Mazda minivan through the City of Chester, Delaware County. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/20/25, at 144-48. Dudley was seated in the front passenger seat. Id. at 147. Appellant drove past the victim, who was walking in the street with his wife, Gail Burke (“Burke”). Id. at 147-48. Dudley was acquainted with Burke as well as the victim, whom she knew as “Marty.” Id. at 148. Upon seeing the victim, Appellant stated, “Oh, there he go. I’m going to kill this mother[---].” Id. at 148-49. Appellant then brought the minivan to a stop, exited the vehicle, and ran toward the victim. Id. at 149. The victim ____________________________________________ 1 The matter was repeatedly continued in significant part due to the protracted proceedings surrounding Appellant’s competency to stand trial. Multiple competency evaluations were performed as the defense’s own expert withdrew his finding of incompetency. The trial court ordered an independent evaluation be completed in which a licensed psychologist determined Appellant was competent to stand trial. See Competency Report, 9/16/24. -2- J-S32043-26 ignored Appellant and continued walking in the opposite direction. Id. Appellant returned to the minivan, executed a U-turn, and drove after the victim. Id. As he accelerated toward the victim, Appellant again declared his intention to kill the victim. Id. at 150. Over Dudley’s voiced objections, Appellant “slammed on the gas” and drove the minivan directly into the victim from behind, striking him with such force that the victim’s head made contact with the front windshield of the vehicle. Id. After this initial collision, Appellant applied the brakes with such force that the victim rolled off the hood of the minivan and fell to the street. Id. at 151. Appellant then attempted to run over the victim’s head with the minivan, which prompted Dudley to grab the steering wheel. Id. Her intervention caused the minivan to veer sharply to the right, crash through a chain-link fence, and come to rest against the wall of the home located at 2618 Price Street. Id. at 151-52. Dudley sustained a broken clavicle and a broken right arm in the crash. Id. at 152. After the crash, Appellant exited the disabled minivan, retrieved a fence post from the wreckage of the chain-link fence, and proceeded to the middle of the street where the victim lay incapacitated. Id. at 176. Surveillance video showed that the victim was still alive at that point, as the victim initially grabbed at the fence post and attempted to fend off Appellant’s continued assault. See Cmwlth. Exh. C-12; Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 1/21/26, at 12- 13. Burke, the victim’s wife, attempted to intervene, but Appellant forced her away and returned to deliver several additional blows to the prone victim with -3- J-S32043-26 the fence post. See Cmwlth. Exh. C-12; T.C.O. at 13. Upon hearing approaching sirens, Appellant fled the scene on foot, running to his home approximately one block away. N.T., 5/20/25, at 215. Surveillance video from the residence at 1400 Culhane Street captured the moment Appellant’s minivan struck the victim, including the sequence in which Appellant retrieved the fence post and beat the victim as he lay helplessly in the roadway. See Cmwlth. Exh. C-11. and C-12. Cell phone videos recorded by Lizbeth Diaz, the resident of the home at 2618 Price Street into which the minivan crashed, captured the aftermath at the crash scene. See Cmwlth Exh. C-8 and C-9. On Exhibit C-8, Appellant is heard yelling: “I ran your ass the f--- over” and “I told you don’t let me catch you walking these streets.” On Exhibit C-9, Appellant is seen attempting to dislodge the minivan from the fence while repeatedly shouting, “You got to die. You got to die.” See also N.T., 5/20/25, at 204. Chester City Police Officer Terrance Broaddus was among the first officers to respond, arriving at the scene just before 11:00 a.m. Id. at 51-54. He observed the victim lying in the street and the minivan resting on top of what remained of a fence at the adjacent property, with visible front-end damage, both airbags deployed, and the driver’s side door open. Id. at 54. An open, empty beer can was visible in the interior of the vehicle. Id. at 56. Officer Broaddus was then directed to Honan Street, where Appellant had already been placed in custody by other officers. Id. at 55-57. Officer Broaddus believed Appellant was intoxicated given that Appellant smelled of -4- J-S32043-26 alcohol, was slurring his words, appeared confused, gave inconsistent statements, and had a disheveled appearance. Id. at 57-58. Appellant repeatedly stated that he did not know where he was, did not understand why he was in handcuffs, and denied having driven a vehicle. Id. at 59. After being transported to the Chester Police Department and again advised of his Miranda rights, Appellant continued to display signs of intoxication and made statements that were at times nonsensical, though he acknowledged that his keys and cell phone were in the van and admitted to having consumed two beers. Id. at 115. However, Appellant also asked officers to secure his home and turn off his stove which he was using as a makeshift heater. Id. at 59. Appellant refused a voluntary blood alcohol test. Id. at 111. After officers obtained a search warrant to compel Appellant to submit to a blood test, a blood sample was drawn from Appellant at 6:27 p.m. on February 1, 2022. N.T., 5/21/25, at 15. The parties stipulated that Dr. Robert Cohn, a forensic toxicologist employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, tested the sample and determined Appellant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.122 at the time of the draw. Id. Given the rate of alcohol dissipation over time, Dr. Cohn calculated that Appellant’s BAC would have been approximately 0.23 at the time he was taken into custody. Id. at 15-16. Although emergency personnel had rushed the victim to the hospital, the victim succumbed to his injuries and passed away. Id. at 129, 136. Dr. Khalil Wardak, qualified as an expert in forensic pathology, testified that he performed the victim’s autopsy on February 3, 2022, and determined that the -5- J-S32043-26 cause of the victim’s death was multiple blunt force injuries to the hip, chest, legs, and head, and that the manner of death was homicide. N.T., 5/20/25, at 128-32. While toxicology testing revealed that the victim had consumed alcohol and cocaine prior to his death, Dr. Wardak testified that these findings did not contribute to the cause or manner of death. Id. at 133. Detective James Reardon of the Delaware County Criminal Investigation Unit, accepted as an expert in accident reconstruction, testified that based on his analysis of the video evidence and his on-scene measurements, the minivan was traveling between 32.44 and 37.31 miles per hour at the moment of impact with the victim. Id. at 290. On cross-examination, Dudley admitted she had an outstanding arrest warrant and had provided false names to law enforcement on prior occasions, but denied using a false social security number or date of birth. Id. at 218- 21. Dudley also acknowledged that while she initially denied Appellant had been drinking that morning, she subsequently conceded that Appellant was a habitual drinker as he drank “every chance he got”; Dudley testified that Appellant could well have been drinking on the morning of February 1, 2022. Id. at 215-17. Appellant elected not to testify at trial. N.T., 5/21/25, at 12. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder. On August 8, 2025, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1). On August 15, 2025, Appellant filed post-sentence motions. On September 2, 2025, the trial court denied the post-sentence motions. -6- J-S32043-26 On October 2, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On October 9, 2025, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within thirty days. On November 7, 2025, Appellant timely filed his concise statement of errors. The trial court authored a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 21, 2026. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish murder of the first degree where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted with malice and could form, or did form, the specific intent to kill? 2. Whether the verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree was against the weight of the evidence because Appellant was intoxicated and thereby incapable of forming the specific intent to kill, and where the Commonwealth produced no evidence to the contrary, such that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial? 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting video exhibits C-8, C-9, C-11, C-12, and C-19 without proper authentication and over Appellant’s objection? See Appellant’s Brief, at 10. Appellant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for murder of the first degree because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to kill in light of his intoxication. We disagree. Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is well established: -7- J-S32043-26 The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. ... Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 457–58 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189 (Pa. Super. 2018). First-degree murder is an intentional killing, i.e., a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). To sustain a conviction for murder of the first degree, the Commonwealth must prove that: “(1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Woodard, 634 Pa. 162, 179, 129 A.3d 480, 490 (2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Houser, 610 Pa. 264, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133 (2011)). Specific intent to kill may be established through circumstantial evidence, including the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Commonwealth v. Burno, 626 Pa. 30, 94 A.3d 956 (2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 (2007)). -8- J-S32043-26 Evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication may, in appropriate circumstances, reduce a charge of first-degree murder to a murder of a lower degree. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308. A claim of voluntary intoxication, which is a defense of diminished capacity, “does not exculpate the defendant from criminal liability entirely, but negates the element of specific intent.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, 286, 55 A.3d 1108, 1122 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (2011)). However, evidence of intoxication, by itself, is not sufficient to establish a diminished capacity defense. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 47, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006). Rather, to reduce a homicide from first- degree to third-degree murder on the basis of diminished capacity, the defendant must demonstrate that “his cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were so compromised, by mental defect or voluntary intoxication, that he was unable to formulate the specific intent to kill.” Sepulveda, 618 Pa. at 286, 55 A.3d at 1122. Critically, the proffering of a voluntary intoxication defense does not alter the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. As our Supreme Court has explained, evidence of intoxication “creates no new presumption for the defendant and imposes no new burden on the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 268, 344 A.2d 824, 826 (1975). ”[T]he [burden to prove the specific intent to kill] is neither increased nor diminished by an attempt by a defendant to disprove the element of intent by a showing of lack of capacity, due to intoxication, to form such an intent.” Id. -9- J-S32043-26 (citation omitted). “Whether a defendant has established that his ‘faculties and sensibilities were so overwhelmed with drugs so that he could not form the specific intent to kill is a question of fact solely within the province of the jury, who is free to believe any, all, or none of the testimony regarding intoxication.’” Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 599 Pa. 617, 628, 962 A.2d 1170, 1177 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403, 861 A.2d 898, 908 (2004)). We also observe, as the Commonwealth correctly notes, that Appellant’s sufficiency argument is in substantial part a challenge to the weight of the evidence rather than its sufficiency. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail, where an appellant phrases an issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but the argument actually goes to the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (1999). The question of how the jury weighs conflicting evidence of intoxication is the province of the fact-finder, not a sufficiency inquiry. Nonetheless, we address the sufficiency claim and find it meritless. Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, overwhelmingly established Appellant’s specific intent to kill. The record contains evidence that Appellant made multiple statements which clearly demonstrated his intent to kill the victim. Dudley testified that when Appellant first noticed Appellant walking on the street, Appellant stated without equivocation that “I’m going to kill him,” and “Oh, there he go. I’m going to kill this mother[---].” N.T., 5/20/25, at 148-50. Appellant then - 10 - J-S32043-26 stopped the vehicle, exited to confront the victim, returned to the minivan when the victim walked away, then deliberately turned the minivan around, accelerated, and struck the victim from behind at a speed of more than thirty miles per hour. Id. at 149-50; 290. Appellant then attempted to drive over the victim’s head, but was prevented from doing so when Dudley grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle to crash. Id. at 151-52. The video evidence further and powerfully corroborated this direct evidence of specific intent. On Exhibit C-8, recorded by a bystander in the immediate aftermath of the crash, Appellant is heard screaming: “I ran your ass the f--- over” and “I told you don’t let me catch you walking these streets.” T.C.O. at 10. Such statements demonstrate not only a recollection of the act Appellant had just committed but also an awareness that the act was deliberate and connected to a prior warning to the victim. On Exhibit C-9, Appellant is heard repeatedly chanting “You got to die. You got to die” while attempting to free the minivan from the fence. N.T., 5/20/25, at 204. Exhibit C-12 also shows Appellant, after exiting the crashed minivan, deliberately retrieving a fence post and using it to beat the victim repeatedly as the victim lay helpless in the street. Appellant continued the assault even as the victim’s wife attempted to intervene. This is not a case in which the Commonwealth relied entirely on circumstantial evidence of intent. To the contrary, Appellant repeatedly and explicitly declared his intent to kill the victim, both before and after his attacks. Appellant’s conduct was methodical, driving past the victim, turning around, - 11 - J-S32043-26 accelerating, striking the victim with the vehicle, attempting to run over the victim a second time, then retrieving a weapon to continue the assault. On this record, no reasonable juror could have concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant acted with the specific intent to kill the victim. Appellant’s argument rests on his suggestion that because his BAC was approximately 0.23 at the time of the crash, the Commonwealth was obligated to introduce affirmative rebuttal evidence of his ability to form intent. Appellant’s Brief, at 31-32. This is a misstatement of the law. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized, evidence of intoxication “creates no presumption for the defendant and imposes no new burden on the Commonwealth.” Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 344 A.2d at 826. The jury, having observed the video evidence directly and heard the testimony of all witnesses, was entitled to conclude that Appellant’s intoxication did not deprive him of the capacity to form the specific intent to kill. As there was sufficient evidence to show Appellant’s specific intent to kill the victim, this claim fails. Appellant next argues that even if the evidence was technically sufficient, the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. He reiterates his claim that that the uncontradicted evidence of his intoxication (his BAC of 0.23) compelled the jury to find in his favor on the voluntary intoxication defense. As such, - 12 - J-S32043-26 Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a new trial. We disagree. With respect to a weight of the evidence challenge: Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of the trial court's discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial court when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is, or is not, against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the trial court's conviction that the verdict was, or was not, against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. A trial court abuses its discretion where the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. By comparison, the role of the trial court is to determine whether, notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 359 A.3d 39, 47 (Pa. Super. 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 351 A.3d 1245, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2026)). The trial court, having presided over the trial and observed the witnesses and video evidence firsthand, thoroughly addressed this claim and declined to disturb the jury’s verdict. T.C.O. at 18-21. Having reviewed the record, we find no palpable abuse of discretion. - 13 - J-S32043-26 The jury was presented with competing evidence on the issue of Appellant’s capacity to form specific intent. Appellant emphasizes that Officer Broaddus agreed that Appellant appeared to be intoxicated at the crime scene as Appellant was slurring his words, appeared confused, gave inconsistent statements, and had a disheveled appearance. Appellant highlights his stipulated BAC of 0.23 at the time of the crash and points out that Dudley conceded that Appellant was a habitual drinker who likely had been drinking that morning. In response, the Commonwealth set forth a strong case to support an inference that Appellant formed the intent to kill the victim: Appellant’s multiple, explicit verbal declarations of his intent to kill; his deliberate, multi-step actions before, during, and after the collision; his demonstrated ability to perceive, identify, and track the victim while driving; his ability to execute a U-turn; and, most compellingly, his own words on video in the immediate aftermath which demonstrated clear perception, cognition, and recall of the events and a prior warning he had given the victim. The jury was instructed on the voluntary intoxication defense and chose to reject it. That choice was well within the jury’s province. The jury was justified in finding that the video evidence, which recorded Appellant’s demeanor and conduct during the murder, was entirely inconsistent with a person so overwhelmed by alcohol as to lack the capacity to form a specific intent to kill. T.C.O. at 20-21. The jury was “free to believe or disbelieve any, all, or none of the testimony addressing intoxication.” Vandivner, supra. - 14 - J-S32043-26 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence and denying a new trial on this basis. Appellant’s final claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting video exhibits C-8, C-9, C-11, C-12, and C-19 over his objection, because the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate them. Specifically, Appellant argues that Dudley lacked the competence to authenticate the videos because they were recorded from vantage points outside the minivan, not from her perspective. Further, Appellant asserts that the officers who testified about the videos lacked knowledge of how the videos were created, downloaded, and preserved. We find no abuse of discretion. With respect to the admission of evidence, ”[t]he admissibility of evidence is a matter for the discretion of the trial court and a ruling thereon will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 495 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Pratt, 357 A.3d 497, 502 (Pa. Super. 2026). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides that ”[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). - 15 - J-S32043-26 “Generally, authentication requires a low burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 818 (Pa. Super. 2022). Pennsylvania Rule 901(b) contains a non-exhaustive list of methods to authenticate evidence, which includes the “testimony of a witness with personal knowledge [that] a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). In addition, evidence may be authenticated when evaluating ”[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of an item, taken together with all the circumstances,” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(4). This Court has acknowledged that “[d]emonstrative evidence such as photographs [and] motion pictures ... have long been permitted to be entered into evidence provided that the demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict.” Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 986-87 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Crucially, this Court has recognized that ”[i]t is not necessary that the maker of a videotape testify to the tape’s accuracy; any witness familiar with the subject matter can testify that the tape was a fair and accurate depiction of the events sought to be shown.” Commonwealth v. Impellizzeri, 661 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. Super. 1995) (emphasis added). This Court has affirmed admission of a video authenticated by a witness who had personal knowledge of the depicted events, even where that witness was not the one who recorded the video. See Commonwealth v. Hindi, 631 A.2d 1341, 1346 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding that the driver of a vehicle who witnessed an incident properly authenticated - 16 - J-S32043-26 video of the incident, though he had not recorded it, by testifying that it fairly and accurately depicted the events). In this case, the trial court conducted two extended evidentiary hearings outside the presence of the jury to carefully assess the authentication issue. N.T., 5/20/25, at 61-101, 156-97. After hearing testimony from Officer Broaddus, Detective McFarland, Captain Goldschmidt, and Dudley, the trial court found the videos were sufficiently authenticated and overruled the defense objections. Id. at 187, 196. We agree that the authentication standard was satisfied. With respect to Exhibits C-11 and C-12, the surveillance videos from 1400 Culhane Street, Dudley testified under oath that Exhibit C-11 fairly and accurately depicted Appellant driving her van and striking the victim, given that she had observed these events from the passenger seat of the van. N.T., 5/20/25, at 159. She testified that Exhibit C-12 also fairly and accurately depicted the subsequent sequence of events she witnessed, including the vehicle crashing through the fence and into the house. Id. at 176-77. Captain Goldschmidt separately corroborated this authentication by testifying that he had personally located the cameras mounted on 1400 Culhane Street during his on-scene canvas, that Exhibits C-11 and C-12 were consistent with the direction in which those cameras were pointed, and that the area depicted was one he had worked in for approximately fifteen years and recognized. Id. at 165-75. With respect to Exhibits C-8 and C-9, the cell phone videos recorded by Lizbeth Diaz, Dudley testified that Exhibit C-8, which showed her van after it - 17 - J-S32043-26 had crashed into the house, fairly and accurately depicted the events of February 1, 2022. Dudley identified Appellant in the video wearing the same clothes he wore that day and noted that she was inside the van during the recording. Id. at 178-79. As to Exhibit C-9, Dudley similarly identified herself exiting the van, identified Appellant, and confirmed the video fairly and accurately depicted the events. Id. at 181-84. Additionally, Officer Broaddus testified to numerous specific, distinctive characteristics visible in Exhibit C-8 that were consistent with his observations at the crime scene, including the minivan, the crash damage, the debris pattern, the street signs, the victim lying in the roadway, Appellant’s appearance, and Appellant’s voice. Id. at 68-72. Taajah Burton, who was at the scene, identified herself in Exhibit C-9 standing next to the victim in the street. Id. at 234-35. Detective McFarland testified that Exhibits C-8 and C-9 were recovered directly from Diaz’s cell phone pursuant to a signed consent form. Id. at 83-84. Further, Detective Stewart, who had personally interviewed Appellant, identified Appellant’s voice in the videos and on the compilation video, Exhibit C-19, which contained portions of the four aforementioned videos. Id. at 255-57. We cannot find any merit to Appellant’s argument that Dudley could not properly authenticate the videos because they recorded events that occurred outside the van during the time that she was inside the van. Appellant offers no authority to support his suggestion that a witness with personal knowledge of an event needs to view the event from the exact vantage point of the - 18 - J-S32043-26 surveillance camera in order to be able to authenticate its recorded video footage. Rule 901 merely requires that the witness with personal knowledge of the event testify that the demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict. To the extent that Appellant argues that Dudley’s testimony regarding the accident does not correlate with the events captured on the video, this is a question of credibility that was resolved by the jury. “[T]he fact-finder is charged with the responsibility to resolve contradictory testimony and questions of credibility, and we may not substitute our judgment in place of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 272 A.3d 511, 516 (Pa. Super. 2022). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the exhibits were properly authenticated. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Date: 10/21/2026 - 19 -