Com. v. Capobianco
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket1967 EDA 2025
JudgeBeck
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN M. CAPOBIANCO :
:
Appellant : No. 1967 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 6, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008644-2022
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
John M. Capobianco (“Capobianco”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“trial
court”) following his guilty plea to one count each of simple assault and
criminal mischief.1 Capobianco argues that his plea was not knowingly
entered. After careful review, we affirm.
On March 2, 2022, the police arrested Capobianco after he shot a pellet
gun at Melanie Morrison and her vehicle. The Commonwealth charged him
with aggravated assault, terroristic threats, possession of an instrument of
crime, simple assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal mischief.
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1), 3304(a)(5).
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Following a protracted procedural history not relevant to this appeal, the
trial court scheduled trial for May 6, 2024. On that date, Capobianco agreed
to plead guilty to simple assault and criminal mischief in exchange for the
Commonwealth nol prossing the remaining charges and an aggregate
sentence of 3 years of probation. 2 The trial court accepted the plea and
imposed the negotiated sentence that same day.
On May 10, 2024, Capobianco filed a motion to withdraw his plea. In
the motion, he contended that the trial court should apply the presentence
standard for plea withdrawal and argued that he was innocent and the
Commonwealth would not be prejudiced if the trial court permitted him to
withdraw his plea. The Commonwealth filed a response, arguing that the post-
sentence standard for withdrawing a plea applied and that Capobianco failed
to meet this heightened burden because his guilty plea was entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court denied Capobianco’s
motion. Capobianco did not file an appeal.
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2 Capobianco completed an oral and written guilty plea colloquy. Following
the filing of the instant appeal, the Commonwealth filed a motion to correct
the record, indicating the written plea colloquy had not been included in the
certified record. This Court granted the motion and directed the trial court to
transmit a supplemental record with the written plea colloquy. Order,
6/22/2026 (per curiam). Subsequently, the trial court sent a response,
stating that the written plea colloquy had been lost. Letter, 7/30/2026.
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On September 18, 2024, Capobianco filed a timely petition for relief
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 3 seeking, inter alia, the
reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The PCRA court granted
Capobianco’s motion to reinstate his appellate rights. He then filed a notice
of appeal nunc pro tunc and a concise statement of matters complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Capobianco’s appeal presents the following issue: “Whether
Capobianco’s guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily[?]” Capobianco’s Brief at 7.
Capobianco argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his
guilty plea. Id. at 11, 15. He contends that in the absence of the written
colloquy, the trial court’s oral colloquy failed to conduct an adequate inquiry
into five of the six questions that establish his understanding of the
consequences of entering the plea. Id. at 11, 12-13. He asserts that he did
not understand the elements of the charges to which he pled guilty; the factual
basis for his plea was “exceedingly short and did not specify the act
performed”; the colloquy did not specify Capobianco’s right to a jury trial, only
that he had an absolute right to have a trial; the correct maximum possible
sentence he could face; and that the trial court is not bound by the terms of
his plea agreement. Id. at 13-14. Capobianco further claims that the trial
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3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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court and plea counsel should have ensured he understood that any attempt
to withdraw the plea after sentencing under the manifest injustice standard
would be significantly more difficult than before sentencing. Id. at 14, 15.
The Commonwealth argues that Capobianco waived his appellate claim
because his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea only asserted
his innocence under a presentence standard to withdraw a plea, and he did
not challenge the allegedly unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent nature
of the plea. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-9.
“Pennsylvania law makes clear that by entering a plea of guilty, a
defendant waives his right to challenge on direct appeal all nonjurisdictional
defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea.”
Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468 (Pa. Super.
2017). There are two different standards to be applied to a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea based upon whether the request is made pre- or post-
sentencing. A defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea after
sentencing must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice
before withdrawal is justified. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d
378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice
when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Id.
(citation omitted). On the other hand, “the proper inquiry on consideration of
[] a [presentence] withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some
colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting
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withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice[,]” unless
withdrawal would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 120-21 (Pa. 2019) (citation
omitted). “A fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes claim of
innocence that is at least plausible.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d
1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2022).
The record reflects that in Capobianco’s post-sentence motion to
withdraw his plea, he raised his claim under the standard governing “the
decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.” Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 5/10/2024, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). In support,
Capobianco asserted “his actual innocence,” and that there would be “no
prejudice to the Commonwealth” by granting his motion. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. He
never raised the post-sentence standard for withdrawing his plea—manifest
injustice—or challenged the voluntariness of his plea before the court below.
We therefore conclude that Capobianco waived the argument he now
raises on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 41 (Pa. Super.
2017) (concluding appellant waived issues not raised in his motion to withdraw
the guilty plea); see also Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506
(Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] request to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds that
it was involuntary is one of the claims that must be raised by motion in the
trial court in order to be reviewed on direct appeal.”) (citation omitted). That
Capobianco challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea in his Pa.R.A.P.
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1925(b) statement does not preserve it for appeal. See Monjaras-Amaya,
163 A.3d at 469 (concluding that the appellant waived a challenge to his guilty
plea when he raised this issue for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement). 4
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/16/2026
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4 To the extent Capobianco contends that plea counsel provided ineffective
assistance, our Supreme Court has held that “claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain
claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should
not be reviewed upon direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d
562, 576 (Pa. 2013) (footnote omitted).
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