Full Opinion

J-S39019-25 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMAAL HASSAN : : Appellant : No. 348 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007595-2023 BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 Appellant Jamaal Hassan appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after he was convicted of possession of a firearm prohibited following a bench trial.1 On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm. The trial court set forth the facts of the case as follows: On October 13, 2023, at approximately 7:00 P.M. a Philadelphia Police Officer, Officer Marcus Allen, along with his partner Officer Glover responded to a mosque located on the 6500 block of Haverford Avenue for a radio call of a person with a gun. At the time Officer Allen had been a Philadelphia Police Officer for 9 ½ years and testified that he was familiar with the area as a high crime area and had made several firearm arrests. Officer Allen stated that the radio call alerted police that two individuals, including Appellant, wearing a white robe and another male wearing a black robe had a gun. The radio call specifically stated that one of these individuals “placed a firearm in the closet ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). J-S39019-25 of th[e] masjid.” After arriving, Officers Allen and Glover [] met with two witnesses who stated that “there were black males that they were unfamiliar with, [and] one of them plac[ed] a [gun] magazine with ammunition in the closet.”[2] Officer Allen clarified that the witnesses the officers spoke to personally saw the individuals placing the firearm and magazine in the closet. He then stated that “another witness came and actually showed us the magazine inside of the jacket with live ammunition.” Those who witnessed the individuals place the jacket and magazine in the closet then brought the two individuals, including Appellant, to the officers. Officer Glover then asked if either had a license to carry firearms or live ammunition with them. Both individuals stated that they did not have a license or any ammunition with them. This signified to the officers that the individuals were lying because officers had “already see[n] the magazine and the live ammunition.” Due to the existence of the magazine and Appellant’s response Officer Allen frisked Appellant and located a firearm on his waistband. The firearm and magazine were placed on a Philadelphia Property Receipt which detailed a “black and gray nine-millimeter [Daewoo DP51], serial number 409621, loaded with 15 rounds and the one extended magazine that was recovered from the jacket with 30 rounds.” Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/25, at 2-3 (citations omitted and some formatting altered). ____________________________________________ 2 As the Commonwealth Court stated in rejecting a claim that large capacity gun magazines are not “ammunition” or an “ammunition component” under the Uniform Firearm Act, “a large capacity magazine stores ammunition . . . directly concerns ‘ammunition’ and is a ‘component’ or piece of firearm that regulates the manner in which a firearm utilizes ‘ammunition.’” Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of Pittsburgh, 276 A.3d 878, 891 n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). We also note that we are not bound by decisions of our sister court; however, “such decisions provide persuasive authority and we may turn to our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.” Lynn v. Aria Health System, 227 A.3d 22, 32 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted and some formatting altered). -2- J-S39019-25 Appellant was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia. See Criminal Information, 11/14/23. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, and on March 11, 2024, the trial court held a suppression hearing wherein Appellant argued that police conducted a Terry3 frisk without reasonable suspicion that he was armed or dangerous. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 3/11/24, at 3-5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. See id. at 27-31. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial on January 22, 2025. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of possession of a firearm prohibited 4 and sentenced Appellant to two to four years’ incarceration. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issue for our review: Did the suppression court err when it denied [Appellant’s] pre-trial motion to suppress physical evidence where a gun was recovered from [Appellant] during a Terry pat-down and the suppression record does not demonstrate that the officer had a reasonable ____________________________________________ 3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 4 The Commonwealth nolle prossed the charges for carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia before proceeding to trial. See N.T., 1/22/25, at 10. -3- J-S39019-25 belief based upon specific and articulable facts that Appellant was armed and dangerous before the frisk was performed? Appellant’s Brief at 5 (footnote omitted and some formatting altered). Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[ ] below are subject to our plenary review. Commonwealth v. McLean, 302 A.3d 211, 215 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)) (some formatting altered). It is well settled that “Article I, [Section] 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence arising under both charters has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and police.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. -4- J-S39019-25 The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause. Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted). [T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time the officer conducted the stop must be answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the stop warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). It is well settled that when determining whether a seizure has taken place, a court must apply an objective test: [T]o guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, our focus is whether, by means of physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way been restrained. In making this determination, no single factor dictates the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred. -5- J-S39019-25 Commonwealth v. Green, 298 A.3d 1158, 1163 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). Our Supreme Court has clarified that the mere possession of a concealed firearm in public is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, “[u]nless a police officer has prior knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to carry a concealed firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a firearm is being used or intended to be used in a criminal manner[.]” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937 (Pa. 2019). The Hicks Court further explained: A police officer is entitled to view individual’s conduct in light of the “probabilities” that criminal activity may be afoot and indisputably may draw “certain common sense conclusions about human behavior.” [United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).] Relevant contextual considerations may include factors such as a suspect’s presence in a high crime area. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-148, (1972), but see [Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)] (“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, [] particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”) * * * A police officer is trained to assess people and situations for danger. An officer responding to a dispatch . . . is capable of responding in a manner not amounting to a seizure by observing the suspect and the circumstances, by determining whether anyone appears to be in danger or whether a crime appears to be occurring, and by interviewing witnesses about any crimes that may have occurred before the officer’s arrival. [See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. 1997)] (reasoning that, where the available information does not give rise to reasonable suspicion, “the police must investigate further by -6- J-S39019-25 means not constituting a search and seizure.”). Such activities preserve peace, law, and order, and do so without depriving anyone of his freedom unless there is cause to do so. Hicks, 208 A.3d at 938-39, 946. Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact: Officer Allen testified credibly that they were called — the radio call was person with a gun. He was actually questioned about whether that was person with ammunition or person with gun. What he had was person with a gun. They arrived at the mosque. The body-worn camera shows they were first greeted by what appeared to be a female who takes them in and says that there is a — I couldn’t actually hear. So I apologize. I don’t know if she said gun or ammunition in a coat in the closet. Closet is opened by what I’ll call the parishioner. I don’t know if she’s a parishioner or someone who works there, but I'll say parishioner. And I also saw Officer Glover actually appear to look back at Officer Allen and say, are were allowed to go in. She’s trying to make sure they’re not, in her — I took it that she didn’t want to do an illegal search. At that point, they — the officers do not search the jacket that’s in that closet, but at that point the jacket has been left in this public closet, but they don’t do a search at that point. The second . . . gentleman[] comes in, goes into that closet, goes right to a particular jacket, and pulls out what turns out to be the magazine that is loaded with, turns out to be, 30 rounds in an extended magazine. You can see it on camera. At that point, the officers now know that there is, at least, at the very least, a magazine in a closet that has been left by one of two gentlemen, per the civilians, who have made this — have made — it is a verified call from a civilian at that point to 911. At that time, [Appellant] and his friend are brought out into the sort of like hallway, slash, common area, I will call it, near the closet. And they are questioned on camera. They are asked very specifically — I’ll say [Appellant] is asked, but so is the other person, do you have a license to carry. And Officer Allen testified -7- J-S39019-25 that their response is no. I can’t — I couldn’t say like who was saying what on the video, but that's Officer Allen’s testimony. [] [T]he next question is, do either of you have any ammunition with you or on your person. And it’s actually a further comment that suggested, like, maybe not on your waistband at this moment, to which the response was no. At that point, Officer Allen had every reason to believe that one of those two people were lying to him as they had found the magazine in the closet, which has been identified by the two parishioners as belonging to one of these two gentlemen. So someone was lying. That gives rise — in [the suppression court’s] opinion, that raises this to reasonable suspicion that someone, in fact, did have ammunition on them. I do want to — I will take a little bit — counsel, you argued that they were — they didn't know what to look for in a Texas, I think it was, license to carry. My understanding of Officer Allen’s testimony is that they were looking at a Texas license, not license to carry. And the officer’s testimony about that was they were asking questions, what’s your address, you know, what’s your name, things like that, to verify that it was, in fact, a real license, but I did not take that to mean license to carry. With that said, Officer Allen then conducted a frisk. He immediately felt what he believed to be a firearm — immediately a firearm. And we can see that on the body-worn camera when he feels it, because it's at that point that he says what is this. Keep your hands up. Don’t put them down. And he does go — and I believe he says thobe, robe — goes under and pulls out a firearm. I do find Officer Allen had reasonable suspicion and, ultimately, probable cause to remove that firearm from [Appellant’s] waistband. And for those reasons, this motion is denied. N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 3/11/24, at 27-31 (some formatting altered; emphasis added). Additionally, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained: Officers responded to a verified 911 call for a person with a gun and met with the caller and other witnesses upon arriving at the scene. Civilians witnessed Appellant and another individual place -8- J-S39019-25 a loaded magazine in a public closet at a mosque. These civilians specifically identified the location and individuals who placed the magazine in the closet. Furthermore, they brought the jacket containing the loaded magazine to police officers to verify what they witnessed. The tip officers received was therefore demonstrated to be exceptionally reliable. These civilians then also brought Appellant and the other individual, whom they personally witnessed place the magazine in the closet, to officers who initiated a brief investigative detention. This brief detention was based on the presence of the loaded magazine and was to determine if either Appellant or the other individual was licensed to carry a firearm. * * * Here, prior to searching Appellant, officers had knowledge that Appellant did not have a permit and was not lawfully carrying a firearm. As stated, Officers Allen and Glover specifically did not search Appellant or the jacket until two things occurred: first, a parishioner at the mosque brought the jacket to the officers and pulled the loaded magazine [which] the [civilian witnesses] saw Appellant and another individual place in a closet[;] and secondly, the officers asked Appellant if he had a license to carry. After Appellant indicated that he [did] not have a license to carry and lied by denying any firearms or ammunition [on] his person or property, Officers Allen and Glover had specific articulable facts which supported their reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This, therefore, permitted officers to conduct a constitutionally permissible Terry frisk of Appellant. Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/25, at 7-8. Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions are supported by the record. See McLean, 302 A.3d at 215. The trial court found Officer Allen testified credibly and that his body- worn camera video corroborated his testimony. Appellant’s detected lie—that he did not have any ammunition or firearm on his person, nor a permit to carry a firearm—gave rise to reasonable suspicion to investigate whether he -9- J-S39019-25 was carrying a firearm unlawfully. Subsequently, Officer Allen conducted a frisk of Appellant and recovered a firearm from his waistband, under his robe, which gave the officer probable cause to arrest Appellant. See N.T., Suppression Hr’g, 03/11/24, at 25–30. See also Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/25, at 2- 4. Recently, this Court, in Commonwealth v. Toliver, 355 A.3d 920 (Pa. Super. 2026), reversed a trial court’s order granting suppression on the basis that the defendant’s lie to a police officer regarding the presence of a firearm in his vehicle was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention, prior to the plain view discovery of the firearm protruding from his pocket and the furtive movements described by the investigating police officer. See Toliver, 355 A.3d at 945. Accordingly, reasonable suspicion supported the investigatory detention of the defendant, as well as the officers’ question to the defendant about his firearms licensing status during the detention. See id. Therefore, the removal of the firearm from the defendant’s pocket following the frisk was lawful. See id. The Toliver Court instructs us that: Reasonable suspicion does not require that the factors on which an officer may rely be unquestionably criminal to support further investigation. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“the totality of the circumstances test [for determining reasonable suspicion] does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct”) (citation omitted). “Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Id. (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances test for determining reasonable - 10 - J-S39019-25 suspicion “is what it purports to be—it requires a suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable based upon the facts of the matter,” and potential innocent explanations for a defendant’s conduct may not negate a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity. Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in original). By disregarding [the defendant’s] lie on the basis that it was not unquestionably criminal, the suppression court here misapplied the totality of the circumstances test and erroneously concluded there was no reasonable suspicion. Toliver, 355 A.3d at 936-37. Similarly, in an unpublished memorandum of this Court, Commonwealth v. Lindsay, 2908 EDA 2023, 2024 WL 4318548 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 27, 2024) (unpublished mem.), 5 this Court reversed a trial court’s order granting suppression in a case where a police officer sitting in a marked patrol car observed [the defendant] walking with a small child. Lindsay, 2024 WL 4318548 at *3, *5. In Lindsay, the officer testified he could see the handle of a black Glock protruding from the defendant’s right pants pocket. Id. at *1. The officer opened his car door, approached the defendant with a body-worn camera, and asked the defendant two times, “Do you have a permit to carry?” Id. at *1, *5. Appellee continued to walk away and responded, “[a]hhh, s**t.” Id. at *1, *5. The officer then asked a third time if the defendant had a permit, he responded, “No, I don’t, but it’s legal.” Id. at *1. The Lindsay Court concluded that the defendant’s response, “ahh s**t,” gave the police officer reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant to determine whether he possessed the gun legally, which turned into probable ____________________________________________ 5 Unpublished memoranda filed by this Court after May 1, 2019 may be cited as persuasive authority. Pa..R.A.P. 126(b). - 11 - J-S39019-25 cause to arrest when the defendant admitted he did not have a permit to carry a gun. See id. at *5. In the instant case, when the police officers first arrived at the mosque in response to the 911 radio call for person with a gun, they interviewed the 911 caller and other witnesses. These individuals expressed concern about the potential of an armed person in their place of worship and the protection of their community, based on their observation of two men placing or perhaps hiding a loaded extended magazine in a jacket in a mosque closet for purposes and motives unknown. See N.T., Suppression Hr’g, 3/11/24 at 7-9. Hicks instructs us that a police officer may view an individual’s conduct in light of the “probabilities” that criminal activity may be afoot and indisputably may draw “certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 938. Further, officers are trained to determine whether a crime appears to be occurring or may have occurred before the officer’s arrival. See id. at 946. Here, the presence of loaded ammunition in a jacket hanging in the closet of a place of worship is understandably alarming to the worshipers at the mosque and gives rise to the reasonable common-sense inference of the possible presence of a firearm on the premises. See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 939. These observations reasonably warranted further investigation by Officer Allen and his partner, by means not constituting a search and seizure, to determine if there was reasonable suspicion that a gun was being carried illegally on the - 12 - J-S39019-25 premises. See id. An officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion does not require that the factors on which the officer relies be unquestionably criminal to support further investigation; rather, a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation based on a totality of the circumstances. See Toliver, 355 A.3d at 936-37. Here, we agree with the trial court’s reasoning in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, which addressed Hicks and concluded that the officers “did not initiate a search or seizure of Appellant, or the firearm, until after they inquired whether Appellant had a license to carry a firearm and Appellant responded he did not. Officers therefore did not infer criminal activity from the mere possession of a gun magazine.” See Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/25, at 7-8. Similar to Toliver, once Appellant lied to Officer Allen claiming that he did not have any ammunition or firearm on his person and admitted that he did not have a permit to carry a firearm, that conduct gave rise to reasonable suspicion to investigate whether he was carrying a firearm illegally. Officer Allen had a “a reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous [which] allows for a limited search for weapons [] after the police officer ascertains specific and articulable facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, so as to justify the intrusion of an investigative detention.” See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 933 (emphasis omitted). Subsequently, Officer Allen conducted a frisk of Appellant and recovered a firearm from his - 13 - J-S39019-25 waistband, under his robe, which gave the officer probable cause to arrest Appellant. On this record, based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and frisk of Appellant, which turned into probable cause to arrest him upon recovering the firearm from Appellant’s person. For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and the trial court’s suppression order denying suppression of evidence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judge Stabile joins the memorandum. Judge Sullivan concurs in the result. Date: 10/27/2026 - 14 -