Full Opinion

J-A13001-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GLENN A. KIRK IV : : Appellant : No. 717 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0000189-2025 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 22, 2026 Glenn A. Kirk IV challenges the May 15, 2025 judgment of sentence imposing a $200 fine following his summary conviction of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked. We affirm. This appeal stems from a motor vehicle traffic stop that occurred in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows: During the hearing on April 29th, 2025, [Allegheny County Police Officer] Tyler Harding,(Officer Harding) testified that on October 16, 2024, he was on duty monitoring traffic at Pittsburgh International Airport when he received an alert for a vehicle registration that had been expired for over a year on a Mini Cooper. Officer Harding ran the vehicle’s license plate and confirmed that the registration on the vehicle had been expired for more than a year, and the registered owner of the vehicle’s license was suspended as a result of a DUI. Officer Harding initiated the traffic stop, and [Appellant] was unable to produce a driver’s license but was able to provide his name and birthdate which Officer Harding used to access [Appellant’s] PennDOT J-A13001-26 driving history which showed his driver’s license was suspended. [Appellant] stated that he was the owner of the vehicle, but the previous owner had never transferred the title to him. It was the previous owner who had received a DUI while owning the vehicle. Officer Harding issued the . . . citation for driving a vehicle while his driver’s license was suspended. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/25, at 1-2 (cleaned up). Appellant was convicted of the summary offense in magisterial district court and exercised his right to a summary appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. After presiding over a de novo trial on April 29, 2025, the trial court found Appellant guilty and imposed the above-referenced fine. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s 1925(b) order. Appellant presents nine issues for our review: 1. Did the prosecution prove in personam jurisdiction? 2. Does the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction? 3. Did the trial court violate [A]ppellant’s Constitutionally protected rights? 4. Did the trial court violate the Fifth Amendment Taking’s Clause? 5. Did the trial court engage [A]ppellant in a Bill of Attainder? 6. Did the trial court follow the principle of stare decisis? 7. Did the trial court violate [A]ppellant’s right to due process of law? 8. Did the prosecution state a cause of action for which relief may be granted? 9. Were the traffic stops illegal according to standing Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law? -2- J-A13001-26 Appellant’s brief at 13-14. 1 We begin by addressing Appellant’s jurisdictional challenges, which present questions of law that we review de novo. See Commonwealth v. Ulysse, 359 A.3d 9, 13 (Pa.Super. 2026). Appellant argues that the trial court lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. As to subject matter jurisdiction, he contends that Pennsylvania’s vehicle code does not apply to him because he was not engaged in commerce at the time of the traffic stops. He continues that since his automobile was used for private travel, the court cannot regulate it. As to personal jurisdiction, Appellant argues that the prosecution never established that he consented to be governed by statutory law, and therefore the court cannot assert personal authority over him. As we outline infra, both challenges fail. Subject matter jurisdiction relates to whether a court is competent to hear the type of controversy presented. Commonwealth v. Sutton, 362 A.3d 25, 35 (Pa. 2026) (“Generally, jurisdiction is understood to mean “the ____________________________________________ 1 Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119 insofar as he neglected to divide the argument section of his brief into as many parts as there are questions presented and “have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein.” Rule 2119(a). While Appellant lists nine issues in the statement of questions presented on appeal, he presents a single argument that lacked the required headings and included few, seemingly random, paragraph breaks. While these defects did not wholly preclude meaningful review of all issues listed in the questions presented, we only address the merits of the arguments that we were able to distill from the non-compliant brief. -3- J-A13001-26 competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belonged[.]”). In Pennsylvania, magisterial district courts exercise subject matter jurisdiction over summary offenses pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S § 1515(a)(1)2 and the court of common pleas exercises subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from final orders of the magisterial district court in accordance with Pa.C.S. § 932 (“[E]ach court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the minor judiciary established within the judicial district.”). Here, Appellant was charged, tried, and convicted of summary violations of the Vehicle Code and he appealed those summary convictions to the common pleas court. Accordingly, both the magisterial district court and the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas were competent to hear the types of controversies presented in these matters. Appellant’s inane arguments concerning the ____________________________________________ 2 In relevant part, section 1515 provides as follows: (a) Jurisdiction.--Except as otherwise prescribed by general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters), magisterial district judges shall, under procedures prescribed by general rule, have jurisdiction of all of the following matters: (1) Summary offenses, except those arising out of the same episode or transaction involving a delinquent act for which a petition alleging delinquency is filed under Chapter 63 (relating to juvenile matters). 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(1). -4- J-A13001-26 inapplicability of the Vehicle Code because he was not engaged in commerce at the time he committed the violations is entirely unpersuasive. As to the challenge to personal jurisdiction, we observe that personal jurisdiction in a criminal matter is secured simply by the defendant’s physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 665 A.3d 1247 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Garrison, 323 A.3d 190, 2024 WL 2874303 (Pa.Super. 2024) (non- precedential decision) (same). Instantly, the offense occurred in Allegheny County. Hence, the district court and the court of common pleas had personal jurisdiction over Appellant by virtue of that territorial presence alone.3 Appellant next argues the prosecution failed to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted because there is no injured party. Appellant’s brief at 30. He asserts that there can be no crime without a victim. He further argues that the Commonwealth was required to establish that he is a civil statutory citizen subject to the vehicle code, which it failed to do. Hence, he posits that because he was not engaged in commerce and there was no complaining victim, the trial court should have dismissed the charges. ____________________________________________ 3 Insofar as neither principle has any apparent relevance to the question of the trial court's jurisdiction, we also reject Appellant’s bare assertions relating to a “Bill of Attainder” and “violation[s] of the Fifth Amendment Takings Cause” in connection with the jurisdictional challenge. See Appellant’s brief at 25-26. -5- J-A13001-26 Appellant’s assertion is misplaced. He was charged with driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked. As this offense did not implicate a person or property, nothing required the Commonwealth to present evidence of a victim. To the extent that Appellant argues that the Vehicle Code does not apply to him because he identifies as a “Constitutional citizen of the United States of America,” that assertion also fails. Appellant’s brief at 26, 36. As discussed infra, Appellant conflates the constitutional right to travel throughout the United States with the Vehicle Code governing his driving privilege. In Commonwealth v. Zumpfe, 2019 WL 5063409, * 4 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non- precedential decision) (citation omitted), this Court reiterated the principle that “Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.” However, Appellant’s ability to exercise that constitutional right and the Commonwealth’s ability to govern the use of motor vehicles for public safety are two distinct but easily reconcilable concepts. In Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), the United States Supreme Court recognized that states have the authority to prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety on its highways. Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Funk, 186 A. 65 (Pa. 1936), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Vehicle Code provisions authorizing license suspensions and revocations. Indeed, the Funk Court specifically -6- J-A13001-26 recognized the legislature’s plenary power over Commonwealth highways, including the power to regulate the manner that people may operate vehicle on public roadways. Id. at 67. As it relates to driving privileges, the High Court held, “The permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of the [C]ommonwealth is not embraced with[in] the term civil rights, nor is a licensee a contract or a right of property in any legal or constitutional sense.” Id. Considering the foregoing ensconced legal principles, it is obvious that, notwithstanding Appellant’s self-styled “National” citizenship, he was required to comply with the Vehicle Code when operating his automobile on public roadways in Allegheny County. Appellant’s brief at 25. As demonstrated by his summary motor vehicle conviction, he failed to do so. Hence, we reject his contention regarding the Commonwealth’s supposed failure to state a cause of action. Stated plainly, the Vehicle Code governed Appellant’s use of an automobile on a public road, and those regulations did not implicate his right to travel within the United States. See Commonwealth v. Syke, 326 A.3d 450, *3 (Pa.Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision) (rejecting the appellant’s “claim that any restriction that touches on the right to travel . . . is per se invalid[ because the] argument does not account for the obvious countervailing governmental interests involved.”). Finally, we address Appellant’s contention that the traffic stop was illegal because Officer Harding’s stated reason for initiating each stop was an expired vehicle registration. This issue relates to Appellant’s unsuccessful oral motion -7- J-A13001-26 to suppress during the de novo trial on April 29, 2025, based on the alleged illegality of the traffic stop.4 See Appellant’s brief at 32. The request relied upon Commonwealth v. Copenhaver, 229 A.3d 242 (Pa. 2020), where our High Court held that an expired registration is not a breach of the peace sufficient to justify a traffic stop by a sheriff. Acknowledging that Copenhaver concerned a deputy sheriff’s limited common law authority to enforce the Vehicle Code, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to apply the High Court’s reasoning to all police officers. He phrases the crux of his argument thusly, “an expired automobile registration is not a breach of the peace [that] justif[ies] a traffic stop. Appellant’s brief at 34-35. Therefore, he argues, Copenhaver precludes all law enforcement from initiating a traffic stop based solely on an expired ____________________________________________ 4 The Copenhaver Court set forth the following standard of review for an order denying suppression. When we review the ruling of a suppression court we must determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. When it is a defendant who has appealed, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Assuming that there is support in the record, we are bound by the facts as are found and we may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Id. at 249 (citation omitted). -8- J-A13001-26 vehicle registration and contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant his requested relief in light of Copenhaver. Id. at 35. The assertion that Copenhaver stands for the proposition that an expired vehicle registration sticker is an insufficient basis for any law enforcement officer to initiate a traffic stop illustrates Appellant’s fundamental misunderstanding of the Copenhaver Court’s examination of a sheriff’s common law authority and a police officer’s statutory authority pursuant to Vehicle Code. Copenhaver involved a traffic stop conducted by an Adams County sheriff’s deputy, as opposed to a police officer, whose authority to stop vehicles derived from common law powers rather than the Vehicle Code. Accordingly, the High Court’s analysis concerned whether an expired registration constituted a “breach of the peace” that would trigger a sheriff’s deputy’s common law enforcement authority. The Court concluded it did not, because operating a vehicle with an expired registration sticker is neither a violent or dangerous action, nor one likely to lead to public disorder. Unlike the common law power of sheriffs and sheriff’s deputies to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace committed in their presence, the power to enforce the Vehicle Code is vested in police officers by 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308, which provides in relevant part: (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine -9- J-A13001-26 number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). Accordingly, notwithstanding Appellant’s protestations to the contrary, our Supreme Court’s holding in Copenhaver, is limited to sheriff personnel acting under common law authority. It has no application to a sworn police officer whose authority to conduct traffic stops is grounded in the Vehicle Code. As Copenhaver plainly is inapplicable to the facts of this case, where the stop was conducted by statutorily authorized law enforcement, Officer Harding, we reject Appellant’s claim that the traffic stop at issue in the case at bar was illegal pursuant to Copenhaver. Judgment of sentence affirmed. DATE: 10/22/2026 - 10 -