Full Opinion

J-S41038-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : VICTORIOUS LEE HOLLOWAY : : Appellant : No. 901 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 8, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004978-2025 BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2026 Appellant, Victorious Lee Holloway, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following her bench trial convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) – general impairment and restriction on alcoholic beverages.1 We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows. On August 18, 2025, around 2:45 a.m., Police Officer Mason Moyer responded to the 1800 block of Baltimore Pike after another officer reported finding Appellant asleep in the driver’s seat of a black Jeep, parked in a store parking lot off the roadway. On his way to the scene, Officer Moyer observed tire debris on the 2000 block of Baltimore Pike, approximately half a mile from the location of Appellant’s vehicle. ____________________________________________ 1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3809(a), respectively. J-S41038-26 On arrival, Officer Moyer observed Appellant’s rear passenger tire was “disintegrated” and the front passenger tire deflated. As well, the officer who had called for backup informed Officer Moyer that although the engine was not running, the hood of the Jeep was still warm. Officer Moyer observed Appellant reclined and passed out in the driver’s seat, with her door partially open. After rousing Appellant, Officer Moyer observed her glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred and thick speech, and a strong odor of alcoholic beverage from both the vehicle and her breath. Appellant gave inconsistent responses regarding where she had been drinking, claimed that she had only been at the location for 30 seconds, and declined to perform field sobriety tests. Appellant later refused chemical testing after being transported to the hospital. As well, Officer Moyer located an open, half-full bottle of vodka on the passenger seat. On May 8, 2026, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The Commonwealth presented the testimony and body-worn camera footage of Officer Moyer.2 At the conclusion of the trial, the court convicted Appellant of the aforementioned offenses. That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to six months of probation and to pay court costs and fines. On June 4, 2026, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On June 10, 2026, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of ____________________________________________ 2 Although a DVD of the body-worn camera footage was included in the certified record, this Court was unable to review the footage as it would not load properly. Nevertheless, Appellant does not challenge the substance of Officer Moyer’s testimony. -2- J-S41038-26 errors complained of on appeal. On June 26, 2026, Appellant timely complied. On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review: Was there insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict for [DUI] because there was no evidence presented that [Appellant] had imbibed a sufficient amount of alcohol such that she was incapable of safely driving where there was no unsafe driving observed and there was no indication that [Appellant’s] faculties were impaired? (Appellant’s Brief at 4). In her single issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for DUI.3 Appellant asserts that the totality of the circumstances established only that she was found asleep at the wheel of a vehicle that was not running. Appellant admits that she refused to complete field sobriety tests or submit to a blood draw but highlights the fact that she answered police questions. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to show that she had recently driven the vehicle at the time the officer discovered her. Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence that she had consumed an amount of alcohol to render her incapable of safe driving to sustain her DUI conviction, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review is as follows: As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant does not challenge her conviction for restriction on alcoholic beverages. -3- J-S41038-26 favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld. Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super. 2013)). The Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of DUI, in relevant part as follows: § 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance (a) General impairment.-- (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, -4- J-S41038-26 operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). “Subsection (a)(1) is a general provision and provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered [her] incapable of safe driving.” Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 402-03, 663 A.2d 669, 673-74 (1995). Further: The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, including manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level may be added to this list, although it is not necessary. … Commonwealth v. Segida, 604 Pa. 103, 115-16, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (2009). Additionally, “[e]vidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a finding of guilt under the relevant statute.” Commonwealth. v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa.Super. 2011). “Evidence that the driver was not in control of [herself], such as failing to pass a field sobriety test, may establish that the driver was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered [her] incapable of safe driving, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.” Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223 (Pa.Super. 2000). Further, a defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests or submit to chemical testing may be considered when evaluating the sufficiency -5- J-S41038-26 of the evidence for DUI. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Pa.Super. 2006). The term “operate” as used in the DUI statute “requires evidence of actual physical control of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in motion.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa.Super. 2003). Significantly, “an eyewitness is not required to establish that a defendant was driving, operating, or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. The Commonwealth can establish through wholly circumstantial evidence that a defendant was driving, operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.” Id. Courts employ a fact-sensitive inquiry to determine whether the Commonwealth has met its burden in this regard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cravener, 344 A.3d 370 (Pa.Super. 2025) (holding Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support DUI conviction where defendant was discovered parked inappropriately in middle of parking lot with his head down and showing signs of intoxication; truck was running with keys in ignition, and driver’s side door was open; and defendant stated he had left his girlfriend’s house after argument and admitted to having snorted Suboxone less than hour earlier); Commonwealth v. Rae, No. 592 WDA 2025, 2025 WL 3458569 (Pa.Super. filed Dec. 2, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (holding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for DUI where: defendant crashed his car on side of public roadway and car was -6- J-S41038-26 lodged on embankment; defendant was awake in driver’s seat and slumped over wheel with his foot actively pressing on gas pedal; car was smoking and showing signs it had recently been operated; and defendant admitted to drinking that day and was clearly intoxicated); Commonwealth v. Norris, No. 1041 WDA 2024, 2025 WL 2815344 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 3, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (holding evidence was sufficient to support DUI conviction where police observed defendant in driver’s seat of parked car with engine running and he admitted to recently using drugs elsewhere).4 Instantly, the trial court explained: Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, sufficient evidence supported [Appellant’s] conviction. Officer Moyer testified that [Appellant] was found asleep in the driver’s seat of her vehicle shortly after another officer located the vehicle. The officer observed that [Appellant] exhibited numerous signs of alcohol impairment, including a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a disheveled appearance. [Appellant] also declined to perform standardized field sobriety tests and refused chemical testing. Additionally, Officer Moyer located a half- full bottle of vodka on the passenger seat during the inventory search. Although [Appellant] emphasizes that no officer observed her driving, the Commonwealth was not required to produce direct evidence of operation. Circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that [Appellant] had recently operated the vehicle. Officer Moyer observed tire debris approximately one-half mile from [Appellant’s] location. [Appellant’s] vehicle had a disintegrated rear passenger tire and a deflated front passenger tire. Another officer advised ____________________________________________ 4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value). -7- J-S41038-26 Officer Moyer that the vehicle’s engine compartment was warm, and [Appellant] herself stated that she had only been at that location for approximately thirty seconds. [Appellant] further admitted she had traveled from Baltimore and had only been at the location for thirty (30) seconds. From this evidence, this [c]ourt reasonably inferred that [Appellant] had recently driven the vehicle before it became disabled. Likewise, [Appellant’s] argument that there was no evidence she had consumed alcohol before driving merely asked this [c]ourt to reweigh the evidence presented at trial. As factfinder, this [c]ourt was free to credit Officer Moyer’s testimony and the body-worn camera footage over [Appellant’s] explanations. Considering [Appellant’s] physical signs of impairment, the open container of alcohol, her inconsistent statements, her refusal to perform field sobriety testing and chemical testing, and the circumstantial evidence establishing recent operation of the vehicle, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence from which this [c]ourt could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of her vehicle after consuming sufficient alcohol to render her incapable of safe driving. (Trial Court Opinion, 7/1/26, at 3-4). The record supports the trial court’s analysis. Here, Appellant was seated in the driver’s seat of her car, which had suffered significant tire damage with tire debris that began half a mile away from the site where she was discovered. Appellant was passed out in the driver’s seat but, upon waking up, asserted she had only been at the location for 30 seconds. The hood of the car was still warm. Appellant showed signs of intoxication including the facts that she had been found passed out, had glassy eyes, had slurred and thick speech, there was an odor of alcohol in the vehicle and on her breath, and she refused to submit to field and chemical testing. On this -8- J-S41038-26 record, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant had consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol such that she was incapable of driving safely, and that she had operated the vehicle while intoxicated. See Segida, supra. See also Cravener, supra; Rae, supra; Norris, supra. Therefore, the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for DUI. See also Sebolka, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/30/2026 -9-