Com. v. Stout, D.

J-S36009-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DUANE PATRICK STOUT : : Appellant : No. 417 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004894-2024 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2026 Duane Patrick Stout (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction by the trial court of one count each of driving under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI) – schedule II or III, DUI – metabolite, and DUI – impaired ability.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court summarized the evidence adduced at Appellant’s nonjury trial as follows: On July 6, 2024, at approximately 11:45 p.m., [Pennsylvania State Police] Trooper John Grzymala [(Trooper Grzymala)], was patrolling the northbound lane of Interstate 83 [(I-83)] when he noticed a silver sedan pulled to the side of the road near a closed weigh station. The car’s flashers were on, and a male was ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (iii), (2). J-S36009-26 performing what appeared to be martial arts moves in the shoulder. N.T., 11/20/25, at 5-6, 21. The speed limit on I-83 in this area is between 55-65 miles per hour. Id. at 23. [] Trooper [Grzymala] first put on his amber lights to stop for a welfare/wellness check. Id. at 6. Upon engaging with [Appellant], [] Trooper [Grzymala] “observed [Appellant’s] eyes to be dilated, his speech to be very quick, and his movements to be very erratic.” Id. at 7. While [Appellant] initially denied using drugs, [] Trooper [Grzymala] decided to conduct [] field sobriety test[s (FSTs)]. [] Trooper [Grzymala] activated his lights, body microphone, and [mobile video recorder (MVR)] prior to starting. Id. at 7-8. [Appellant] indicated that he had injuries to his legs, and he was unable to do the walk-and-turn-test or the one-leg-stand test. Id. at 9-10. On the [modified] Romberg test, [Appellant] was 7 seconds off on the passage of 29 seconds. Id. at 10. [] Trooper [Grzymala] then asked for permission to search [Appellant’s] vehicle. [Appellant] consented. [] Trooper [Grzymala] found a black bag containing a glass smoking device and a white substance that appeared to be cocaine. Id. at 12. [] Trooper [Grzymala] then made the decision to arrest [Appellant]. While transporting [Appellant], [] Trooper [Grzymala] stated that, “in an excited utterance, [Appellant] told me that he had stopped at the Welcome [C]enter right over the Maryland line, which I clarified, meaning mile marker 2 northbound, and he had smoked and then continued driving,” a distance of about 30 miles from where the sedan was spotted. Id. at 13. The [trial] court listened to the audio [in Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 (MVR)2] to determine if the statement was made voluntarily or in response to ____________________________________________ 2 At trial, the Commonwealth played select portions of Exhibit 1, which the assistant district attorney identified by timestamps. See generally N.T., 11/20/25. For purposes of the instant appeal, we confine our review of Exhibit 1 to only those portions played for the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 212 A.3d 1076, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Because our consideration of [sufficiency claims] requires us to review only the trial evidence, we decline [the a]ppellant’s invitation to view the video [exhibit] in a different manner than the way in which it was presented to the [fact-finder].” (citation omitted)). -2- J-S36009-26 a question. Id. at 15.3 [] Trooper [Grzymala] reviewed the DL- 26 [chemical testing] form with [Appellant], who consented to a blood draw. Id. at 17. The blood draw occurred at approximately 1:03 a.m. on July 7. Id. at 24. [At trial, Appellant stipulated to the results of the blood test, which] showed [the presence of] benzoylecgonine, cocaine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. Id. at 25. Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/26, at 1-3 (punctuation modified; footnote added). On August 26, 2024, Trooper Grzymala filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with the above-described offenses, as well as possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.4 The matter proceeded to a bench trial on November 20, 2025, at the conclusion of which the trial court convicted Appellant of the DUI offenses. On January 21, 2026, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve six months’ probation, conditioned on Appellant serving three days’ house arrest/electronic monitoring, and ordered Appellant to pay court costs and a $1,000 fine. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following issues: 1. Was there insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict[s] for [DUI:] ____________________________________________ 3 Before rendering its verdict at the conclusion of trial, the trial court found that Appellant “clearly volunteered the information.” Id. at 30. 4 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (32). On August 7, 2025, the Commonwealth withdrew the possessory offenses. -3- J-S36009-26 a. Under 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3802(d)(2), where there was no evidence presented that [Appellant’s] ability to safely drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle was impaired? b. Under 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3802(d)(1)(ii), where there was no evidence presented that established the drugs found in [Appellant’s] blood were Schedule II or III controlled substances as defined in the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act[ (the Drug Act), 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.]? c. Under 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3802(d)(1)(iii), where there was no evidence presented that established the drugs that produced the metabolites found in [Appellant’s] blood were Schedule I, II, or III controlled substances as defined in the [Drug Act]? Appellant’s Brief at 4. Each of Appellant’s issues challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. A sufficiency claim “presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 320 A.3d 1231, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2024) (en banc) (citation omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the factfinder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’ testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. …. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re- weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. -4- J-S36009-26 Commonwealth v. Kling, 351 A.3d 1274, 1280–81 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation and brackets omitted). Significantly, “[t]his standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Dewald, 317 A.3d 1020, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted); id. (“[W]hen examining sufficiency issues, we bear in mind that[] the Commonwealth’s burden may be sustained by means of wholly circumstantial evidence ….” (citation omitted)). In his first issue, Appellant claims that the evidence supporting his DUI – impaired ability conviction was insufficient to prove that Appellant’s “ability to safely drive was impaired beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant points out that Trooper Grzymala did not observe Appellant driving. Id. While Appellant acknowledges that the evidence established that Appellant “stopped at the Welcome Center just over the Maryland line, had smoked, and then continued driving because he thought he was okay to drive[,]” he emphasizes that there “was no evidence that [Appellant] had any issues driving …, no reports of erratic driving, and no evidence of any kind of collisions.” Id. at 12 (record citation omitted). Concerning his performance on the FSTs, Appellant argues that the evidence showed that he did not refuse to complete the walk-and-turn and one-leg stand tests, but that “he could not do the test[s] because of his [leg] injury.” Id.; see also id. (Appellant stating that in Exhibit 1, Appellant can -5- J-S36009-26 be heard “explaining that he has two bad legs and medically could not do the [one-leg-stand] test, not that he was refusing to do it.”). According to Appellant, Exhibit 1 “shows that, while [Appellant] was a little animated and conversational during the [FSTs], he was not erratic or incapable of listening [to] and following directions.” Id. at 13. Appellant claims that because he was not observed driving poorly, and because the FSTs did not demonstrate his inability to safely drive, the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to sustain his Section 3802(d)(2) conviction. Id. at 14. Section 3802(d)(2) provides that an “individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” where he “is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). “In other words, to convict a defendant under this section, the Commonwealth must establish three elements: 1) that the defendant drove; 2) while under the influence of a [drug]; and 3) to a degree that impairs the defendant’s ability to drive safely.” Commonwealth v. Marberger, 344 A.3d 403, 411 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Nestor, 314 A.3d 863, 874 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“Section 3802(d)(2) does not require that any specific amount or specific quantity of the drug be proven in order to successfully prosecute under that section”; and “expert testimony is not required to establish that a defendant’s inability to -6- J-S36009-26 drive safely was caused by a drug or combination of drugs.”) (citations omitted; emphasis in original)). “Evidence of consumption of a drug, standing alone, is insufficient to prove impairment.” Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). This Court has emphasized, however, that [w]ith respect to [S]ection 3802(d)(2), the Commonwealth must simply prove that, while driving or operating a vehicle, the accused was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that impaired his … ability to safely drive that vehicle. Evidence of such impairment should be drawn from the totality of the factual circumstances. Sufficient evidence has been found through combinations of police officer observations, witness testimony to unsafe driving, and blood tests showing drugs in the driver’s system. Commonwealth v. Macik, 319 A.3d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that to convict a defendant of DUI under Section 3802(d)(2) “the Commonwealth only had to prove that, while driving or operating a vehicle, []he was under the influence of a drug to a degree that impaired h[is] ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle.” (citation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)). Instantly, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court confined its analysis to whether sufficient evidence supported an inference that Appellant operated/was in physical control of a motor vehicle. Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/26, at 7-9. The trial court opined as follows: In this case, [Appellant] was [] the only person by his vehicle at 11:45 p.m.[,] on a limited access interstate highway, i.e., I-83. -7- J-S36009-26 This was not a roadway to which [Appellant] could have walked or a location where he would not have been noticed by someone in short order. The [trial] court can infer, just from those facts, that [Appellant] drove the vehicle to that location. However, importantly, [Appellant] volunteered to [] Trooper [Grzymala] that he had used drugs and then driven approximately 30 miles to arrive at the location where he and his vehicle were found. Id. at 8 (citing N.T., 11/20/25, at 13). The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and we agree with its legal conclusion that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Appellant operated a motor vehicle after consuming drugs. See Kling, 351 A.3d at 1280-81. Upon review of the notes of testimony and Exhibit 1, we further conclude the evidence sufficiently proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was under the influence of drugs to a degree that impaired his ability to safely operate his vehicle. See Marberger, 344 A.3d at 411. At trial, Trooper Grzymala explained that he has been employed as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police since 2019. N.T., 11/20/25, at 4. Trooper Grzymala testified that he had undergone standardized training at the police academy, as well as specialized training concerning FSTs, “and other trainings on drug interdiction and id[entifying] criminal activity.” Id. Trooper Grzymala estimated that he had conducted between 80 and 90 DUI investigations, and hundreds of cases involving drug possession. Id. at 5; see also id. (Trooper Grzymala confirming that he had experience and training in identifying drugs). -8- J-S36009-26 Trooper Grzymala testified that upon first encountering him, Appellant was “doing martial arts” within the right shoulder of I-83 northbound. Id. at 6. The key to Appellant’s vehicle was in the ignition, and the engine was running. Id. at 22. Appellant’s behavior, and the fact that he had activated the hazard lights on his vehicle, caused Trooper Grzymala to approach Appellant to “check on [his] welfare[.]” Id. While speaking to Appellant, Trooper Grzymala “observed his eyes to be dilated, his speech to be very quick, and his movements to be very erratic.” Id. at 7; see also id. at 10 (Trooper Grzymala testifying, “During my interaction with [Appellant], he was sweating profusely and his eyes were dilated”; and Appellant exhibited “erratic movement and [provided] quick verbal responses to what I was saying.”). Trooper Grzymala asked Appellant if he had consumed any controlled substances, and Appellant responded that he had “taken a Percocet days prior.” Id. Based on his observations and Appellant’s statements, Trooper Grzymala requested that Appellant perform FSTs. Id. at 9-10. Trooper Grzymala first asked Appellant to perform the walk-and-turn test. Id. at 10; see also id. (Trooper Grzymala testifying that he allowed Appellant to “put his shoes on” prior to performing FSTs); Exhibit 1 at 7:00- 7:19 (depicting Appellant changing from slip-on sandals to tennis shoes). After commencing the walk-and-turn test, Appellant ultimately “refused to -9- J-S36009-26 complete” the test. Id.5 Appellant additionally refused to complete the one- leg-stand test, indicating that “due to his injuries, he wasn’t going to be completing that.” Id. Lastly, Trooper Grzymala administered the modified Romberg test, which requires an individual to estimate the passage of 30 seconds. Id. at 11; see also Exhibit 1 at 11:30-12:05 (Trooper Grzymala repeating his instructions for the modified Romberg test after it appeared Appellant did not understand how to perform the test). Trooper Grzymala testified that Appellant’s estimate was off by seven seconds, i.e., Appellant believed that 22 seconds had elapsed in a period of 29 seconds. N.T., 11/20/25, at 11; see also Exhibit 1 at 12:10-13:10 (Appellant initially failing to close his eyes as instructed; indicating he stopped counting when he estimated 22 seconds, instead of continuing until he estimated 30 seconds had elapsed, as instructed; and explaining that he was unsure why he decided to stop counting at 22 seconds). Based on Appellant’s behavior and performance on the FSTs, Trooper Grzymala suspected Appellant “to be under the influence of a stimulant, and [] requested consent to search [his] vehicle.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 18 (Trooper Grzymala confirming that he “would [not] have felt comfortable with ____________________________________________ 5 After Trooper Grzymala demonstrated the walk-and-turn test for Appellant, Appellant stated, “I can’t do it,” as he does not “have any balance in my left leg,” and that “I don’t think it would be beneficial to me, doing that.” Exhibit 1 at 8:40-9:09. - 10 - J-S36009-26 [Appellant] driving the vehicle away from the scene”). Appellant consented to the search, whereupon Trooper Grzymala found a black bag that contained “a glass smoking device with burnt chore boy inside consistent with drug use, and a dental retainer case with a retainer in it, and white powder substance consistent[, in] my experience[,] with cocaine.” Id. Trooper Grzymala testified that after he arrested Appellant and was transporting him to the State Police Barracks for booking, he asked Appellant when he had last “smoked cocaine.” Id. at 13; see also id. at 16 (Trooper Grzymala testifying that Appellant was asking him “about [] recovery programs and resources available for drug use.”).6 Appellant responded by claiming the black bag did not belong to him, although he acknowledged that the retainer case was his. Id. at 13. Trooper Grzymala advised Appellant that the retainer case contained cocaine, and testified to his following conversation with Appellant: [Appellant] had told me that he stopped at the Welcome Center right over the Maryland line, which I clarified, meaning mile marker 2 northbound, and [Appellant stated that] he had smoked and then continued driving, and he had thought that he was okay to drive. Id.; see also id. at 23 (Trooper Grzymala estimating that it would take between 30 and 40 minutes to travel from the Welcome Center to the location where Appellant stopped his vehicle). ____________________________________________ 6 Appellant did not challenge, either before or at trial, the lawfulness of the vehicle search or the voluntariness of his statements to Trooper Grzymala. - 11 - J-S36009-26 Appellant ultimately consented to a blood draw. Id. at 24. At trial, Appellant stipulated that the resulting chemical testing revealed the presence of benzoylecgonine, cocaine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. Id. at 24-25; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 (Toxicology Report, 7/23/24, at 2 (stating that benzoylecgonine and norfentanyl are metabolites of cocaine and fentanyl, respectively)). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by his consumption of drugs. The evidence elicited at trial amply established Appellant’s drug use, as (1) Trooper Grzymala recovered suspected cocaine from Appellant’s retainer case; (2) Appellant admitted to smoking cocaine prior to driving; and (3) Appellant stipulated to a lab report confirming the presence of benzoylecgonine, cocaine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl in his blood. N.T., 11/20/25, at 13, 16, 24-25; Exhibit 4; see also Kling, 351 A.3d at 1285 (concluding circumstantial evidence supported the appellant’s drug impairment while driving, noting that “police found drugs and drug paraphernalia at the scene and on [the appellant’s] person, thus suggesting recent [drug] use.” (citation omitted)); Macik, 319 A.3d at 534 (identifying “blood tests showing drugs in the driver’s system” as a factor in determining whether sufficient evidence supports a Section 3802(d)(2) conviction). - 12 - J-S36009-26 Concerning evidence of Appellant’s drug impairment, Trooper Grzymala observed the physical effects of Appellant’s drug use, explaining that his pupils were dilated; his speech was quick; his movements were erratic; and he was sweating profusely. N.T., 11/20/25, at 7, 10; see also id. at 6 (Trooper Grzymala testifying that Appellant was performing “martial arts moves” on the side of I-83 when he first observed Appellant). While Appellant claims that he declined to perform the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand FSTs due to leg injuries, the trial court, as fact-finder, was permitted to reject Appellant’s explanation and infer that Appellant’s refusal was attributable to his drug impairment. See Kling, 351 A.3d at 1280-81; see also Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“We have previously considered the fact of a driver’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests and to submit to chemical testing in determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of DUI.” (citing Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 804- 05 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Further, Appellant’s claim that the evidence demonstrated that he was able to listen to and follow directions is belied by the record. Appellant’s Brief at 12. A review of Exhibit 1 reveals that even after Trooper Grzymala repeated his instructions for performing the modified Romberg test, Appellant was unable to follow his instructions. See Exhibit 1 at 12:10-13:09 (Appellant failing to close his eyes as instructed and arbitrarily choosing to stop counting at what he estimated to be 22 seconds); see also Marberger, 344 A.3d at - 13 - J-S36009-26 414 (noting that FSTs “are generally accepted methods for ascertaining alcohol or drug impairment at the time of a traffic stop.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, in considering the totality of the circumstances and affording the Commonwealth, as verdict-winner, all reasonable inferences, we conclude the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, Appellant’s guilt of DUI – impaired ability. In his second and third issues, Appellant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that the substances detected in his blood (i.e., benzoylecgonine, cocaine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl) were Schedule II or III controlled substances, or metabolites of Schedule II or III controlled substances, under the Drug Act. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant acknowledges that he stipulated to a lab report indicating that his blood “contained cocaine, fentanyl, and the inactive metabolites of both,” but complains that there “was no testimony regarding the Drug Act, and the lab report … speaks only to cocaine being a ‘[Drug Enforcement Administration] Schedule II controlled central nervous system stimulant drug’ with no mention of the Drug Act.” Id. at 17 (citation and footnote omitted). According to Appellant, [i]t is not enough that cocaine’s illegality is common knowledge— it[]s particular [S]chedule[,] as well as the [S]chedule of its metabolites[,] is not common knowledge. As an element of these two offenses, the Commonwealth was required to prove the classification—pursuant to the [] Drug Act and not pursuant to a federal agency designation—of the substances in [Appellant’s] blood[,] beyond a reasonable doubt. With a record that is barren - 14 - J-S36009-26 of any reference to the Drug Act or its schedules, the Commonwealth most decidedly failed to meet its burden. Id. at 19-20. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of his convictions under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (iii). As it is pertinent to our analysis, we recite Section 3802(d)(1) in full: (d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: (1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a: (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), [35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.,] known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act; (ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance, as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which has not been medically prescribed for the individual; or (iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i) or (ii). 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1) (italics added; footnote moved to body in brackets). The Drug Act defines a “controlled substance” as “a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V of this act.” 35 P.S. § 780-102 (citing id. § 780-104). Pertinently, Section 780-104 classifies cocaine and fentanyl as Schedule II controlled substances. Id. § 780- 104(2)(i)(4) (“Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves ….”), (ii)(6) (“Fentanyl”); see also Commonwealth v. Dancy, - 15 - J-S36009-26 650 A.2d 448, 450 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“Cocaine is a natural derivative of coca leaves, so it comes within this provision of Schedule II.” (citation omitted)). We have recognized that “if the General Assembly supplies definitions of the words comprising a statute, those definitions are binding.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 355 A.3d 9, 17 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). Relatedly, we have observed that “whether a particular substance is prohibited by the [Drug] Act is a matter of law to be decided by the court, not the jury.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 341 A.3d 112 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum at 15) (citing Commonwealth v. McKetta, 364 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Pa. 1976)).7, 8 Our Supreme Court’s decision in McKetta is instructive. In McKetta, the defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of dangerous drugs and dealing in dangerous drugs (predecessors to offenses now codified in 35 P.S. § 780-113). McKetta, 364 A.2d at 1351. During the course of trial, “the question arose as to whether Ritalin was[,] in fact[,] a ‘dangerous drug’ within ____________________________________________ 7 Unpublished nonprecedential memorandum decisions of this Court, filed after May 1, 2019, may be considered for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). 8 In Howard, we concluded the appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s jury instruction for drug delivery resulting in death, which informed the jury “that heroin and [f]entanyl are both controlled substances under Pennsylvania law,” was proper, as the “trial court did not instruct the jury to accept the Commonwealth’s allegations as true[,] but rather that fentanyl and heroin are controlled substances whose delivery is prohibited under the” Drug Act. Howard, 341 A.3d 112 (unpublished memorandum at 14-15). - 16 - J-S36009-26 the meaning of the [Drug Act].” Id. The trial court ultimately instructed the jury that Ritalin fell within the statutory definition of a “dangerous drug,” and the defendant was convicted of both counts. Id. The trial court subsequently granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, reasoning that it had erred by “failing to allow the jury to determine whether the substance in question was a dangerous drug ….” Id. The Commonwealth appealed, and this Court affirmed. Id. In determining that Ritalin’s classification under the Drug Act was a matter of law, the McKetta Court explained that “[a] distinction must be recognized between a challenge to the identity of a substance and where the identity is known and its classification is at issue.” Id. at 1352. The McKetta Court noted that the former typically involves a factual dispute that must be resolved by a jury, while the General Assembly’s classification of a substance is a matter of law. Id. Instantly, Appellant misapprehends the import of Section 780-104 of the Drug Act and, consequently, the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. The General Assembly’s placement of controlled substances under delineated Schedules is a definitional matter of law, and not a matter of fact for a fact- finder’s determination. See id. Indeed, our appellate courts have repeatedly identified the Schedule of a controlled substance by reference to Section 780- 104 of the Drug Act. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunte, 337 A.3d 483, 491 n.17 (Pa. 2025) (“Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is classified as a - 17 - J-S36009-26 Schedule II controlled substance in Pennsylvania.” (citing 35 P.S. § 780- 104(2)(ii)(6)); Commonwealth v. Beatty, 227 A.3d 1277, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Fentanyl is a [S]chedule II substance, [35] P.S. § 780- 104(2)(ii)(6).”); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 661 A.2d 1388, 1390 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995) (noting Section 780-104(2)(i)(4) classifies cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance); Dancy, supra; Commonwealth v. Eicher, 605 A.2d 337, 341 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“Cocaine is a [S]chedule II controlled substance.” (citing 35 P.S. § 780–104(2)(i)(4)). Here, Appellant stipulated to the results of a lab report confirming that his blood contained benzoylecgonine, cocaine, fentanyl, and norfentanyl. N.T., 11/20/25, at 24-25; see also Exhibit 4. The lab report further identified benzoylecgonine and norfentanyl as metabolites of cocaine and fentanyl, respectively. Exhibit 4. As noted above, cocaine and fentanyl are Schedule II controlled substances as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Commonwealth established that Appellant operated his vehicle with Schedule II controlled substances in his blood, as well as the metabolites of those substances, beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Appellant’s second and third issues are meritless. - 18 - J-S36009-26 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/30/2026 - 19 -