Com. v. Giardina, D.

J-A18021-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DENNIS RAY GIARDINA : : Appellant : No. 1559 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0000464-2023 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: October 20, 2026 Appellant, Dennis Ray Giardina, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (“DUI”), and his bench trial convictions for the summary offenses of driving with a suspended license (DUI related), disregard of traffic lanes, and careless driving.1 We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows. Late at night on February 2, 2023, in Green Township, Indiana County, Pennsylvania, Dana Lloyd called her brother, Art Weaver, because she noticed a white Ford Bronco disabled in her yard, approximately 70 feet from the road. The vehicle was running, with its windows up and doors locked. Fresh snow ____________________________________________ 1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(ii), 1543(b)(1.1)(i), 3309(1), and 3714(a), respectively. J-A18021-26 covered the ground, and witnesses described tire tracks indicating that the vehicle had driven through a T intersection in the road before skidding off the roadway into the yard. Mr. Weaver advised Ms. Lloyd to call 911 after walking out to the car and discovering Appellant unconscious in the vehicle. He was seated in the driver’s seat but slumped over into the passenger side with his head angled to the floor. His feet were located beneath the steering wheel by the pedals. Appellant did not respond to Mr. Weaver yelling at him. The call to 911 was placed shortly before midnight; Ms. Lloyd later called Sharon Keith, Appellant’s grandmother, to let her know what had happened. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, emergency medical services (“EMS”) responded to the scene, where they removed Appellant from the vehicle, laid him on the ground, and administered a dose of Narcan in an attempt to revive him. At 12:11 a.m., additional EMS employed by Citizens Ambulance arrived and Appellant was lifted from the ground into an ambulance, where more Narcan was administered. At 12:27 a.m., Appellant was transferred to Veterans Ambulance, where he received a third dose of Narcan. When Trooper Daniel Bradley arrived on scene,2 he observed that the footprints in the snow tracked from the driver’s side of the ambulance to the ____________________________________________ 2Trooper Bradley stated it could have taken him anywhere from 15 to 40 minutes to arrive on scene, and initially noted on his report that he arrived on (Footnote Continued Next Page) -2- J-A18021-26 driver’s side of Appellant’s vehicle. As well, he observed some footprints leading off the road, and Ms. Lloyd explained that Mr. Weaver had come from that way. Trooper Bradley did not see any other footprints. During the initial investigation, officers discovered that Appellant’s license was suspended. Subsequently, the ambulance transported Appellant to the hospital, where Trooper Bradley read him the DL-26 form and warnings. Appellant consented to a blood draw, the results of which revealed methamphetamine and amphetamine in his blood. On October 12, 2023, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion. First, Appellant sought to suppress the results of his blood draw because the consent was not freely given. Appellant asserted that he signed the consent form while suffering from a drug overdose event and believing that further treatment was contingent upon signing the consent. Second, Appellant sought to dismiss the case, arguing that there was no evidence he had been driving the vehicle with a controlled substance in his blood. On December 13, 2023, the court held a suppression hearing and a hearing on Appellant’s motion for habeas corpus. Relevantly, at the hearing, Ms. Lloyd testified that she called the police on February 2, 2023, after observing a disabled vehicle in her yard; when she approached, she saw Appellant unconscious with his feet in the air, body over the console, and his ____________________________________________ scene at about 1:04 a.m. However, he also testified that the reports indicate approximate times, and that he assisted with the transfer of Appellant from Citizens to Veterans Ambulance. Based upon ambulance records and other testimony, it appears Trooper Bradley arrived on scene as of 12:27 a.m. -3- J-A18021-26 head down on the floor of the passenger’s side. She later clarified that Appellant’s feet and butt area were towards the driver’s seat. Trooper Bradley testified that on February 2, 2023, he responded to a report of a vehicle in someone’s yard with a male slumped over. When he arrived at the scene, Trooper Bradley observed EMS removing Appellant from a white Bronco, located approximately 70 feet off the road. All prints in the snow tracked from the driver’s side of the ambulance to the driver’s side of the vehicle. The engine of the Bronco was running, there were keys in the ignition, its lights were on, and the exhaust was showing steam. EMS administered Narcan and transported Appellant to the hospital. At the hospital, Trooper Bradley found Appellant in one of the trauma rooms, awake and able to respond appropriately to questions. At 1:11 a.m., Trooper Bradley read Appellant the DL-26 warnings and, when he finished, Appellant consented to a blood draw, which ultimately revealed methamphetamine and amphetamine. Following the hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress and the motion to dismiss. On October 15, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the omnibus pre-trial motion. Specifically, Appellant requested the trial court to reconsider its decision in light of Bold v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 320 A.3d 1185, 1193-1201 (2024), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Cout held that the term “operate” in the implied consent statute encompasses and subsumes driving and actual physical control of movement of vehicle, and that the officer in that case had -4- J-A18021-26 lacked reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been operating or in physical control of the vehicle. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that even after applying Bold, the Commonwealth had proven a prima facie case that Appellant had been operating the vehicle. On January 27, 2025, the matter proceeded to jury trial. Prior to trial, Appellant made a motion in limine, requesting that the jury be allowed to view the vehicle. The court deferred ruling on the request but, ultimately, denied the motion near the close of Appellant’s case. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Art Weaver; Dana Lloyd; Mark Joseph Riva and Brooke Riva, employed by the Commodore Volunteer Fire Department in the Quick Response Service Unit; Steven Dickert, an EMT of Citizens Ambulance Service; Joyce Morse, a medical technologist and phlebotomist at Indiana Regional Medical Center; Pennsylvania State Police Corporals John Wogan, Ryan Shrift, and Jesse L. Dumm; Pennsylvania State Police forensic scientist Nicole M. Blascovich; and Trooper Bradley. At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Appellant moved for a directed verdict or motion to dismiss, arguing that the evidence did not establish that Appellant had been in control, operation, or driving the vehicle while under the influence. The trial court denied the motion. On the second day of trial, Appellant presented the testimony of Kenisa Colbert, his girlfriend; Sharon Keith, Appellant’s grandmother; and Matthew Stanick, Appellant’s friend. -5- J-A18021-26 Relevant to the instant appeal, Ms. Colbert testified that she is Appellant’s girlfriend. On the night of the incident, they had gone to several stores including a Dollar General and Sheetz. Around 10:13 p.m., she was driving the Bronco with Appellant as a passenger when the car lost power and flashed some sort of notification about an issue with the transmission. Ms. Colbert stated that she lost control of the car, resulting in a skid off the road. The two argued about what to do. Around 10:15 or 10:18 p.m., Ms. Colbert left the car while it was still running. She got out of the driver’s side door and walked straight back from the door, through the field, and to the road. Then, Ms. Colbert walked home, leaving Appellant to call his friend for help. The walk took about 10 minutes. At home, Ms. Colbert let her dogs out, texted and called Appellant and received no response, and then went to bed. She was awoken around 1:00 a.m. by Appellant’s grandparents pounding on the door and discovered that Appellant had overdosed. Ms. Colbert claimed that she had later taken the car to the shop for repairs but did not provide any records to support this claim. Matthew Stanick testified that he is Appellant’s friend. On February 2, 2023, around 10:30 p.m., he received a phone call from Appellant stating that his car had broken down near where he lived. Appellant asked if Mr. Stanick could assist and Mr. Stanick agreed. However, by the time Mr. Stanick got a ride to the location, he could not find Appellant. He called repeatedly but did -6- J-A18021-26 not receive an answer. As he circled around the neighborhood, he saw flashing lights, but he drove past without stopping. Mr. Stanick then returned home. The Commonwealth then called Trooper Bradley as a rebuttal witness. Trooper Bradley testified he had never received any phone calls or messages from Ms. Colbert or Mr. Stanick. At some point, approximately a year and a half after charges were filed, Trooper Bradley was advised that Ms. Colbert was now claiming to have been driving the night of the accident. He immediately attempted to call her but did not receive a reply. Trooper Bradley called again and left a voicemail with his phone number, informing her that he was the investigating officer and was trying to figure out what had happened that evening, and asking her to return the call. Trooper Bradley did not receive a response. As well, Trooper Bradley went to Appellant and Ms. Colbert’s residence, but no one answered the door. Trooper Bradley explained that if he had received this information earlier, there were steps he could have taken to verify Ms. Colbert’s story, including pulling surveillance footage from Dollar General, Sheetz, or any local ring cameras. However, he was not able to do this based upon the timing of Ms. Colbert’s report. During the charging conference, Appellant objected to the charge explaining circumstantial evidence to the jury. The instruction explained that, if a person does not see the snow fall, but does see snow on the ground with footprints in it, the person can infer from circumstantial evidence that snow fell, even though it was not seen. Appellant argued that this was too close to -7- J-A18021-26 the facts of the current case and requested an alternate hypothetical regarding emerging from a movie theater to observe signs of rainfall. The court overruled the objection and instructed the jury using the “tracks in the snow” charge. On January 28, 2025, the jury convicted Appellant of DUI. On March 21, 2025, the court convened for a sentencing hearing, but Appellant failed to appear. On September 10, 2025, Appellant was arrested on a bench warrant. On October 24, 2025, the court again convened for a sentencing hearing. Despite the parties’ prior stipulation that the offense would have been a third offense, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Shifflett, ___ Pa. ___, 335 A.3d 1158 (2025),3 the court considered Appellant’s DUI as a second offense and imposed an aggregate term of 14 months to 5 years of incarceration, plus costs of prosecution. On October 31, 2025, the court amended the sentencing order to reduce the costs of prosecution by approximately ten dollars.4 Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. ____________________________________________ 3 In Shifflett, our Supreme Court held that a defendant’s prior acceptance of accelerated rehabilitative disposition (“ARD”) is a fact that must be submitted to the jury pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). “Thus, an individual’s previous acceptance of ARD, which, when construed as a prior offense under Section 3806 to increase the penalty for a subsequent conviction pursuant to Section 3804, is a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Shifflett, supra at ___, 335 A.3d at 1175. 4 The record does not make clear why the court reduced the amount of the costs of prosecution. We recognize that in Commonwealth v. Mumford, 353 A.3d 247 (Pa.Super. 2026), this Court recently deemed a sentence illegal (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A18021-26 On November 24, 2025, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The next day, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On December 15, 2025, Appellant timely complied. On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review: [1. Whether] the Trial Court erred by failing to grant [Appellant’s] motion to suppress the search of his blood on the basis that the consent to search was not freely given. [2. Whether] the Trial Court erred by failing to grant [Appellant]’s Motion to Reconsider [Appellant]’s pretrial motion to dismiss the case, despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in [Bold, supra], wherein the Supreme Court held that the statutory language of “drove, operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” required proof that an [Appellant] actually drove a vehicle, not merely that he was found inside of a running vehicle while impaired. [3. Whether] the Trial Court erred by failing to grant [Appellant]’s motion in limine to permit the jury to view the vehicle which [Appellant] allegedly drove, operated or of which he was in actual physical control. [4. Whether] the Trial Court erred by denying [Appellant]’s objection to a portion of the Criminal Jury Charge that too closely mirrored the facts of the instant case. To illustrate the concept of circumstantial evidence, the Charge ____________________________________________ where the court amended a sentencing order to add a term that the defendant was subject to mandatory reentry supervision under 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2, where the defendant was not present at the time the court amended the sentencing order. Notably, Mumford involved the court’s addition of a sentencing term. Here, the original sentencing order had already imposed costs of prosecution, and the amended sentencing order merely reduced the amount by approximately ten dollars. Thus, the facts of Mumford are distinguishable from this case, and we see no issue implicating the legality of Appellant’s sentence on this ground. -9- J-A18021-26 explained that observing footprints in snow could properly lead one to the conclusion that a person had walked through the snow, even though one never saw a person walking in it. In the instant case, a lack of footprints in the snow outside of [Appellant]’s vehicle was one of the Commonwealth’s central pieces of circumstantial evidence that [Appellant] had been the only person in the vehicle and therefore must have driven it. [5. Whether] the Trial Court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal made by the Defense at the closing of the Commonwealth’s case, when the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that: a. [Appellant] drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle while there was in his blood a Schedule 2 or 3 Controlled Substance; b. [Appellant] disregarded a traffic lane; c. [Appellant] drove carelessly; or d. [Appellant] drove while his operating privilege was suspended in relation to a DUI while having in his blood a controlled substance. (Appellant’s Brief at 12-13). Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Appellant avers that the evidence established that he was too impaired to consent as he had been unconscious and was experiencing a drug overdose upon Trooper Bradley’s arrival at the scene. As a result of Appellant’s condition, Appellant maintains that he was unable to give free consent. Appellant concludes that the court erred in denying his suppression motion on these grounds. We disagree. “The United States Supreme Court has held that because ‘the taking of - 10 - J-A18021-26 a blood sample’ is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, police officers may not compel the taking of a blood sample without a search warrant, absent an applicable exception.” Commonwealth v. Haines, 168 A.3d 231, 234 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 455, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 195 L.E.d2d 560 (2016) (footnote omitted)). “One such exception is consent, voluntarily given.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 56, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000). See also Commonwealth v. Myers, 640 Pa. 653, 681, 164 A.3d 1162, 1178 (2017) (plurality) (explaining that Birchfield’s holding “supports the conclusion that ... an individual must give actual, voluntary consent at the time that testing is requested”). Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code provides that “any person who drives, operates or is in the actual physical control of a vehicle” in the Commonwealth is deemed to have “given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance” if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that said person has been driving while intoxicated. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a). This implied consent nevertheless implicates a right to refuse, that may be subject to civil penalties. See id. “[A] trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining if a defendant’s consent to a blood draw was voluntary.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 186 A.3d 448, 451 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 650 Pa. 247, 199 A.3d 858 (2018). - 11 - J-A18021-26 While there is no hard and fast list of factors evincing voluntariness, some considerations include: 1) the defendant’s custodial status; 2) the use of duress or coercive tactics by law enforcement personnel; 3) the defendant’s knowledge of his right to refuse to consent; 4) the defendant’s education and intelligence; 5) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; and 6) the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation with the law enforcement personnel. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 186 A.3d 440, 444 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 649 Pa. 179, 195 A.3d 852 (2018). “[K]nowledge of the right to refuse to consent to the search is a factor to be taken into account, [but] the Commonwealth is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1125 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Strickler, supra at 79, 757 A.2d at 901). “Further, the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant (including age, intelligence and capacity to exercise free will), are to be taken into account.” Id. (internal citation, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 1359 MDA 2018 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 15, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (rejecting argument that defendant was too intoxicated to provide consent to blood draw, because voluntary intoxication is not defense to criminal charge).5 See also Commonwealth v. Benvenisti-Zarom, 229 A.3d 14, 23 (Pa.Super. 2020) (holding that trooper’s testimony that defendant was awake, alert and able to have ____________________________________________ 5 We may rely on unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). - 12 - J-A18021-26 intelligent conversation was sufficient to establish voluntary consent, despite administration of Fentanyl in hospital setting). Here, the trial court observed: Trooper Bradley testified that he spoke to [Appellant] in the hospital after he had regained consciousness. He said that [Appellant] was alert and responded appropriately to his questions. Trooper Bradley read the Form DL-26 to [Appellant] and gave him the form to review it himself. After reading the form and allowing [Appellant] to review it, [Appellant] signed the form and consented to the blood draw. On cross-examination, Trooper Bradley said that the medical personnel did not interrupt him or say that they needed some time with [Appellant]. Although [Appellant’s] use of narcotics and apparent overdose are factors to consider in determining whether he had the capacity to consent, they are only factors in an objective inquiry of whether he consented. Trooper Bradley testified that [Appellant] appeared to be alert and responded appropriately to Trooper Bradley’s prompts. [Appellant] reviewed the form himself and then signed in the appropriate spot. At no point did medical personnel interrupt or stop Trooper Bradley. Overall, the evidence was that [Appellant] was in such a state that he could understand the information provided to him. [Appellant claims] that Trooper Bradley interrupted active medical treatment and that [Appellant] believed that his continued treatment was contingent on his consent for the blood draw. However, there was no evidence of these averments. [Appellant] did not testify as to what he believed, and it was not apparent from Trooper Bradley’s testimony that he interrupted some active and critical medical care to address the blood draw. Nor did [Appellant] call someone from the hospital to support his argument that Trooper Bradley interrupted active medical care. For all these reasons, the [c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] Motion to Suppress. (Trial Court Opinion, 1/23/26, at 12-13) (internal citations omitted). - 13 - J-A18021-26 The record supports the court’s analysis that Appellant’s consent to the blood draw was voluntary. The record demonstrates that while Trooper Bradley was reading Appellant the DL-26 form, Appellant was awake, alert, and able to appropriately participate in answering questions. In other words, the record does not support Appellant’s contention that he was so intoxicated or otherwise in medical distress as to render his consent involuntary. See Benvenisti-Zarom, supra; Robertson, supra; Hill, supra. Thus, Appellant’s first issue on appeal merits no relief. In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the court erred by failing to grant his motion to reconsider his pretrial motion for habeas corpus, predicated upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Bold, supra. According to Appellant, he was only found inside of a running vehicle, and there was no proof introduced that he drove, operated, or was in actual physical control of the vehicle while impaired. Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case that he had been driving under the influence, and that the court should have granted his motion to dismiss the case. We disagree. Preliminarily, we observe: It is well-established that an accused may challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence at the pre-trial stage through a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Commonwealth v. Hetherington, [460 Pa. 17, 331 A.2d 205 (1975), superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Sutton, ___ Pa. ___, 362 A.3d 25 (2026)]. The denial of such a petition is not immediately appealable as of right, and the defendant must petition this - 14 - J-A18021-26 court for review. Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa.[Super.] 2015) disapproved of on other grounds by Commonwealth v. McClelland, [660 Pa. 81, 233 A.3d 717] (2020). Where the defendant instead proceeds to trial and is convicted, any deficiency in the Commonwealth’s pretrial ability to establish a prima facie case is not reviewable. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 172 A.3d 605, 610 (Pa.Super. 2017) (observing that the appellant’s “conviction at trial precludes this Court from reviewing his pretrial habeas issues”). Commonwealth v. Hastings, No. 1034 MDA 2021, at * 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum). Here, Appellant proceeded to trial and was convicted; thus, we can no longer examine the propriety of the court’s rulings on his habeas corpus petition. See id. In Appellant’s third issue, he contends that the court erred by failing to grant his motion in limine to permit the jury to view the vehicle in which Appellant had allegedly driven, operated, or of which he was in actual physical control. In Appellant’s view, it was important that the jury should see the interior of the car to better assess some or all of the descriptions by Commonwealth witnesses of his position within the vehicle. Appellant argues that the descriptions by various witnesses were inconsistent and difficult to visualize without seeing the interior of the car, and the probative value of viewing the vehicle went beyond resolving inconsistencies; it would have permitted the jury to determine whether such descriptions were even physically possible. Appellant concludes the denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion necessitating the grant of a new trial. We disagree. Our standard of review of the trial court’s evidentiary decisions is well - 15 - J-A18021-26 settled: “When ruling on a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.” Commonwealth v. Belani, 101 A.3d 1156, 1160 (Pa.Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 231 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court has committed an error of law, or “when the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, to the extent we are required to review the trial court’s conclusions of law, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 648 Pa. 577, 583, 194 A.3d 564, 567 (2018). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: Rule 643. View by Jury (A) The trial judge may in the judge’s discretion order a view by the jury. (B) The trial judge, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant and defendant’s attorney shall be present at the view, except as provided in Rule 602. Pa.R.Crim.P. 643. Absent an abuse of discretion, the denial of a request for a jury view will not be overturned. See Commonwealth v. Lowry, 55 A.3d 743, 752 (Pa.Super. 2012). Instantly, the court observed: Initially, the [c]ourt deferred ruling on [Appellant’s] motion - 16 - J-A18021-26 requesting the jury view [Appellant’s] vehicle. Near the close of [Appellant’s] case the [c]ourt did rule on the request and denied [Appellant’s] motion to remove the jury from the box to view the actual car. … Based on the facts of this case and the testimony as presented by the various witnesses, this [c]ourt found that a view of the vehicle would not be beneficial to the jury as there was no substantive factual dispute as to how [Appellant] was found in the vehicle. The various witnesses described the interior of [Appellant’s] vehicle and how [Appellant] was found inside the vehicle. Additionally, [Appellant] was free to introduce pictures or video of the car and he simply chose not to do so. (Trial Court Opinion, 1/23/26, at 15-16). The record supports the trial court’s conclusions. All of the witnesses described, essentially, Appellant situated in the driver’s seat, with his legs below the steering wheel, his torso slumped over the center console, and his head hanging down in the passenger seat area with his face towards the floor. (See N.T. Trial, 1/27/25, at 35, 39-49). It was clear from this testimony that Appellant was seated in the driver’s seat, with his feet below the wheel, slumped over the center console with his head pointed towards the floor of the passenger seat. On this record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for a jury view. See Belani, supra; Lowry, supra. In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that the court erred by denying his objection to a portion of the criminal jury charge that too closely mirrored the facts of this case. To illustrate the concept of circumstantial evidence, the charge explained that observing footprints in snow could properly lead one to the conclusion that a person had walked through the snow, even though one - 17 - J-A18021-26 never saw a person walking in it. In the instant case, the lack of footprints in the snow outside of Appellant’s vehicle was one of the Commonwealth’s central pieces of circumstantial evidence. Appellant claims that the charge prejudiced the jury and gave the jury the impression that the court considered footprints in the snow to be particularly probative circumstantial evidence. Appellant concludes that the court abused its discretion by denying his request for an alternative charge, and that this Court must award him a new trial. We disagree. The following principles apply to our review of a trial court’s jury instructions: A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to fundamental error. * * * [W]e must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing its jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only when there is an inaccurate statement of the law. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 335 A.3d 1236, 1245 (Pa.Super. 2025), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 348 A.3d 1039 (2025) (internal citations omitted). As well, we recognize generally that the “failure to make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the - 18 - J-A18021-26 proceedings will result in waiver of the issue.” Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 451 (Pa.Super. 2014). Specifically, an appellant’s failure to object to the jury instructions provided to the jury constitutes waiver of this issue on appeal. Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 630, 887 A.2d 220, 224 (2005) (explaining that appellant must make specific objection to jury charge to preserve issue involving jury instruction). Instantly, prior to the jury charge, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Anything else we need to put on the record? [COUNSEL]: I think that perhaps for the sake of the record I would ask that the illustration of circumstantial evidence be the movie theater analogy rather than the tracks-in snow analogy. THE COURT: I understand your question. The proposed language in here regards circumstantial evidence, and this is really—the goal of that is so that the jury understands circumstantial evidence. The fact that the example uses snow and it’s similar to this case, I don’t think that is a problem in my view, and, again, it’s not showing this [c]ourt’s opinion as to whether or not to believe the evidence. It’s just a description of how a jury should understand what circumstantial evidence is. Any response, [Commonwealth]? [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Your Honor, I would just note that that is an example that’s been used in Indiana County courts many times. THE COURT: Yeah. I have used it in I think all the jury trials that I’ve done. It doesn’t mean that it’s always right, but I understand your objection, and your request to modify it is denied. (N.T. Trial, 1/28/25, at 191-93). Subsequently, the jury was brought into the - 19 - J-A18021-26 courtroom for closing arguments and the charge itself, and counsel did not make further argument or objection regarding the circumstantial evidence instruction. During the charge, the court referenced Appellant’s “prior objection.” (See id. at 224). However, regardless of the language used by the court, an examination of the record confirms that Appellant did not lodge a specific objection to the instruction. Rather, he requested an alternate instruction and failed to object after the request was denied. Therefore, Appellant has waived this issue. See Pressley, supra; Houck, supra. Moreover, even if not waived, Appellant would not be entitled to relief on this issue. Here, the court instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence as follows: Now, evidence may be of two different types in a criminal case. On the one hand, there is direct evidence, which is testimony by a witness from his or her own personal knowledge such as something he or she saw or heard himself or herself. The other type is circumstantial evidence, which is testimony about a fact which points to the existence of other facts which are in question. Let me offer an illustration of circumstantial evidence in our day-to-day lives. Suppose you retire on a winter night and the streets were clear. When you awoke, the snow was on the street and sidewalks and you saw footprints in the snow. You would properly conclude that snow had fallen during the night even though you never saw it snow and that somebody had walked in the snow even though you never actually saw anybody do this. That is an example of circumstantial evidence. - 20 - J-A18021-26 Whether or not circumstantial evidence is proof of other facts in question depends in part on the application of common sense and human experience. In deciding whether or not to accept circumstantial evidence as proof of the facts in question, you must be satisfied, first, that the testimony of the witness who is presenting the circumstantial evidence is truthful and accurate and, second, that the existence of the facts the witness testifies to leads to the conclusion that the facts in question also happened. (N.T. Trial, 1/28/25, at 220-21). Here, Appellant does not challenge the accuracy of the court’s charge but he contends that the similarity of the analogy to the facts at issue in the case prejudiced the jury. Appellant points to Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761 (2004), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined Hughes’ challenge to various jury instructions and ultimately observed: Similarly, [Hughes] argues that the court’s discussion of circumstantial proof improperly focused upon circumstances indicating his guilt, for example, the court referred to the letters that had been burned into the ceiling at the crime scene and those appearing on the ceiling of [Hughes’] bedroom. Notably, the court also employed generic examples of circumstantial evidence as part of the explanation. In any event, the instruction was aimed at contrasting the Commonwealth’s indirect or circumstantial proof with direct evidence, and the fact that the court used as examples certain aspects of the circumstantial evidence in [Hughes’] case did not improperly suggest his guilt. Hughes, supra at 327, 865 A.2d at 792-93. Appellant attempts to distinguish Hughes, contending that the jury charge in his case did not include any other examples of circumstantial evidence, solely the general example which was