Full Opinion

J-S31006-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM LEE BLAKE : : Appellant : No. 1797 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003125-2023 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 William Lee Blake appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County for his convictions of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and three total counts of conspiracy associated with each substantive offense, for his attempted transport of four pounds of methamphetamine.1 Blake argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger because the search warrant lacked specificity, omitted a material fact, and did not amount to probable cause. After careful review, we affirm. ____________________________________________ 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively. J-S31006-26 On July 12, 2023, Blake was charged with drug related offenses. His case was consolidated with his co-defendant Katon Williams. Blake retained private counsel who filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress all evidence. A joint suppression hearing was held on January 22, 2024. Based on the testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial court explained the facts surrounding the search of the vehicle. At the pretrial [suppression hearing] held in this matter, testimony was presented that on July 11, 2023, Trooper Christopher Zampini was part of a criminal interdiction unit looking for narcotics, guns, fugitives and drugs and/or human trafficking. On [that day], Trooper [] Zampini was given information by Trooper Joseph Maletz to be stationed on Route 222 in Richmond Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania[,] and to be on the lookout for a Black Infiniti QX60. Trooper Zampini was in full uniform and in an undercover vehicle. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Trooper Zampini observed the [b]lack Infiniti QX60 with darkly tinted windows in violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. As a result of this observation, Trooper Zampini activated his lights and sirens and pulled over the [b]lack Infiniti on Route 222 Northbound near Meadow Drive in Richmond Township. Trooper Zampini ran a NCIC query on the [b]lack Infiniti QX60 which was registered to a female in Allentown, PA. After running this query. Trooper Zampini approached the vehicle on the passenger side. He observed two males in the vehicle. Katon Williams was identified as the driver, while William Blake was identified as the front seat passenger. Trooper Zampini asked Mr. Williams to get out of the vehicle and asked for license, registration and proof of insurance. Mr. Williams did not know the owner’s name, but stated it was Mr. Blake’s girlfriend. Mr. Blake received and provided the Trooper with the registration and insurance from his girlfriend who owned the car. Both Mr. Williams and Mr. Blake had different stories for where they were coming from and where they were going before the traffic stop. Additionally, Mr. Williams had changes in his cadence when speaking to the Trooper about different things. Based on these conflicting stories and his observations, Trooper Zampini -2- J-S31006-26 asked Mr. Williams for consent to search the vehicle. Mr. Williams responded to ask the owner or Mr. Blake as the car was not his. Trooper Zampini then asked Mr. Blake who said no and put a female on the phone who said no. The female on the phone was purportedly the owner of the car and Mr. Blake’s girlfriend. At that point, Trooper Zampini called for a K9 officer to respond. The only K9 officer available was from Allentown. [] Officer Carbaugh arrived on scene at 6:30 p.m. Officer Carbaugh and his [canine] did a sniff around the vehicle but the [canine] did not alert to anything. Officer Carbaugh then talked to the Trooper to see if the car could be turned off. Mr. Blake and Mr. Williams denied the request and did not turn off the car. As a result, the [canine] did not get any hits on the vehicle[,] as Officer Carbaugh stated he felt the fact the car was running and thus air flowing under the car may have affected the dog’s ability to sniff[,] but he was not sure. Before this traffic stop, Trooper Maletz testified that he was involved with and had started an investigation involving trafficking of methamphetamine between Reading and Allentown and was investigating Mr. Blake. A confidential informant [(“CI”)] had advised Trooper Maletz that Mr. Blake would be going from Reading to Allentown[,] . . . and that [his vehicle] would be carrying a large quantity of methamphetamine.[2] A controlled buy was set up in Richmond Township, Pennsylvania. Trooper Maletz had positioned other officers before the controlled buy to see if they could pull over the vehicle before it arrived [at] the agreed upon location. This was where and when Trooper Zampini pulled over the Infiniti before the controlled buy location. After receiving the search warrant, [the vehicle was searched and] ____________________________________________ 2 The trial court also found that that “[t]he [CI] had advised Trooper Maletz of the vehicle make, model and year[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 2/24/26, at 4. Blake contends that this finding was not supported by the record because Trooper Maletz instead testified that the CI “did not provide us with an exact vehicle[,]” and that this information was obtained by officers observing Blake operating the vehicle on July 10-11, 2023. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14 (citing N.T., 1/22/24, at 97, 111; Aff. of Probable Cause, 7/11/23, at ¶ 11). Based on our review of the record, we agree with Blake. Therefore, this fact plays no role in our review of the legal issues. See Commonwealth v. Foster, 356 A.3d 747, 755 (Pa. 2026). -3- J-S31006-26 Trooper Maletz found over 4 pounds of methamphetamine in the black Infiniti. Trial Court Opinion, 2/24/26, at 3-4. On May 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Blake’s suppression motion.3 Blake’s private counsel withdrew his appearance and Blake was appointed counsel. Prior to trial, Williams pled guilty to his charges and Blake proceeded to trial pro se with his appointed counsel as standby counsel. On September 10, 2025, Blake was found guilty of the above referenced charges. On September 18, 2025, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of nine to twenty years’ incarceration. Blake, again represented by appointed counsel, filed a post-sentence motion which was denied without a hearing. He timely appealed. Both Blake and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b). Blake raises the following issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred in denying Blake’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the search of the black 2017 QX60 Infiniti automobile because the search warrant lacked specificity, omitted a material fact, and overall fell short of probable cause. ____________________________________________ 3 The factual recitation above from the trial court’s February 24, 2026, opinion is nearly verbatim to the findings of fact the trial court made in its May 23, 2024, opinion. -4- J-S31006-26 Appellant’s Brief, at 5.4 Our standard of review in addressing a suppression court’s order denying a suppression motion is “restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 791 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). The following legal principles are relevant to our review of a probable cause determination for a search warrant application. Before an issuing authority may issue a constitutionally valid search warrant, he or she must be furnished with information sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that probable cause exists to conduct a search. The standard for evaluating a search warrant is a “totality of the circumstances” test as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and adopted in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985). A magistrate is to make a “practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” The information offered to establish probable cause must be viewed in a common sense, nontechnical manner. Probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, not a prima facie showing of criminal activity, and deference is to be accorded a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. Commonwealth v. Rapak, 138 A.3d 666, 670-71 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). ____________________________________________ 4 Blake’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised an issue regarding the seizure of the vehicle, but after “further research and review of the record,” appellate counsel determined that the “claim is meritless and forgoes argument.” Appellant’s Brief, at 5 n.4. We appreciate counsel’s candor to the Court. -5- J-S31006-26 Blake asserts that the affidavit of probable cause in support of the search warrant does not contain sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause. Specifically, he argues that it contains a vague assertion that the trooper observed “indicators of criminal activity” during the traffic stop, and it omits reference to the relevant fact that the canine did not signal to the presence of drugs. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-18. According to Blake, had the vague statement been omitted and the lack of a signal from the canine sniff been included in the affidavit of probable cause, then the presence of probable cause would have been negated. See id. at 18. The Commonwealth argues that the vague statement that “indicators of criminal activity were observed during the traffic stop” does not undermine the probable cause finding because the reliability of the CI was established through the June 26, 2023, controlled buy and additional information that was corroborated by the troopers’ observations. See Appellee’s Brief, at 14-15. Therefore, as stated in the affidavit of probable cause, there was reason to believe, based on the CI’s corroborated information and the officers’ own observations, that the vehicle contained drugs. See id. Additionally, the affidavit of probable cause does not contain any material misstatement of fact and it is well established that a canine’s inability to alert does not undermine a finding of probable cause. See id. at 16-17. We agree with the Commonwealth. -6- J-S31006-26 Blake concedes the following, as stated in the affidavit of probable cause: (1) On June 26, 2023, the CI engaged in a controlled buy with Blake, but the black Infiniti was not involved; (2) On July 10-11, 2023, officers observed Blake driving the black Infiniti; (3) On July 11, 2023, the CI ordered methamphetamine from Blake who told the CI that he would go to Reading to obtain the methamphetamine and for the CI to meet him in Richmond Township, Berks County; (4) The traffic stop was initiated on Route 222 in Richmond County—the same route of travel from Reading to Richmond Township. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15. Despite these facts, he contends that probable cause cannot be established without relying on the vague and unsupported assertion that “indicators of criminal activity were observed during the traffic stop” because “the vehicle in question had not been seen involved in any drug activity.” Id. at 16. However, to be subject to a search warrant supported by probable cause, the suspected vehicle does not need to be observed directly involved in the defendant’s criminal activity. Rather, the affidavit of probable cause must establish a “substantial nexus” between the suspect’s criminal -7- J-S31006-26 activity and the place to be searched. Commonwealth v. Mendoza, 287 A.3d 457, 463 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court aptly explained the nexus between Blake’s drug dealing activities and the searched vehicle. Instantly, the search warrant was based on information from a previous observation, i.e., June 26, 2023, along with the information from July 10 and 11, 2023. On June 26, 2023, only 15 days before the vehicle stop, officers observed Mr. Blake engage in a drug transaction with a [CI]. Mr. Blake sold the [CI] methamphetamine. Further, on July 10 and July 11, 2023, the officers observed Mr. Blake operating the black Infiniti which was the subject of the search warrant. . . . [T]he [CI] gave information that Mr. Blake . . . was to meet the [CI] in Richmond Township, Berks County. The Infiniti was stopped before the controlled buy location and Mr. Blake was found to be in the black Infiniti. Trial Court Opinion, 2/24/26, at 11. Viewing these facts in a common sense manner led to the inescapable conclusion that Blake was in the process of transporting methamphetamine to the CI, which established a substantial nexus between Blake’s drug dealing activities and the searched vehicle. Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, absent the vague assertion of observed criminal activity, the affidavit of probable cause still contained sufficient information to support issuance of the search warrant. Moreover, the omission of the fact that the canine did not alert to the presence of drugs did not negate the finding of probable cause. It is well established that “[g]iven the recognized fallibility of the dogs’ sense of smell and its vulnerability to confusion by other ambient odors,” the absence of an -8- J-S31006-26 alert during a canine sniff does not dispositively prove that drugs are not present. Commonwealth v. Brown, 924 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also id. at 1288-89 (collecting and discussing cases). Accordingly, we have previously held that, even when it is omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, “a dog’s failure to alert will not defeat probable cause where other factors, viewed within the totality of the circumstances, continue to support it.” Id. at 1289. Here, as explained above, the affidavit of probable cause contained sufficient information to support the issuance of the search warrant of the vehicle. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, in a common sense manner, the information contained in the affidavit of probable cause established probable cause and was not negated by the vague assertion of criminal activity and the omission of the canine’s failure to alert. Therefore, we discern no error with the trial court denying Blake’s suppression motion. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 -9-