Full Opinion

J-S16007-26 NON-PRECEDENTAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ELVIS LUIS HOLGUIN VENTURA : : Appellant : No. 1067 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0000860-2023 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: October 27, 2026 Elvis Luis Holguin Ventura appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, after the trial court, in a non-jury trial, convicted him of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance1 and possession of a controlled substance.2 On appeal, Ventura challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence uncovered from a vehicular stop. Upon review, we affirm. On July 8, 2026, we remanded this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine why missing notes of testimony from Ventura’s preliminary hearing and suppression hearing were not transcribed ____________________________________________ 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 2 Id. at § 780-113(a)(16). J-S16007-26 and/or transmitted in the certified record to this Court. See Per Curiam Order, 7/8/26. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and, subsequently, filed a corresponding opinion and findings of fact concluding that the lack of transcripts in the record resulted from an oversight or breakdown in communication by the court. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/26, at 4. The trial court ordered the transcripts to be prepared and transmitted to this Court. See id. at 5. As such, we can now review the appeal on the merits. The trial court previously summarized the facts as follows: On February 28, 2023, [Pennsylvania State] Trooper [Ryan] Marmol was conducting “daily operations as a criminal or interdiction officer as a Shield member” by looking for vehicles on the Pennsylvania Turnpike that were possibly involved in criminal activity. At one point, Trooper Marmol observed a vehicle whose driver left the turn signal on after completing a lane change. He conducted a query of the vehicle’s registration and learned that it was registered to Mario Caba from Philadelphia. Additionally, he observed that the emission and inspection stickers on the vehicle were expired. Trooper Marmol conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle due to the vehicle’s expired inspection and emissions. Trooper Marmol thereafter approached the vehicle’s driver’s side and confirmed what he had seen on the emission and inspection stickers. He made contact with the vehicle’s two occupants and advised them of the reason for the traffic stop. The driver of the vehicle, whom he identified as [Ventura], provided Trooper Marmol with a Puerto Rico identification card/driver’s license[, however, Ventura’s criminal history listed him as a resident of the Dominican Republic[3]], and the passenger provided him with a Pennsylvania driver’s license. Additionally, Trooper Marmol noticed that [Ventura]’s lip was trembling, and his hand was “violently trembling” when[] he provided his identification. Additionally, during the stop, [Ventura] indicated that he was going to Pittsburgh to accompany the passenger with errands. ____________________________________________ 3 See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 16. -2- J-S16007-26 The passenger indicated that they were going to Pittsburgh because he had a small car business. At this point, Trooper Marmol became suspicious that “criminal activity was afoot[]” for the following reasons: “So where I was positioned first and foremost, I was on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, which is a notorious and known smuggling corridor and the fact that the vehicle was registered from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. And based on my training and experience I know that Philadelphia is a source area for distribution of narcotics. Furthermore, I know that there is a strong connection as it pertains to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in terms of drug trafficking. The vehicle was recently registered, and based on my training and experience I know that these vehicles are oftentimes [] registered frequently [] to beat license plate readers, to evade law enforcement surveillance and things of that nature. The vehicle did not display a license plate bracket around the license plate. And oftentimes that is done because the vehicle and the—the criminal organization doesn’t want that vehicle to be tied to a certain geographical area. There were no—the vehicle was very plain and these vehicles are oftentimes selected by these criminal organizations so that they can further blend in with the innocent motoring public. Upon catching up to the vehicle I noticed that the operator of the vehicle was not the pictured registered owner. So[,] at that point I believed that the vehicle was being operated by a third party. Based on my training and experience I know that organizations will utilize third-party vehicles so that if there is any contraband located within the vehicle that they—it’s an automatic defense that’s built in, they can distance themselves from the contraband. Upon activating my lights and sirens to effect the traffic stop, the traffic stop was delayed. I can’t recall for exactly how long the vehicle did not stop for, but that is a—something that we oftentimes see. And through my training and experience I’ve learned that when this happens it’s possible that the organization, the members involved are—if there’s any interaction with law enforcement [] they are told to place a call or given certain instructions if there's law enforcement encounters. So this delayed stop caused me to believe that that was a possibility that that was happening or there were other tactics being discussed or possible rehearsed stories. And then to include the nervous behavior upon initial contact. -3- J-S16007-26 So[,] once I observed the nervous behavior that’s when I became suspicious of the—that criminal activity was afoot and I was going to extend the traffic stop to confirm or deny my suspicions.” [N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 19-21.] Trooper Marmol thereafter asked via a translator application on his department-issued cellphone for consent to search from [Ventura].4 [Ventura] responded “yes[,]” but indicated that Trooper Marmol would have to consult with the passenger who is the registered owner of the vehicle. Trooper Marmol then asked the passenger for permission to search the vehicle, and he agreed. Trooper Marmol did not need to utilize a translator application to speak with the passenger[] and could converse with him in English. He did not have any difficulty understanding the passenger. Trooper Marmol provided the passenger with a consent[-]to[-]search form that was issued by the Pennsylvania State Police prior to conducting the search. He did this while he was standing by the passenger side door. Trooper Marmol testified that the form contains a discussion of tools that are necessary to search a vehicle. He stated that the passenger appeared to read the form and acknowledged what it said, but he did not want to sign it. At [some] point, Trooper Zachary Delsordo also arrived on scene. Trooper Marmol subsequently searched the vehicle and became suspicious that the subwoofer box in the rear cargo area contained contraband. [Therefore], he used a hand-held roadside x-ray on the subwoofer box, and [saw] anomalies consistent with contraband[.] Trooper Marmol also believed that the subwoofer box contained contraband because, when[] they removed two screws securing the box, the panel could not be removed. This made them suspicious that the subwoofer box was fabricated to contain contraband. Trooper Marmol also stated that [Ventura] ____________________________________________ 4 Trooper Marmol used the application known as “Say Hi” for the translation. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 22. He acknowledged that the translations on the application are not one hundred percent accurate, but stated that he used the application to expedite the process. Id. at 23. -4- J-S16007-26 and the passenger provided consent to search the vehicle, and they were denied consent to search the subwoofer box.[5] [Ventura] and the passenger were ultimately detained and placed “under investigatory detention.” They were transported to the Pennsylvania State Police Greensburg Barracks, and the vehicle was towed. A drug detection K-9 was subsequently deployed on the vehicle and the subwoofer box[,] resulting in an alert and indication. Trooper Marmol thereafter obtained a search warrant, and approximately 800 bricks of suspected heroin/fentanyl were found inside of the subwoofer box.[6] He testified that this amount was consistent with someone who is selling drugs. Additionally, the bricks that were found were wrapped together, and there were coffee grinds within the cellophane wrapping to throw off a drug detection K-9. He estimated the value of the drugs seized to be approximately $130,000.[00]. Trooper Marmol further explained his decision to charge both [Ventura] and the passenger with the narcotics. Neither of them made any statements to him regarding the narcotics that were found. Trooper Marmol estimated that [Ventura] was removed from the vehicle approximately two minutes after the traffic stop was conducted. He believed that he asked the passenger to exit the vehicle approximately 10 or 11 minutes into the traffic stop, after he asked [Ventura] for permission to search the vehicle. Trial Court Opinion, 9/9/24, at 2-4. On September 5, 2023, Ventura filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the glassine packets found during the stop, claiming the search of ____________________________________________ 5 Ventura does not raise the specific issue of lack of consent to search the subwoofer box in either his Rule 1925(b) statement or appellate brief. Thus, we do not consider it on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“appellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal”) (internal citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Burchard, 503 A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Super. 1986) (need to advance same theory of relief at each and every stage of review by specific allegation of error). 6 Trooper Marmol testified that 800 bricks could weigh anywhere from 800 to 1,000 grams. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/25, at 28. -5- J-S16007-26 the vehicle was not justified, there was no reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, and he did not “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consent” to the search based on the language barrier. See Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence, 9/5/23, at 3, 5-6 (unpaginated). On April 15, 2024, the court held a suppression hearing. By agreement of the parties, the preliminary hearing transcript was incorporated into the suppression record. The court requested additional briefing by the parties and, subsequently, entered an order denying the motion. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial before the Honorable Scott O. Mears, Jr. On March 31, 2025, the trial court found Ventura guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 6½ to 14 years’ imprisonment, followed by 12 months of reentry supervision. Ventura filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. He presents the following issue for our consideration: “Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying [] Ventura’s omnibus pretrial motion?” See Appellant’s Brief, at 7.7 Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they ____________________________________________ 7 In his appellate brief, Ventura solely focuses on one sub-issue raised in his suppression motion—that the trial court erred in finding Trooper Marmol had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9. Thus, we confine our review to that claim. -6- J-S16007-26 are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial. Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). Ventura contends that Trooper Marmol did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and, as a result, any evidence uncovered from the stop should have been suppressed. Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10. This Court has held that “[if] there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation . . . additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has been fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “The question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped.” Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (brackets in original; citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires the officer to articulate “specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the -7- J-S16007-26 person he stopped was involved in that activity." Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 851 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Instantly, we conclude that Trooper Marmol had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop beyond the initial traffic violation. First, the stop was legitimate where the vehicle violated the motor vehicle code by displaying expired inspection and emissions stickers. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 15; see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2019) (officer may conduct legitimate traffic stop when he has witnessed any technical violation of traffic code). Subsequently, during the course of the traffic stop, Trooper Marmol gathered additional information that supported further investigation and detention, including Ventura’s “lip trembling” and his hand “violently trembling” when he provided the officer his identification. See Sloan, supra. Moreover, Ventura’s identification raised further suspicion where he provided Trooper Marmol a Puerto Rican identification card, but Ventura’s criminal history listed him as a resident of the Dominican Republic. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 16; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 4, at 16:16. Furthermore, Trooper Marmol testified that, based upon a totality of the circumstances, including his professional experience, he believed the two men were engaged in criminal activity. See Green, supra. Specifically, Trooper Marmol testified that the following factors signaled that criminal activity was afoot: (1) vehicle traveling from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh on Pennsylvania Turnpike; (2) vehicle recently registered; (3) no license plate bracket on -8- J-S16007-26 vehicle; (4) non-descript vehicle; (5) vehicle’s registered owner not driving car; and (6) vehicle made delayed stop. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 3/8/23, at 19-20. In addition to these specific observations, Trooper Marmol testified that he has been a police officer for fifteen years, including ten years with the Pennsylvania State Police, and has completed over 400 hours of Highway Interdiction and Narcotics training.8 See id. at 10-11. Thus, based upon a totality of the evidence, we conclude that Ventura’s claim that Trooper Marmol did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop has no merit where the trooper had legitimate reasons to further detain Ventura “to investigate[] new suspicions.” Sloan, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 898 A.2d 1089, 1091-94 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding officer’s ten years’ experience in particular area “warranted his forming a reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity was afoot.”). Judgment of sentence affirmed. Bowes, J., Joins this Memorandum. Lane, J., Files a Dissenting Memorandum. ____________________________________________ 8 Trooper Marmol testified that Highway Interdiction training is a program that teaches police to identify vehicles that are involved in criminal activity, make traffic stops, and assess the traffic stops for criminal activity utilizing the reasonable suspicion scope. See id. at 11. -9- J-S16007-26 DATE: 10/27/2026 - 10 -