Full Opinion

J-S38010-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GARY URYC : : Appellant : No. 705 MDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 30, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005370-2010 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GARY WAYNE URYC : : Appellant : No. 706 MDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 30, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000051-2012 BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2026 Gary Wayne Uryc appeals pro se from the order dismissing his motion to vacate sentence as an untimely serial Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. We affirm. Appellant, a designated sexually violent predator (“SVP”), is serving a sentence of thirty-two to sixty-four years of imprisonment imposed in 2012 J-S38010-26 upon jury convictions for offenses related to his sexual abuse of his daughter. Neither his direct appeal nor his first four PCRA petitions garnered him relief. See Commonwealth v. Uryc, 331 A.3d 645, 2024 WL 4867053, at *1, *5 (Pa.Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision) (detailing the dispositions of Appellant’s direct appeal and first three PCRA petitions, and affirming the dismissal of the fourth), appeal denied, 345 A.3d 621 (Pa. 2025). The instant proceedings commenced on January 20, 2026, when Appellant filed at both of the above docket numbers a pro se motion to open or vacate his sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (providing the general rule that a court has thirty days to modify or rescind an order if no appeal is taken), and Commonwealth v. Walters, 814 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“[W]here a showing of fraud or another circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute extraordinary causes justifying intervention by the court, then a court may open or vacate its order after the [thirty]-day period [established by § 5505] has expired.” (cleaned up)). The gist of Appellant’s motion was that the prosecution allegedly violated his due process rights by knowingly presenting false testimony at his trial and at sentencing, amounting to a miscarriage of justice and fraud upon the court that was amenable to correction despite the fact that his sentence became final more than a decade ago. On March 9, 2026, the court entered notice of its intent to treat Appellant’s filing as an untimely PCRA petition and to dismiss it without a -2- J-S38010-26 hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Therein, the court detailed why none of Appellant’s issues presented fraud or another extraordinary cause to disturb his sentence pursuant to § 5505 jurisprudence, and instead amounted to an untimely request for PCRA relief presenting no exception to the statute’s one- year time bar. Appellant timely submitted a response arguing that fraud upon the court is not a claim cognizable under the PCRA, and that the Commonwealth’s attorney “committed extrinsic fraud” at Appellant’s trial when she: “(1) solicited false testimony[;] (2) referred to evidence not in the record[;] (3) appealed to the jury based on passion and/or prejudice rather than facts[;] (4) injected her personal belief numerous times during summation[;] and (5) failed to disclose mitigating psychiatric/medical records.” Response to Notice, 3/23/26, at 1.1 Before receiving Appellant’s response, the PCRA court filed an order dismissing his petition.2 ____________________________________________ 1 Appellant’s response is dated March 23, 2026, but was not docketed until August 31, 2026. Although the envelope for the filing is included in the certified record, the postmark date is indiscernible. The precise filing date ultimately is irrelevant because, since the docket does not reflect that the notice of intent to dismiss was served upon Appellant in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C), the twenty-day period for him to respond never commenced. See Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2023) (holding time period triggered by a court filing does not begin to run in the absence of compliance with Rule 114). 2 While the certified record confirms that the dismissal order was served upon Appellant by certified mail in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4), the docket entry for the order likewise does not contain a notation of service upon Appellant as mandated by Rule 114(C). -3- J-S38010-26 This appeal followed. The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he timely complied. The PCRA court thereafter authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion relying on its Rule 907 notice as the basis for refuting Appellant’s claims of error. Appellant states the following questions for our determination: 1. Did the trial court err at law when it denied relief by order dated March 30, 2026, therein, attempting to treat [Appellant]’s 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 motion as a PCRA despite the fact that the motion is challenging an illegal sentence perpertrated [sic] through the use of extrinsic fraud. 2. Did the trial court err at law when it denied relief by order dated March 20, 2026, from a § 5505 motion argued from the certified record proving that the Commonwealth violated [Appellant]’s due proces[s] rights under Napue/Glossip[3] and commi[t]ted fraud upon the court, because the prosecutor knew or should have known that false testimony was presented during trial/sentencing and failed to correct it. Therefore should have relief been granted, if the proceedings that resulted in his conviction featured below were so unfair that a miscarriage of justi[c]e occurred; (a) Do the inconsistent statements and the pictures entered by the prosecutor with the sole purpose of engendering sympathy for the declarant with the intent of creating an ____________________________________________ 3 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“[A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” (citations omitted)); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 246 (2025) (indicating that, upon establishing a Napue violation, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial—that is, if it in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury” (cleaned up)). -4- J-S38010-26 atmosphere of prejudice against the defendant, undoubtedly meet the Herring[4] standard for proof of fraud upon the court. (b) Was the fund[a]mental fairness of the court proceedings affected with testimony of insinuations from both Officer [Jerry] Snader[,] a nonexpert witness[,] and the prosecutor Karen Mansfield offering [Officer] Snader’s unqualified assessments as truth of the matter asserted in a calculated deception in the beginning of trial and emphasized during her closing argument.[5] (c) Was the negative publicity forced upon the community by members of the regional police designed to ingratiate the veniremen with explicit terror that were calculations designed to effectively deny the defendant his constitutional right to a public trial, by an impartial jury. (d) In defiance of the rule of law and her oath of office did the prosecutor obst[r]uct justice when she repeatedly inflicted her personal belief upon the jury during summation. (e) Did the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose vital psychiatric medical records of a jail psychiatrist presc[r]ibing [Appellant] Thorazine to treat his delusions not only shield the ____________________________________________ 4 See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing elements of an independent cause of action for fraud upon the court, as opposed to a motion for relief from a final judgment due to fraud pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3)). 5 By way of background, Officer Snader interviewed the victim and her mother, i.e., Appellant’s wife, at the police station when they reported Appellant’s abuse. He described the victim as seeming nervous and having a hard time talking about what happened, “like it was a very bad experience for her.” N.T. Trial, 5/6/12, at 206. When he began to similarly describe the demeanor of Appellant’s wife, counsel objected to the officer interpreting the witnesses’ appearance. The trial court instructed Officer Snader to limit his testimony to what he observed rather than his opinions or assessments. Id. at 207. During closing arguments, in countering Appellant’s defense that the allegations against him were fabricated, the prosecution reiterated Officer Snader’s testimony that, rather than being eager to implicate Appellant, the witnesses were having a difficult time and did not want to talk about the abuse. See N.T. Trial, 5/10/12, at 304-05. -5- J-S38010-26 court from viable medical professional testimony during trial, but undermine the outcome of the verdict as it permitted false testimony to stand during the penalty phase which aggravated the sentencing factors in violation of the obligation that the Due Process Clause imposes upon the state. 3. In light of the totality of facts surrounding the fabricated proceedings above did the trial court err at law by failing to retain it’s [sic] inherent power to bring this illegal sentence obtained pursuant to violating both federal and state constitutional due process protections into conformity with the rule of law as proscribed by statute. Appellant’s brief at 4-6 (cleaned up). We begin with the applicable legal principles. This Court reviews “an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). Our General Assembly enacted the PCRA to provide “the sole means of obtaining collateral relief[,] . . . encompass[ing] all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Stated differently, “the PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief . . . to the extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA offers relief when a petitioner establishes that his conviction resulted from, inter alia, a constitutional violation, ineffective assistance of counsel, or the unavailability -6- J-S38010-26 of subsequently discovered exculpatory evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). A claim does not fall outside the ambit of the PCRA “[s]imply because the merits of the PCRA petition [at issue] cannot be considered due to previous litigation, waiver, or an untimely filing[.]” Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa.Super. 2001). Instead, a non-PCRA collateral proceeding may be entertained only if the claims “fall outside the eligibility parameters of the PCRA[.]” Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc). Thus, “issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition or other self-styled petition outside of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Mucci, 327 A.3d 1223, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up). To be timely, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the underlying judgment of sentence became final unless the petitioner pleads and offers to prove one of the statute’s enumerated timeliness exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (providing exceptions in certain instances of governmental interference, newly-discovered facts, and newly-recognized constitutional rights). “[I]f [a PCRA] petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa.Super. 2022). -7- J-S38010-26 As is apparent from his detailed statement of questions presented, Appellant seeks to have his sentence vacated based upon a violation of his due process rights as recognized in Napue and Glossip. Such Napue/Glossip allegations are cognizable through the PCRA as constitutional-violation claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez, ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 2435416, at *29 (Pa. Aug. 18, 2026). Consequently, his motion to vacate sentence, filed more than a decade after his judgment of sentence became final, was properly treated as a facially-untimely PCRA petition. Furthermore: “To the extent Appellant contends [§] 5505 provides an avenue for relief, we disagree. Appellant’s claim falls under the PCRA. Thus, he is required to prove the applicability of one of the time-for-filing exceptions in order to obtain relief pursuant to a facially untimely petition.” Commonwealth v. Arnold, 256 A.3d 15, 2021 WL 1830367, at *6 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision). Since he neither pled nor offered to prove that an exception applies to confer jurisdiction on the court to resolve the merits of his claim, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s untimely filing. Order affirmed. -8- J-S38010-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/27/2026 -9-