Full Opinion

J-S37001-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYREEK JACKSON : : Appellant : No. 1393 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 27, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000245-2020 BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 Appellant, Tyreek Jackson, appeals from an order entered on May 27, 2025, that dismissed, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the PCRA court erred in failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. This Court has previously laid out the facts as follows: [O]n August 16, 2018, Appellant, accompanied by Brooklyn Bradley [Ms. Bradley], and Jaquil Watson [Mr. Watson], invaded the home of 70-year-old Larry Feinberg (the Victim). N.T., 10/5/21, at 12-16, 31-33. Appellant and [Mr. Watson] restrained the Victim with plastic ties, pressed a gun to the Victim's head, pushed him, and sprayed mace in the Victim's eye. Id. at 13-16, 35-36. J-S37001-26 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 293 A.3d 623, *1 (Pa Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision). On October 5, 2021, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the trial judge of robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i), burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i), persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501(a)(1), conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c), criminal trespass, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii), firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), theft by unlawful taking, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), receiving stolen property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a), carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108, unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1), possessing an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a), terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1), simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a), recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, and false imprisonment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903(a). On December 15, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 7 to 20 years’ incarceration on the charges of robbery, burglary, persons not to possess firearms, and conspiracy. Appellant received no further penalty on the remaining charges. Appellant appealed his conviction, alleging insufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the charges of persons not to possess firearms, unlawful restraint, and recklessly endangering another person. This Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions on February 16, 2023. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 293 A.3d 623, *1 (Pa Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision). On -2- J-S37001-26 July 25, 2023, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Appellant filed a timely, pro se first PCRA petition on September 5, 2023, and appointed counsel subsequently filed an amended petition. Appellant’s petition claimed that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a post-sentence motion and in failing to provide Appellant with discovery or to investigate Appellant’s case. Memorandum in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 7/11/2024, at 8, 14. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition without a hearing on May 27, 2025. This appeal followed. 1 On appeal, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred in denying relief on the above-referenced claims and, additionally, in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s Brief, 5/14/2025, at 2. We affirm the court’s dismissal order, concluding that Appellant’s ineffective assistance claims lack merit and that the trial court did not err by dismissing Appellant’s petition without a hearing. “We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). To obtain relief under the PCRA ____________________________________________ 1 On July 7, 2025, Appellant filed a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). The PCRA court followed with a Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 30, 2026. -3- J-S37001-26 on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must plead and prove that the actions or omissions of counsel, “in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Counsel is presumed effective and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by proving: 1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; 2) that counsel’s acts or omissions lacked any reasonable strategic explanation; and 3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of those acts or omission. Commonwealth v. Drayton, 313 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa. 2024) (additional citations omitted). Appellant’s first claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion preserving Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. Appellant’s Brief, 5/14/2025, at 15. To succeed on this issue, Appellant must prove his underlying weight of the evidence claim has merit. See Drayton, supra. A weight of the evidence claim, in contrast to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, admits that sufficient evidence was produced to prove each element of the crime, but contends that the trial court weighed that evidence improperly. Commonwealth v. Richard, 150 A.3d 504, 516 (Pa. Super. 2016). Reviewing a weight of the evidence claim on appeal “is a review of the [trial court’s] exercise of discretion, not the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Stefanowicz, 315 A.3d 162, 169 (Pa. Super. 2024), citing -4- J-S37001-26 Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000). “[O]nly a palpable abuse of discretion will cause us to overturn the court’s action.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1190 (Pa. 1994) (citation omitted). To overturn, the verdict must be “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice . . . .” Id. at 1191. Because a trial court is uniquely positioned to observe witness testimony and assess credibility, “the trial court’s conviction that the verdict . . . was not against the weight of the evidence” is “one of the least assailable reasons for . . . denying a new trial[.]” Commonwealth v. Garcia Arce, 352 A.3d 495, 508 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant specifically challenges the trial court’s determination that the testimony of Ms. Bradley, Appellant’s co-perpetrator, was credible. Appellant’s Brief, 5/14/2025, at 15. That determination was not so contrary to the evidence as to be shocking. In fact, Ms. Bradley’s testimony is corroborated by the testimony of the victim, Larry Feinberg, and investigating officer, Detective Jim Waring. Additionally, Ms. Bradley’s testimony regarding the events at the victim’s house largely aligned with the victim’s account of those events.2 It also lined up with the video evidence and cellular telephone ____________________________________________ 2 For example, both explained that Ms. Bradley told the victim she had been diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumor, was invited to his house and ordered pizza while there, and that Appellant and Mr. Watson then came in and threatened the victim. N.T. 12-14, 32-36, 54. They both testified that Appellant and Mr. Watson coerced the victim at gunpoint into opening his safe, (Footnote Continued Next Page) -5- J-S37001-26 call logs that Detective Waring described in his testimony. 3 In light of the corroboration of Ms. Bradley’s testimony that is evident in the record, and the deferential standard applied to a trial court’s “on-the-scene evaluation of the evidence,” Brown, 648 A.2d at 1190, Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge has no arguable merit.4 As such, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to preserve this issue fails. Appellant’s second argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide Appellant with discovery, failing to investigate Appellant’s case, and failing to provide effective representation. Appellant’s Brief, 5/14/2025, at 17. Appellant claims counsel failed to adequately argue that: ____________________________________________ id. at 13-14, 35, took money and a ring from the safe, and subsequently pushed the victim to the ground and maced him. Id. at 14-16, 35. The only discrepancies relate to whether Appellant’s and Mr. Watson’s guns were real, id. at 16, 35, whether the victim was asleep just before the confrontation, id. at 13, 24, and the nature of Ms. Bradley’s relationship with the victim. Id. at 23-25, 51. These minor inconsistencies do not cast doubt on the remainder of Ms. Bradley’s testimony. And regardless, “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony[.]” Widmer, 744 A.2d at 752. 3 Detective Waring testified about recovering recordings from video cameras affixed to private residences in the victim’s neighborhood. N.T., 10/5/2021, at 100. These recordings corroborated Ms. Bradley’s testimony regarding the vehicle she, Appellant, and Mr. Watson used to depart the victim’s residence. Id. at 39. Cellular records also placed Appellant’s telephone near the victim’s home at the time of the invasion and near Jewelry Row (a street with several jewelry stores) at the time Ms. Bradley testified she and Appellant sold a ring. Id. at 135-136. 4 To the extent Appellant purports to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that this Court has previously rejected such claims. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 293 A.3d 623 (Pa Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision). -6- J-S37001-26 1) video surveillance did not identify Appellant and its time and location was not property authenticated; 2) the gun case was not found in Appellant’s home; 3) the license plate of the vehicle used in the incident, and its vehicle identification number (VIN), were not authenticated to confirm Appellant’s ownership; 4) the cellular phone was not registered to Appellant; and 5) the prison call was from a previous incarceration. Id. at 18. Additionally, Appellant challenges counsel’s decision not to show him a video of Lashae Adams, Appellant’s girlfriend at the time, stating that Appellant did not live with her, as well as counsel’s decision to withhold allegedly forged documents of Ms. Bradley’s apparently used by the Commonwealth at trial. Id. These claims lack merit. As an initial matter, it is not clear how further investigation into points established in the record, and how the presentation of discovery materials to Appellant , could have affected the verdict. The same is true of Appellant’s allegation that trial counsel failed to cure alleged deficiencies in authentication. Resolving these deficiencies in favor of Appellant (i.e. accepting that Appellant could not be identified from the video, that Appellant did not live at the residence from which the gun box was recovered, and that Appellant did not officially own the car or cellular phone) would leave the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant intact. For example, Appellant first challenges the video, which he argues was insufficient to establish his identity. But the record shows that no identification was made from the video. See id. at 101-104. Instead, the Commonwealth -7- J-S37001-26 established Appellant’s identity through the testimony of Ms. Bradley, who stated that Appellant helped plan the robbery and participated in its commission. Id. at 33. Appellant next argues that the gun box was recovered from Ms. Adams’s residence, not his own, thus suggesting that his ownership of it could not be established. But ownership is irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s case, which was only premised on Appellant’s access to and use of a gun. Additionally, the record reflects that trial counsel elicited a statement from Detective Waring indicating that Appellant was associated with a different address. Id. at 122. The record therefore makes clear that Appellant did not live with Ms. Adams in the residence from which the gun box was recovered. Nowhere in the record is Appellant alleged to own the gun box; further argument regarding its ownership would therefore be futile. Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge regarding the location of the gun box is unavailing. His challenge to counsel’s failure to provide him with the video of Ms. Adams, in which she stated Appellant did not live with her, is unavailing for the same reason. Appellant’s place of residence is irrelevant. Appellant also alleges that trial counsel ineffectively argued his lack of ownership over the car and cellular phone. Similar to the gun box, however, the Commonwealth’s case only required proof that Appellant could access these things, not that he owned them. Appellant was seen by Detective Waring standing at the open trunk of the Hyundai Sonata. Id. at 107. Detective -8- J-S37001-26 Waring recovered registration documents for that car in Appellant’s name. Id. at 111. And Ms. Bradley placed him in the vehicle during the crime. Id. at 105. The cellular phone, meanwhile, is on the record as having placed a call to Detective Waring and his partner around the same time that Appellant called them to inquire about his case. Id. at 117-120. The call logs show that number frequently called Ms. Adams — Appellant’s girlfriend at the time. Id. at 133-134. There are also calls to Ms. Bradley’s number on the day of the robbery, as well as the next day, when Ms. Bradley testified she and Appellant pawned the ring together. Id. at 133. The record therefore supports the conclusion that Appellant had access to the Hyundai Sonata and the cellular phone and used them during the robbery. That Appellant may not legally own these items is irrelevant. Counsel’s lack of argument regarding the above points therefore was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s points lack arguable merit, counsel had a reasonably strategic basis for not pursuing them, and fully arguing them at trial could not have changed the outcome. The remainder of Appellant’s allegations on this issue are insufficiently developed. The telephone call Appellant challenges appears on the record as occurring on September 17, 2018. Id. at 124. Appellant does not provide any reason to question that conclusion beyond his bald assertion that it occurred before the events in question. Additionally, Appellant does not specify which documents belonging to Ms. Bradley were not provided to him by counsel or how they would have assisted in his case. These claims also fail. -9- J-S37001-26 Appellant’s final contention is that the PCRA court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s Brief, 5/14/2025, at 19. Judges may dispose of PCRA petitions without hearing if, after review of the petition, the Commonwealth’s answer, and other matters of record, they are “satisfied . . . that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact . . .” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). “A PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the record or from other evidence.” Commonwealth v. Lipinski, 258 A.3d 547, *2 (Pa Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision), citing Commonwealth v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902, 905 (Pa. Super. 2002). Appellate review of a PCRA court’s decision not to hold a hearing uses an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 A.2d 651, 660 (Pa. 2003). No abuse of discretion was committed by the PCRA court in forgoing an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s petition. As discussed above, the record discloses no support for Appellant’s arguments. The PCRA court therefore acted within its discretion in deciding Appellant did not raise genuine issues concerning any material facts. Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. - 10 - J-S37001-26 Date: 10/27/2026 - 11 -