Full Opinion

J-S36014-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SEAN M. SWEIGART : : Appellant : No. 1 MDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001585-2022 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2026 Sean M. Sweigart (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his first petition timely filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. On May 6, 2022, Berks County District Attorney’s Office Detective Frank DeBellis (Detective DeBellis) filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with numerous offenses in connection with his repeated sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, A.E. Detective DeBellis alleged that an unnamed witness, a friend of Appellant, reported that Appellant advised her, via the Facebook Messenger application, that he “did things with [A.E.] that I do with my wife[,]” and that he “screwed her and it was the worst mistake of my life.” ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S36014-26 Criminal Complaint, 5/6/22, at 8; see also id. (Detective DeBellis alleging he conducted a forensic extraction of the unnamed witness’s cell phone and recovered the incriminating messages). In a subsequent forensic interview, A.E. disclosed that Appellant repeatedly raped her, from 2015 to 2022, and periodically directed her to provide him with nude photographs of herself. Id. at 9. On April 20, 2022, Detective DeBellis interviewed Appellant, at which time Appellant confessed to sexually abusing A.E. Id.1 On November 6, 2023, Appellant, represented by plea counsel, entered an open guilty plea/charge agreement to two counts of rape of a child.2 At the guilty plea hearing, Appellant admitted to the following facts forming the basis for his plea, as recited by the assistant district attorney: [B]etween January 1st of 2015 and February 28th of 2022, … A.E. … was between the ages of five years old and 12 years old[.] [Appellant] … was [A.E.’s] stepfather at that time, [and] sexually assault[ed A.E]. Specifically, [Appellant] would penetrate [A.E.’s] vagina with his fingers and his tongue. [Appellant] also penetrated [A.E.’s] vagina with his penis, and would also ____________________________________________ 1 The circumstances surrounding Appellant’s police interview are not apparent from the record. 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c). In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth declined to pursue numerous other offenses originally charged in the criminal information, including three additional counts of rape of a child; four counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child; three counts of aggravated indecent assault – complainant less than 13 years of age (second-degree felony) and aggravated indecent assault of a child (first- degree felony); and one count each of indecent assault – complainant less than 13 years of age/course of conduct, corruption of minors – sexual offense/course of conduct, and indecent exposure. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b); 3125(a)(7), (b); 3126(a)(7); 4304(a)(1); 6301(a)(1)(ii); 3127(a); see also generally Criminal Information, 6/20/22. -2- J-S36014-26 penetrate her mouth with his penis. [Appellant] did, on at least one occasion, t[ake] pictures of [A.E.] naked. These [events] happened multiple times at several residences, [including] a residence located [in] Reading, Berks County, … and at the Country Inn Motel in Mohnton, … Berks County. N.T., 11/6/23, at 10-11 (punctuation modified); see also id. at 11 (Appellant acknowledging the accuracy of the assistant district attorney’s factual recitation). The trial court determined Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily tendered his guilty plea, and scheduled the matter for sentencing pending the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board’s sexually violent predator (SVP) evaluation. Id. at 20; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 11/6/23. On December 23, 2024, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing, at the conclusion of which it designated Appellant an SVP and advised him of his lifetime reporting requirements under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. The matter immediately proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Following argument from the parties, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 9 to 20 years in prison, followed by 20 years’ probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or notice of appeal. On August 26, 2025, Appellant, pro se, timely filed the instant PCRA petition,3 his first. Therein, under the section setting forth the “facts in support of the alleged error(s) upon which [the PCRA] motion is based,” ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant’s PCRA petition is a pre-printed form document. -3- J-S36014-26 Appellant alleged the following, in total, as his bases for PCRA relief: (1) “rule 600E”; (2) “no arrest warrant”; and (3) “no Miranda4 warning.” PCRA Petition, 8/26/25, at 4 (punctuation, capitalization, and formatting modified; footnote added). But see id. at 2 (Appellant checking, on the form petition, inter alia, the boxes indicating that he is eligible for PCRA relief because his plea counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was unlawfully induced). The PCRA court issued an order appointing counsel (PCRA counsel) to represent Appellant, and directing PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition or a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On October 14, 2025, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a thorough Turner/Finley no-merit letter, which outlined the issues Appellant wished to raise for PCRA review and determined that each issue lacked merit. See generally No-Merit Letter, 10/14/25. On October 28, 2025, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw, and issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing (Rule 907 Notice). Appellant timely filed a pro se response. Therein, Appellant cited and discussed our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -4- J-S36014-26 Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021),5 but made no allegations of PCRA counsel’s purported ineffectiveness. See Response, 11/19/25, ¶¶ 8, 12 (Appellant arguing that the PCRA court “violated [Appellant’s] rights to due process by overriding … Bradley” and “giv[ing] only a cursory statement” in its Rule 907 Notice, that “would challenge even a seasoned attorney to understand why [Appellant’s PCRA petition] was being dismissed.”). But see Rule 907 Notice, 10/28/25, at 1-6 (the PCRA court setting forth a detailed factual and procedural background of the case and specifically addressing each issue Appellant raised in his PCRA petition). On December 1, 2025, the PCRA court formally dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following issues: 1. [Appellant] sat in pre-trial detention for a total of 963 day[s,] violating [] Pennsylvania Artic[le] 1[, S]ection 9 and United States 6th [A]mendment[,] of both constitutions[,] that guarantee[] equal protection for all citizens, [and] ask[s] the Superior [C]ourt to grant his [requested] relief for violat[ions of] his United States [S]ixth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendment [rights,] and his Pennsylvania Artic[le] 1[, S]ection 9[ rights]? 2. When [Appellant] notified [plea counsel] that he wasn’t given his [M]iranda [warnings] before answer[ing] any questions, [plea counsel] said “good luck fighting for your [M]iranda rights[,]” [which] is a clear violation of [Appellant’s] ____________________________________________ 5The Bradley Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. -5- J-S36014-26 [d]ue process [rights to] Miranda warning[s], [and Appellant] ask[s] this [C]ourt to grant [relief based on] this Miranda violation and ineffective assistan[ce] of counsel? 3. W[he]ther [plea counsel] was ineffective for not filing[ ]any pretrial motion? 4. W[he]ther [Appellant’s] Miranda rights w[ere] violated by not being read [to Appellant, and] by being interrogated under custodial interrogation? 5. During [Appellant’s] length of incarceration[, plea counsel] abandoned his duty to follow through with any investigations to assist with any defense and prepare [Appellant] for trial, [and Appellant] ask[s] that this [C]ourt grant [him relief based on the] ineffective assistance of counsel? 6. [Plea counsel] never went over the discovery, discuss[ed] the facts or evidence the prosecutor had[, throughout] the life of the case[,] or kept [Appellant] informed with any updates violating [Rule of Professional Conduct] 1.4 (communication)[,] and viol[ated the] due process[ rights of Appellant, and Appellant] ask[s] that this [C]ourt grant his inef[f]ective assitan[ce] of counsel[ claim]? …. Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unpaginated) (issues reordered).6, 7 ____________________________________________ 6 We note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in several respects. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (requiring that an appellant’s brief include nine “separately and distinctly entitled” sections); see also generally Appellant’s Brief (omitting most of Rule 2111(a)’s prescribed sections). Among other deficiencies, Appellant labels what is ostensibly his Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) statement of questions involved as “arguments.” As Appellant’s brief does not contain a separately entitled statement of questions involved, we have reproduced the above-enumerated list of issues from the “arguments” section of his brief. 7 On appeal, Appellant abandoned his claim, raised in his PCRA petition, that there was “no arrest warrant.” PCRA Petition, 8/26/25, at 4. Appellant additionally raises, for the first time in his brief, a challenge to the trial court’s SVP determination. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. As Appellant did not include this (Footnote Continued Next Page) -6- J-S36014-26 In an appeal from the dismissal of a PCRA petition, our standard of review is confined to examining “whether the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 355 A.3d 394, 413 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted); see also id. (“A PCRA petitioner ‘has the burden of persuading an appellate court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.’” (brackets omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a) (providing that a PCRA petitioner must “plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that he is entitled to relief). ____________________________________________ issue in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631, 633 (Pa. 2002) (“Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” (citation omitted; emphasis in original)). Even if not waived on this basis, we would deem Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s SVP determination waived for failing to develop his claim with any relevant argument or citations to pertinent authorities. See Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Where the appellant fails to develop an issue or cite legal authority, we will find waiver of that issue.” (citation omitted)); see also Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (citing cases describing the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a defendant satisfies the criteria for classification as an SVP, and enumerating the statutory factors relevant to an SVP determination; but failing to set forth any argument as to how the trial court’s finding was erroneous). -7- J-S36014-26 We consider Appellant’s first four issues together, as they each appear to allege plea counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to file pretrial motions.8 In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the presumption that counsel was effective. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome this presumption, the petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. ____________________________________________ 8 To the extent Appellant’s first and fourth issues raise standalone constitutional challenges to the lawfulness of his pretrial detention and his statements to police, these claims are waived for failure to raise them before the trial court, and are thus not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (providing that a petitioner is ineligible for PCRA relief where “the allegation of error … [was] waived.”); id. § 9544(b) (providing that “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”); see also Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[U]pon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the legality of the sentence imposed.” (citation omitted)). We consider Appellant’s first and fourth issues as challenges to plea counsel’s failure to file pretrial motions to vindicate these rights, consistent with his claim (in issue three) that plea counsel “was ineffective for not filing[ ]any pretrial motion[s.]” Appellant’s Brief at 9. -8- J-S36014-26 Commonwealth v. Sargent, 359 A.3d 441, 447 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation and brackets omitted). If a petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, the claim is subject to dismissal. Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188; see also Commonwealth v. Rosario, 314 A.3d 888, 892 (Pa. Super. 2024) (addressing the appellant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 600 motion; explaining that “it [is] incumbent upon [an a]ppellant to set forth the tripartite standard applicable to an ineffectiveness claim and establish each prong before he may obtain relief”; and holding that the appellant waived his ineffectiveness claim by failing “to raise and develop an ineffective assistance of counsel argument in his brief ….” (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 282 (Pa. 2011)). Pertinently, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Kapellusch, 323 A.3d 837, 848 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets and citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“A defendant is bound by the statements which he makes during his plea colloquy. As such, a defendant may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he entered the plea.” (brackets, citations, and -9- J-S36014-26 quotation marks omitted)). “Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained that the entry of a plea that is unknowing, in the sense that the defendant lacks a basic understanding of the legal principles giving rise to the criminal responsibility that he is accepting, is a manifest injustice and grounds for post-conviction relief. The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, under which the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 502 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). Instantly, the following is the entirety of Appellant’s argument concerning his ineffectiveness claim based on plea counsel’s failure to file pretrial motions: Under the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution and the United States [C]onstitution[,] a criminal has the right to a speedy a[nd] fair tr[ia]l and effective counsel. [Plea counsel] did not protect these rights. After my incarceration[,] I sat inside of Berks [C]ounty jail for a total of 963 days with no pretrial relief. During the time I spent inside the county jail, it deprived me from my liberty[,] which v[io]lates my [F]ourteenth Amendment [rights] under the United States Constitution …. This raises my claim for [a] speedy tr[ia]l under [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600[.] Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 337 A.3d 541[, 543-44] (Pa. Super. 2025) [(concluding the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s oral - 10 - J-S36014-26 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600, and holding that a Rule 600 motion must be in writing)]; Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 335 A.3d 1158 (Pa. 2025). Because I did[]n’t receive effective counsel from [plea counsel,] he didn’t inform me about anything that was going on with my case, did[]n’t provide me with any discovery or any factual evidence pertaining to my case, and when I notified him that I answered the questions that the detectives asked me without reading me my [M]iranda rights he said[,] “good luck arguing that[.”] Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; Commonwealth v. Gaul, 912 A.2d 252 (Pa. 2006)[ (“The prosecution may not use statements stemming from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates that he was apprised of his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.”)]. This violate[d] my [right to] due process and violate[d Rule of Professional Conduct] 1.4. …. Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unpaginated) (citations modified); see also id. (Appellant requesting “that he be either released from custody and discharged or that his sentence be corrected in an unspecified manner.”). Appellant fails to set forth and develop arguments on each of the three prongs of an ineffectiveness claim, and fails to support his argument with any discussion of and citation to pertinent authorities. We could, therefore, deem Appellant’s first four issues waived. See Rosario, 314 A.3d at 892 (explaining that it is “incumbent upon [an] appellant to set forth the tripartite standard applicable to an ineffectiveness claim and establish each prong before he may obtain relief”; and holding that an appellant’s failure “to raise and develop an ineffective assistance of counsel argument in his brief” results in waiver); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s “argument shall be … followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). - 11 - J-S36014-26 While Appellant cites several cases in his argument, we are unable to readily discern their application to Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims. It is well established that while “this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). To the contrary, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Waiver notwithstanding, Appellant’s first four issues merit no relief. Even liberally construing his brief, Appellant fails to argue that plea counsel’s purported ineffectiveness caused him to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. See Kapellusch, 323 A.3d at 848. Here, in its Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court addressed the voluntariness of Appellant’s guilty plea in detail, concluding as follows: [Appellant] entered an open plea in this matter. Prior to the acceptance of the plea by the [trial c]ourt, the potential maximum sentence for each count was stated on the record[,] and [Appellant] was informed that there was no plea agreement in the matter. A factual recitation was given by the Commonwealth during the guilty plea proceeding. [Appellant] admitted to the facts as recited by the assistant district attorney. [Appellant] indicated [his] agreement with and understanding of the Commonwealth’s statement of the charges and maximum permissible sentences against him. … Throughout the proceeding, [Appellant] indicated, both verbally and in his written and signed plea colloquy, an understanding of the rights he was waiving by the entry [of] his guilty plea. This specifically included [Appellant’s] right to pretrial motions and a jury trial. See Guilty Plea Colloquy questions 11, 12, and 13[; see also N.T., 11/6/23, at 7 (Appellant acknowledging that he was foregoing his - 12 - J-S36014-26 right to litigate pretrial motions by entering a guilty plea)]. [Appellant] could have indicated he wished to file and proceed with pretrial motions at that time, but he did not. [Appellant] was shown the five-page guilty plea colloquy, acknowledged that he reviewed the colloquy with [plea counsel], and signed the document. In both the written and oral colloquy, [Appellant] indicated that he was satisfied with the services of [plea counsel]. …. The entry of a guilty plea serves as a waiver of all defects and defenses except those concerning jurisdiction, legality of sentence[,] and the validity of the plea. Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806, 808 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1998); see also Commonwealth v. Chumley 394 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1978). Accordingly, … the issues raised by [Appellant] would be considered pretrial issues to be raised as part of an omnibus pretrial motion … or separate motion raising potential violations of his speedy trial right[s], and have been waived by the entry of his guilty plea. Rule 907 Notice, 10/28/25, at 3-4 (citations modified); see also id. at 5 (the PCRA court opining that Appellant’s “later reflection on his circumstances and [his] determination that perhaps some pretrial issues might have been pursued does not rise to the level of establishing that the plea was involuntary.”). The PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and we agree with its legal conclusion. Critically, Appellant has failed to (1) plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that plea counsel’s “deficient stewardship … facilitate[ed] entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea[,]” Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 502; or (2) allege “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [Appellant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial[,]” Pier, 182 - 13 - J-S36014-26 A.3d at 479. As these showings are requisite to a plea-based ineffectiveness claim, their absence is fatal to Appellant’s claims. Accordingly, Appellant’s first four issues merit no relief.9 In his fifth and sixth issues, Appellant argues that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and prepare a defense, and by failing to appropriately communicate with Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant’s fifth and sixth issues are waived both because he did not include them in his PCRA petition, and because they are undeveloped. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 494 (Pa. 2014) (concluding the appellant waived a claim that he “never raised … in any PCRA petition, and first raised [] in a supplemental [Rule] 1925(b) statement” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (“We have stressed that a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the ____________________________________________ 9 Regarding Appellant’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600, the record reflects that between July 2022 and the date Appellant entered his guilty plea, the trial court issued ten case management orders continuing Appellant’s case for various reasons, each of which indicated that Appellant expressly waived application of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 875 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“Rule 600, like the right to a speedy trial which it protects, may be waived.” (brackets and citation omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (“[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” (citation omitted)). - 14 - J-S36014-26 first time on appeal.”); see also Rosario, 314 A.3d at 892; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).10, 11 Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/30/2026 ____________________________________________ 10 We emphasize that while Appellant cited Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, in his pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 Notice, he did so in connection with his claim that the Rule 907 Notice was inadequate. See Response, 11/19/25, ¶¶ 8, 12. Appellant did not, in his pro se response, assert PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to identify a particular claim. Further, Appellant does not cite Bradley in his appellate brief nor argue PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. 11 Although Appellant checked boxes on his form PCRA petition indicating his eligibility for PCRA relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel and an unlawfully induced guilty plea, see PCRA Petition, 8/26/25, at 2, checking those boxes was insufficient to preserve the specific ineffectiveness claims he raises in his fifth and sixth issues. A PCRA petition must set forth the specific facts upon which each claim is based. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12). “Boilerplate allegations have never been sufficient to discharge the appellant’s affirmative burden to rebut the presumption of effectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 910 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 2006) (brackets and citation omitted). - 15 -