Full Opinion

J-S33034-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMIR Q. MITCHELL : : Appellant : No. 645 EDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0007049-2019 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J. MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2026 Jamir Q. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals from the order entered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 On appeal, Mitchell claims that counsel was ineffective by inducing him to enter a guilty plea by guaranteeing that the trial court would impose a sentence of one to two years of incarceration. After review, we affirm. In 2019, Mitchell engaged in four separate drug transactions where he sold heroin and/or fentanyl to a confidential informant. After police arrested him and the Commonwealth charged him, Mitchell entered an open guilty plea to four counts of possession with intent to deliver. On May 4, 2022, the trial ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S33034-26 court sentenced Mitchell to an aggregate term of four to eleven years of incarceration. Mitchell filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 9, 2023, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on February 21, 2024. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 304 A.3d 736 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 313 A.3d 948 (Pa. 2024). On January 15, 2025, Mitchell filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed Attorney John F. McCaul to represent Mitchell, and he filed an amended PCRA petition. In the amended PCRA petition, Mitchell alleged that plea counsel was ineffective because she induced Mitchell to enter an open guilty plea by promising that the trial court would impose a one-to- two-year prison sentence. The PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the amended petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Mitchell did not respond. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the amended petition. Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal. He presents a single issue for review: “Did the lower court err by dismissing [Mitchell]’s amended PCRA petition and denying [Mitchell] the relief requested, to withdraw his guilty plea, or alternatively, to an evidentiary hearing, in his amended PCRA petition?” Mitchell’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). “We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Epps, 240 A.3d 640, 645 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “This -2- J-S33034-26 Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding,” but will reverse only if “the record fails to support those findings.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 393, 397 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). However, we give no deference to, and are not bound by, the trial court’s legal conclusions, which we review de novo. See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 313 A.3d 287, 293 (Pa. Super. 2024). Mitchell contends that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition without holding a hearing because he was induced by plea counsel to enter an unknowing guilty plea. Mitchell’s Brief at 11-15. According to Mitchell, he “intended to go to trial and only pled guilty because of this guarantee, a false impression [he] relied upon to his detriment.” Id. He argues that his underlying claim has arguable merit, counsel had no reasonable basis for giving him this erroneous advice and information about the plea, and he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions because he gave up his right to defend himself. Id. at 13-14. He further claims the PCRA court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Id. at 13. The PCRA court found that Mitchell’s claim was “not supported by the record” because the trial court made clear that “there was no agreement between the defense and the Commonwealth” about his sentence, and “no sentence was promised to [him],” which provided the basis to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Rule 907 Notice, 9/30/2025, at 2, 4; see also -3- J-S33034-26 PCRA Court Opinion, 5/8/2026, at 5. Based upon Mitchell’s responses to the guilty plea colloquies, which included that he “specifically affirmed that he wished to continue with the open guilty plea knowing that there was no agreement as to his sentence and knowing the sentencing guidelines that applied to him and the penalties he was facing,” the PCRA court found that Mitchell’s ineffectiveness claim was meritless. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/8/2026, at 6-8. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove, by the preponderance of evidence, that (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on the appellant to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted). “The failure to satisfy any one of the ineffectiveness prongs precludes relief.” Commonwealth v. Drayton, 313 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa. 2024) (citation omitted). A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea process as well as during trial. The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty. Instead, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. The voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Therefore, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. -4- J-S33034-26 Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently entered. There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice amounting to “manifest injustice.” A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently. A defendant’s disappointment in the sentence imposed does not constitute “manifest injustice.” Felix, 303 A.3d at 820 (citation omitted). A valid guilty plea colloquy must contain six elements: “1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). This line of inquiry serves as the basis for the court to determine whether the guilty plea is being made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. “The guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its consequences.” Felix, 303 A.3d at 820 (citation omitted). “In determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, a court is free to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Id. (citation omitted). “Furthermore, nothing in the rule precludes the supplementation of the oral -5- J-S33034-26 colloquy by a written colloquy that is read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). The record reflects that in his written and oral colloquies, Mitchell affirmed that he understood English, and although he suffered from post- traumatic stress disorder and anxiety (for which he took anxiety medication), he understood his decision to enter the plea. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 4-5; Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 2. He affirmed that he understood the rights he was foregoing by entering his guilty plea, including his right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, and that it would have been the Commonwealth’s burden to prove that he committed the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt if the case proceeded to trial. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 5-6; Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 3. Mitchell acknowledged the factual basis of his guilty plea, admitting that he delivered heroin and/or fentanyl on four separate occasions. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 13-14; Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 6. He also expressed his understanding of the maximum possible sentences, the sentencing ranges for each offense, that his sentence for each crime could run consecutively or concurrently, and that there was no agreement as to his sentence. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 10-15; Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 4; see also N.T., 2/2/2022, at 10 (indicating the Commonwealth was seeking a state prison sentence while Mitchell sought a county sentence). He further denied that anyone forced, coerced, or threatened him to enter his guilty plea, and confirmed both that he willingly entered his plea and was satisfied with -6- J-S33034-26 trial counsel’s performance. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 8, 16; Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 5-6. Additionally, and importantly for our purposes, Mitchell confirmed that no promises had been made to induce him to enter the guilty plea. Written Plea Colloquy, 2/2/2022, at 5-6. Satisfied with his responses, the trial court accepted Mitchell’s guilty plea. N.T., 2/2/2022, at 16. The totality of the statements made by Mitchell during the plea process establishes that he knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Kapellusch, 323 A.3d 837, 848 (Pa. Super. 2024) (emphasizing that “[a] defendant is bound by statements made during a plea colloquy and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing a plea that contradicts the statements he made when he pled”) (citation omitted). He stated that he understood there was no agreement about the length of his sentence, his prison term could run consecutively or concurrently, and that no promises had been made to him about the length of his sentence. In fact, the record shows the trial court went into detail about the ranges of the sentences. See N.T., 2/2/2026, at 13-15. At no time did Mitchell make any statement that he was guaranteed a one-to-two-year sentence. Even assuming plea counsel had provided Mitchell with an estimate of what his sentence could be if he pled guilty, this would not entitle him to relief based upon the statements he made on the record. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 765 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[c]ounsel’s statements to [a]ppellant about what she believed his likely sentence might be did not induce the guilty plea because -7- J-S33034-26 any misconceptions [a]ppellant had about his possible sentence were dispelled by the written and oral plea colloquies”). Therefore, Mitchell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without arguable merit, as he tendered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Felix, 303 A.3d at 822. We further conclude the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Mitchell’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. As the record fully supports the finding that his guilty plea was made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his plea was unlawfully induced. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Commonwealth v. King, 999 A.2d 598, 601 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that it is appropriate to deny a petitioner an evidentiary hearing where the PCRA court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist); see also Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasizing that there is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition). Because we find no error or abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s decision, we affirm the order dismissing Mitchell’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Order affirmed. -8- J-S33034-26 Date: 10/20/2026 -9-