Full Opinion

J-S27001-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : FRANK GRAZULIS : : Appellant : No. 2547 EDA 2024 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1054051-1990 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 Frank Grazulis appeals from the order dismissing on the merits his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We conclude that the petition was untimely and he did not prove a statutory exception. Therefore, we affirm.1 The history of this case is quite lengthy. Briefly, “[w]hen he was sixteen years old, [Appellant] and some other youths accosted a smaller group of teens. [Appellant] stabbed one boy to death and seriously wounded two others. He later pled guilty to first degree murder, conspiracy, and aggravated assault[,]” and was sentenced to life without parole. See Commonwealth ____________________________________________ 1 See Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2009) (noting that “we may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if there is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action” (cleaned up)). J-S27001-26 v. Grazulis, 195 A.3d 1048, 2018 WL 4177758, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). Since then, he has sought relief both on direct appeal and pursuant to the PCRA. While his guilt-phase challenges have not garnered him relief, he was resentenced on June 3, 2019, to twenty-eight and one-half years to life imprisonment following the federal Supreme Court decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (finding mandatory life without parole for juveniles to be cruel and unusual punishment), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (holding that Miller announced a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive for those seeking state collateral review).2 On appeal, we affirmed Appellant’s new sentence.3 See Commonwealth v. Grazulis, 239 A.3d 110, 2020 WL 4345811, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). Appellant subsequently sought habeas relief in the federal district court. While that remained pending, he initiated the instant PCRA proceedings on November 12, 2021, by submitting a serial petition with the assistance of counsel. Recognizing its patent untimeliness, Appellant invoked the ____________________________________________ 2 He has since been released on parole, which he will serve for the remainder of his lifetime. 3 We note that the resentencing did not alter the finality of his original judgment of sentence for PCRA timeliness purposes. See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa.Super. 2008) (holding that “a successful . . . PCRA petition does not ‘reset the clock’ for the calculation of the finality of the judgment of sentence for purposes of the PCRA where the relief granted . . . neither restored a petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbed his conviction, but, rather, affected his sentence only” (cleaned up)). -2- J-S27001-26 governmental interference and newly-discovered facts exceptions based upon the “homicide detectives conceal[ing] their intimidation and coercion of juvenile witnesses and eyewitnesses[,]” and averred that this behavior was unknown “until the arrest of the detectives was made public on August 13, 2021.” PCRA Petition, 11/12/21, at ¶¶ 15-16 (capitalization altered). He specifically cited the arrests of former detectives Frank Jastrzembski, Martin Devlin, and Manuel Santiago, and attached the criminal court docket for Mr. Jastrzembski. Appellant supplemented his filing with a brief on December 21, 2021. Nine months later, Appellant filed an amended petition “to include materials contained in the Police Department Homicide file and the District Attorney’s file which were produced for the defense [in August of] 2022 but never given to [Appellant]’s defense during discovery.” Amended Petition, 9/30/22, at ¶ 13. In the end, he claimed the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding twenty-four pieces of exculpatory evidence. See generally Brief in Support, 12/14/22. As will be discussed later, Appellant had pled guilty, in part, to avoid going to trial because the Commonwealth indicated it would pursue the death penalty. One piece of undisclosed evidence stated that the death penalty had been disapproved by the District Attorney. Regarding the time-bar, he again invoked the newly-discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions based upon the police misconduct and the Brady violations that were revealed -3- J-S27001-26 by reviewing the police and prosecution files in August of 2022. See Amended Petition, 9/30/22, at ¶ 40. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, undeveloped, and without merit. See Motion to Dismiss, 3/27/23, at 11-14. Regarding timeliness, it argued that the record belied one of the alleged Brady violations that the Commonwealth’s threat of pursuing the death penalty was a mere ploy. It did not address whether the discovery of the twenty-three other discrepancies between the Commonwealth’s files and discovery or the 2021 arrests of some of the investigating officers for misconduct satisfied an exception. A reply brief followed on May 19, 2023, wherein Appellant, inter alia, rebutted the Commonwealth’s timeliness argument thusly: [Appellant] brought the instant petition within four months after the D[istrict Attorney]’s Office itself made known that the detectives involved in his case had falsified evidence, perjured themselves and coerced witnesses. It was only on August 11, 2022, after th[e PCRA] court permitted inspection of the police homicide file and the District Attorney’s file, that [Appellant] learned that the death penalty had been declined in his case, and that the threat of it was used to coerce his guilty plea. The death penalty declination was therefore after-discovered evidence which was unknown to [Appellant] and which could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Reply brief, 5/19/23, at 8 (cleaned up). The court held a hearing on January 8, 2024, at which point it narrowed Appellant’s Brady claims to sixteen documents. The parties submitted briefs on the prejudice prong of Appellant’s substantive Brady claims. Thereafter, -4- J-S27001-26 the PCRA court conducted three bifurcated hearings, wherein the parties argued prejudice and the court heard testimony from Appellant and Thomas Perricone, Esquire, the Commonwealth attorney who had handled the preliminary stages of prosecuting Appellant. See generally N.T. Hearing, 4/1/24; N.T. Hearing 4/29/24; N.T. Hearing 8/20/24. At the final hearing, the Commonwealth stipulated to the timeliness of Appellant’s petition filed within one year of his review of the Commonwealth’s trial file in August of 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 8/20/24, at 9 (agreeing that the amended petition was timely as to the Brady claims because it was filed within one year of reviewing the files). Following Appellant’s testimony, the court dismissed the petition. It discredited Appellant’s testimony that he would have proceeded to trial with the undisclosed evidence. Specifically, it determined that even if he had every item that was allegedly withheld, he still would have chosen to plead guilty in light of the substantial evidence against him, the possibility of receiving the death penalty if he was found guilty by a jury, his lawyers’ promise of only serving ten years if he pled, and his parents’ emotional insistence to avoid death by accepting the plea offer. Therefore, the court concluded that Appellant did not prove prejudice and was not entitled to PCRA relief. -5- J-S27001-26 This timely appeal followed.4 Appellant complied with the court’s order to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the court provided a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.5 Appellant presents two issues for our consideration: I. Whether the lower court erred in ruling that the [sixteen] Brady violations it found, all of which supported or corroborated that [Appellant] did not commit the stabbings he was charged with, were not prejudicial, in that a reasonable attorney would still have pled his client guilty. II. Whether the lower court erred when it did not make a finding concerning whether the assigned homicide detectives engaged in the official misconduct of coercing identifications of [Appellant] from the juvenile witnesses who were involved in the attacks upon the three victims? Appellant’s brief at 4 (capitalization altered). Before we reach the merits of these claims, we must first assess whether the petition was timely filed or met a statutory exception, as neither this Court nor the PCRA court may entertain claims raised in an untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019). Critically, “the timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach ____________________________________________ 4 Nearly two years have elapsed since the initiation of this appeal. We recognize that some of the delay was due to Appellant’s inadvertent failure to timely file a docketing statement, resulting in this Court reinstating his appeal after dismissing it. Notwithstanding this excused period, it still took the PCRA court over eight months to transmit the record. Such delay is unacceptable. 5 We remind the PCRA court that it must include in its orders “both the place the appellant can serve the Statement in person and the address to which the appellant can mail the Statement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii). -6- J-S27001-26 the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Giles, 357 A.3d 555, 559 (Pa.Super. 2026) (cleaned up). As a starting point, “the PCRA requires that all PCRA petitions, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless an enumerated statutory exception applies.” Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1146 (cleaned up). It is well-settled that “for an exception to apply, a petitioner must: (1) plead and prove the applicability of one of the exceptions set forth in [§] 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); and (2) file a petition raising the exception within one year from when the claim could have been presented.” Id. (cleaned up). The three exceptions are as follows: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As noted, Appellant’s serial petition was filed more than one year after his judgment of sentence became final. As noted, he pled the newly- discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions in his PCRA petition based upon police misconduct, and in his amended petition due to the -7- J-S27001-26 withheld evidence. “Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (cleaned up). For the newly-discovered facts exception, “a petitioner need only establish that the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up). Finally, both of these exceptions call for a petitioner to prove that the information could not have been previously obtained through due diligence: Due diligence requires the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. However, it does not require perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief. As such, the due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the circumstances presented. A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 448–49 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (cleaned up). Here, instead of deciding whether Appellant met an exception, the court appears to have accepted the Commonwealth’s stipulation to the timeliness of the petition and proceeded to the merits. We have held time and again -8- J-S27001-26 that the only path around the PCRA’s time-bar is pursuant to the statutory exceptions, which a petitioner must plead and prove, not obtain through the agreement of the parties. See Commonwealth v. Mickeals, 335 A.3d 13, 20 (Pa.Super. 2025) (“In the PCRA context, statutory jurisdiction cannot be conferred by silence, agreement or neglect.” (cleaned up)). No court may skip this step. See Giles, 357 A.3d at 559 (“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” (cleaned up)). Thus, in order “to confirm proper jurisdiction, it is appropriate for an appellate court to consider sua sponte the timeliness of a PCRA petition.” Id. (cleaned up). Our assumption of this jurisdictional issue presents “a question of law, and therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. (cleaned up). We begin with Appellant’s reliance in his amended petition upon the discovery of the allegedly undisclosed contents of the Commonwealth’s files because the Commonwealth agreed this satisfied a statutory exception. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2008), is instructive. In that case, the High Court reiterated that neither the governmental interference nor newly-discovered facts exceptions “can begin with a discussion of the merits of a Brady claim[.]” Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310. Instead, the proper focus for the timeliness inquiry was “whether the government interfered with [Stokes]’s access to the [United States Postal Service (“USPS”)] and [Philadelphia Police Department Homicide Division -9- J-S27001-26 (“PPD”)] files, and whether [Stokes] was duly diligent in seeking those files.” Id. There, “the PCRA court determined that there was no government interference, and that [Stokes] was not duly diligent, because the record established that [he] was aware of the existence of the USPS and the PPD files for years before he sought them.” Id. Our High Court agreed, explaining: [Stokes] has never asserted that the prosecution (or anyone else) prevented him from gaining access to these files in the [twelve] years between the date his direct appeal was decided and the date he ultimately sought the files. The fact that multiple agencies commenced investigations in this case was known to [him] at the time of trial, at post-verdict proceedings, and on direct appeal, all of which were completed over a decade before [he] filed the instant petition. Id. (cleaned up). Thus, the Court concluded: Because the record reflects that [Stokes] was aware of the files upon which he now relies several years before he ever sought them, and because [Stokes] failed to explain why he did not request these files earlier, he did not establish the due diligence required to excuse him from over a decade of inaction. [He] has not explained why it is that he sought the files in 2004, but failed to do so earlier. Nor does he describe how it was that he was able to acquire the documents in 2004, but could not do so before that date. [Stokes] has not satisfied either of [the governmental interference or newly-discovered facts] exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. Id. at 311–12. We are now faced with a nearly identical situation. Appellant has not asserted that he was unaware that the District Attorney’s office had a file for prosecuting the case against him, nor that the local police department had an investigative file regarding the stabbings and his involvement. Additionally, he has not explained why he did not or could not seek access to those files - 10 - J-S27001-26 earlier. Furthermore, he “presented no testimony or affidavit whatsoever that prior PCRA counsel, or even trial counsel, did not know of the” allegedly undisclosed evidence. See Mickeals, 335 A.3d at 23. In light of the foregoing, Appellant cannot rely upon the alleged Brady violations as a basis for overcoming the PCRA’s deadline. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. McGriff, 354 A.3d 507, 2026 WL 127604, at *6 (Pa.Super. 2026) (non-precedential decision) (“If it were the case that an appellant presenting a well-pled Brady claim could satisfy the due diligence requirement of any exception to the PCRA by pointing to the Commonwealth’s outstanding obligation to produce material evidence, the [Stokes and Abu- Jamal] holdings would be meaningless.”). Thus, the substantive Brady claims are not before us, and we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s first issue. Appellant’s second issue, however, is based instead upon the newly- discovered facts and governmental interference exceptions he raised in his initial petition, that is, the arrest of former detectives Jastrzembski, Devlin, and Santiago, for alleged misconduct in other cases. 6 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant did not provide any proof that these individuals acted improperly in his case, alleging that, “[i]nstead, he only offers raw speculation that unfavorable inculpatory statements against him were coerced, with no ____________________________________________ 6 Since Appellant’s Brady claims were not predicated upon the misconduct of the detectives in other investigations, these facts cannot usher the Brady claims through the PCRA’s time-bar. - 11 - J-S27001-26 witness certifications from any of the witnesses he claims were coerced.” Commonwealth’s brief at 16. In his reply brief, Appellant elucidates that Messrs. Jastrzembski and Devlin “took statements from the juveniles who named [Appellant] as the stabber.”7 Appellant’s reply brief at 20. He continued: Upon hearing that the detectives in his case had been indicted for corruption, [Appellant] timely filed a PCRA [petition] in Common Pleas Court alleging that these same detectives may have falsified and coerced the statements of the juveniles who identified him. In March, 2025, the criminal case against the detectives ended in a mixed verdict: [Mr.] Devlin was acquitted on all charges, [Mr.] Jastrzembski was convicted on one count of perjury and [Mr.] Santiago was convicted on two counts. [Appellant] had long suspected that, in his case, it was no coincidence that all the neutral, disinterested witnesses identified persons other than himself as the stabber of the three victims, while the juveniles interviewed by this police unit provided all the evidence implicating him. That a statement has been coerced can be inferred from all the surrounding facts and circumstances of a case, and frightened and easily manipulated juveniles can be easy targets for such manipulations. But this particular police homicide unit had some familiarity with the craft. [Messrs.] Devlin, Santiago[,] and Jastrzembski were members of that homicide unit which was investigated. The three officers were charged and tried by the District Attorney’s Office. The District Attorney himself made public statements condemning their perjuries and coercions. Odd or suspicious circumstances, such as those present in the instant case, ought to be given some extra scrutiny when the police unit involved is alleged by the District Attorney to have engaged in a pattern of this kind of misconduct. Id. at 20-21 (cleaned up). As a specific example of this coercion, Appellant cites Detective Thomas Baker re-interviewing one of the victims, Gene Otto, ____________________________________________ 7 It appears that Mr. Santiago was not involved with the investigation of the case sub judice. - 12 - J-S27001-26 about who attacked him, purportedly in an effort to persuade him to change his identification of the stabber from “Wimpy” to Appellant. 8 Id. at 21-22; Appellant’s brief at 40-42. At bottom, Appellant’s contention is simple: “It is perfectly reasonable to infer that police coercion created the anomalous situation in which all the victims and the neutral, disinterested witnesses identified persons other than [Appellant]; while all the juveniles with criminal exposure for the assault identified [Appellant] as the lone stabber.” Appellant’s brief at 43. He bases this inference on the alleged misconduct of the three detectives in other cases because some of them formed part of the unit that investigated the underlying stabbings. At the PCRA hearings, Appellant provided the court with two instances of coercion. Initially, he claimed that the only witness who was coerced was Mr. Otto at the hands of Detective Baker. See N.T. Hearing, 1/8/24, at 70. After the PCRA court rejected his blanket argument that “[t]he Jastrzembski unit” coerced unnamed additional witnesses, Appellant proffered that it was “a reasonable inference” that Mr. Jastrzembski had coerced witness Robert Righter, whom he interviewed, because Mr. Righter changed from one statement to the next how many people he saw Appellant stab. Id. at 73-78. Recognizing the multitude of reasons why witnesses change their statements ____________________________________________ 8 Although Detective Baker was not indicted with Messrs. Jastrzembski, Devlin, and Santiago, Appellant averred that he was part of Detective Jastrzembski’s unit in this case and therefore applied similar practices. - 13 - J-S27001-26 and the lack of any specific evidence of coercion, the PCRA court disallowed that claim. Id. at 78. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Jastrzembski’s arrest has been the subject of several different attempts by various petitioners to overcome the PCRA’s time-bar. We have held that a petitioner “cannot meet the newly-discovered-fact exception based on [Mr.] Jastrzembski’s misconduct in other, unrelated cases without some indication that the detective committed misconduct in this case.” Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 341 A.3d 85, 2025 WL 1342377, at *4 (Pa.Super. 2025) (non-precedential decision) (emphasis in original). This holding is wholly applicable here. The coercion Appellant cites as happening in the case sub judice is either unrelated to Mr. Jastrzembski because it was performed by Detective Baker or was wholly speculative and based solely upon a witness changing his story without any evidence that Mr. Jastrzembski coerced the witness to do so. Having cited no evidence of “misconduct in this case[,]” Mr. Jastrzembski’s arrest for perjury and related charges in another case cannot satisfy a statutory exception to the application of the PCRA’s time-bar in the instant matter. Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, neither the PCRA court nor this Court have jurisdiction to address the merits of Appellant’s second issue. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s petition was time- barred. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition, albeit for different reasons. See Wiley, 966 A.2d at 1157. Order affirmed. - 14 - J-S27001-26 Date: 10/22/2026 - 15 -