Full Opinion

J-S23043-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALTERIK YUSAN BANKS : : Appellant : No. 238 EDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 26, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000128-2024 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant, Alterik Yusan Banks, appeals from the order of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541, et seq. (PCRA), collaterally challenging his guilty plea conviction of failing to register with the state police as a sexual offender.1 He presently raises three claims of trial court error by jurists in related but separate criminal matters, all of which are unreviewable and meritless for our purposes. Accordingly, we affirm. On July 8, 2022, a jury found Appellant guilty of four counts of indecent exposure, one count of corruption of a minor and one count of unlawful contact with a minor in connection with his having openly masturbated in front of his ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). J-S23043-26 then-girlfriend’s 16-year-old daughter in the home that they shared. In October 2022, the court imposed a term of imprisonment of twelve to thirty- six months and ordered him to report to prison on November 1, 2022. Appellant did not report as mandated. His direct appeal was subsequently quashed. Sometime after, Appellant was arrested on a bench warrant. He appeared before the court on December 27, 2023. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 2026 WL 1785911, *1 (Pa. Super., filed June 22, 2026) (3043 EDA 2025) (memorandum affirming the dismissal of Appellant’s first, but untimely- filed, PCRA petition).2 On March 13, 2023, Appellant was charged with offenses arising from his absconding from custody following his convictions for sexual offenses: (1) failing to register with the state police as a sexual offender under Docket Number CP-45-CR-0000128-2024; and (2) defaulting from required reporting to prison on November 1 under Docket Number CP-45-CR-0000129-2024.3 On April 7, 2025, Appellant pleaded guilty in open court to failing to register and defaulting from reporting. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 4/7/25, 9-10; see also Guilty Plea and Colloquy (CP-45-CR-0000128-2024). The plea court deferred sentencing and ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. See N.T. Guilty Plea, 4/7/25, 10. On August 22, 2025, the court imposed terms of imprisonment of: fifteen to sixty months for the conviction of failing to register ____________________________________________ 2 The authoring judge of the instant memorandum also was the author of the memorandum in June 2026. 3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4915.1(a)(1) and 5124(a), respectively. -2- J-S23043-26 with the state police as a sexual offender; and three to twelve months for defaulting in required appearance. See N.T. Sentencing, 8/22/25, 4, 8-9. The term of imprisonment for failing to register was ordered to be served consecutively to his term of imprisonment for his prior sexual offenses. See id., 10; see also Sentencing Order, 8/22/25, 1 (CP-45-CR-0000128-2024). On August 27, 2025, Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to modify his sentence for failing to register, asserting that it was excessive under the circumstances. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 8/27/25, 1. The motion was denied by written order of the court on August 28, 2025. See Order, 8/28/25. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal. Therefore, the judgment of sentence became final on Monday, September 29, 2025, with the expiration of the direct review appeal period. On October 9, 2025, Appellant filed, pro se, a motion to modify or correct his sentence nunc pro tunc. See Appellant’s Motion to Modify or Correct Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc, 10/9/25. In the motion, Appellant stated it was his understanding that, “based on plea discussions with counsel and representations made during the plea process, [his] sentence would run concurrent with [the sexual offenses case].” Id., 1 (emphasis omitted). He also stated that he did “not knowingly or voluntarily agree to consecutive time” and “was not made aware that consecutive time would be imposed.” Id. He stated that he filed the motion “as soon as he became aware of the error,” and asked the court “to review the plea and sentencing transcript to confirm whether there was an understanding of concurrent sentencing and to modify -3- J-S23043-26 the sentence accordingly in the interest of justice.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant also asked for release from prison based on “fairness, family hardship, and justice.” Id., 1-2. The court accepted Appellant’s pro se pleading, treated it as PCRA petition under Docket Number CP-45-CR-0000128-2024, and appointed PCRA counsel. See Order, 11/21/25, 1-2; see also Commonwealth v. Hagan, 306 A.3d 414, 421–422 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“[r]egardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the PCRA”). PCRA counsel sought and obtained orders for the relevant notes of testimony to be transcribed. See Appellant’s Motion for Transcripts, 10/22/25; Order, 10/23/25; Notice of Completion of Transcript, 11/03/25. On November 12, 2025, Appellant, pro se, sought the removal of PCRA counsel based on allegations of “complete breakdown in communication,” counsel’s refusal to present exculpatory materials, and counsel’s inability to represent Appellant’s interests fairly or adequately. See Appellant’s Motion to Remove Counsel and Proceed Pro Se, etc., 11/12/25, 1. Appellant also noted for the court that his birthday was upcoming and requested to be released from prison to reunite with his “aging parents.” Id. In addition, and on the same date, Appellant filed an addendum to his pro se petition, requesting the court to both review attached materials supporting his innocence and release him from prison to reunite with his parents. See Appellant’s Addendum to PCRA Petition, 1. He also asserted that the underlying accusations in the -4- J-S23043-26 sexual offenses case “were false and motivated by personal retaliation” to force Appellant to transfer his interest in shared real property to his ex- girlfriend.4 See id. On November 13, 2025, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) (en banc), finding that Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition lacked merit. See Finley Letter, 11/13/25, 7. In the body of the letter, counsel explained that he interpreted Appellant’s claim in the pro se PCRA petition to allege the ineffective assistance of plea counsel for unlawfully inducing Appellant’s guilty plea by misleading him to believe he would receive sentence terms concurrent to his sentence in the sexual offenses case. See id., 3-4. Upon review of the record, PCRA counsel concluded that a “plain reading of the [p]lea [a]greement sets forth concurrency only as to both of [Appellant’s] 2024 cases,” and “left open the possibility for [Appellant] to argue concurrency for his 2021 case” but left the question to the court’s discretion. Id., 5-6. PCRA counsel also informed the court that Appellant told him that “he should have received time credit in his 2024 cases for time spent in Monroe County Prison while serving his prison sentence on his [sexual offenses] conviction.” Id., 6. Because a prisoner may not receive time credit ____________________________________________ 4 These allegations and supporting materials also were the basis of Appellant’s PCRA proceeding and appeal in the sexual offenses case. See Banks, 2026 WL 1785911, *4 (describing underlying time barred PCRA petition as “raising claims including medical incapacity, inability to appear, out-of-state residency, coercion, and innocence-related evidence”). -5- J-S23043-26 in a new case while serving a sentence on another case and Appellant had received the credit in the sexual offenses case, PCRA counsel determined that no credit was due. See id. PCRA counsel also referenced the pro se addendum filed by Appellant. PCRA counsel noted that the exhibits were addressed both in counsel’s own Finley letter in the sexual offenses case PCRA proceeding and in a 2025 federal court memorandum dismissing Appellant’s federal habeas corpus action in the sexual offenses case. See Finley Letter, 11/13/25, 6. Counsel attached both the prior Finley letter and the federal court decision. See id., Attachments B & D. PCRA counsel also explained that the court lacked “jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] request for early release or parole because the Court issued a state prison sentence,” citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9776(a). See id., 6-7. On December 1, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se motion for release on unsecured bail, during the pendency of his PCRA petition, alleging that he “suffers from ongoing medical issues requiring stable care and continued evaluation.” Appellant’s Pro Se Motion for Release on Unsecured Bail, 12/1/25, 1. He also asserted that his elderly parents “depend on him emotionally and practically” and that the “prolonged delay in PCRA review has caused additional strain on [them] and [his] immediate family.” Id. On the same date, he filed a pro se motion to expedite PCRA review on the grounds of medical need and family hardship. See Appellant’s Pro Se Motion to Expedite PCRA Review Due to Medical Need and Family Hardship, 12/1/25, 1. Also on the -6- J-S23043-26 same date, Appellant filed a pro se motion to compel a ruling on his PCRA petition. See Appellant’s Pro Se Motion to Compel Ruling on Pending PCRA Petition and Counsel Withdrawal, 12/1/25. On December 9, 2025, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing, for the reasons stated in the Finley letter and after its own independent review of the record and applicable law. See Order, 12/9/25, 1-2; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. In the same order, the PCRA court granted counsel’s request to withdraw from representation and provided Appellant with thirty days to file an amended PCRA petition or other response to the notice. Id., 2. The court also denied Appellant’s motion for release on unsecured bail and dismissed the other pending motions filed by Appellant. Id., 2-3. On December 22, 2025, Appellant filed an objection to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss his petition. See Petitioner’s Pro Se Rule 907 Objection, 12/22/25. He alleged the court failed to address the “new evidence including coercion, motive, and communications supporting innocence.” Id., 1. He alleged that a hearing was required, without specifying any genuine issue of material fact. Id. He also alleged that consecutive sentences were improperly imposed because “the [c]ourt relied on an incorrect belief [that h]e was ‘running,’” when he lived in New Jersey, had a medical incapacity, was awaiting attorney instruction, was not properly served with a warrant, and lacked the “physical ability to appear.” Id. In addition, and on the same date, Appellant filed a pro se amended petition alleging new evidence about “the -7- J-S23043-26 accuser” in his former sexual offenses case. See Appellant’s Pro Se Amended PCRA Petition, 12/22/25, 1. He also alleged the ineffective assistance of prior counsel who “failed to raise available issues, present documentation, challenge sentencing, or request a hearing,” without identifying which counsel or specifying what issues or documentation. Id. Appellant also alleged that the court violated due process by dismissing the petition without a hearing “when facts are disputed.” Id. He also alleged, for the same reasons that he contended consecutive terms were improperly imposed, that his aggregate “15-month consecutive sentence” was illegal based on a false finding that he fled, and because no “valid reason was stated under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 (b).” Id., 1-2. On December 26, 2025, the PCRA court issued an order in which it found that Appellant’s Rule 907 objection and amended PCRA petition were timely filed. See Order, 12/26/25, 1. It also found that, after “[a] review of [Appellant’s] submissions[, … Appellant] has failed to assert a non-frivolous claim and that the Rule 907 Objection and Amended PCRA add only general, boilerplate, conclusory[] assertions of attorney ineffectiveness and after- discovered evidence that are insufficient to warrant a hearing or support relief under the PCRA.” Id., 1-2. It therefore dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. See id., 2. Appellant filed a timely appeal on January 2, 2025. See Notice of Appeal, 1/2/26. The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal. See Order, 1/6/26; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). -8- J-S23043-26 Appellant complied, asserting ten separately enumerated issues. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/12/26.5 In his brief, Appellant presents three questions for our review: 1. Whether the court erred in relying upon photographs that did not depict criminal conduct and were presented in a misleading and prejudicial manner[?] 2. Whether the court erred in determining willful flight where Appellant resided in New Jersey due to documented medical conditions and reliance upon counsel[?] 3. Whether the court failed to properly consider evidence of motive, bias, and credibility issues of the accuser[?] Appellant’s Brief, 1.6 ____________________________________________ 5 After filing the appeal, Appellant filed in the PCRA court a motion for reconsideration of his motion for bail pending appeal. See Motion for Reconsideration, 1/15/26. The PCRA court denied the motion. See Order, 1/21/26. Also in the PCRA court, well after taking this appeal, Appellant filed a document in which he proclaimed his innocence in the sexual offenses case, complained that photographs of him were introduced in the sexual offenses case depicting “non-criminal activity,” asserted accusations against his ex- girlfriend in the sexual offenses case, and contended that he “did not flee the jurisdiction” or “willfully fail to comply with court requirements,” as he was a resident of New Jersey and “unable to travel.” See Appellant’s Verified Statement, 1/30/26. In this Court, Appellant filed a motion seeking expedited consideration of his appeal due to an alleged urgent medical need that could not be properly treated while incarcerated. See Application for Expedited Consideration, 5/6/26. We denied the application. See Superior Court Order, 5/29/26. 6 We could deem Appellant’s single spaced one and one-quarter page brief inadequate for proper review. See Pa.R.A.P 2119(b)-(e). “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “This Court (Footnote Continued Next Page) -9- J-S23043-26 With respect to a PCRA court’s denial of relief, our standard of review is limited to “whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s determination is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Miner, 44 A.3d 684, 688 (Pa. Super. 2012). As an initial matter, only Appellant’s second and third questions were raised in his Rule 1925(b) Statement at all, and they were raised in slightly different form. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, ¶¶ 5, 6, 9 (raising claims 2 and 3 in the guise of an allegation of prior counsel’s ineffective assistance). The first question, however, was not asserted in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement in any form. “Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not included in the Statement ____________________________________________ will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. If a deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability to address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding that appellant waived issue on appeal where he failed to support claim with relevant citations to case law and record). Rather than focus on Appellant’s non-compliance with briefing requirements that have not interfered with our ability to understand his claims, we choose to address other, more fundamental problems with Appellant’s brief and appeal. - 10 - J-S23043-26 and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). Therefore, we will not review the merits of the issue raised in Appellant’s first question. There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the issues raised by Appellant. None of the claims raised on appeal address his conviction for failing to register with the state police as a sexual offender, the only conviction he challenged in his PCRA petition. For convenience, we will repeat the entirety of Appellant’s legal argument: A. Mischaracterization of Evidence The photographs at issue were lawful personal images taken years prior in New Jersey. They did not depict criminal conduct. The manner in which they were presented created unfair prejudice outweighing any probative value. B. No Willful Flight Appellant remained in New Jersey due to medical impairment and reliance on appointed counsel. A finding of flight requires evidence of consciousness of guilt. The record reflects residence and medical hardship, not evasion. C. Failure to Weigh Motive and Bias Where credibility is central, courts must consider motive to fabricate. Evidence of property disputes, password knowledge, and subsequent control over Appellant’s residence directly relate to credibility and should have been weighed appropriately. Appellant’s Brief, 1-2. In the instant matter, Appellant entered a guilty plea to failing to register with state police as a sexual offender. He is now appealing the denial of PCRA relief for that conviction. He did not proceed to a trial. There were neither - 11 - J-S23043-26 witnesses nor evidence presented at the guilty plea hearing. Instead, Appellant admitted to the following allegations: The Court: … around November 3, 2022, in Jackson Township, you knowingly failed to register with the state police as legally required, did you do that? [Appellant]: Yes, absolutely. N.T. Guilty Plea, 4/7/25, 9. Appellant’s arguments A and C, corresponding to Questions 1 and 3 of his questions presented, raise claims related to witnesses at a trial or evidence admitted at a trial. The only trial even tangentially related to Appellant’s conviction for failing to register with the state police as a sexual offender was his trial for sexual offenses in a prior, separate criminal matter. Appellant’s first question is unreviewable, but his third question references evidence of bias and a lack of credibility of an “accuser,” which based on the documents referenced in his pro se addendum to his PCRA petition, as well as his claims in his state and federal appeals of his sexual offense convictions, refers to his former girlfriend, who testified in the sexual offenses trial. The documents allegedly demonstrate her “property disputes, [her] password knowledge, and [her] subsequent control over Appellant’s residence,” all of which were plausibly relevant to an after-discovered evidence claim arising from the sexual offenses trial but are irrelevant to Appellant’s guilty plea conviction. Therefore, he would not have been entitled to any relief from his conviction for failing to register with the state police on the basis of either question 1 or 3, even if the claims had merit. - 12 - J-S23043-26 With respect to Appellant’s second question for review, he argues that there was no “willful flight,” because he “remained in New Jersey due to medical impairment and reliance on appointed counsel,” therefore, the “record reflects residence and medical hardship, not evasion.” Appellant’s Brief, 1-2. Putting aside whether Appellant’s documents demonstrated a lack of flight, there are still two insurmountable problems with this claim. Flight is not an element of his conviction for failing to register with the state police, which required only proof that Appellant knowingly failed to register “with Pennsylvania State Police as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) or 9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and Pennsylvania State Police).” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). Therefore, this claim is irrelevant to this appeal. Even if flight were an element of his other guilty plea conviction, defaulting in required appearance, it would still not be cognizable in this appeal.7 Appellant did not challenge that conviction in his PCRA petition. “[I]ssues not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be considered on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. Super. 2003). Thus, Appellant would not have been entitled to any relief from his conviction for ____________________________________________ 7 Flight was not an element of Appellant’s conviction for defaulting on required appearance, as his conviction was graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree, see N.T. Sentencing, 8/22/25, 9, whereas flight is only an element when the offense is graded as a felony of the third degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5124(a). Further, Appellant admitted his guilt based on his failing to report to prison on November 1 as required. - 13 - J-S23043-26 failing to register with state police as a sexual offender even if there were merit to his second question. A second, independently fatal problem with Appellant’s claims on appeal is that they are presented as direct claims of trial court error. To obtain PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove, inter alia, that “the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). However, “issues [that] could have been raised in a direct appeal, [even where] no direct appeal was taken, [] are [] deemed waived for purposes of [a] PCRA appeal.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa. Super. 2007). Each of Appellant’s claims in this appeal could have been raised, in the form they are now presented, in a direct appeal but were not, and therefore are waived under the PCRA. See id. In addition, a defendant who enters a guilty plea, “waives all defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed,” and a defendant who enters an “open” guilty plea, i.e., one that is entered without agreement on a joint recommendation for the sentence, “will not be precluded from appealing the discretionary aspects of [his] sentence.” Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2 995, 997 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1999); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rounsley, 717 A.2d 537, 539 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“any issue relating to the sufficiency of the evidence is waived by entry of a guilty plea and is not subject to attack in a post-conviction proceeding”). None of the questions presented encompass a challenge to the jurisdiction of the plea court, the voluntariness - 14 - J-S23043-26 of the guilty plea, the legality of the sentence (with the possible exception of a meritless challenge to the grading of a different conviction), or the discretionary aspects of sentence. Therefore, they are waived from review in this appeal for a second reason. At the PCRA stage, claims of trial court error are either previously litigated if raised on direct appeal, or waived if could have been asserted on direct review and were not. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 260-61, 270 (Pa. 2011) (rejecting claims of trial court error as either previously litigated where raised on direct appeal or waived where not raised on direct appeal). Trial court error may constitute the arguable merit prong of an ineffective assistance claim, but the issue must be framed properly for a petitioner to be entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014) (discussing waiver and setting forth ineffectiveness standards); Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 449 n.11 (Pa. 2011) (admonishing against conflating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with claims of trial court error); Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (holding that “a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review under [42 Pa.C.S.] § 9544(a)(2) [… and] a PCRA court should recognize ineffectiveness claims as distinct issues and review them under the three-prong ineffectiveness standard announced in [Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987)]”). - 15 - J-S23043-26 When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly raised, the petitioner must demonstrate: “(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) [] counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 868 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2005). Appellant’s substantive claims, here, however, are raised as claims of trial court error and not as the underlying claim for an allegation of plea counsel’s ineffective assistance. The word “ineffective” is not used in Appellant’s short brief, much less did he argue and persuasively demonstrate in the brief that prior counsel were ineffective with respect to any substantive claims presented for our review. We therefore find Appellant’s second and third questions unreviewable as raised in his brief. We find that Appellant would not have been entitled to PCRA relief for the claims raised in this appeal. Accordingly, we discern no error in the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Order affirmed. Date: 11/3/2026 - 16 -