Com. v. Capriotti, Z.

J-S36004-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY CLAYTON CAPRIOTTI : : Appellant : No. 1025 MDA 2024 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-57-CR-0000021-2019 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Zachary Clayton Capriotti (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order denying and dismissing his first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. In its opinion, the PCRA court aptly summarized the facts underlying the instant appeal: … Enrico and Arlene Capriotti [(Enrico and Arlene, respectively; collectively, the Capriottis)] are the parents of [Appellant]. [The] Capriotti[s] own a property located at 556 Main Street, Laporte, Sullivan County, Pennsylvania. Said property consists of The Griffin Grill (hereinafter “the restaurant”), which is a restaurant and kitchen on the first floor and a single unit apartment on the second floor. [The] Capriotti[s] allowed [Appellant] to stay in the apartment as long as he paid the bills and maintained the ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S36004-26 restaurant. There was no lease agreement, no rent to own agreement, nor any partnership agreement. [Appellant] did not pay rental income to his parents[,] as he was recently released from prison and needed a home to stay [in] for his home plan. [Appellant] and [the Capriottis] had an oral agreement wherein [Appellant] was supposed to pay the mortgage. At the end of June 2018 or early July 2018, [Appellant] began running the restaurant. In or around October of 2018, [Appellant] fell behind on paying the bills[,] so [Appellant] and [the Capriottis] discussed selling the business. In fact, in November of 2018[, the] Capriotti[s] decided to auction the restaurant and building to the highest bidder. [The Capriottis] paid the mortgage for December 2018 and January of 2019, together with the insurance that [Appellant] let lapse and the taxes. In late January of 2019 or early February 2019, [the] Capriotti[s] discussed with [Appellant] the fact that if he could not pay the bills and maintain the business, he could no longer reside in the apartment[,] and [the Capriottis] were taking over the business. This conversation was a peaceful conversation and following the same, [Appellant] assisted [Enrico] in changing the locks of the restaurant. Upon leaving, Enrico [] asked [Appellant] not to damage the property[,] and [Appellant] responded that he would need to tear out a wall because his guns were stored within. On February 17, 2019, [Appellant] came to the restaurant and was acting erratically. Arlene [] testified that she saw [Appellant] holding a pistol. Because of this, the police were called. The Pennsylvania State Police [(PSP)] arrived[,] and although [Appellant] was present, he was no longer holding a pistol. With the police present, Enrico [] cut a hole in the newly painted wall, where two (2) long guns and a magazine for an AK- 47 were found. The evidence was taken to [PSP] Barracks where they were logged into evidence. After the police left[,] and out of fear for his grandchildren1 [who] had access to the apartment, Enrico [] searched the apartment for the pistol his wife had previously seen [Appellant] ____________________________________________ 1 One of Enrico’s grandchildren, Appellant’s minor son, occupied the apartment every other weekend, and was on the premises at the time of the incident. Commonwealth v. Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560, 1287 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 7, 9). -2- J-S36004-26 holding. Upon searching the closet of one of his grandchildren’s rooms, Enrico [] found two (2) handguns and what looked like drugs. The discovery was made in the bedroom of his fourteen (14) year[-]old grandson. [The] Capriotti[s] again called the [PSP] to inform the investigating officer of what they had found. Upon arrival, Enrico [] led officers to the bedroom[,] where they found handguns, suspected drugs and smoking pipes. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/19/24, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted; footnote added). “The drugs were later identified as methamphetamine and marijuana.” Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 6). Appellant was arrested and charged two days later. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence recovered from the apartment. Following a hearing, the suppression court denied the motion. In June 2020, a jury convicted Appellant of three counts of possession of a firearm prohibited (second-degree felony); and one count each of possession of a firearm prohibited (first-degree felony), endangering the welfare of children, possession of a controlled substance, possession of marijuana – small amount, and possession of drug paraphernalia.2 On September 1, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 24½ to 55 years in prison, to be served consecutive to another sentence he was then serving for ____________________________________________ 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 4304(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (31)(i), (32). -3- J-S36004-26 a 2006 conviction.3 Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. On direct appeal, a panel of this Court concluded the trial court erroneously denied Appellant’s request for time credit. Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 26-28). We therefore vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remanded for the trial court to grant Appellant credit for time served. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 28). We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all other respects. See id.4 Upon remand, the trial court awarded Appellant 1,157 days of time credit. Order, 10/3/23. On December 19, 2023, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant timely PCRA petition. Jennifer L. McCambridge, Esquire (PCRA counsel), who represented Appellant during his resentencing, was appointed as PCRA counsel. Appellant filed a pro se “Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel,” citing an “unreconcilable personality conflict” and explaining his wish to raise claims of ____________________________________________ 3 Relevantly, Appellant “was in prison prior to adjudication and sentencing on a parole detainer for his 2006 conviction….” Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 10). The trial court did not award Appellant credit for time he spent in prison while on detainer. 4 Initially, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider this Court’s application of the “silver platter” exception to the exclusionary rule; our Supreme Court later dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. Commonwealth v. Capriotti, 273 A.3d 510 (Pa. 2022) (granting allowance of appeal), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 287 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2023). -4- J-S36004-26 PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.5 Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel, 1/8/24, ¶¶ 1-2. On February 23, 2024, PCRA counsel filed an application to withdraw as counsel and an extensive Turner/Finley6 “no-merit” letter. Subsequently, on April 18, 2024, Appellant filed a “Motion to Receive Appointment of Adequate Counsel or the Right to Proceed Pro Se.” Appellant expressed displeasure with PCRA counsel’s representation during and after his resentencing, as well as with PCRA counsel’s decision to file a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Appellant requested that the PCRA court conduct a Grazier7 hearing and allow him to proceed pro se, or alternatively, to permit Appellant to choose his own appointed counsel. Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA petition on May 9, 2024. Therein, Appellant identified several instances of alleged perjury by several witnesses, and argued the Commonwealth knowingly presented this perjured testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The PCRA court conducted a hearing on May 28, 2024. At the start of the hearing, the PCRA court addressed PCRA counsel’s application to ____________________________________________ 5 Although not specified in his motion, Appellant presumably sought to challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness in connection with her representation for resentencing purposes. 6 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 7 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). -5- J-S36004-26 withdraw. Appellant indicated that he did not object to PCRA counsel’s withdrawal. See N.T. (PCRA hearing), 5/28/24, at 6. Following a Grazier colloquy, the PCRA court determined that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to PCRA counsel. See id. at 7-9. The court therefore granted PCRA counsel’s application to withdraw and permitted Appellant to proceed pro se. See Order, 5/28/24. Appellant additionally filed a written waiver of his right to counsel. See Written Waiver of Counsel, 5/28/24. The PCRA court consolidated Appellant’s PCRA petition and amended PCRA petition and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. Appellant called as witnesses Enrico, Arlene, and Pamela Capriotti Saxon (Saxon).8 Relevantly, Enrico testified that he tried to cut through the apartment wall using a knife, but the knife could not cut through the drywall. N.T., 5/28/24, at 28-29. Enrico testified that Saxon then “slammed her body into the wall.” Id. at 29. Saxon confirmed that Enrico first attempted to cut the wall, but ultimately, she “took [her] elbow and busted a hole in it.” Id. at 57-58. On June 6, 2024, the PCRA court entered an order denying and dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal ____________________________________________ 8 The exact nature of Saxon’s relationship to the Capriottis is not specified; however, from the record, it appears Saxon is related to the Capriottis through marriage. See N.T., 5/28/24, at 56 (Saxon explaining that she was at Griffin’s Grill on the date of the incident “[t]o pick up one of two of my children that were staying with [Appellant’s] son….”); see also id. at 57 (describing Enrico as her father-in-law at that time). -6- J-S36004-26 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal (in which he raised 32 claims of error). The PCRA court subsequently filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Approximately two years of protracted procedural history ensued. Relevantly, Appellant filed a petition for appointment of counsel on July 24, 2024. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s petition. On November 5, 2024, the PCRA court submitted a letter to this Court, explaining, in part, as follows: The Court Administration of Sullivan County has contacted no less than ten (10) attorneys who are unwilling to accept an appointment of representation of [Appellant]. [Appellant] has a history of filing civil actions against his previous attorneys, as well as filing reports with the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board. [The PCRA c]ourt, having never previously been in this situation, is seeking guidance from the Superior Court on how to proceed with appointment of counsel. Letter Request from PCRA Court, 11/5/24 (paragraph break omitted). This Court subsequently remanded the case for 60 days for the court to resolve Appellant’s representation status. Order, 4/23/25. The PCRA court appointed new appellate counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw from representation, citing a conflict of interest. This Court again remanded for the PCRA court to address the motion to withdraw, and to “conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine whether Appellant is eligible for, and wishes to proceed with, new court-appointed counsel, or pro se.” Order, 8/8/25. -7- J-S36004-26 Once again, the PCRA court appointed new appellate counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw. Appellate counsel asserted he was unable to provide competent representation, as his practice area did not include appellate work or PCRAs. During a hearing, the PCRA court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. See N.T., 12/16/25, at 7. The PCRA court then stated, “[A]t this point in time[,] this [c]ourt has exhausted all the resources for court[-]appointed counsel on your PCRA appeal.” Id. at 9; see also id. at 13 (PCRA court stating, “[M]y administration has been through every … criminal attorney and otherwise that we use in both Wyoming and Sullivan [C]ounties.”). On February 23, 2026, after receiving the PCRA court’s response, this Court directed our prothonotary to remove counsel from the docket and list Appellant as pro se. Order, 2/23/26.9, 10 The matter is now, at long last, properly before us for our review. ____________________________________________ 9 Because the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s application to withdraw, Appellant is not entitled to court-appointed counsel for appeal. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 318 A.3d 927, 933 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[O]nce the PCRA court permits counsel to withdraw after filing a Turner/Finley no- merit letter, an appellant is no longer entitled to the appointment of counsel on appeal.”) (citation, quotation marks, and some brackets omitted). We nevertheless commend the PCRA court’s extensive efforts to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in the instant appeal. 10 Appellant thereafter filed various pro se applications for relief, all of which were denied. -8- J-S36004-26 Appellant raises the following ten issues:11 1) Has Appellant been denied his rule[-]based right to fully- counseled PCRA representation, due to counsel abandoning Appellant? Further[,] the [PCRA] court compel[ed]/forc[ed] Appellant to proceed pro se on his first petition, violating Appellant’s guaranteed right by and through both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution[s], as well [as Pa.R.Crim.P.] 904? 2) Did the [Commonwealth] fail to meet [its] burden of proof and persuasion, under [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 581(H)? Further, was Appellant[’]s counsel ineffective in framing the question presented upon appeal correctly, which Appellant’s [w]hole argument was based upon? As well, should PCRA counsel ha[ve] litigated this argument in counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 3) Did the trial court violate Appellant’s constitutional right to due process[,] as guaranteed him by and through … the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution[s], where the trial court violated [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 581(I); also causing a violation [of] Brady …? Further, should PCRA counsel have addressed this argument within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? ____________________________________________ 11 We reiterate that Appellant raised 32 claims of error in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. We caution Appellant that listing an abundance of issues may impede meaningful appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 301-02 (Pa. 2019) (“As the Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated, ‘it is rare that a brief successfully demonstrates that the trial court committed more than one or two reversible errors. I have said in open court that when I read an appellant’s brief that contains ten or twelve points, a presumption arises that there is no merit to any of them … and it is this presumption … that reduces the effectiveness of appellate advocacy.’”) (quoting “The Appellate Bar: Professional Competence and Professional Responsibility—A View From the Jaundiced Eye of the Appellate Judge,” 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 445, 458 (1982) (emphasis in original)); see also Satiro v. Maninno, 237 A.3d 1145, 1150- 51 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that “such ‘voluminous’ statements do not identify the issues that appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) makes the raising of so many issues impossible.”). -9- J-S36004-26 4) Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s suppression motion, where the trial court relied solely upon testimony of a witness that was never presented at the suppression hearing, thereby violating [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 581(H) & (J); as well, the constitutional prohibition on hearsay? Further, was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to address this issue within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 5) Did the PCRA court violate Appellant’s constitutional due process rights[,] as guaranteed [to] him, by and through both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, where the private search doctrine was violated regarding the search of Appellant’s apartment and rest[a]urant? Further, was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to litigate this matter, nor addressing [the claim] within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 6) Did the [Commonwealth] com[m]it fraud upon the court, causing the trial court to violate the Landlord Tenant Act of 1951, as well [as] the coordinate jurisdiction rule, due to the trial court’s refusal to comply with [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 575(A)(2)(g)? Further, was Appellant’s PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to make any meaningful reference to the fraud committed upon the court within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 7) Did the [Commonwealth] violate Brady … and [its] progeny, by and through the withholding of material witness Pamela Saxon at both the suppression hearing and trial? Also, was PCRA counsel ineffective for refusing to speak to Appellant, as well [as] contact any witnesses that support the Brady violation? Further failing to make any reference too, within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 8) Did the [Commonwealth] violate Brady … and [its] progeny by and through the use of coached and knowingly perjured testimony at both Appellant’s suppression hearing and trial? Also, was PCRA counsel ineffective for refusing to speak to Appellant, as well [as] contact any witnesses that supported the Brady violation? Further failing to make any reference to[ this claim], within counsel’s Turner/Finley letter? 9) Did the sentencing court err in imposing an excessive sentence upon Appellant, as his criminal history, and community work, does not meet the convicted act, nor rehabilitative needs of Appellant, but is purely punitive in nature? Further, was PCRA counsel - 10 - J-S36004-26 ineffective for failing to place any meaningful argument regarding Appellant’s sentence being excessive before the court? 10) Based upon the cumulative error of the trial court, counsel, the [Commonwealth], and the utter disregard for Appellant’s due process rights, is Appellant entitled to relief? Appellant’s Brief at 6-9 (issues renumbered; emphasis omitted; some capitalization and punctuation modified).12, 13 “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free ____________________________________________ 12 On September 14, 2026, Appellant filed a pro se application for relief, seeking an extension of time to file a reply brief. Appellant asserted that he did not receive the Commonwealth’s brief until September 4, 2026, and requested that the time for filing his reply brief begin on that date. See Application for Relief, 9/14/26; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2185(a)(1) (providing that a party may file reply brief within 14 days after service of the preceding brief); id. (“Briefs shall be deemed filed on the date of mailing if first class, express, or priority United States Postal Service mail is utilized.”). Appellant subsequently filed a reply brief, which was filed in this Court on September 22, 2026. The postmark on the reply brief indicates that Appellant mailed the reply brief on September 18, 2026. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2011) (explaining that “the prisoner mailbox rule provides that a pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”). We grant Appellant’s request and accept his reply brief as timely filed. 13 Appellant filed a 76-page appellate brief despite two prior orders by this Court denying his requests to exceed the word count. Order, 5/7/26; Order, 5/29/26. Appellant further failed to include a certificate of compliance concerning the length of his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1) (providing that a principal brief shall not exceed 14,000 words, and a party must file a certificate of compliance with the word count if the principal brief exceeds 30 pages), (d) (“Any brief in excess of the stated page limits shall include a certification that the brief complies with the word count limits.”). We additionally observe that Appellant’s lengthy arguments lack clarity, and we summarize them below to the extent we are able to discern the gist of his claims. - 11 - J-S36004-26 of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). Further, [o]ur scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing part at the PCRA court level. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court. However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In his first claim, Appellant argues he was denied the assistance of counsel throughout litigation of his first PCRA petition. See Appellant’s Brief at 64-69. Similarly, in conjunction with each of his second through eighth claims, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain issues in her Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904(C) provides that “when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s first” PCRA petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). This rule-based right to appointment extends “throughout the post- conviction collateral proceedings, including any appeal from disposition of the petition for post-conviction collateral relief.” Id. 904(F)(2). However, as set forth above, “once the PCRA court permits counsel to withdraw after filing a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, an appellant is no longer entitled to the - 12 - J-S36004-26 appointment of counsel on appeal.” Gibson, 318 A.3d at 933 (citation and brackets omitted). Here, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s application to withdraw and permitted Appellant to proceed pro se following a Grazier hearing. Appellant does not explicitly contest PCRA counsel’s withdrawal or present any basis upon which to disturb the PCRA court’s ruling on PCRA counsel’s application to withdraw under Turner/Finley. See Gibson, 318 A.3d at 933 (concluding the appellant did not preserve and develop his challenge to his PCRA counsel’s withdrawal, and he failed to raise a basis to disturb the PCRA court’s ruling). After PCRA counsel was permitted to withdraw under Turner/Finley, Appellant was not entitled to the appointment of new counsel to assist him with the instant appeal. See id. Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley no-merit letter identified the issues raised by Appellant in his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Knecht, 219 A.3d 689, 691 (Pa. Super. 2019) (detailing the requirements of a Turner/Finley brief, including the requirement that counsel “list each issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed”). Accordingly, it was within the PCRA court’s discretion to permit PCRA counsel to withdraw. Because Appellant was not denied his rule-based right to counsel, his first claim lacks merit. We must further reject the portions of his second through eighth claims alleging PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to raise certain arguments in her Turner/Finley no-merit letter. - 13 - J-S36004-26 We address Appellant’s next four issues together, as they each relate to his pre-trial motion to suppress physical evidence. In his second claim, Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of establishing the evidence, recovered from the apartment, was not obtained in violation of his rights. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-31 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H)). In his third claim, Appellant contends the trial court denied him the right to due process by failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. at 39-44 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I)). In his fourth claim, Appellant argues the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress. See id. at 55-56; see also id. at 55 (claiming that, in explaining its denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress, the suppression court improperly relied on trial testimony from a witness who did not testify during the suppression hearing). In his fifth claim, Appellant argues the suppression court misapplied the private search doctrine. See id. at 69-72. Appellant points to Saxon’s testimony, during the PCRA hearing, that she broke through the wall where the firearms were recovered. Id. at 70-71. According to Appellant, Saxon did not have authority to search the apartment. Id. at 71. Instantly, in his direct appeal, Appellant litigated three claims relating to the suppression court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 11-17). The PCRA is clear that a petitioner is not entitled to collateral relief arising from a claim that he previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (providing that a PCRA - 14 - J-S36004-26 petitioner must establish “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”); id. § 9544(a)(2) (explaining that “an issue has been previously litigated if … the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue[.]”).14 Because Appellant’s claims have been previously litigated, he is not eligible for relief. In his sixth claim, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth committed intentional fraud by representing that Enrico cut into the apartment wall where the firearms were discovered. See Appellant’s Brief at 32-38. According to Appellant, the Commonwealth’s misrepresentations influenced the denial of suppression, and “allow[ed] the fraud to be in front of a jury.” Id. at 35. While Appellant points to statements purportedly made by the prosecutor, he fails to explicitly identify when those statements were made (i.e., whether in a hearing, during trial, or through an official filing). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring an appellant to reference “the place in the record where the matter referred to appears”). Appellant’s claim, which sounds in prosecutorial misconduct, was not raised on direct appeal, and is therefore ____________________________________________ 14 Further, to the extent Appellant seeks to raise new theories related to his suppression challenge, his claims are waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (providing that for purposes of the PCRA, “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”). - 15 - J-S36004-26 waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(b)(3), 9544(b). Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.15 We address Appellant’s seventh and eighth claims together, as they are related. In his seventh claim, Appellant contends the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by “withholding” Saxon as a witness. Appellant’s Brief at 45-50. Appellant claims the Commonwealth fraudulently withheld evidence that Saxon, who had no proprietary right to the apartment, broke through the wall. Id. at 48-49. In his eighth claim, Appellant argues the Commonwealth violated Brady by introducing coached and perjured testimony. See id. at 50-56. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth encouraged the Capriottis, as well as a PSP trooper, to commit perjury and “mislead the jury into thinking Enrico [] took it upon himself to cut a wall in presence of police….” Id. at 50. In both arguments, Appellant relies on Saxon’s testimony, during the PCRA hearing, that she broke through the wall, rather than Enrico. Appellant provides no indication of when he learned that Saxon might provide testimony that conflicts with Enrico’s account of the search. Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellant only recently became aware of Saxon’s version of events (and ____________________________________________ 15 To the extent Appellant’s argument is an attempt to relitigate his suppression challenges under a new legal theory, his claim would fail for the reasons set forth infra. - 16 - J-S36004-26 therefore did not waive his Brady claims for failing raise them on direct appeal, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)), he is not entitled to relief. A Brady claim is cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 264 n.16 (Pa. 2013). “To demonstrate a Brady violation, [an a]ppellant must show that: (1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) which was either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him; and (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment.” Id. at 264. Here, Appellant fails to allege that the Commonwealth had spoken to Saxon prior to trial or was aware of any possibility that she might present conflicting testimony. Moreover, as Appellant acknowledges, Saxon did not have a proprietary right to the apartment, and thus would have no authority to authorize a search of the premises. Appellant’s pre-trial suppression claim was premised on his assertion that the Capriottis had no proprietary interest in the apartment and lacked authority to permit a search by police. See generally Motion to Suppress, 5/22/19; N.T. (suppression), 6/6/19; see also Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 13-16) (addressing, on direct appeal, Appellant’s claim that he had a right to privacy in the apartment, and concluding that the Capriottis provided the evidence to PSP on a “silver platter”). The introduction of Saxon’s testimony at trial would simply attach a potential alternate actor to the same underlying claim and, at most, create a credibility question for the fact finder. Therefore, Appellant fails to establish he was prejudiced by his inability to present Saxon’s - 17 - J-S36004-26 testimony at trial. Appellant’s seventh and eighth claims do not entitle him to relief. In his ninth claim, Appellant argues the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 57-64. Appellant suggests that statements made by the trial court, during sentencing, evidenced the court’s bias and vindictiveness toward him. Id. at 63. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (detailing the types of claims that are cognizable under the PCRA). Moreover, Appellant litigated a discretionary sentencing challenge on direct appeal. See Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 23-26); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(3).16 Appellant’s claim merits no relief. In his final claim, Appellant asserts cumulative errors denied him due process. See Appellant’s Brief at 73-76. However, “[w]here a claimant has failed to prove prejudice as the result of any individual errors, he cannot prevail on a cumulative effect claim unless he demonstrates how the particular ____________________________________________ 16 We note that on direct appeal, Appellant failed to raise a substantial question that his sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); see also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329- 30 (Pa. Super. 2013) (setting forth the requirements for invoking this Court’s jurisdiction over a discretionary sentencing claim). Nevertheless, this Court briefly addressed the merits of Appellant’s claim, as presented in the argument section of his brief, and concluded Appellant was not entitled to relief. See Capriotti, 262 A.3d 560 (unpublished memorandum at 25-26). - 18 - J-S36004-26 cumulation requires a different analysis.” Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 318-19 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). As Appellant has presented no more than a bald assertion of cumulative prejudice, he is not entitled to relief. See id. at 319 (stating that an appellant claiming cumulative prejudice must set forth a “specific, reasoned, and legally and factually supported argument for the claim.”). Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying and dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Application for relief granted. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/29/2026 - 19 -