Com. v. Mason, T.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2757 EDA 2025
JudgeBender
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
J-S25031-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TYRONE C. MASON :
:
Appellant : No. 2757 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 29, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004156-2022
BEFORE: SULLIVAN, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2026
Appellant, Tyrone C. Mason, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment
of sentence imposed after he was convicted at a bench trial of one count of
strangulation, two counts of simple assault, and two counts of recklessly
endangering another person (REAP).1 On appeal, Appellant argues that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. After review, we affirm.
The trial court provided a summary of the relevant facts in this matter:
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the
complainant, Charles Stewart. Mr. Stewart, who was 76 years
old, testified that on the morning of March 21, 2022, [Appellant]
rang the doorbell to his residence located at 755 North 38 th Street
in Philadelphia. Mr. Stewart previously had suffered a stroke
which caused the left side of his body to be paralyzed. His
stepdaughter, Markieta Daughtry – who often visited to assist him
following his stroke – was present in the apartment at the time.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-S25031-26
Ms. Daughtry answered the door and started talking to
[Appellant]. Upon seeing [Appellant] at the door,[fn4] Mr. Stewart
started to get dressed in his bathroom.[fn5] [Appellant] then
entered Mr. Stewart’s residence and walked toward the front
window. Upon getting dressed, Mr. Stewart walked out of the
bathroom and asked [Appellant], who was 46 years old at the
time, “What are you doing in here?” Mr. Stewart described the
ensuing events: “[Appellant] turned around and looked at me and
just ran over and started punching on me. He had knocked me to
the floor and was beating on me.”
[fn4] Mr. Stewart had an intercom system that “shows who’s
at the door.”
[fn5] Mr. Stewart testified that [Appellant] was not allowed in
his apartment.
Mr. Stewart testified that Ms. Daughtry came to his aid and said:
“If you want to beat on somebody, beat on me.” [Appellant] “got
up and started beating on her[.]
[Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:]
[Assistant D.A.] Q. When you say he was beating on her,
was he using his fists again or something else?
[Mr. Stewart] A. He was using his fists.
Q. Did you see where he was hitting her?
A. In the head and around her shoulders.
Q. Okay.
A. He had his left arm around her neck, and she was choking
and crying[.]
* * *
Q. Was she standing or on the ground or something else?
A. She was laying down on her back.
Q. On her back?
A. Yes.
Q. How did he have his arm on her?
-2-
J-S25031-26
A. He had his left arm on her throat --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and she was basically choking, trying to breathe.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection; speculation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Assistant D.A.]:
Q. I’ll ask a question, get a little foundation. When you say
“trying to breathe,’’ what did you mean? Without saying
anything she may have said, what did you hear?
A. She was choking, gasping.
Mr. Stewart testified that he tried his best to pull [Appellant] off
Ms. Daughtry but “couldn’t move him.” Accordingly, Mr. Stewart
retrieved a knife from his bathroom and “stuck [Appellant] one
time in the back.” [Appellant] then got up and started beating Mr.
Stewart again:
A. He was hitting me.
Q. Okay. What happened after that, sir?
A. We ended up on the floor between the bathroom door -
halfway between the little hallway and the bathroom, and
he was punching [me] and trying to grab the knife.
Q. Okay.
A. I had the knife in my hand, and he had his hand around
my wrist.
Q. How did that end, sir?
A. It ended when Markieta took the knife from me. . . . After
that, [Appellant] got up and ran outside.
Mr. Stewart testified that his next-door neighbor’s home
healthcare aide called the police. Upon reporting the above events
to police, Mr. Stewart noticed that Ms. Daughtry had suffered a
cut to her hand. Ms. Daughtry was treated at the hospital for the
wound. Additionally, Mr. Stewart testified that in the wake of the
attack, he suffered pains in his back and additional loss of
mobility, which required him to undergo physical therapy.
-3-
J-S25031-26
For his case-in-chief, [Appellant] called his aunt, Latanya
Richardson, to the stand. Ms. Richardson testified she had known
[Appellant] since he was born and was familiar with his
relationship with Ms. Daughtry. Specifically, prior to the incident,
[Appellant] and Ms. Daughtry were involved in a romantic
relationship resulting in her becoming pregnant, and [Appellant]
had spent some nights with Ms. Daughtry at Mr. Stewart’s
residence. Ms. Richardson knew that [Appellant] had spent nights
there because she had dropped him off and picked him up there
on multiple occasions. Ms. Richardson also testified that she had
given [Appellant] money to pay Mr. Stewart rent for letting him
stay there.
[Appellant] then took the stand in his own defense. He testified
that he suffers from a cornucopia of health issues, including
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), asthma,
cardiomyopathy, congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease
and orthostatic hypertension. [Appellant] testified that prior to
suffering these ailments, he used to practice three different types
of mixed martial arts, to wit, Muay Thai, kickboxing and jiu jitsu.
He also had spent many nights at Mr. Stewart’s residence by virtue
of his romantic relationship with Ms. Daughtry. On the date of the
incident, [Appellant] was having “plumbing issues” at his own
residence, which was located down the street. He called Ms.
Daughtry and asked if he could fill a jug of water. Ms. Daughtry
obliged, and he proceeded to Mr. Stewart’s residence. He met Ms.
Daughtry in the common area of the building, where Ms. Daughtry
had a large jug of water waiting for him. [Appellant] protested,
“Markieta I don’t want this. I told you I have my own jug.” Ms.
Daughtry then retreated into Mr. Stewart’s residence, and
[Appellant] followed her in.
[Appellant] testified that, following a conversation with Ms.
Daughtry, she exited the apartment and he started to retrieve his
belongings (reading glasses and shoes). Mr. Stewart then
emerged from the bathroom and stated, “What are you looking
for[?]” [Appellant] responded, “I’m about to get my stuff.” Before
he could do so, however, Ms. Daughtry returned to the apartment
and yelled at him and grabbed him “from the back.”
According to [Appellant], and despite his myriad of health issues,
he then did a “football spin” to get away from her, at which point
his mixed martial arts training - to which moments earlier he
testified he could not perform due to his health issues - “kicked
in.” [Appellant] testified that he then applied an assortment of
-4-
J-S25031-26
“grips” and “holds” to Ms. Daughtry, including an “over-
underhook” which he transitioned into a “seat belt hold” before
“taking her down” and applying a “Gable grip” as the two grappled
on the floor. [Appellant] explained that, in applying the Gable
grip, he was “on one side of [Ms. Daughtry’s] body while
controlling the other side of her body” and applying pressure so
that “her head [was] against my shoulder and against my jaw. . .
. It’s like a hug.” [Appellant] also acknowledged that Ms.
Daughtry was frantically “struggling” to “get loose.”
[Appellant] testified that, at that point, Mr. Stewart emerged from
the bathroom and stabbed him in the lower back, and then
stabbed Ms. Daughtry as well:
So that is when I look over to him and I see that he has a
knife in his right hand. So . . . I’m trained for this, and so I
go and do a single-leg takedown [to drop him to the floor].
. . . Then I scrambled on him and grabbed the knife, his
wrist. . . [.] He’s trying to bite me also, so I put him in a
cross-face.
A cross-face, you use the elbow to his jaw or between the
carotid artery and jaw and use your forearm to force him to
the ground.
[Appellant] testified that he got off Mr. Stewart and exited the
apartment when Ms. Daughtry went to get the knife out of Mr.
Stewart’s hand. Upon being asked how he was able to do all these
maneuvers with his medical conditions, [Appellant] responded,
“They’re just holds.”
On cross-examination, [Appellant] admitted that, in applying the
“Gable grip” to Ms. Daughtry, her head was in the crook of his
elbow and pressed against his shoulder and jaw. He then
admitted that this was the position that Mr. Stewart encountered
him in when Mr. Stewart stabbed him. [Appellant] also admitted
that it only takes “eight pounds of pressure applied to the carotid
artery for eight seconds [to] knock a person unconscious.” He
further admitted that he had already freed himself from Ms.
Daughtry’s alleged grasp before going on the offensive and
applying his various jiu jitsu moves. Additionally, despite claiming
that he only applied “holds,” he admitted to performing a “single-
leg takedown” of Mr. Stewart, wrestling him to the ground and
pinning him from behind while controlling his wrists.
-5-
J-S25031-26
Prior to resting. [Appellant] introduced via stipulation Ms.
Daughtry’s medical records pertaining to the treatment of her
injuries and the “75-48” incident report taken by police in this
case.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/29/25, at 3-8 (citations omitted and some
formatting altered).
As noted above, following the bench trial in March of 2023, Appellant
was convicted of strangulation, two counts of simple assault, and two counts
of REAP.2 The trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 29, 2023.
As to the offenses committed against Ms. Daughtry, the court imposed
seven years of probation for strangulation (count two), one to two years of
incarceration for simple assault (count three), and one to two years of
incarceration for REAP (count four). As to the offenses involving Mr. Stewart,
the court imposed a sentence of one to two years of incarceration for simple
assault (count five), and it imposed a sentence of one to two years of
incarceration for REAP (count six). Sentencing Order, 9/29/23, at 1-2. The
trial court ordered the sentences at counts three and four to be served
consecutively and ordered the sentences at the remaining counts to run
concurrently to the sentence at count three. Id. This resulted in an aggregate
sentence of two to four years of incarceration with a concurrent term of seven
years of probation. Id.
____________________________________________
2 The trial court acquitted Appellant of burglary, aggravated assault, and
criminal trespass. See TCO at 8.
-6-
J-S25031-26
Appellant subsequently filed an appeal that this Court quashed as
untimely. See Order, 3120 EDA 2023, 4/26/24 (single page). Thereafter,
Appellant filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act3 (PCRA) petition, and the
PCRA court entered an order reinstating Appellant’s post-sentence and
appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant then filed a post-sentence motion
challenging the weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, which the trial court denied.
Appellant filed a timely nunc pro tunc notice of appeal on October 27,
2025, and both the trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues:
1. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
2. Whether Appellant’s sentence was unduly harsh and excessive.
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his post-sentence motion for a new trial based on
the weight of the evidence. Id. at 18. Specifically, Appellant argues that the
absence of physical injuries to Ms. Daughtry and Mr. Stewart is inconsistent
with an attack by a trained martial artist such as himself, and that Ms.
Daughtry and Mr. Stewart gave different descriptions of how Appellant struck
____________________________________________
3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46.
-7-
J-S25031-26
and choked Ms. Daughtry and how she sustained a cut on her hand. Id. at
18-19.4
In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard of
review is as follows:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations omitted).
____________________________________________
4 Appellant adds an additional argument asserting that he was somehow
entitled to a “presumption of self-defense,” as he claimed that he had no
motive to harm Ms. Daughtry, as she may have been pregnant with his child.
Appellant’s Brief at 19. The Commonwealth responds that this claim is
completely undeveloped and merely “a bald assertion unsupported by any
legal authority.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. We agree. It is well settled that
appellants are required to support their arguments with relevant facts and
pertinent legal authority. See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001,
1005 (Pa. Super. 2014); Pa.R.A.P. 2119. This Court will neither search the
record for factual support nor develop arguments on an appellant’s behalf.
See id. Therefore, Appellant’s failure to develop his argument with citations
to any legal authority results in waiver. Id.
-8-
J-S25031-26
Moreover, this Court has explained:
[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact,
who is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory
testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of
fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for
that of the trier of fact.
* * *
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
of justice.
Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to
the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
court.
Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations
omitted and formatting altered).
[T]he trial court’s role changes in ruling on a post-sentence motion
after a non-jury trial. Post-trial, the court cannot re-deliberate,
as it is no longer the fact finder. Although weight of the evidence
claims have been addressed in non-jury cases, there is a logical
inconsistency in asking a trial judge to conclude that his non-jury
decision shocked his own conscience. It would be highly
incongruous for a trial judge presiding over a non-jury trial to find
his own decision shocks his conscience. . . . A judge in a non-jury
trial has the dual duties of determining the weight and
admissibility of evidence. A trial court sitting as fact-finder is
unlikely to find, in response to a post-sentence motion, that it
reached a verdict contrary to the evidence.
-9-
J-S25031-26
Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(internal citations omitted and formatting altered).
In its opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the
weight of the evidence as follows:
Here, having presided as the trier of fact, this court had the first-
hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
assess their credibility. In that regard, having twice carefully
reviewed the record by virtue of [Appellant’s] post-sentence
motion and the instant appeal, the court is confident that its
verdict is soundly supported by the weight of the evidence. The
court found the testimony of Mr. Stewart to be candid, detailed
and corroborated by the physical evidence. Conversely, setting
aside that the court acquitted [Appellant] of the more serious
offenses of burglary, criminal trespass and aggravated assault,
the court did not find [Appellant’s] testimony to be remotely
credible. Indeed, [Appellant’s] testimony that he needed to
punch, tackle and wrestle a 76-year-old, half-paralyzed man and
a pregnant woman as a matter of self-defense — as opposed to
simply walking away — not only strained credulity but was
internally inconsistent in myriad respects. That is, [Appellant]
claimed that it was physically impossible for him to assault the
complainants because he suffered from numerous debilitating
ailments which “subject [him] to sudden cardiac death” and
hamper him from performing basic activities like “moving around,”
“bending down” or even “walking more than a block.” Yet, in the
next breath, [Appellant] claimed that he performed various feats
of cardiovascular endurance and great physical ability in this case,
including football spins, single-leg take-downs, and numerous jiu-
jitsu grappling holds and maneuvers. Simply put, the court found
[Appellant’s] testimony to be self-serving and incredible.
Nor was the court persuaded by [Appellant’s] argument that the
evidence conflicted with Ms. Daughtry’s hospital discharge
summary, which indicated “lacerations” to her wrist and ankle.
Indeed, both Mr. Stewart and [Appellant] testified to Ms. Daughtry
sustaining these wounds during the incident. Moreover, that the
discharge summary did not include a diagnosis of “blunt force
trauma” hardly means that [Appellant] did not punch her on the
“head and shoulders” as testified to by Mr. Stewart. [fn6]
- 10 -
J-S25031-26
[fn6]Nor does Ms. Daughtry’s discharge summary have any
bearing whatsoever on the assault of Mr. Stewart.
Likewise, contrary to [Appellant’s] contention, the evidence did
not conflict with the “75-48” (i.e., the initial police report), which
noted stab wounds to Ms. Daughtry’s arm and ankle, and
[Appellant’s] back. Again, both Mr. Stewart and [Appellant]
testified to these precise injuries. Additionally, that the initial
incident report referenced [Appellant] as a “victim” given his stab
wound and emergency transport to the hospital, does not detract
from any of [Appellant’s] actions — much less conclusively
adjudicate him innocent in this case.
In sum, the court carefully assessed and accorded weight to the
evidence presented on a first-hand basis; that, on balance, the
scales were tipped against [Appellant] does not amount to court
error. Stated differently, the verdict in this case hardly shocks
one’s sense of justice . . . . Indeed, there was nothing shocking
about the verdict — rather, [Appellant] benefitted by the
reasonableness and impartiality of the court. Accordingly,
[Appellant]’s weight of the evidence claim fails.
TCO at 11-12 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).
Our review of the record confirms that the trial court provided a
thorough recitation of its reasoning for rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the
weight of the evidence, see id., and we reiterate that it was for the finder of
fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and evidence that appeared
before it. See Spence, 290 A.3d at 311. Therefore, in light of the record
before us, and pursuant to the applicable standard of review, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the trial court denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion
for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. See Windslowe, 158
A.3d at 712; Spence, 290 A.3d at 311. Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to
the weight of the evidence fails.
- 11 -
J-S25031-26
Next, Appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, he argues that the trial court
imposed an unduly harsh and excessive sentence. Appellant contends that
while the sentence imposed was below the sentencing guidelines, it was
unreasonable considering Appellant’s mental and physical issues and his
rehabilitative needs. Id.
This Court has explained:
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006).
. . . Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are
generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing
or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth
v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003) . . . .
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Sierra, supra at 912–13.
- 12 -
J-S25031-26
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his issue by raising it
in a post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered
Rule 1925(b) statement, and including a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.
Additionally, we conclude that Appellant’s issue presents a substantial
question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302,
1306 (Pa. Super. 2022) (explaining that a claim that the sentencing court
imposed an excessive sentence after not considering rehabilitative needs
raises a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244,
1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence claim—in
conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating
factors—raises a substantial question”).
Our standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
(d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
- 13 -
J-S25031-26
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54 (citation omitted).
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,
[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim and
[the] community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]”
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider
the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 848 (citation omitted). However, “[a]
sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for
- 14 -
J-S25031-26
imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in question, but the
record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts
of the crime and character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Schutzues,
54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9725.
We note that the balancing of sentencing factors is the “sole province”
of the sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant
and all witnesses firsthand. Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536
(Pa. Super. 2023). In conducting appellate review, this Court “cannot reweigh
sentencing factors and impose judgment in place of sentencing court where
[the] lower court was fully aware of all mitigating factors.” Id. (citation
omitted). The sentencing court “has broad discretion in determining a
reasonable penalty, and appellate courts afford the sentencing court great
deference, as it is the sentencing court that is in the best position to ‘view the
defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference, and the
overall effect and nature of the crime.’” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194
A.3d 625, 637 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Finally, “where the trial
court is informed by a PSI [report], it is presumed that the court is aware of
all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the
court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Id. at
638 (citation omitted and formatting altered).
Here, Appellant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive
sentence and failed to consider mitigating factors. Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.
Appellant argues that when factors such as his age, history, and character are
- 15 -
J-S25031-26
properly considered, the aggregate sentence imposed is unduly harsh. Id. at
22.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed this issue as
follows:
[T]he record demonstrates that the court considered all the
pertinent factors and circumstances of this case, and thoroughly
explained its rationale prior to imposing sentence. Specifically, in
addition to [Appellant’s] PSI report, mental health evaluation, and
the Sentencing Guidelines, the court duly considered the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses as it relates to
the impact on the community, the impact on the lives of the
victims, the character and condition of [Appellant], the support of
his family, his extensive health issues, remarkable mental health
history and his rehabilitative needs. The court also considered
[Appellant’s] allocution, including his complete failure to accept
responsibility and total lack of remorse, in addition to his
extraordinary criminal history - which entailed 96 arrests, 39
convictions and 26 commitments. (See N.T., [Sentencing]
9/29/23 at 2-16). Thus, contrary to [Appellant’s] contention, the
record demonstrates that the court considered all relevant factors
and circumstances prior to imposing a sentence tailored to this
particular [individual].
Moreover, the record reflects that the court imposed a lenient
sentence considerably below the recommended guidelines.
Specifically, given [Appellant’s] prior record score of five, and the
offense gravity score (OGS) of nine for strangulation, the
Sentencing Guidelines called for a standard minimum sentence of
48 to 60 months’ incarceration. The court, however, imposed only
a probationary term.
Likewise, [Appellant’s] remaining four convictions for simple
assault (two counts, each with an OGS of three) and REAP (two
counts, each with an OGS of three) each called for standard
minimum sentences of 6 to 16 months’ incarceration. Thus, the
court’s sentence of one to two years’ incarceration for each of the
above offenses fell squarely within the standard guideline range.
Further, the court ran two of these sentences concurrently, which
reduced [Appellant’s] minimum term of confinement by a period
of two years.
- 16 -
J-S25031-26
In sum, the record reflects that the court not only weighed all
pertinent factors of consideration prior to imposing sentence, but
imposed a sentence that was eminently fair, and indeed favorable,
to [Appellant]. As such, [Appellant’s] claim is without merit.
TCO at 15-16 (some formatting altered, footnote and some internal citations
omitted).
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the
trial court ordered a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to sentencing. See
N.T., Sentencing, 9/29/23 at 13. Therefore, we presume that the trial court
was fully aware of any mitigating factors and considered them when imposing
Appellant’s sentence. See Edwards, 194 A.3d at 638; see also Kurtz, 294
A.3d at 536. Further, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered
Appellant’s health and mental health issues, the applicable sentencing
guidelines, and the Section 9721(b) factors. See N.T., Sentencing, 9/29/23
at 13-14; see also Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. We will not re-weigh the trial
court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors on appeal. See Kurtz,
294 A.3d at 536. Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence warrants no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
- 17 -
J-S25031-26
Date: 11/17/2026
- 18 -