Com. v. Sheffer, S.

J-A22035-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAUN P. SHEFFER : : Appellant : No. 241 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000914-2023 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J. MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: October 20, 2026 Shaun P. Sheffer (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after his jury convictions of one count each of rape by forcible compulsion, rape of a mentally disabled person, rape of a person less than 13 years of age, indecent assault without consent, indecent assault of a person suffering from a mental disability, indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age, and corruption of minors.1 After careful review, we affirm. On June 28, 2023, the Forty-Ninth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury (grand jury) issued a presentment recommending the filing of criminal charges against Appellant. Criminal Complaint, 7/5/23, at 8 (unpaginated). On July 5, 2023, Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG), Bureau of ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), (5), (6); 3126(a)(1), (6), (7); 6301(a)(1). J-A22035-26 Criminal Investigations, Special Agent Stephen J. Adametz (Agent Adametz) filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with numerous sexual offenses. Id. at 3-7. In his supporting affidavit of probable cause, Agent Adametz reproduced portions of the grand jury presentment, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: In 2019, the [OAG] received a resource referral from a District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the Commonwealth Attorneys Act[, 71 P.S. §§ 732-101 – 732-506]. As a result, the grand jury undertook an investigation into allegations of sexual assault involving members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW) religious community. During the course of its investigation, the grand jury determined that [Appellant] (DOB: February 12, 1978) sexually assaulted K.[ (DOB: May 4, 1988)], his younger sister, from the time she was at least seven years old through 12 years of age. K.[] … grew up in Callery, Butler County, with her parents and her four older brothers.2 The family was actively involved with the Zelienople[, Pennsylvania,] JW congregation. The grand jury learned that K.[] was home-schooled and never attended public or private school. [K.’s] father[, Timothy Sheffer (Timothy),] owned his own [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)] business, and was seldom at home. K.[]’s mother[, Candace Sheffer (Candace),] had medical issues and spent time in and out of the hospital. … [W]hen she was not in the hospital, [Candace] frequently left the children home alone so that she could assist with the HVAC business or run errands. Accordingly, the children were frequently unsupervised. K.[] testified that beginning in 1995, when she was seven years old, [Appellant, who was ten years older than K.,] would sexually assault her. [Appellant] raped [K.] by placing his penis into her vagina, and he also forced her to perform oral sex on him. K.[] indicated that [Appellant] raped her 50 to 75 times, until she was 12 years old. During the rapes, [Appellant] would place his ____________________________________________ 2 K.’s brothers, from eldest to youngest, are Appellant, Joshua Sheffer (Joshua), Brandon Sheffer (Brandon), and Stephen Sheffer (Stephen). N.T., 1/14/25, at 5-6. -2- J-A22035-26 hand on [K.’s] mouth in order to keep her quiet. According to K.[], she would not say a word because she was “very afraid” of [Appellant]. K.[] stated that the rapes occurred in the same locations: [Appellant’s] bedroom, an unfinished bathroom, their parents’ bedroom, and in or around their above-ground swimming pool. …. K.[] testified that she ultimately told her brother, [Brandon], about the abuse. [Brandon] then reported the abuse to [Candace]…. [Candace] told K.[] that she should not tell anyone what had happened. … K.[] testified that although she reported the sexual assaults to [Candace], [Appellant] continued to rape her and force her to perform oral sex on him through the year 2000. [Appellant] would have been 18 years old in 1996, and 22 years old when the assaults stopped. The grand jury heard testimony from [Brandon], who corroborated [K.’s] testimony. … [Brandon] explained that K.[] struggles with a mental handicap that rendered her nonverbal until at least age four. [K.] is developmentally disabled, and it was believed that she would never be capable of learning to read and write. It was this disability that [Appellant] used to manipulate situations requiring someone to comfort or help K.[] [Brandon] stated that [Appellant] would pick on him and usually fight with their brother [Joshua]. These fights were often violent and would trigger K.[] to the point where she would become agitated, ending with her hiding within a room of the house. [Brandon] believes [Appellant] used [these events] as an opportunity to sexually assault K.[] …. …. Investigators were able to identify K.[] through records obtained from the Zelienople JW congregation that documented an [internal/JW] investigation into [Appellant’s] conduct. Although [Appellant] denied the assaults, the records revealed that vigilance in monitoring his conduct on JW property [was] undertaken. Criminal Complaint, 7/5/23, at 9-13 (footnote, section headers, and some paragraph breaks omitted; punctuation and capitalization modified; footnote added). -3- J-A22035-26 Following a preliminary hearing, a magisterial district court judge held the above-referenced charges for court, and dismissed three counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and aggravated indecent assault.3 The parties thereafter engaged in extensive pretrial litigation, the substance of which is irrelevant to the instant appeal. The matter proceeded to a five-day jury trial, which commenced on January 13, 2025.4 Both the Commonwealth and Appellant called numerous witnesses. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the above-described charges. The trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) assessment to determine whether Appellant met the criteria for classification as a sexually violent predator (SVP), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (defining SVP). On June 3, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 14 to 34 years in prison.5 The trial court did not determine Appellant’s SVP status ____________________________________________ 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(1), (5), (6); 3125(a)(1), (6), (7). 4 Benjamin Jacob Steinberg, Esquire (trial counsel), represented Appellant at trial. Trial counsel withdrew as Appellant’s counsel on February 11, 2025. On that same date, Alexander H. Lindsay, Jr., Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of Appellant. Attorney Lindsay represents Appellant in the instant appeal. 5 Upon review of the docket, it does not appear that the sentencing hearing was transcribed. However, on the date of sentencing, the trial court entered an order memorializing that it notified Appellant of his obligation to register (Footnote Continued Next Page) -4- J-A22035-26 at the time of sentencing. Appellant timely filed a post sentence motion (PSM). Therein, Appellant asserted numerous grounds he claimed entitled him to a new trial, including various evidentiary issues; the trial court’s determination that K. was competent to testify; and trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. PSM, 6/12/25, at 2-20; see also id. at 22 (Appellant moving for arrest of judgment based upon the Commonwealth violating Appellant’s “due process rights by failing to adhere to the Child Protective Services Law [(CPSL), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq.,]” and claiming that “the prosecution was based on a grand jury investigation lacking subject matter jurisdiction.”) (capitalization modified)). At the trial court’s direction, the parties briefed the issues Appellant raised in his PSM. On October 10, 2025, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying Appellant’s PSM. Appellant subsequently purported to appeal his judgment of sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, and Appellant timely complied. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, directing this Court to its October 10, 2025, opinion and order denying Appellant’s PSM. On December 12, 2025, this Court sua sponte quashed Appellant’s appeal, “[a]s there was no indication in the trial court docket that an SVP determination ha[d] been rendered[.]” Order, 12/12/25; see also id. ____________________________________________ as a Tier III offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. See Order (Notice), 6/3/25. -5- J-A22035-26 (quoting Commonwealth v. Schrader, 141 A.3d 558, 561 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[W]here a defendant pleads guilty and waives a pre-sentence SVP determination, the judgment of sentence is not final until that determination is rendered.”)).6 On January 28, 2026, the trial court entered an order granting Appellant’s motion to clarify the sentencing order. On January 30, 2026, the trial court issued an order, docketed February 2, 2026, vacating its January 28 order. On February 2, 2026, the trial court issued a corrective order, docketed February 3, 2026, amending the June 3, 2025, sentencing order to reflect that, based on the SOAB assessment, Appellant “did not meet the requirements of” an SVP, and that “[a]ll other terms of the June 3, 2025, judgment of sentence shall remain in full effect.” Order, 2/3/26. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement. On April 10, 2026, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, again directing this Court to its October 10, 2025, order and opinion denying Appellant’s PSM. Appellant’s appeal is now ripe for review. Appellant raises the following issues: ____________________________________________ 6 On December 19, 2025, the Commonwealth filed in the trial court a “Filing Clarifying Record for Superior Court,” explaining that, upon receiving the SOAB’s report opining that Appellant did not satisfy the criteria to be designated an SVP, the Commonwealth notified Appellant and the trial court that the Commonwealth was not requesting that the court conduct an SVP hearing. See Filing Clarifying Record for Superior Court, 12/19/25, ¶¶ 6-8. -6- J-A22035-26 I. Did the trial court err by refusing to dismiss the prosecution against [Appellant], as it was based on a grand jury investigation lacking subject matter jurisdiction, thereby denying [Appellant] his due process rights by failing to adhere to the [CPSL]? II. Was the cross-examination of defense witnesses concerning their affiliation with the religion known as Jehovah’s Witnesses violative of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902 and irrelevant to the issues at trial, entitling [Appellant] to a new trial? III. Was it error for the trial court to grant the Commonwealth’s motion in limine denying trial counsel’s ability to argue that the Commonwealth’s complaining witness, K.[], was “intact,” meaning not damaged or impaired in any way, as the prosecution well knew at the time of filing this motion, in that the evidence the Commonwealth had obtained in the form of medical records … established that K.[] was, in fact, “intact,” and therefore [Appellant] was actually innocent? I[V]. Did the [trial] court err in ruling that … K.[] was competent to testify? V. Was it error for the [trial] court to fail to hold a “taint” hearing, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27 (Pa. 2003)? VI. Was it error for the trial court to permit the introduction of hearsay statements, over proper objections, thereby buttressing the testimony of an incompetent witness, [i.e.,] K.[]? VII. Was it error for the [trial] court to admit the testimony of Dr. Veronique Valliere[, Ph.D. (Dr. Valliere),] about how the culture of religion could impact a victim’s ability to disclose sexual abuse? VIII. Was the Commonwealth’s decision to use [Appellant’s] religion as a factor to prosecute [Appellant] violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution? -7- J-A22035-26 Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (capitalization, punctuation, and citations modified; issues reordered). In his first issue, Appellant argues “the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s] due process rights by failing to adhere to the [CPSL,] and the prosecution was based on a grand jury investigation lacking subject matter jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Brief at 55 (capitalization modified). Appellant points out that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4544(a) provides that a multicounty investigating grand jury is only to be convened because it is “necessary because of organized crime and public corruption or both involving more than one county of the Commonwealth and that, in [the Attorney General’s] judgment, the investigation cannot be adequately performed by a[ county] investigating grand jury ….” Id. (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4544(a)) (emphasis omitted). Appellant argues that the sexual allegations leveled against him “hardly could have been considered to amount to public corruption or organized crime.” Id. at 56. Consequently, Appellant contends, “the grand jury process as used in the instant case amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of [Appellant’s] due process of law rights.” Id. Appellant further argues (without citation to a specific statutory section or case law) that “the manner in which the case was originated by the [OAG] was improper under the [CPSL].” Id.; see also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 22 (Appellant stating that his argument that the Commonwealth violated his due process rights, by purportedly failing to comply with the CPSL, is “the essence -8- J-A22035-26 of his claim with regard to the referral of the matter to the grand jury.”). Appellant insists that K.’s “allegations should have been referred to [] Butler County[’s] Children and Youth Services.” Id. According to Appellant, the Commonwealth’s “failure to abide by” the CPSL and Section 4544(a) “is a classic example of violating procedural due process insofar as the government was supposed to follow a certain statutorily[-]mandated procedure, but failed to do so.” Id. at 57.7 In response, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant does not request a specific form of relief in this issue. The charges against [Appellant] were not issued by the grand jury; the grand jury only recommended charges be filed. The Commonwealth filed the charges and [Appellant] received all the constitutional, statutory, and rule-based protections as the case proceeded from the filing of the complaint until he was sentenced. …. [Appellant] has also not referenced any evidence elicited during the investigating grand jury that could only have been elicited at the grand jury[,] and thus was unlawfully admitted at trial. In other words, the incriminating evidence at trial is not grand jury testimony or grand jury exhibits; it was trial testimony and exhibits that were lawfully elicited at trial[,] and which did not have to be obtained through an investigating grand jury. ____________________________________________ 7 Appellant’s brief contains no citation to or discussion of either the CPSL or any decisional or constitutional law relating to due process rights. As a result, Appellant’s undeveloped due process argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be … followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Mere issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of a matter.” (citation and brackets omitted)). Nevertheless, even if preserved, Appellant’s due process argument would merit no relief for the reasons that follow. -9- J-A22035-26 Commonwealth Brief at 36 (paragraph break omitted). Concerning questions of subject matter jurisdiction, we recognize our standard of review: “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that poses a pure question of law, subject to a de novo standard of review.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 344 A.3d 417, 419 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted); see also id. (“The [trial] court’s subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that is not susceptible to waiver, and it may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). “[A]ll courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising under the Crimes Code.” Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003). Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the competency of a court to hear and decide the type of controversy presented. McGinley v. Scott, 164 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1960). Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Id. at 428; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (defining the unlimited original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas). …. Controversies arising out of violations of the Crimes Code are entrusted to the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas for resolution. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. Every jurist within that tier of the unified judicial system is competent to hear and decide a matter arising out of the Crimes Code. PA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (establishing the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas within the unified judicial system). Commonwealth v. Howell, 322 A.3d 243, 246 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some citations modified; citation omitted). The Grand Jury Act defines a “multicounty investigating grand jury” as a - 10 - J-A22035-26 [s]tatewide or regional investigating grand jury convened by the Supreme Court upon the application of the Attorney General and having jurisdiction to inquire into organized crime or public corruption or both under circumstances wherein more than one county is named in the order convening said investigating grand jury. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4542. Application for a multicounty investigating grand jury may be made by the Attorney General to the Supreme Court. In such application the Attorney General shall state that, in his judgment, the convening of a multicounty investigating grand jury is necessary because of organized crime or public corruption or both involving more than one county of the Commonwealth and that, in his judgment, the investigation cannot be adequately performed by an investigating grand jury available under section 4543 (relating to convening county investigating grand jury). The application shall specify for which counties the multicounty investigating grand jury is to be convened. Within ten days of receipt of such application, the court shall issue an order granting the same. …. Id. § 4544(a). This Court has observed that [o]nce a grand jury is properly impaneled, “the purpose for which a grand jury is convened does not restrict the grand jury from investigating actions which constitute criminal activity or probable violations of the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. McCauley, 588 A.2d 941, 945 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citation omitted); see also In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 907 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. 2006) (stating that the Grand Jury Act “does not require that every matter submitted to a multicounty or statewide investigating grand jury needs to independently meet each one of the criteria that are threshold to the convening of the investigative body in the first instance,” as the statutory requirements relative to the empaneling of a statewide investigating grand jury and the statutory powers of the grand jury to inquire into criminal offenses once empaneled are different). “Rather, all that need be alleged in an application for submission of an investigation to any grand jury, county or multi-county, is that the matter in question - 11 - J-A22035-26 requires the investigative resources of the grand jury.” Commonwealth v. Atwood, 601 A.2d 277, 281 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citing to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4550[).] Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1091-92 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations modified). Significantly, an investigating grand jury presentment does not curtail the investigated individual’s liberty interests: An investigating grand jury presentment, unlike an indictment, criminal complaint, or information, does not formally charge an accused. Instead, it is merely a recommendation, in advisory fashion, that the prosecutor should bring formal charges. Neither the governing statute, court rules[,] nor common law expressly require the prosecutor to file charges against a person named in an investigating grand jury presentment. This construction is consistent with the principle that a prosecutor is not bound to prosecute every alleged criminal offender, and that the decision of whether to prosecute is within his discretion. The individual named in the presentment is not subject to any liberty restraints, and the presentment itself is insufficient to support a prosecution. It is only when the prosecutor chooses to file a complaint that the accused is held to answer a criminal charge and is subject to arrest and imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Mallon, 515 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1986) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also In re County Investigating Grand Jury of April 24, 1981, 459 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1983) (quashing the Commonwealth’s “submission of investigation” to a new grand jury on jurisdictional grounds, but explaining that “quashing the notice of submission does not preclude the District Attorney from initiating prosecution in accordance with the normal procedures of complaint and information.”). - 12 - J-A22035-26 Concerning Appellant’s due process claim, our Supreme Court has stated that a “question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). Here, Appellant contends that he was deprived of procedural due process. See Appellant’s Brief at 57. In terms of procedural due process, [the] government is prohibited from depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property, unless it provides the process that is due. While not capable of an exact definition, the basic elements of procedural due process are adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case. Thus, courts examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there is a life, liberty, or property interest that the state has interfered with; and the second examines whether the procedures attendant to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 764 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). Instantly, relying on Sandusky, supra, the trial court concluded the Commonwealth appropriately utilized the grand jury process to conduct its initial investigation into K.’s sexual abuse allegations: At trial, … [Agent] Adametz outlined the grand jury investigation, approved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and conducted by the [OAG], into the [JW] religious association and how that investigation led [the Commonwealth] to [Appellant].8 As stated ____________________________________________ 8 At trial, Agent Adametz testified that the OAG originally received a “referral for the [JW] investigation [] from the York County District Attorney’s Office.” N.T., 1/14/25, at 163. Agent Adametz explained that when an investigation (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 13 - J-A22035-26 correctly by the Commonwealth in its response to [Appellant’s PSM], “the purpose for which a grand jury is convened does not restrict the grand jury from investigating actions which constitute criminal activity or probable violations of the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.” Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1091. Moreover, the Grand Jury Act “does not require that every matter submitted to a multicounty or statewide investigating grand jury needs to independently meet each one of the criteria that are threshold to the convening of the investigative body in the first instance.” Id. at 1092. The grand jury[,] therefore[,] had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/25, at 14 (some citations modified; footnote added). Upon review, we agree with the trial court, and discern no basis for concluding that either the grand jury proceedings, or the subsequent criminal case filed against Appellant, “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Brief at 55. While Appellant broadly challenges, as lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the grand jury proceedings that led to the Commonwealth’s investigation of Appellant’s criminal conduct, he does not articulate how this purported legal defect deprived him of his right to procedural due process in his separately-filed criminal case. Appellant wholly fails to identify or discuss how he was deprived of “adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and ____________________________________________ involves a potentially large number of victims, the OAG utilizes a tipline. Id. at 164. Agent Adametz testified that Brandon and his wife, Jessica Sheffer (Jessica), called the tipline and reported Appellant’s criminal acts against K. Id. at 170-71. Agent Adametz’s subsequent investigation, initiated based on Brandon and Jessica’s call to the JW investigation tipline, eventually led Agent Adametz to file criminal charges against Appellant. Id. at 175. - 14 - J-A22035-26 the chance to defend [himself] before a fair and impartial tribunal….” Turner, 80 A.3d at 764. Further, Appellant does not argue that the Forty-Ninth Investigating Grand Jury was improperly empaneled. Instead, Appellant emphasizes that his specific conduct did not constitute “organized crime or public corruption,” see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4544(a), and was thus improper for consideration by the grand jury. Appellant’s Brief at 56. As the trial court correctly pointed out, however, the Grand Jury Act “does not require that every matter submitted to a multicounty or statewide investigating grand jury needs to independently meet each one of the criteria that are threshold to the convening of the investigative body in the first instance.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/25, at 14 (quoting Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1092). Moreover, even if the grand jury’s investigation into Appellant’s criminal conduct was somehow defective, that would have no bearing on his undeveloped due process argument. Our review confirms that Appellant’s prosecution followed the proper filing of a criminal complaint. See Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1074 (“[A]ll courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in cases arising under the Crimes Code.”); see also Mallon, 515 A.2d at 4 (“It is only when the prosecutor chooses to file a complaint that the accused is held to answer a criminal charge and is subject to arrest and imprisonment.” (citation omitted)). - 15 - J-A22035-26 As Appellant identifies no procedural due process violation in the proceedings that occurred following the filing of the criminal complaint underlying his convictions, his first issue fails. In his second issue, Appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the “prosecuting attorney in this case attacked the credibility of defense witnesses by cross examination about their affiliation with the [JW] religion[,]” in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902 (Effect of religious beliefs). 9 Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant claims the prosecutor improperly questioned Joshua; Appellant’s cousin, Kevin Michael Kohl (Mr. Kohl); Sheffer family friend Zachary Tokos (Mr. Tokos); and Appellant’s wife, Megan Sheffer (Megan), regarding their affiliation with the JW religion. See id. at 17-25 (Appellant quoting the purportedly objectionable questions and answers). We pause to summarize the relevant testimony. ____________________________________________ 9 Judicial Code Section 5902 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Religious opinions not to disqualify.--The capacity of any person to testify in any judicial proceeding shall not be affected by his opinions on matters of religion. (b) Religious belief may not be shown.--No witness shall be questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject, for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902(a)-(b). - 16 - J-A22035-26 At trial, Joshua testified that “Brandon told [him] that [Appellant] was molesting [K.,]” but that Joshua did not believe the allegations. N.T., 1/15/25, at 26. According to Joshua, he never “notice[d] anything concerning about” Appellant and K.’s relationship. Id. at 29; see id. at 31 (Joshua denying ever “see[ing] anything indicative of [Appellant] sexually abusing [K].”). Joshua denied that Appellant has “a reputation for being excessively violent[.]” Id. at 32. Concerning K., Joshua testified that “she exaggerates the truth very much.” Id. at 33; see also id. (Joshua testifying, “If you’ve ever heard the term take it with a grain of salt, that describes [K].”). Joshua further denied having any knowledge of K. having “an official diagnosis of being a mentally disabled person[.]” Id. at 34. Joshua additionally testified regarding his ex-wife, Jessica Laneave (Ms. Laneave).10 Id. at 34-35. Joshua stated that Ms. Laneave was not “fond of” ____________________________________________ 10 Ms. Laneave testified as a Commonwealth witness on the first day of trial. Ms. Laneave explained that she and Joshua were husband and wife from 2002 to 2007, when they divorced. N.T., 1/13/25, at 82. Pertinently, according to Ms. Laneave, she met K. for the first time in 2001, and described her as “very much like an elementary school kid, like, much younger than what typical 12 [year olds] would be. She was still wetting the bed and sucking her fingers[,] very much like a baby[.]” Id. at 83; see also id. at 93 (Ms. Laneave denying that K. “would act out to get attention[.]”). Ms. Laneave testified that her interactions with Appellant were limited, and that she interacted with Appellant “only through [the JW] Kingdom Hall[, i.e., house of worship,] or remodel[]ing” Appellant’s apartment after he left the family residence. Id. at 87. - 17 - J-A22035-26 K., “was generally unkind to my entire family[,]” and denied that Ms. Laneave “act[ed] as a motherly figure for [K].” Id. at 35. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if Joshua and Ms. Laneave “were married into the [JW] community[.]” Id. at 37. Trial counsel objected on relevancy grounds, and the trial court overruled the objection. Id. Joshua’s cross-examination continued, and the following exchange occurred: Q. [Prosecutor]: Okay. And today you are still an active member of the [JW] community as an elder? A. [Joshua]: Yes. Q. Okay. And isn’t it practice in the [JW] community that current or active members are not to associate with worldly people or nonactive members of the community? [Trial counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to again object to relevance. Can we approach? [Sidebar] [Trial counsel]: Your Honor, we are getting into credibility determinations based on religion, which is completely inappropriate. I didn’t ask [Joshua] one question on direct about his religion, and the only questions I asked about [Ms.] Laneave [related to] her time in [the family residence], so this is going completely beyond the scope of direct, and it’s going into prejudicial territory as far as credibility based on religion. [Prosecutor]: Number one, this is cross-examination, so cross-examination you have wide rein when it comes to credibility issues, and credibility is at issue. [Joshua] has already testified as to the believability of [Ms.] Laneave directly, and so I have every right to bring out any type of bias or reasons as to why he would speak poorly about [Ms.] Laneave, and the fact that they were divorced is relevant. Secondly, [Joshua has] already offered testimony about … the credibility of [K.] and what type of person [K.] is, and I have - 18 - J-A22035-26 every right on cross-examination to explore [Joshua’s] communication with [K.] and why he would or would not have communication with [K.] and whether or not they speak. Because [K. is] not an active member of the [JW] community 11 is [sic] a very relevant area of cross-examination. [Trial counsel]: We’re getting into race, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation for cross-examination. That’s completely off-base, inappropriate, prejudicial, and irrelevant. That’s all grouped together. [Prosecutor]: It goes directly to [Joshua’s] credibility and his bias for or against the witnesses that have already testified. [Trial court]: Overruled. Id. at 37-39 (footnote added). The only additional question the prosecutor posed to Joshua regarding the JW community was whether it was “common for active members to not associate with nonactive members …?” Id. at 39. Joshua responded, “That’s not necessarily true.” Id. Mr. Kohl testified that he has known “the Sheffer family” for “pretty much [his] whole life.” N.T., 1/15/25, at 132-33; see also id. at 135 (Mr. Kohl testifying that he and Appellant “were good friends” between the ages of 17 and 22). Mr. Kohl testified that he and Appellant worked together at a potpourri factory between 1995 and 1997, Mondays through Fridays, for six ____________________________________________ 11 On the first day of trial, K. testified that she and Joshua do not have a relationship. N.T., 1/13/25, at 114. K. testified that Joshua “doesn’t accept [K.]” because Joshua is a member of the JW community, and K. left the JW community. N.T., 1/13/25, at 115. - 19 - J-A22035-26 to eight hours a day. Id. at 134. Mr. Kohl testified that after Appellant left the potpourri factory, Appellant worked at a Gibsonia motorcycle shop through 2000, and that Appellant was “always at that place.” Id. at 135. Mr. Kohl confirmed that he never observed anything “that would cause [him] concern about [Appellant] being around [K.]” Id. at 137. According to Mr. Kohl, Appellant is “a good man, he’s a great father, and he’s somebody to be like.” Id.; see also id. at 143-44 (Mr. Kohl testifying regarding Appellant’s character for peacefulness and honesty). Regarding K., Mr. Kohl testified that she “has a reputation as time has gone on[,] as she got older[,] … she kind of manipulates to get what she wants, and she’ll do what she needs to do to get what she wants.” Id. at 139. Mr. Kohl continued that K. “is prone to being non-truthful.” Id. During Mr. Kohl’s cross-examination, he testified that it had been years since he spoke with K. Id. at 146. The prosecutor then asked whether Mr. Kohl was “an active member of the [JW] community?” Id. Trial counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Id. at 146-47. Mr. Tokos testified that, growing up, he and Brandon were “best friends,” and that he spent time at the Sheffer family residence between 1995 and 2000. Id. at 154. Mr. Tokos testified that during that time he “basically never s[aw Appellant] there[,]” and that he never observed K. to be afraid of Appellant. Id. at 154-55. According to Mr. Tokos, he “hadn’t had any - 20 - J-A22035-26 relationship with [Brandon] for [] the past 20[-]some[-]odd years.” Id. at 156. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mr. Tokos whether he no longer had a relationship with Brandon “because [Brandon is] no longer part of the [JW] community?” Id. at 158. Trial counsel objected that the question was irrelevant, prejudicial, and outside of the scope of direct examination. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, and Mr. Tokos confirmed that he chose not to ha