Com. v. Herbert, M.

J-S29009-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW HERBERT : : Appellant : No. 557 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003388-2023 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW HERBERT : : Appellant : No. 558 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003389-2023 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MATTHEW HERBERT : : Appellant : No. 559 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003390-2023 J-S29009-26 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 Matthew Herbert appeals from the judgments of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after he was convicted of first-degree murder,1 third-degree murder,2 rape,3 aggravated indecent assault,4 sexual assault,5 false imprisonment,6 indecent assault,7 possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC),8 and two counts of tampering with evidence.9 After review, we affirm. The trial court recounted the case’s factual history as follows: On September 18, 2022, [Herbert] was at a bar or club in Philadelphia. While there[,] he interacted with Donte Woodard, a long-time acquaintance; [S.B.], who[m] [Herbert] had known for about a year; Valenzia Jones, [Herbert]’s sometimes girlfriend; and Vanessa Mercado, a friend of Jones who did not really know [Herbert]. At some point they all left to go to a second bar in a white truck driven by [Herbert], accompanied by Woodard, Jones[,] and [S.B.] Mercado drove separately. When she arrived in the vicinity of 17th and Lehigh, Mercado heard Valenzia yelling at Woodard. [Herbert] intervened between Jones and Woodard, ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). 2 Id. at § 2502(c). 3 Id. at § 3121(a)(1). 4 Id. at § 3125(a)(1). 5 Id. at § 3124.1. 6 Id. at § 2903(a). 7 Id. at § 3126(a)(1). 8 Id. at § 907(a). 9 Id. at § 4910(1). -2- J-S29009-26 at which point [Herbert] and Woodard began to fight. Mercado then pulled Jones away and they walked back to Mercado’s car. At some point, the argument between [Herbert] and Woodard escalated to a physical fight. [Herbert] told Woodard to stop hitting him, to which Woodard responded: [“W]hat are you going to do?[”] At which point [Herbert] pulled a gun and shot the unarmed Woodard in the head and the back. At the point of [the] shooting, Woodard had already stopped swinging at [Herbert]. [Herbert] then told [S.B.] to get in the car [] and he drove away in the truck. Mercado and Jones, who had started to drive away, heard shots. Believing it might have involved the people they just left, Mercado made a U-turn and returned to 17th and Lehigh where they saw a man lying in the street and a white truck driving away. They called 911 and followed in the direction of the truck. Mercado, the driver, pulled up next to the truck being driven by [Herbert]. [S.B.] was in the back seat of the truck. Jones, sitting in the front passenger seat of Mercado's car, called to [Herbert] asking him what that was all about. [Herbert] fired two shots at Jones, one of which entered the side of her face and killed her. Mercado drove off and within two blocks she encountered a police officer, who took Jones into his vehicle and drove her to the hospital, telling Mercado to follow. At the hospital, a hysterical Mercado calmed down enough to speak with police[] and take an officer back to the scene of the shooting at 17th and Lehigh. [S.B.] was still in the truck with [Herbert], who asked her: “What should I do with you? This is going to be my last shot anyway.” Scared, fearing that [Herbert] would do something to harm her, [S.B.] begged him not to kill her, asked him to take her home, assured him that she would not snitch and that he had acted in self-defense. In fear, [S.B.] tried to ingratiate herself with [Herbert]. [Herbert] drove [S.B.] to an unknown location, where he threw something in the water. [S.B.] asked [Herbert] to take her home, but instead he took her to a residence, then to a second residence. [Herbert] took [S.B.] inside and upstairs to a bedroom, where [Herbert] told [S.B.] to lie down and remove her pants. [Herbert] then had unprotected intercourse with her. [The next morning,] another person arrived in a red car, which [the person] gave to [Herbert] then walked away. [Herbert] gave [S.B.] $20 and sent her in the red car to a gas station at the corner to get some gas in a container. After getting the gas, [S.B.] -3- J-S29009-26 started to drive off in the opposite direction, but [Herbert] called and told her to come back. Fearful because [Herbert] knew where she and her children lived, [S.B.] returned to [Herbert]. [Herbert] and [S.B.] then went to a location on Strawberry Mansion Drive, where [Herbert] poured the gas on the white Isuzu truck and lit it on fire. [Herbert] then got back in the red car with [S.B.], told her [“]none of this happened,[”] then drove her home. [Herbert] insisted on entering [S.B.]'s home to use the bathroom because he had been burned. [Herbert] used the bathroom then left. Later, [S.B.] called her ex-husband to tell him what had happened and they decided to go to the Philadelphia Police Special Victims Unit. A DNA sample was collected from her and, as stipulated at trial, the DNA [was] a match for [Herbert]. Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 2-4. Herbert’s case, proceeding on three separate dockets, was tried before a jury from January 8-13, 2025.10 On January 13, 2025, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the above-mentioned offenses. 11 On January 24, 2025, the trial court sentenced Herbert to life imprisonment for first-degree murder at docket CP-51-CR-0003389-2023. The trial court sentenced Herbert to concurrent sentences of twenty to forty years’ incarceration for third-degree murder, two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration for PIC, and no further penalty on the two convictions for tampering with evidence at docket CP-51- ____________________________________________ 10 At trial, Herbert did not contest that he shot Woodard and Jones, discarded the gun, had non-consensual, unprotected intercourse with Bussey, and burned the truck. Herbert contested the circumstances surrounding those events and his mental state. 11 During trial, Herbert moved for judgments of acquittal with regard to one charge of tampering with physical evidence and the charges for rape, aggravated indecent assault, sexual assault, false imprisonment, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm in the streets of Philadelphia. The trial court denied the motions. -4- J-S29009-26 CR-0003388-2023. On April 4, 2025, the trial court sentenced Herbert to an additional concurrent sentence of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for rape, with no further penalty imposed on the aggravated indecent assault, sexual assault, false imprisonment, and indecent assault convictions at docket CP- 51-CR-0003390-2023. Herbert did not file any post-sentence motions. Herbert filed timely notices of appeal on all three dockets.12 Both Herbert and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and Herbert now raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the verdict of guilty on the following charges was against the weight of the evidence and lacked the requisite sufficiency: a. Murder of the third degree[;] b. [PIC;] c. Tampering with/fabricating physical evidence[;] d. Murder of the first degree[;] e. Rape by forcible compulsion[;] f. Aggravated indecent assault without consent[;] g. Sexual assault[;] h. False imprisonment[;] i. Indecent assault without [consent;] 2. Whether the [trial c]ourt abused its discretion when it failed to grant [] Herbert’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency [for] the charges of rape by forcible compulsion and ____________________________________________ 12 We sua sponte consolidated these three appeals on August 13, 2025. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. Herbert filed separate notices of appeal for each docket in compliance with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). -5- J-S29009-26 aggravated indecent assault on docket CP-51-CR-0003390- 2023? 3. Whether the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it: a. Intentionally misle[]d the jury to believe that [] Herbert had a criminal record through the testimony of Detective William Golphin? b. Intentionally misle[]d the jury when it questioned [] Herbert as to whether his gun license had been in revoked status at the time of the alleged crimes but failed to introduce evidence at trial representing the same? 4. Whether the [trial c]ourt abused its discretion when it denied [] Herbert’s motion to be charged with involuntary manslaughter as it related to the alleged homicide of [] Jones? 5. Whether the [trial c]ourt abused its discretion when it stated on the record that “[t]oo many of the objections [by Herbert were] without merit,” after overruling several objections in error, including but not limited to: a. Allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony in through Officer Mark Lapenta? b. Allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony in through [] [S.B.]? c. Allowing non-probative and overtly prejudicial testimony in through [S.B.]? d. Allowing non-probative and overtly prejudicial testimony in through Det[ective] Golphin that misle[]d the jury to believe that [] Herbert had a prior criminal record? e. Allowing the prosecution to question [] Herbert about his gun license’s alleged revoked status without producing any evidence of the same? Appellant’s Brief, at 11-13 (reordered for ease of disposition). -6- J-S29009-26 Herbert first argues that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence and lacked sufficient evidentiary support. See id. at 50-68. For the following reasons, Herbert has waived these challenges. Turning to Herbert’s sufficiency arguments, to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements for which the appellant claims the evidence was insufficient. See Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 76 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013)). This is particularly important where the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes, each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See LeClair, 236 A.3d at 76 (citing Garland, 63 A.3d at 344). Here, Herbert’s Rule 1925(b) statement, despite challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for all nine crimes he was convicted of, failed to specifically identify any element or elements that lacked evidentiary support. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, at 2-3.13 Accordingly, because Herbert failed to identify with specificity the element or elements he claimed lacked sufficient evidentiary support, we find his sufficiency claims waived. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 348 A.3d 1233, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2025); Garland, supra. ____________________________________________ 13 We refer to the documents entered on the lead docket, CP-51-CR-0003388- 2023. -7- J-S29009-26 Likewise, Herbert has waived his weight of the evidence claims. A claim challenging the weight of the evidence “shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 607(A)(1)-(3). The failure to preserve a weight claim results in waiver even where the trial court addresses the claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 736 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 491 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Here, the record does not reveal any instance of Herbert raising his challenge orally prior to sentencing. 14 Likewise, Herbert failed to raise the claim in a written motion, either prior to or after sentencing. Herbert’s brief also provides no statement of place of raising or preservation of issues, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e). Therefore, we find Herbert has waived his weight claim. See Barkman, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“An appellant’s failure to avail himself ____________________________________________ 14 The certified record does not contain the transcript from January 13, 2025, the last day of trial when the jury delivered its verdict, which prevents us from determining whether Herbert raised his weight claim at that proceeding. We will not assume that he did so, as it is the appellant’s “responsibility to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal.” Layton-Herron v. Litke, 352 A.3d 510, 515 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wint, 730 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. Super. 1999)). -8- J-S29009-26 of any of the prescribed methods of presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim.”) (citation omitted). Herbert next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the rape and aggravated indecent assault charges. See Appellant’s Brief, at 32-38. “The test for ruling upon a [motion for judgment of acquittal] is whether the prosecution’s evidence, and all inferences arising therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution[,] are insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.” Commonwealth v. Powanda, 304 A.3d 1284, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. 1982) (internal citation and quotation omitted)). Determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of law, meaning our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 969 (Pa. Super. 2018). We must determine whether, when viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). -9- J-S29009-26 An individual commits the offense of rape when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant by forcible compulsion. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1). Under subsection 3121(a)(1), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant engaged in “sexual intercourse” by “forcible compulsion.” Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2023). “In addition to its ordinary meaning, [“sexual intercourse”] includes intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight; emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. Forcible compulsion is defined as “[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional[,] or psychological force, either express or implied.” Id. Thus, in addition to “sheer physical force or violence,” forcible compulsion encompasses the act of using superior force—physical, moral, psychological, or intellectual—to compel a person to do a thing against that person’s volition or will. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 720 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Ables, 590 A.2d 334, 337 (Pa. Super. 1991)). The object of this force is “to compel a person to engage in sexual intercourse against her will[.]” Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1230 (Pa. Super. 1986). Whether a defendant used forcible compulsion depends on the totality of the circumstances, including this non-exhaustive list of factors: the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the respective mental and physical conditions of the victim and the accused, the atmosphere and physical setting in which the incident was alleged to have taken place, the extent to which the accused may have been in a position of authority, - 10 - J-S29009-26 domination[,] or custodial control over the victim, and whether the victim was under duress. Id. [at 1226.] Our courts have not specified every set of circumstances that can show forcible compulsion, which turns on the facts of each case. Id. [] Proof of forcible compulsion does not require evidence that the victim resisted. [Id.] at 1227 n.14 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3107). This recognizes that a victim may not struggle against the attack of an assailant who can physically overpower the victim. Commonwealth v. Lee, [] 638 A.2d 1006, 1008 ([Pa. Super.] 1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Gabrielson, [] 536 A.2d 401, 407 ([Pa. Super.] 1988)). The inquiry is whether the defendant’s physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force compelled the victim to submit to intercourse against the victim’s will, not whether the victim resisted the compulsion. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226, 1227 n.14. Banniger, 303 A.3d at 1092–93. A victim’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to support a rape conviction. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 721 (citing Commonwealth v. Wall, 952 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2008)). Herbert claims that the Commonwealth cannot show forcible compulsion because Herbert did not explicitly threaten S.B., and because the “weapon [] [S.B.] was allegedly fearful of was either in the river or still in the vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief, at 35. We disagree. Here, the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence, through S.B.’s testimony, to support the rape conviction. S.B. testified that she witnessed Herbert shoot Woodard, and that Herbert subsequently told her to get into his vehicle. See N.T. Trial, 1/8/25, at 98-100. Almost immediately thereafter, Jones and Mercado pulled up in their vehicle alongside Herbert’s. Id. at 100- 01. Herbert then fired multiple shots at their vehicle, leading S.B. to believe - 11 - J-S29009-26 that she had witnessed Herbert “kill three people.” 15 Id. at 103, 111. Herbert then turned around to S.B. and asked her “what I’ma do with you?” to which S.B. responded “Please don’t kill me[.]” Id. at 104. Herbert’s words made S.B. feel “like [she] was about to die.” Id. at 105. S.B. asked Herbert to take her home “probably about three or four times” and reassured him that she was “not going to snitch on [him].” Id. at 106. Herbert disregarded S.B.’s requests. Id. at 107-08. While Herbert drove her around after the shootings, S.B. believed Herbert still had a gun in his vehicle after discarding the one he used to shoot Woodard and Jones. Id. at 106-07. When Herbert brought her to a second home in North Philadelphia, she complied when Herbert asked her to go upstairs because she was “going to do whatever he want[ed her] to do [after she saw] what happened[.]” Id. at 110-11. When asked why she was going to do “whatever he wanted [her] to do[,]” S.B. replied: “Because I just witnessed him kill three people.” Id. at 111. Once upstairs, S.B. testified that Herbert told her to take off her pants. Id. S.B. complied, saying she felt “[s]ick to [her] stomach[.]” Id. at 112. S.B. testified that Herbert then proceeded to get on top of her and have sex with her. Id. at 113. When asked whether she wanted or approved of his actions, S.B. said no. Id. Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence is sufficient to show that Herbert forcibly ____________________________________________ 15 Bussey’s then-belief was mistaken, as Herbert did not kill Mercado. - 12 - J-S29009-26 compelled S.B. to have sexual intercourse with him. At the time, Herbert believed she had witnessed Herbert kill three people. S.B. feared for her life and believed Herbert still possessed a firearm when he refused her requests to take her home, directed her into a bedroom, and ordered her to take her pants off. S.B.’s lack of consent, her credible fear for her life, Herbert’s comment regarding what he was going to do with her, and the attendant circumstances provide sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion to support Herbert’s conviction for rape. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 721 (victim’s testimony sufficient to support rape conviction). The same evidence is sufficient to support Herbert’s conviction for aggravated indecent assault. The Crimes Code defines the offense, in relevant part, as follows: A person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic[,] or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent assault if: (1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent[.] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(1). The above-recited testimony demonstrates that Herbert engaged in penetration without S.B.’s consent. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and Herbert’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. Herbert next argues that the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct when: (1) Detective Golphin’s testimony suggested Herbert had a criminal record; and (2) it questioned Herbert as to whether his gun license - 13 - J-S29009-26 was in revoked status at the time of the relevant incidents. See Appellant’s Brief, at 23-28. Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 39 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2012). Not every inappropriate remark by a prosecutor constitutes reversible error, and we must determine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect one. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Solomon, 25 A.3d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2011)). To succeed on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, an appellant must show that the prosecutor’s actions had the unavoidable effect of undermining the fact- finder’s neutrality so as to preclude a true verdict. See Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 17 (Pa. 2012). “A reference, either expressly or by reasonable implication, to prior criminal activity, which does not qualify as a recognized exception to the general rule excluding evidence of an accused’s prior criminal convictions, is impermissible.” Commonwealth v. Percell, 454 A.2d 542, 592 (Pa. 1982) (internal citation omitted). On the other hand, “not all such references warrant reversal[; a]n isolated[,] passing reference to prior criminal activity will not warrant reversal unless the record indicates that prejudice resulted from the remark. There is no per se rule which requires a new trial for every passing reference to prior criminal conduct.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 41 A.3d 892, 895 (Pa. Super. 2012)). When the appellant alleges the - 14 - J-S29009-26 prosecutor elicited improper testimony, we must consider “whether the improper remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth, whether the answer was responsive to the question posed, whether the Commonwealth exploited the reference, and whether the curative instruction was appropriate.” Baker, 313 A.3d at 1120 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bracey, 831 A.2d 678, 682–83 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Herbert argues that the Commonwealth “intentionally misle[]d the jury” and “created the unavoidable inference that [] Herbert possessed a criminal history” through Detective Golphin’s testimony. Appellant’s Brief, at 23-26. The first relevant exchange occurred when Detective Golphin was explaining the initial steps he took in investigating Herbert’s case and went as follows: [Commonwealth]: Okay. And did you check local, state, and federal criminal records— [Detective Golphin]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: —to check for him? And you also had records—you already told us independently you had—and I’m going to show you something in a second, but you also looked through residences for him, correct? [Detective Golphin]: Yes. N.T. Trial, 1/9/25, at 40. The Commonwealth continued with a line of questioning regarding Detective Golphin’s search into Herbert’s prior residences: [Commonwealth]: Tell us what the document is. I’m not going to put it up. [Detective Golphin]: This looks like a police inquiry of his criminal history that was listed, like all his addresses that he lived at within— - 15 - J-S29009-26 [Defense Counsel]: Objection. [Commonwealth]: All the lists of— [Defense Counsel]: Objection. [Commonwealth]: —addresses that he lived at. [Trial] Court: Hold on a second [Defense Counsel]: Move to strike. [Trial] Court: No. Overruled. Rephrase your question. [Commonwealth]: What is listed there? [Detective Golphin]: All his addresses that he lived at. [Commonwealth]: Okay. [Trial] Court: All his previous addresses? [Detective Golphin]: Yes. [Trial] Court: All right. Id. at 44. The Commonwealth then moved on and asked Detective Golphin about the request for extradition of Herbert from Georgia back to Pennsylvania and did not further reference or ask Detective Golphin about Herbert’s criminal history. See id. at 45-47. The trial court maintains that the Commonwealth’s line of questioning does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, and that Detective Golphin’s brief mention of Herbert’s criminal history was not “intentional or with an improper motive.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 6. The court similarly did not find the Commonwealth’s questioning to be improperly motivated. Id. We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth’s questioning and Detective Golphin’s responses do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. The Commonwealth asking whether Detective Golphin searched criminal - 16 - J-S29009-26 records databases and Detective Golphin identifying a document as “a police inquiry of his criminal history[,]” without more, did not have the effect of undermining the fact-finder’s neutrality and preventing a true verdict. The references to Herbert’s criminal history were brief, and the Commonwealth did not expand on these references or exploit them in its closing argument. Accordingly, Detective Golphin’s passing reference to a criminal history search did not undermine the fairness of his trial, and the first of Herbert’s misconduct claims is without merit. See Baker, supra. Herbert next argues that the Commonwealth intentionally misled the jury by asking Herbert whether his gun license was revoked at the time of the underlying crimes without providing its own evidence in support of that contention. See Appellant’s Brief, at 26-28. On direct examination, Herbert testified that he was licensed to carry a gun in Pennsylvania on the day in question. See N.T. Trial, 1/9/25, at 137. Thereafter, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: [Commonwealth]: [I]n fact, on September 18 of 2022, your permission to a carry a gun was actually in revoked status, wasn’t it? [Defense Counsel]: Objection. [Herbert]: How would I know that? [Trial] Court: Overruled. [Commonwealth]: How would you know? [Herbert]: Yes. [Commonwealth]: Didn’t you own all of your guns? [Herbert]: Yes. - 17 - J-S29009-26 [Commonwealth]: You had no idea you were in revoked status? [Herbert]: No. I didn’t have—why would it get revoked? Id. at 142–43. The trial court reasoned that Herbert’s testimony regarding his license to carry a gun on the day in question opened the door on cross-examination to questions about his license. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 6-7. Further, as Herbert had been charged under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106 and 6108, both of which criminalize carrying a gun without a license, the questions were directly relevant to crimes the Commonwealth was attempting to prove Herbert had committed. Accordingly, it was not misconduct for the Commonwealth to ask if Herbert knew whether his license was revoked on the night in question, and this claim is meritless. Herbert next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request that the jury be instructed on involuntary manslaughter in addition to first- and third-degree murder as to Herbert’s fatal shooting of Jones. See Appellant’s Brief, at 28-31. Herbert has, however, waived this claim for failing to object when the trial court charged the jury. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 647(C) states that a party must make a specific objection to the instruction given to the jury to preserve that issue for appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). This is the case even where the party has submitted points for charge that were denied by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 222–23 (Pa. 2005). Here, although Herbert did request an involuntary manslaughter charge, he did not - 18 - J-S29009-26 raise an objection when the trial court denied that request. See N.T. Trial, 1/10/25, at 6-7. Accordingly, because Herbert did not raise a specific objection to the instruction given to the jury, the issue is waived. See Pressley, supra. Herbert next argues that the trial court’s “systemic pattern of erroneous evidentiary rulings” was an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s Brief, at 39. Herbert includes in this purported pattern rulings on evidentiary objections as well as prejudicial statements allegedly made by the trial court on the record. Id. at 40. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Sullivan v. Werner Company, 306 A.3d 846, 853 (Pa. 2023). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 379 (Pa. 2005)). A decision overriding or misapplying the law also constitutes an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 2005). Herbert identifies several evidentiary rulings that he maintains were in error. See Appellant’s Brief, at 40-50. We address each in turn. Herbert first argues that the trial court permitted inadmissible hearsay when it allowed Officer Lapenta to testify regarding Officer Katie Lankford’s interaction with Mercado. The exchange went as follows: - 19 - J-S29009-26 [Commonwealth]: Okay. Do you know whether or not anything was recovered from that scene? [Defense Counsel]: Objection. Hearsay [Trial] Court: Overruled. [Officer Lapenta]: So[,] I maintained my position at the hospital. There’s a lot of procedures that need to be done there. Officer Lankford did take the female to 17th and York. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, unless he was present when it took place. [Trial] Court: Overruled. [Officer Lapenta]: And through police radio only, I was notified that they did, in fact, recover some items there. N.T. Trial, 1/8/25, at 78-79. Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)- (2). Statements that meet the definition of hearsay are not admissible, unless they fall within an established hearsay exception. See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 357 A.3d 480, 488 (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc). Herbert complains that these statements were prejudicial hearsay because the testimony about the recovery of evidence could have “improperly suggest[ed] investigative thoroughness, witness credibility, or evidentiary significance that lacks the reliability safeguards of direct testimony.” Appellant’s Brief, at 42. Herbert avers that “[h]earsay about evidence recovery addresses . . . the circumstances of discovery, chain of custody implications, and investigative context.” Id. at 44. - 20 - J-S29009-26 The trial court opined that “[t]he testimony that [Officer Lapenta] learned that some evidence was recovered was neither specific enough to be meaningful, nor was there any prejudice where, as noted, the physical evidence was not meaningfully in dispute, just [Herbert]’s intent.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 8. We agree. Assuming arguendo that Officer Lapenta’s testimony that he learned about evidence recovery through the police scanner was hearsay that did not meet an enumerated exception under Pa.R.E. 803.1, its admission was nonetheless harmless. Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 483 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 521 (Pa. 2005)). Here, Officer Lapenta’s testimony was both de minimis and cumulative of substantially similar, untainted evidence. The testimony was de minimis because, as noted by the trial court, the factual circumstances were not at issue—only Herbert’s intent was. This lack of dispute significantly lessens the weight of testimony about evidence recovery or investigative context. Further, a separate witness, Officer Christopher Campbell, testified about recovering the evidence that Officer Lapenta said he learned of through the police radio. See N.T. Trial, - 21 - J-S29009-26 1/9/25, at 14-17. Accordingly, if the admission of Officer Lapenta’s testimony was erroneous, the error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo- Rivera, 341 A.3d 159, 169 (Pa. Super. 2025) (admission of hearsay cumulative where other witness provided first-hand account of same information). Herbert next points to S.B.’s testimony regarding what the man who brought a red car said to Herbert the morning after the shootings. See Appellant’s Brief, at 45-47. When S.B. was testifying about this, the following exchange occurred: [Commonwealth]: What did he say, the other guy? [S.B.]: What did the other—what did he say? [Commonwealth]: No, what did the other guy say? [S.B.]: Something about leaving witnesses. [Commonwealth]: Leaving witnesses? [S.B.]: Yes. [Defense Counsel]: Objection. Move to strike. [Trial] Court: Overruled. [Commonwealth]: How did that make you feel? [S.B.]: I was—I was scared the whole time, so[.] N.T. Trial, 1/8/25, at 116-17. The trial court found Herbert did not sufficiently identify the above statements by S.B. in his Rule 1925(b) statement, leaving the trial court to guess at which statement he alleged was admitted in error. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 8 (“The hearsay testimony complained of by [S.B.] is not - 22 - J-S29009-26 sufficiently identified, and hardly satisfies the court’s April 28, 2025[] [o]rder to file []a detailed and it