Com. v. Tunnell, K.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2135 EDA 2025
JudgeFord Elliott
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
J-A19037-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KAMAL TUNNELL :
:
Appellant : No. 2135 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008328-2024
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2026
Appellant, Kamal Tunnell, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for his
convictions of one count each of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance (PWID), knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance
by a person not registered (K&I), carrying a firearm without a license, and
carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia. 1
Appellant challenges the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress drugs, a
handgun, and money that police recovered from his person. We affirm.
The suppression court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 18 Pa.C.S. §
6106(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, respectively.
J-A19037-26
On October 7, 2024, at approximately 5:48 p.m., Philadelphia
Police Officer John Yeager was on routine patrol in the 24th district
with Police Officer Corey Kelly. Both officers were in full uniform
and in a marked patrol car. Officer Yeager is a nine-year veteran
of the Philadelphia Police Department, having spent his entire
career assigned to the 24th district. Officer Yeager parked his
patrol car[] outside a corner store known for narcotics sales, on
the corner of [the] 500 [block of] Hart Lane and Kensington
Ave[nue]. He described the Hart Lane and Kensington Ave[nue]
area as an open-air drug market, where he has personally
witnessed hundreds of drug transactions and made numerous
narcotics arrests.
While parked, Officer Yeager saw Appellant engage in three to four
hand-to-hand transactions in the front vestibule area of the store.
Officers Yeager and Kelly then got out of the patrol car and
entered the front vestibule of the store.
As the police entered the vestibule, Appellant attempted to leave
the store. The officers immediately stopped Appellant. Officer
Kelly asked Appellant if he had anything on his person. Appellant
said he had drugs in his left pocket. The officers found a bundle
of heroin in Appellant's pocket and arrested him. The officers then
conducted a search incident to arrest and found an additional 53
[Z]iploc baggies of heroin/fentanyl, 28 [Z]iploc baggies of meth,
two Adderall pills, an unlicensed handgun, and 106 dollars cash in
denominations of ones, fives, tens, and twenties, on Appellant's
person.
Suppression Court Opinion, 11/20/25, 1-2 (record citations omitted).
On February 12, 2025, Appellant filed a pre-trial omnibus motion to,
inter alia, suppress the physical evidence recovered from him on the basis
both that his arrest was illegal because “(a) he was arrested without probable
cause[;] (b) he was subjected to a stop and frisk on less than reasonable
suspicion[; and] (c) he was arrested without a lawfully issued warrant or other
legal justification,” and that a warrantless search absent probable cause had
occurred. Appellant’s Pre-Trial Omnibus Motion, 2/12/25, ¶ 1 (unpaginated).
-2-
J-A19037-26
On May 8, 2025, the suppression court presided over a hearing on
Appellant’s motion. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer
Yeager, whose testimony was consistent with the above summary of the facts.
The Commonwealth also admitted property receipts to corroborate the items
recovered from Appellant’s person as well as Officer Kelly’s body-worn camera
footage documenting the circumstances of the arrest. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
Immediately following the suppression hearing, Appellant waived his
right to be tried by a jury and proceeded to a stipulated bench trial where the
parties agreed that all the non-hearsay evidence from the suppression hearing
would be incorporated as the trial evidentiary record. See N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 5/8/25, 38. After considering the stipulated record and the
arguments of counsel, the trial court found Appellant guilty of all the above-
referenced offenses.
On July 17, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two to four
years’ incarceration on the PWID charge; K&I merged for the purposes of
sentencing. See Order (sentencing), 7/17/25, 1. For carrying a firearm
without a license, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve six to twelve
months’ incarceration to be served consecutive to the PWID sentence for a
total aggregate prison term of two and one-half to five years. See id. The
trial court declined to impose any further penalty for carrying firearms on
public streets or public property in Philadelphia. See id.
-3-
J-A19037-26
That same day, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for
reconsideration of sentence. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motions and
Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 7/17/25, 1-2. The trial court denied the
motion on July 25, 2025. See Order (post-sentence motion), 7/25/25, 1. On
August 6, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. See Notice of
Appeal, 8/6/25, 1. The trial court and Appellant complied with Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Order (Rule 1925(b)), 8/7/25, 1;
Appellant’s First Extension of Time (EoT) Request, 8/28/25, 2; Order (first EoT
Request), 8/29/25, 1; Appellant’s Second EoT Request, 9/12/25, 2; Order
(second EoT request), 9/22/25, 1; Appellant’s Third EoT Request, 10/7/25, 2;
Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, 10/8/25, 1; Suppression Court Opinion,
11/20/25, 1-20.
Appellant presents the following question for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in [Appellant]’s motion to suppress
physical evidence where [Appellant] was stopped and interrogated
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and then
subjected to a full search without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous?
Appellant’s Brief, 2.
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth “failed to establish that
Officers Yeager and Kelly possessed probable cause or reasonable suspicion
when they stopped and searched” him. 2 Appellant’s Brief, 7. Appellant relies
____________________________________________
2 Beyond Appellant’s statement that there was no probable cause when
officers stopped and searched him, Appellant does not go on to develop any
specific arguments concerning probable cause. We infer that his claim
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4-
J-A19037-26
on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89,
95 (Pa. 2011), that finds an officer must possess knowledge of “specific and
articulable facts” to form the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop someone,
as the officers stopped Appellant in the store’s vestibule. Id. at 7-8. Appellant
argues that the officers in the instant case did not have those facts on hand
because “[n]o objects or money were observed, no conversation was
overheard, and no suspected drug buyers were stopped.” Id. at 11. Appellant
also alleges that the record is “barren of any indication that [he] engaged in
unprovoked flight or other evasive behaviors that might weigh in favor of a
finding of reasonable suspicion.”3 Id. at 9. Finally, while Appellant
acknowledges that Officer Yeager “had nine years of experience as a
Philadelphia police officer and had observed ‘hundreds’ of narcotics
transactions during his tenure,” he alleges that the officer failed to establish a
nexus between his training and experience and his ability to “distinguish a
hand-to-hand drug sale from innocent conduct.” Id. at 10.
____________________________________________
challenges the legality of the initial stop and detainment and that his
conclusion that his arrest lacked probable cause derives from the alleged
illegality of the stop.
3 Appellant makes this claim while also acknowledging in his own footnote that
Officer Yeager’s testimony was that multiple people were trying to leave,
including himself. Absent any supporting citations, he argues that the
suppression court’s finding that he engaged in flight cannot be supported by
the record because multiple people tried to leave when the officers entered
the store. See Appellant’s Brief at 9 n.7.
-5-
J-A19037-26
On review of the denial of a suppression motion, our standard of review
is well-settled:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where … the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-527 (Pa. Super. 2015),
quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d
230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025).
In the context of suppression review, there are three types of
warrantless encounters between police and citizens: a “mere encounter,” an
“investigative detention,” and a “custodial detention” or arrest.
Commonwealth v. Toliver, 355 A.3d 920, 934 (Pa. Super. 2026). To be
-6-
J-A19037-26
valid, each level of interaction requires a different level of suspicion.
Specifically,
[A] mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual
encounter, [ ] does not require the officer to have any suspicion
that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal activity. This
interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop or respond to
the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a seizure, as
the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with the officer
and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to ignore the
officer and continue on his or her way. The second type of
interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary detention
of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a person, and
to be constitutionally valid[,] police must have a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a custodial
detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and must be
supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also
constitutes a seizure.
Id. quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa.
2019) (citations, brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).
The category of the investigative detention derives from Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and a seizure for the investigative detention occurs when,
based on the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that
they were not free to go and were subject to police orders. See
Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 827 A.2d 469, 478 (Pa. Super. 2003).
A totality of the circumstances test is necessary to determine if a police
officer had reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention. See
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004). Our Supreme
Court has found that:
-7-
J-A19037-26
In making this determination, we must give “due weight ... to the
specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Also, the totality
of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). The reasonable suspicion test “‘is what it
purports to be—it requires a suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable
based upon the facts of the matter,’ and potential innocent explanations for a
defendant’s conduct may not negate a police officer’s suspicion of criminal
activity.” Toliver, 355 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
Among relevant factors are an officer’s training, their past experience with
similar investigations and arrests, and their familiarity with the location the
investigative detention occurred in—including whether it occurred in a “high
crime area.” Clemens, 66 A.3d at 380. Whether the defendant exhibited
nervous or evasive behavior is another relevant factor. See id.
Reasonable suspicion can ripen into probable cause during an
investigative detention. See Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1192. An officer has
probable cause “where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed.” Id. quoting
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d 203, 206 (Pa. 1994). Once an officer
with probable cause makes an arrest, the search incident to arrest exception
applies to permit a warrantless search of the arrested person and the area
-8-
J-A19037-26
within his immediate control. See Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d
792, 797, 799 (Pa. Super. 2016). Courts of this Commonwealth have
recognized that “[t]he search incident to arrest exception permits a search of
the arrestee’s person as a matter of course—and without a ‘case-by-case
adjudication ... [of] whether a search of a particular arrestee is likely to protect
officer safety or evidence.’” Id. at 799 (citation omitted).
Here, we agree with Appellant that an investigative detention occurred
when Officer Kelly, Officer Yeager’s partner, grabbed Appellant by the arm and
stopped him from leaving the store, as, at that time, Appellant would not have
felt free to leave. See Appellant’s Brief, 8; see also N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 5/8/25, 21; see also Bennett, 827 A.2d at 478.
In viewing the totality of the circumstances, we disagree with Appellant,
however, on the matter as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion
for the detention. Indeed, like the suppression court, we find that officers had
reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative detention of Appellant. See
Suppression Court Opinion, 11/20/25, 13. When the officers first saw
Appellant, he was in the vestibule of a corner store in a part of town that
Officer Yeager described as an “open-air drug market” on a block where he
had made “numerous” previous narcotics arrests. N.T. Suppression Hearing,
5/8/25, 8-9. Regarding the store within which the officers first observed
Appellant, Officer Yeager testified that “they sell narcotics inside,” and
explained that he had observed “approximately [one hundred]” prior drug
transactions there during his nine years as a police officer. Id. at 8-9, 16, 25.
-9-
J-A19037-26
In support of his training and experience, Officer Yeager testified that he had
received narcotics training that included surveillance training, and that he had
observed hundreds of drug transactions during his tenure. See id. at 8, 25-
26.
The officers observed Appellant engage in “three to four” hand-to-hand
transactions in the store’s vestibule. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/8/25, 11.
It does not negate reasonable suspicion, as Appellant argues, that Officer
Yeager did not observe any objects or money exchanged, as this does not
prevent a trained and experienced officer from forming the reasonable
suspicion that a narcotics transaction is occurring. See id. at 20; Appellant’s
Brief at 7-9; see also Clemens, 66 A.3d at 380 (finding that an officer who
testified to his experience and training had reasonable suspicion that a hand-
to-hand narcotics transaction was taking place in a “‘nonstop’ open-air
narcotics sales” area despite not seeing any particular items being passed).
Moreover, we conclude that Appellant’s engagement in the hand-to-hand
transactions in the vestibule of the store gave rise to a reasonable inference
of his involvement in illicit narcotics trading rather than some legitimate
involvement in the sales of the business in which he was standing. See
Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1189.
Additionally, once the officers exited their patrol vehicle and entered the
corner store, Appellant attempted to leave the establishment. See N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 5/8/25, 11. Appellant argues that, since multiple people
moved to leave in addition to him when the officers entered the store, that
- 10 -
J-A19037-26
the suppression court erred in characterizing this action as flight. See
Appellant’s Brief, 11 n.7. Existing case law does not support this argument.
The spontaneous flight of four or five men from a scene of suspected gambling
in an area known for its gambling after the arrival of two officers was enough
for our Supreme Court to find officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the
appellant in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016, 1022, 1039 (Pa.
2025). Here, as in Lewis, Appellant and others, seemingly in unison,
departed the store—an area known for narcotics transactions—after suspected
narcotics transactions just occurred provided the officers with a reasonable
basis for suspecting flight and that Appellant was engaging in criminal activity.
When combined with the factors of Officer Yeager’s narcotics surveillance
training, and his past experiences observing narcotics transactions and
making narcotics arrests in the area generally and in the subject corner store
specifically, Officer Yeager had reasonable suspicion for conducting an
investigatory stop as he could “reasonably conclude … that criminal activity
was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity.”
Bennett, 827 A.2d at 477.
When, during the investigative detention, Appellant informed the
officers that he possessed narcotics in his left pocket, and, in fact, Officer Kelly
removed heroin from the indicated pocket, reasonable suspicion ripened into
probable cause. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/8/25, 11; see also
Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1192 (finding that reasonable suspicion ripened into
probable cause where, during a traffic stop, a police canine unit dog alerted
- 11 -
J-A19037-26
officers to the possible presence of drugs in the right rear of the stopped car);
Commonwealth v. Kondash, 808 A.2d 943, 948-49 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(finding that appellee’s affirmative response during an investigatory detention
regarding whether he possessed intravenous needles on his person provided
probable cause to arrest him and perform a search incident to arrest). At that
point, the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge were
“sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed,” such that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Appellant for illegal drug possession offenses. Rogers, 849
A.2d at 1192. Specifically, Officer Yeager believed at that point that Appellant
had committed PWID and arrested him. See N.T. Suppression Hearing,
5/8/25, 11, 14-15; see also 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). The “additional 53
[Z]iploc baggies of heroin/fentanyl, 28 [Z]iploc baggies of meth, two Adderall
pills, an unlicensed handgun, and 106 dollars cash in denominations of ones,
fives, tens, and twenties,” were lawfully recovered from Appellant’s person as
part of a valid search incident to arrest. See Suppression Court Opinion,
11/20/25, 2.
Since the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant in the store
vestibule and that reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause when
Appellant admitted he possessed narcotics in his pocket, the search and
recovery of all the items was valid. The suppression court appropriately
denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
- 12 -
J-A19037-26
Date: 11/17/2026
- 13 -