Com. v. Miller, J.

J-A22033-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES R. MILLER JR. : : Appellant : No. 1637 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001019-2024 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J. MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 22, 2026 James R. Miller, Jr. (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of two counts each of aggravated assault – attempt serious bodily injury (AA – attempt SBI), aggravated assault – attempt serious bodily injury to designated individuals (AA – attempt SBI/designated individual), aggravated assault – physical menace of designated individual in line of duty (AA – physical menace/designated individual), assault of a law enforcement officer – firearm discharged, simple assault – attempt bodily injury, simple assault – physical menace; four counts of recklessly endangering another person; and one count each of discharge of J-A22033-26 a firearm into an occupied structure, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 After careful review, we affirm. The charges arose from incidents which occurred in East Huntingdon Township on January 28, 2024. In its opinion, the trial court aptly summarized the testimony describing the first incident as follows: [Ryan] Lewandowski [(Lewandowski)] testified that he and his wife, Chelsie, were home in bed around [8:00] or [9:00] p.m., when they heard “what sounded like gunfire” and then heard “like, glass, kind of crashing in the house somewhere.” They discovered that the skylight in the kitchen had shattered and was falling into the kitchen. Lewandowski testified he had heard multiple shots and then heard the skylight shatter. After looking around both inside and outside the residence, Lewandowski found a bullet fragment in the window housing frame for the skylight. He called 911 to report the incident. [Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)] Troopers [Brandon] Smith and [Brandon] Gelet [(Trooper Smith and Trooper Gelet, respectively)] responded to the scene and spoke with Lewandowski. [Lewandowski] provided the troopers with the bullet fragment he had found and showed the damaged skylight window. The Commonwealth … introduced twelve (12) photographs. Exhibit 1 was an aerial photograph that depicted [Appellant’s] house in relation to the Lewandowski residence. Exhibits 10 through 12 depicted the Lewandowski attic. Lewandowski testified that he went into the attic to attempt to determine what happened, and he observed a hole in the wood of the front roof, “where it was like splintered.” Lewandowski surmised that the bullet hit the roof of his house and traveled through that attic and struck the skylight located on the rear side of the roof. It was after determining his house had been struck by a bullet that he called the police. ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), (2), and (6), 2702.1(a)(1), 2701(a)(1) and (3), 2705, 2707.1(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). -2- J-A22033-26 Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/26, at 2 (citations omitted). Troopers Smith and Gelet investigated the reported shooting: Troopers Smith and Gelet responded to the Lewandowski residence in separate vehicles. [Trooper] Smith, who was backing up [Trooper] Gelet, drove an unmarked blue vehicle, and [Trooper] Gelet was driving a marked state police vehicle. Both troopers were in full uniform[,] including jackets with [the] PSP insignia on the shoulders and back. After talking to [] Lewandowski, and receiving the bullet fragment, the troopers decided to conduct an “area” or “neighborhood canvas” in an attempt to determine where the gunshots may have come from. The troopers proceeded to [Appellant’s] residence after leaving the Lewandowski residence to begin their canvas. It was dark outside when they arrived. [Trooper] Gelet parked his marked state police car in [Appellant’s] driveway, behind a vehicle that he assumed belonged to the homeowner, and [Trooper] Smith parked his car facing Route 819 with his running lights on. They approached the residence in an attempt to contact who[m]ever was at home. Trooper Gelet approached the “side door of the residence that leads to an enclosed porch.” As they approached the residence, they heard “obnoxiously loud music” playing from the porch area. There were no signs of anyone present, nor were there lights on in the house. Trooper Gelet knocked loudly on the main door “multiple times” because of the loud music. Upon receiving no answer, Trooper Gelet, utilizing his flashlight as it was dark outside, proceeded “around the side of the house, towards the main road, which is State Route 819, Porter Avenue, just to see if there’s any, you know, lights on or signs of anybody in different rooms of the house opposite this.” This was the front of the house, and Trooper Gelet did not observe any lights on, or signs of anybody occupying that side of the house. When he did not find any lights on, or signs of anyone in the front portion of the home, [Trooper Gelet] proceeded back to the enclosed porch where he had first knocked on the door. He re-approached the side door and knocked multiple times again, and on this occasion heard a small dog start[] barking. [Trooper Gelet] waited to see if these sounds would draw someone’s attention to the door[;] however, no one responded. He tried -3- J-A22033-26 knocking again, and then when no one responded, [Trooper Gelet] walked into the side yard area and looked inside the windows to see if anyone was present. He could see into the home, and into the doorway area, and he shined his flashlight into the home to see if he could observe movement or anyone inside. Id. at 2-4 (citations omitted). The second incident occurred during this investigation: Trooper Gelet observed “an AR-style rifle” that was propped up against a counter or something similar and related that information to [Trooper] Smith. [Trooper Gelet] then noticed a Ring doorbell that was propped on the windowsill. Familiar with how these devices operate, he repositioned the Ring doorbell toward his face/torso area and activated it. Trooper Gelet then testified as to what happened next: After activating the Ring doorbell, I still have a flashlight shined [sic] inside the residence into the next room over on the rifle. Moments after I activated it, I noticed that a light is turned on in the next room over. I can now see into that room more clearly. I see there’s, what I assume to be, a dining room table. I let Trooper Smith know, hey, a light turned on in the next room over. So, I’m thinking, okay, I got the attention of somebody inside, whether a homeowner, whoever it might be. Moments after the light turns on, I see an individual come around the side of the dining room table at a fast, aggressive pace and go[] straight for the rifle that I pointed out before that was propped up on the counter. I tell Trooper Smith, hey, there’s somebody coming, he’s going straight for the rifle. Troopers Gelet and Smith began to retreat from the windows and house upon realizing that [Appellant] had “without hesitation” … grabbed the rifle and moved toward the doorway. [Trooper] Gelet told [Trooper] Smith that [Appellant] just grabbed the rifle, and both troopers at this point unholstered their “weapons and began yelling commands into the window for him to drop the weapon, drop the gun.” -4- J-A22033-26 [Appellant] proceeded to the door[,] and as soon as he got through the door, he fired “two rounds … immediately out in front of him towards the ground.” [Trooper] Gelet testified that he could “visibly see and hear the rounds being fired.” [Trooper Gelet] testified that [Trooper] Smith and he “at this point were still giving commands for [Appellant] to drop the weapon, drop the gun repeatedly, at which time, he d[id] not do so. Trooper Smith described [Appellant’s] actions in exiting the residence as “breaching the door,” which he explained as “whenever you, like, bust through a door.” Both troopers testified that after [Appellant] quickly fired the two rounds upon exiting the residence, [Appellant] “begins to pivot and turn” in [Trooper] Gelet’s direction. [Trooper] Smith described [Appellant] holding the rifle down near his hips, in the “lower ready” position. “As [Appellant was] coming out, that’s when he began to fire from the hip, spinning, pivoting towards where [Trooper Smith] and Trooper Gelet were, so pivoting in our vicinity.” Both troopers fired their weapons, striking [Appellant], who fell to the ground. Trooper Gelet testified that no more than 10 to 15 seconds elapsed from his activation of the Ring doorbell to [Appellant] coming out of the side door with the rifle and firing. When [Trooper Gelet] first saw [Appellant] through the window going for the rifle, and then coming out of the door, no more than 5 seconds elapsed. [Trooper Gelet] reiterated that he and Trooper Smith were giving “verbal commands and getting tactical distance by retreating from the windows, anticipating [Appellant] coming through the door with the rifle.” After [Appellant] fell to the ground, Trooper Smith approached and moved [Appellant’s] rifle further away from him. Trooper Gelet radioed dispatch and alerted them to the incident, and both [t]roopers subsequently began to administer aid to [Appellant] until paramedics arrived. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted). Paramedics transported Appellant to the hospital. Additional PSP troopers “responded to the scene and observed the rifle, namely, an ABC AR15 [5.5]6 NATO rifle, utilized by [Appellant] in this incident, along with a pump -5- J-A22033-26 shotgun, in the area where [Appellant] fell to the ground.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 3/6/24, at 2. On January 29, 2024, the PSP executed a search warrant at Appellant’s residence. As detailed in the affidavit of probable cause, two spent .223 caliber LC 22 casings were located near the side door where [Appellant] exited his residence and discharged the firearm. Outside of the residence, PSP Forensic Services Unit [] members photographed a ground disturbance in the backyard in the grass area between [Appellant’s] driveway and the location of the Troopers. Apparent dirt/mud debris was observed and photographed … on the front hood of [Appellant’s] blue Subaru Impreza and of the PSP patrol unit[, both of which] were parked in the driveway. Also collected inside the residence w[ere] multiple pieces of drug paraphernalia, [including] a digital scale, smoking devices and metal spoons/measuring devices with visible residue. … PSP [] members on scene observed bullet holes in the front windshield of a Ford F-250, light blue in color, located on [Appellant’s] property…. This vehicle was in direct line of sight from [Appellant’s] property to Lewandowski’s neighboring property … and did not have a sufficient backstop preventing rounds being fired into the vehicle from traveling beyond the vehicle or stopping the bullets[’] trajectory. Five additional spent .223 caliber LC 22 casings were observed in the grass near [Appellant’s] barn, consistent with [Lewandowski’s] report of shots being fired in the area of his residence. Id. (some capitalization modified). The following day, Corporals Jeffrey Summits (Corporal Summits) and Wesley Wilson interviewed Appellant in his hospital room.2 On January 31, ____________________________________________ 2 Corporal Summits participated in the investigation following the officer- involved shooting. See generally N.T., 9/9/25, at 207; see also N.T. (omnibus pretrial hearing), 7/30/24, at 127. When Corporal Summits (Footnote Continued Next Page) -6- J-A22033-26 2024, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of REAP and one count of discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure. Later, on March 6, 2024, the Commonwealth withdrew the original charges and filed a criminal information charging Appellant with all of the above-described offenses, as well as two counts of attempted homicide.3, 4 Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on May 23, 2024, including motions for habeas corpus as to all charges (except possession of drug ____________________________________________ interviewed Appellant at the hospital, Appellant indicated that he did not remember much about the day of the incident. N.T. (omnibus pretrial hearing), 7/30/24, at 131. According to Corporal Summits, Appellant “was under the impression that someone was coming to get him.” Id. at 132. Appellant stated that at some point during that day, he went outside to fire a .22 caliber rifle at his pickup truck before returning inside to play video games “and didn’t remember anything after that.” Id. According to Corporal Summits, Appellant did not recall anyone approaching his house or firing his rifle toward anyone. Id. at 133-34; see also id. 134-35 (Corporal Summits stating Appellant “didn’t remember going outside. He didn’t remember firing a rifle. He didn’t understand why he would have done that, but … that he didn’t hold the troopers accountable.”). 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2502. 4 Based on the initial charges, the magisterial district judge set Appellant’s bail at $500,000.00. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 319 A.3d 575, 577 (Pa. Super. 2024). Appellant filed a motion to modify bail, and the hearing took place on March 6, 2024 (i.e., the same date the Commonwealth revised the charges against Appellant). See id. Though the magisterial district judge declined to modify bail, Appellant posted the bond and was released from prison. See id. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a petition to modify bail; following a hearing, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion and revoked bail. See id. at 578-79. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. See id. at 579. Appellant then filed a petition for specialized review in this Court, and a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s order. See id. at 570-83. -7- J-A22033-26 paraphernalia) and a motion to suppress the physical evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the omnibus pretrial motion. Additional pretrial litigation ensued, much of which is not relevant to the instant appeal. Relevantly, on August 16, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude Appellant from “presenting self-serving hearsay statements through Corporal [] Summits or any other witness.” Motion in Limine, 8/16/24, at 1 (unpaginated). The Commonwealth asserted “[t]here is no evidence to justify even the implication of self-defense,” and therefore, no basis for Appellant to present evidence about his state of mind. Id. at 1-2 (unpaginated). The Commonwealth additionally described Appellant’s “alleged lack of memory” as self-serving hearsay. Id. at 2 (unpaginated). In response, Appellant emphasized he made the challenged statements in connection with the officer-involved shooting investigation, and before he was charged with any offenses. Brief in Response, 9/5/24, at 3 (unpaginated). Appellant argued the statements were probative of his state of mind at the time of the shooting. Id. at 4 (unpaginated). Further, Appellant argued that because the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Corporal Summits (its -8- J-A22033-26 own witness) that could be exculpatory for Appellant, prohibiting the testimony at trial would be a Brady5 violation. Id. at 5 (unpaginated).6 The Commonwealth subsequently filed a supplemental motion in limine, clarifying that it would not elicit testimony from Corporal Summits about the statements made by Appellant during the hospital interview. Supplemental Motion in Limine, 9/5/25. The Commonwealth again requested the court to prevent any questioning about Appellant’s statements. Id. Appellant filed an answer. On September 8, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a motion to quash subpoenas obtained by Appellant to compel three individuals to appear at trial: Westmoreland County District Attorney Nicole Ziccarelli, Esquire (DA Ziccarelli); assistant district attorney Steven Reddy, Esquire (ADA Reddy); and a former victim/witness advocate. In the subpoenas, Appellant sought ____________________________________________ 5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 6 Appellant filed an answer to the Commonwealth’s motion in limine a year later, on September 5, 2025. The reason for this delay is not immediately apparent from the record. -9- J-A22033-26 information relating to the investigation of Orlando Holt (Holt)7 in an unrelated case.8 The trial court and the parties addressed the motion to quash subpoenas prior to the start of Appellant’s jury trial on September 8, 2025. The following exchange took place on the record: [Trial Court]: Okay. As far as the district attorney witnesses that [the defense] had proposed to call, I just feel that there are a number of reasons why I don’t think they’re proper witnesses. I ____________________________________________ 7 In the motion for reconsideration Appellant filed after the trial court revoked his bail, Appellant averred that on August 31, 2022, he “was the target of an attempted homicide perpetrated by [] Holt” and two other individuals. Motion for Reconsideration, 4/19/24, ¶ 3. Appellant also alleged he was the Commonwealth’s witness in Holt’s case. Id. ¶ 8. 8 The Commonwealth’s motion to quash describes the information sought as follows: 3. The subpoena served upon [DA Ziccarelli] commanded her to bring her “March 6, 2024, letter to Captain Jonathan Rush regarding the officer involved shootings involving Troopers [] Smith and [] Gelet of the [PSP].” 4. The subpoena served upon [] ADA [Reddy] ordered him to bring “all reports, criminal complaints, affidavits of probable cause, witness statements, interviews, narratives, general offense reports, and documentary and physical evidence obtained during your investigation of the criminal charges against [] Holt in connection with events occurring on 8/31/2022 and the case docketed at CP-65-CR-0003347-2022.” 5. The subpoena directed to [the former victim’s advocate], which was not served upon her as she does not work for the DA’s Office, required her to bring a “disposition notification letter to [Appellant] re[: ] Holt….” Motion to Quash Subpoenas, 9/8/25, ¶¶ 3-5 (some capitalization and punctuation modified). - 10 - J-A22033-26 think, for one thing -- I guess the biggest thing is that I think all of their testimony would be hearsay. Number Two, I think there are -- I think you can prove your point with other witnesses. Do you have other witnesses you can call? [Defense Counsel]: I think I do, yeah. [Trial Court]: … [Y]ou understand my ruling with regard to [DA] Ziccarelli? [Assistant District Attorney]: Your Honor, I was hoping that Attorney Brown[, i.e., Alexander Brown, Esquire, the ADA who filed the Commonwealth’s motion to quash,] could be heard on that. If we verified earlier on that [DA] Ziccarelli did not interview anybody as the in-camera review, that means she would be, you know, free from that subpoena and, perhaps, if [Attorney Brown] could be heard on that matter to verify that, then she is simply an impeachment witness. [Trial Court]: Well, look, if defense counsel will stipulate that [DA Ziccarelli] didn’t talk to anybody, didn’t interview anybody, then that’s fine, but if she’s not going to stipulate to that, hearing [Attorney] Brown is no different than hearing from you or hearing from anybody else, so -- [ADA]: Other than [DA] Ziccarelli, if we could hear from her, rather than waiting until the end of my case in chief, perhaps we could do that now and -- [Trial Court]: We don’t even know if … what [DA Ziccarelli] indicated in the letter [to Appellant] contradicts any other statement. If there’s nothing in … her statement that contradicts anything that the officers said, then whether she talked to officers or not is immaterial because there’s no relevance to her testimony. So, … frankly, I don’t anticipate that the defense is going to be able to call [DA Ziccarelli], but Number One, I think -- what we have to determine is, what [DA] Ziccarelli put in her report, does that contradict any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses? If it doesn’t, that’s the end of it. If it does, then the next step would - 11 - J-A22033-26 be to call her in-camera, so just a proceeding like this, outside the hearing of the jury, to say, did you interview anyone, or did you just base your report on reports that you read? I assume she’s going to say that she made her determination based on reports that she read. And then, if that’s the case, then [DA Ziccarelli] may be subject to cross-examination as to … which report did she get, just to make sure that the defense has all of those reports, but, basically, … if she has not interviewed any witnesses, I can’t see any reason for calling her. But you … and [Attorney] Brown telling me … it would have to come from [DA] Ziccarelli under oath, but we’re not even there yet. Again, if what [DA Ziccarelli] indicated in the report doesn’t contradict anything, then we don’t have to have her testimony. So, I can’t imagine that she’s going to have to testify in this case, but, first, we have to take things one by one. N.T., 9/8/25, 3-5. The trial court, inter alia, (1) granted the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude any reference to, or cross-examination concerning Appellant’s self-serving statements made to Corporal Summits; (2) granted the Commonwealth’s motion to quash the subpoenas pertaining to ADA Reddy; and (3) denied, without prejudice, the Commonwealth’s motion to quash the subpoena pertaining to DA Ziccarelli. See Order, 9/8/25. The trial court indicated that it would revisit the issue of DA Ziccarelli’s requirement to testify following the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Id. Later, after Troopers Gelet and Smith had testified, the court revisited the subpoena issued to DA Ziccarelli: [Trial Court]: So, while this is on my mind, I’ll mention that I didn’t see anything inconsistent between these troopers’ statements and [DA] Ziccarelli’s statement. …. - 12 - J-A22033-26 [Trial Court: Troopers Gelet and Smith] both testified that [Appellant] immediately came out of the house and started shooting, and that’s what they’ve testified to. [Defense Counsel]: Well, he9 also testified that [Appellant] never shot toward him, that he shot straight ahead. …. [ADA]: [DA Ziccarelli] says exactly what you said [in her statement], Your Honor. He came out shooting. [Defense Counsel]: Fired at the troopers. …. [Trial Court]: Here’s what it says. It says, Trooper Smith and Trooper Gelet attempted to contact the neighbor, [Appellant], at his residence located at 1036 Porter Avenue, East Huntingdon. [Appellant] was observed inside his residence through a window retrieving an AR-15 rifle and proceeding towards the front door. Both troopers started to retreat while giving verbal commands to [Appellant] to drop the weapon. [Appellant] exited the front door of his residence, armed with the rifle, and immediately fired upon Trooper Smith and Trooper Gelet, which resulted in them returning fire on [Appellant]. …. [Trial Court]: So, what is inconsistent? [The parties thereafter discussed whether “fired upon” is inconsistent with “fired toward.”] [Trial Court]: … I guess there could be an inconsistency there, but, as I look at this, [the troopers have] already both admitted that … [Appellant] fired. I forget the exact term. But I remember … Trooper Smith[] said that [Appellant] didn’t fire toward him, but [Appellant] was turning at the time. [Trooper Gelet] said, I think, [Appellant] wasn’t firing directly at him, I think was the statement. So you’ve elicited that. ____________________________________________ 9 It is unclear which trooper defense counsel was referring to in this statement. - 13 - J-A22033-26 [Defense Counsel]: Okay. [Trial Court]: That’s helpful to your case. Do you really want to cloud the issue by calling [DA] Ziccarelli? [Defense Counsel]: I don’t think I need to at this point. [Trial Court]: Okay. So you’re going to withdraw that request? [Defense Counsel]: Yes. N.T., 9/9/25, at 310-12 (footnote and emphasis added; one paragraph break omitted). Following the three-day jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the above- described crimes. The jury acquitted Appellant of two counts of attempted homicide. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report. Prior to sentencing, Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the verdict. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on December 2, 2025. The court first heard argument concerning Appellant’s motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 22 to 44 years’ imprisonment, with credit for time served. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. The evidence was insufficient to establish that [Appellant] was guilty of assault of law enforcement officer – firearm discharged, aggravated assault – attempting to cause serious bodily injury to - 14 - J-A22033-26 designated individuals, and aggravated assault – fear of imminent serious bodily injury against designated individuals, where there was no evidence that [Appellant] had the requisite mens rea and knew that the individuals outside his home were police officers, and any such finding would be based on pure speculation. 2. The evidence was insufficient to establish that [Appellant] was guilty of assault of law enforcement officer – firearm discharged and aggravated assault – attempts to cause serious bodily injury to designated individuals, aggravated assault – attempts to cause serious bodily injury, and simple assault, where there was no evidence that [Appellant] attempted to commit the crimes by taking a substantial step toward commission of those crimes and/or that he had a firm intent to actually cause bodily injury. 3. The evidence was insufficient for discharging a firearm into an occupied structure and for two counts of recklessly endangering another person, where the evidence introduced at trial failed to establish that [Appellant] committed the conduct of firing a bullet into his neighbor’s residence. 4. The trial court erred in precluding [Appellant] from introducing evidence that he had been the victim of an attempted homicide inside his home, where a firearm had been pulled on [Appellant], which was relevant to show [Appellant’s] state of mind and why he would exit his home armed. Appellant’s Brief at 9 (some punctuation modified). In each of his first three issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under the following standard: Our applicable standard of review is whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, when examining sufficiency issues, we bear in mind that: the Commonwealth’s burden may be sustained by means of wholly circumstantial evidence; the entire trial record is evaluated - 15 - J-A22033-26 and all evidence received against the defendant considered; and the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence when evaluating witness credibility. This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Commonwealth v. Hill, 348 A.3d 264, 275-76 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted). A sufficiency claim “presents a pure question of law and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Akeley, 320 A.3d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). Appellant’s first two claims relate to his convictions arising out of the officer-involved shooting. We begin by setting forth the statutory definitions of the relevant offenses. The Crimes Code defines assault of a law enforcement officer as follows: (a) Assault of a law enforcement officer.-- (1) A person commits a felony of the first degree who attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a law enforcement officer, while in the performance of duty and with knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer, by discharging a firearm. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.1(a)(1). “Bodily injury” means “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 2301. As this Court has explained, - 16 - J-A22033-26 in order to establish a prima facie case for the offense of assault of law enforcement officer …, the Commonwealth is required to set forth evidence that: (1) the defendant attempted to cause, or intentionally or knowingly caused, bodily injury; (2) the victim was a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duty; (3) the defendant had knowledge the victim was a law enforcement officer; and (4) in attempting to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causing such bodily injury, the defendant discharged a firearm. Commonwealth v. Landis, 48 A.3d 432, 445 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (some punctuation modified). Further, attempt “requires a showing of some act, albeit not one actually causing bodily injury, accompanied by an intent to inflict bodily injury upon a law enforcement officer by discharging a firearm.” Id. at 446 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a)). Appellant was also convicted of aggravated assault under three subsections of section 2702, which provide as follows: (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances involving extreme indifference to the value of human life; (2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c) or to any employee of an agency, company or other entity engaged in public transportation while in the performance of duty; *** (6) attempts by physical menace to put any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in - 17 - J-A22033-26 subsection (c), while in the performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), (2), (6); see also id. § 2702(c)(1) (identifying police officers as designated individuals). “Serious bodily injury” is “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 2301. Further, “we have defined the term ‘physical menace’ as ‘menacing or frightening activity.’” Commonwealth v. Joseph, 350 A.3d 1057, 1060 (Pa. Super. 2026). In his first claim, Appellant asserts the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions of assault of a law enforcement officer, AA attempt SBI – designated individual, AA physical menace – designated individual. See Appellant’s Brief at 24-30. Appellant claims there is no evidence that he knew Troopers Gelet and Smith were law enforcement officers when he exited his home armed. Id. at 24-25. According to Appellant, [t]he Commonwealth’s evidence that [Appellant] purportedly knew that the two men outside his home, who never announced themselves as police while knocking, nor activated their emergency lights, is that Trooper Smith activated a Ring camera that did not record anything and pointed the camera at his chest to show [the] State Police insignia. But the Commonwealth never established that the Ring camera was active and working and/or that [Appellant] had a device connected to the Ring camera that would enable him to see in real-time someone utilizing the Ring doorbell. - 18 - J-A22033-26 Id. at 25; see also id. at 26 (claiming “[i]t is pure conjecture and speculation that [Appellant] actually had the capability of seeing anything from the Ring camera, which did not record.”). Appellant also points to the lack of evidence concerning whether the police vehicles were visible from Appellant’s residence. Id. at 26-27. Instantly, Appellant challenges only the evidence supporting a finding that he knew Troopers Smith and Gelet were police officers when he exited his home holding a rifle.10 ____________________________________________ 10 Our review reveals no case law affirmatively concluding that knowledge of the victim’s status as a designated individual is an element of these offenses. Notably, our Supreme Court has held that knowledge of the victim’s status is not an element of aggravated assault for purposes of prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3) (providing a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers … enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of duty”). See Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1995) (applying a prior, but substantially identical version of the statute codified at 18 P.S. § 2702(a)(3), and concluding the language “in performance of duty” does not “require a defendant to have knowledge of the officer’s official status since such a reading would all but strip the undercover officer of the protection the legislature intended to afford him.”); see also id. (holding “a defendant’s lack of knowledge should only be considered in those cases in which a defendant acts with the mistaken belief that he is threatened with an intentional tort by a private citizen.” (emphasis in original)). We conclude the reasoning espoused in Flemings is applicable to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(6) as well. Further, we observe that the plain language of section 2702(a)(2) and (6) contrasts with the language of section 2702.1, which very clearly requires the defendant’s knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer. Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3), (6), with id. § 2702.1. - 19 - J-A22033-26 At trial, Trooper Smith testified that on the night of January 28, 2024, he was on patrol during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. N.T., 9/9/25, at 154. Trooper Gelet received the dispatch and requested Trooper Smith to respond as backup. Id. at 155. According to Trooper Smith, he and Trooper Gelet responded to the Lewandowski residence between approximately 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. Id. at 160. Trooper Smith confirmed that it was dark at that time. Id. at 161; see also generally id. at 213 (describing the area surrounding Appellant’s and the Lewandowskis’ residence as rural). Trooper Smith testified that he arrived in an unmarked vehicle, while Trooper Gelet had arrived in a marked police vehicle. Id. at 161, 196; see also id. at 161 (explaining that Trooper Gelet’s police vehicle “has [] the Pennsylvania State Police insignia on the door, gray-in-color light bar, [] it’s an obvious police car.”). Trooper Smith parked his unmarked vehicle in the lane beside Appellant’s driveway. Id. at 196. Emergency lights were never activated on either vehicle. Id. at 197. Trooper Smith also stated that he was wearing his patrol uniform, including a “gun belt, Pennsylvania State Police p