Com. v. Ashford, D.

J-S36007-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANTE JAMES ASHFORD : : Appellant : No. 1319 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001093-2023 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Dante James Ashford (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury convictions of one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms, and evading arrest or detention on foot.1 Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings (1) admitting video evidence, over Appellant’s objection that it constituted improper Pa.R.E. 404(b) character evidence;2 and (2) ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 5104.2(a). 2 Rule 404(b) addresses the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-S36007-26 precluding the defense from inquiring into the substance of Appellant’s co- conspirator’s prior offenses, which Appellant contends precluded him from presenting a complete defense. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court summarized the evidence adduced at Appellant’s jury trial in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion: On February 11, 2023, Ashley South [(Ms. South)] was carjacked in Reading City, Berks County, Pennsylvania, by three men in black balaclavas[, one of whom] brandish[ed a] handgun[] with blue laser sights.3 (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 127). [Ms. South’s] ____________________________________________ (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. (3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial. Pa.R.E. 404(b). 3Ms. South was unable to identify any of her assailants due to their faces being obscured by balaclavas. N.T., 5/15/26, at 129. Ms. South testified that one “gunman threatened me and said he would pop me if I made any sudden movements,” after which the three men stole both her car and cell phone. Id. (Footnote Continued Next Page) -2- J-S36007-26 vehicle was promptly reported stolen. (Id. p. 132). Ms. South never saw her car again. (Id.). The evening prior, on February 10, 2023, a video [(“the video” or “the YouTube video”)] was uploaded to the online video sharing platform[,] YouTube[,] depicting Appellant and [two] other men in black balaclavas handling and displaying various firearms with blue laser sights, including a purple Glock handgun.4 (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 242). [The video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial, albeit without sound.5 Id. at 245; Commonwealth Ex. 1.] The video itself is undated, though Appellant appears to be around the same age [in the video and at the time of the offense,] and is depicted wearing the same sweatshirt in which he was apprehended ten days later. ____________________________________________ at 129-30. Ms. South stated that she only observed one firearm, which “had a blue laser on it.” Id. at 131. 4 The video, which is a part of the certified record, remains posted on YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-IX9rvOflg (last visited Oct. 1, 2026); N.T., 5/15/25, Commonwealth Ex. 1. At several points during the two- minute-long video, Appellant (1) partially removes his facial covering, revealing his face; and (2) is holding a purple Glock handgun equipped with a blue laser sight. The video is accompanied by background music that was created by a rap musician with whom Appellant claims to have no association. 5 Immediately before the video was played for the jury, the trial court issued the following limiting instruction: [Y]ou are going to see [the video,] but you are not going to hear [any audio associated with] this exhibit. [The trial court has] made a determination that the audio portion of [the video] is not relevant for your consideration in any way. You are not to give any consideration whatsoever as to what may be being said, [or] what might not be being said. It doesn’t matter. What matters[,] and the reason [the video] is introduced[,] is for you to observe it, not listen to it. So, again, please place no consideration into the fact you’re not hearing the audio. N.T., 5/15/26, at 245; see also Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 2004) (“It is presumed the jury follows [a trial] court’s instructions.”). -3- J-S36007-26 [See id. at 246 (Officer [Bradley] Redinger [(Officer Redinger)] testifying that “the sweatshirt that [Appellant] was wearing the night of the incident [that gave rise to the instant charges against Appellant] was the same sweatshirt that’s in … [the] video”).] Although Appellant’s trial counsel averred the [video] to be a rap music video, no lyrical or musical content associated with th[e] video was ever presented at trial. [See id. at 250 (trial counsel characterizing the video as a “music video”); see also id. at 254 (Officer Redinger disagreeing with trial counsel, testifying that the video is “not a music video”).] Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/25, at 3 (footnotes, emphasis, and bracketed citations added). The trial court continued: Approximately ten days later, on February 20, 2023, Officer Redinger of the Northwest Regional Police identified Ms. South’s stolen car while on patrol in Mount Joy Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 140 [(Officer Redinger testifying that the license plate reader equipped on his patrol vehicle alerted him that the car was reported stolen)]). When [Officer Redinger] attempted to pull the car over using lights and sirens, the vehicle fled. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 142-[]43). Several minutes later, law enforcement officers were eventually able to stop the fleeing vehicle using spike strips. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 144). Four male occupants, including Appellant, emerged and fled on foot in different directions[,] in pairs of two. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 150). Sergeant [Seth] Arnold [(Sergeant Arnold)] of the Northwest Regional Police chased two of the males, including Appellant, behind a nearby residence. (Id.).6 Sergeant Arnold ____________________________________________ 6 Sergeant Arnold testified that although he initially chased two of the vehicle occupants on foot, one of the men “split off to the left.” N.T., 5/16/25, at 163. Sergeant Arnold abandoned pursuit of this individual and continued pursuing Appellant, who “continued straight[.]” Id. at 164. Though Sergeant Arnold did not apprehend the individual who “split off to the left,” he testified that he did not observe this individual discard anything as he fled. Id. at 173 (Sergeant Arnold stating, “[f]rom the parts that I did see him go left, there (Footnote Continued Next Page) -4- J-S36007-26 was able to apprehend Appellant when [Appellant] tripped and fell near a trampoline in the backyard [of a residence]. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 163).7 When Sergeant Arnold retraced Appellant’s path of flight, he observed a bright blue light shining in the grass near the trampoline. (N.T., 5/15/25, p. 167). Closer inspection revealed the light to be emanating from a purple Glock handgun with a blue laser attachment. (Id.).8 Other officers responding to the scene recovered the firearm while Sergeant Arnold took Appellant into custody. (Id. at 234).9 Laboratory testing revealed Appellant’s DNA on the firearm[, as well as the DNA of at least three other, unidentified individuals]. (N.T., 5/16/25, p. 309).10 The other male whom ____________________________________________ was no throwing motion … at all.”). The pursuit was captured by Sergeant Arnold’s body-worn camera; the footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Id. at 163-64; Commonwealth Ex. 1. Moreover, Officer Redinger and assisting officers apprehended and placed into custody the two remaining occupants of the vehicle. Id. at 150. 7 Sergeant Arnold testified he pursued Appellant for approximately 50 yards before tackling him and taking him into custody. N.T., 5/15/25, at 167, 171. 8 The stipulated purple semiautomatic Glock “model 19[,] Gen5” handgun was admitted into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit 3 and published to the jury. N.T., 5/15/25, at 184, 189. Sergeant Arnold confirmed that Exhibit 3 “is [] the same gun that [he] found in the path of travel with” Appellant, “by the trampoline.” Id. at 181, 185, 186. Separately, Regarding his path of travel when he observed the distinctive blue laser, Sergeant Arnold testified that he and Appellant “walked back in the exact same path that we took originally where I chased [Appellant] at.” Id. at 167 (emphasis added). 9 For ease of reference, we sometimes hereinafter refer to the February 20, 2023, incident as “the incident.” 10 At trial, Jillian Scola (Ms. Scola), a stipulated expert in the field of forensic DNA science employed by the Pennsylvania State Police, testified that she performed a forensic analysis of the purple Glock firearm. Ms. Scola testified that a swab of the weapon revealed a “DNA profile [that] was consistent with a mixture of at least four unidentified contributors.” N.T., 5/16/25, at 307. (Footnote Continued Next Page) -5- J-S36007-26 Se[]rgeant Arnold had initially pursued was [later identified as T.M.,] a juvenile on probation at the time[.] [T.M.] was not apprehended until he was arrested on an outstanding warrant several weeks later. (N.T., 5/16/25, p. 285)[; see also id. at 345 (the trial noting that the basis for law enforcement’s linking T.M. to the incident came from an anonymous tip).] Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/25, at 3-4 (footnotes, emphasis, and three paragraph breaks added). By criminal information filed on March 24, 2023, Appellant was charged with the above-mentioned offenses, as well as with one count of receiving stolen property.11 Prior to trial, on May 12, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a notice, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) (Rule 404(b) Notice), of its intention to introduce the video into evidence at trial. See Rule 404(b) Notice, 5/12/25, ¶ 2 (stating the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence of the “video posted on YouTube by [Appellant depicting] him and two others handling a purple Glock firearm that is identical to the firearm recovered in this case, down to the blue laser.”). The Commonwealth asserted that the video is probative of the fact that [Appellant] had the power and intent to control the firearm in the early morning hours of February 20, 2023. The video clearly shows [Appellant] with the firearm in question, wearing the same clothing that he was apprehended in a week later. Id. ¶ 10. ____________________________________________ Ms. Scola compared these DNA results with a known sample of Appellant’s DNA, and her comparative analysis revealed that “[Appellant] can be included as a potential contributor to this mixture profile.” Id. at 309. 11 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). -6- J-S36007-26 The day after the Commonwealth filed its Rule 404(b) Notice, Appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the video. Appellant asserted the video constituted inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b)(1), as it was (1) “strictly irrelevant to any of the charges” against Appellant; (2) “not relevant to prove anything but pure propensity”; and (3) “unduly prejudicial, and would be a lurid distraction from the issues to be properly decided.” Motion in Limine, 5/13/25, at 1. Appellant further asserted that the video constituted protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: “[U]sing a purple gun as a prop in a music video, just as if [Appellant] had been singing about a gun, is not to be taken literally as an expression of autobiographical ownership; it is probative of nothing; it is theater.” Id. ¶ 10 (italics in original); see also id. ¶ 8 (“[A]s wordless artistic expression is protected by the First Amendment, holding any such prop as [Appellant] appears to hold in the video would be protected expression as well.”). The trial court deferred ruling on the motion in limine until the time of trial. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on May 14-16, 2025.12 Prior to the presentation of evidence, the trial court considered extensive argument from ____________________________________________ 12 For trial purposes, the charge of persons not to possess firearms was bifurcated from the remaining charges, since a conviction on this charge would require the jury to be informed of Appellant’s prior criminal history. -7- J-S36007-26 the parties regarding the admissibility of the video. See N.T., 5/14/26, at 7- 22. The trial court ruled that the video was admissible, reasoning as follows: As to the YouTube video, the court finds that [the video] is not being used as evidence of character or for any character purposes. Rather, the court finds that the fact that [Appellant] may have possessed a very distinctive firearm on a prior occasion to be highly probative of whether [Appellant] possessed such a weapon on a later occasion. Even if this were true [Rule] 404(b) evidence, the proffered evidence would meet the exceptions [to Rule 404(b)(1)] regarding the natural development of the facts of these allegations, as well as the identity of the possessor of the firearm. While perhaps not explicitly stated, the [trial] court finds that the Commonwealth’s [Rule 404(b)] Notice does adequately address and explain the purpose of the proffered evidence. Th[e] video will be admitted; however, the [audio portion of the video] will not be permitted to be played. Id. at 32-33 (some capitalization modified). The trial court further determined that the Commonwealth’s purpose [for seeking to introduce the video] is simply to show that there is a distinctive firearm that they’re alleging that [Appellant] had and tossed [when fleeing from law enforcement on February 20, 2023], and [Appellant is depicted] in th[e] video with the distinctive firearm. That is a very distinct purpose and [a] very different [situation] from [a situation wherein the Commonwealth intended] to try to use someone’s lyrics [in a rap music video] against them. Id. at 14; see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1160 (Pa. 2018) (the case referenced by the trial court, wherein our Supreme Court determined that a rap music video, uploaded to YouTube, that contained threatening lyrics did not constitute protected speech under the First-Amendment, as the song’s -8- J-S36007-26 lyrics fell within the “true-threat” exception to the First Amendment’s protection).13 ____________________________________________ 13 In Knox, following a routine traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Jamal Knox (Knox), law enforcement charged Knox with multiple drug and firearm offenses. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1148-49. While the charges were pending, Knox and an associate “wrote and recorded a rap song entitled, ‘F--k the Police’” that was ultimately uploaded to YouTube by a third party. Id. at 1149. “The song’s lyrics express[ed] hatred toward the Pittsburgh police” and “contain[ed] descriptions of killing police informants and police officers.” Id. at 1149; see also id. (observing that in the rap video, Knox and his associate “are looking into the camera and motioning as if firing weapons.”). Additionally, the song’s lyrics (1) identified by name the officers who effectuated Knox’s arrest, and (2) referenced an unrelated prior incident in which an individual murdered three Pittsburgh police officers. Id. In response to the rap video, the Commonwealth arrested Knox and charged him with terroristic threats and witness intimidation. Id. at 1150. The matter proceeded to a consolidated non-jury trial regarding both sets of charges. Id. “By the conclusion of the trial, it became clear that the rap song was the sole basis on which the Commonwealth sought convictions for witness intimidation and terroristic threats.” Id. at 1151. In his closing argument, Knox argued that the rap video constituted “protected speech, and hence, any conviction based on it would violate his First Amendment rights.” Id. The trial court rejected this argument and found Knox guilty of both witness intimidation and terroristic threats. Id. On appeal, our Supreme Court rejected Knox’s First-Amendment challenge, determining that the rap video was not protected by the First Amendment because the song’s lyrics were “both threatening and highly personalized to” the arresting police officers, and because certain “aspects of the song … detract[ed] from any claim that [the lyrics] were only meant to be understood as an artistic expression of frustration.” Id. at 1159. The Court determined that because the song’s lyrics specifically directed threats at the arresting officers, explicitly referenced the facts surrounding Knox’s traffic stop and arrest, and repeatedly implied that the “unconditional” threats should be taken literally (as opposed to being “mere satire or social commentary”), the rap video was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Id.; see also id. at 1160 (noting that the rap video was uploaded to YouTube, a publicly-accessible platform). -9- J-S36007-26 At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from several witnesses, including Ms. South, Officer Redinger, and Sergeant Arnold, who testified consistent with our above-mentioned factual recitation. Pertinent to this appeal, Appellant presented testimony from Makeda Flowers (Ms. Flowers), a Lancaster County Juvenile Probation (LCJP) Officer. Shortly prior to Ms. Flowers’s testimony, Appellant declared that he sought to introduce evidence, through Ms. Flowers, (1) that T.M. was on juvenile probation on February 20, 2025; (2) T.M.’s “DNA was collected” by LCJP, in connection with T.M.’s prior juvenile offenses (which are unrelated to the instant case); and (3) the substance and nature of T.M.’s prior juvenile adjudications. N.T., 5/16/26, at 345-49. When asked by the trial court to explain what relevance T.M.’s probationary status had to Appellant’s case, Appellant argued it was relevant to show “[t]hat [T.M.] was very easily found. [The defense’s] case is that [law enforcement] didn’t do an adequate investigation, that there was a possibility there was a fourth guy” involved in the incident. Id. at 345. The trial court permitted the defense to present Ms. Flowers’s testimony, with the following limitation: [Ms. Flowers] can testify that she supervised … [T.M.]. I am not going to permit [the defense] to get into the reason why [T.M. was] on probation. You are using that for character purposes and I find that is more prejudicial than probative. It’s more likely to confuse [the jury] than probative. - 10 - J-S36007-26 Id. at 350; see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), n.2, supra. Ms. Flowers then briefly testified that she had worked for LCJP for 10 years, supervised T.M. beginning in 2020, and that T.M. was under juvenile probationary supervision at the time of the incident. N.T., 5/16/26, at 350-51. The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty of one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license and evading arrest or detention on foot, and not guilty of receiving stolen property. Id. at 422. After the verdict regarding these charges was recorded, the bifurcated charge of persons not to possess firearms was heard by the same jury. The parties stipulated that Appellant had a prior juvenile adjudication for robbery, and a prior adult conviction for possession of a controlled substance.14 See id. at 424. The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty of persons not to possess firearms. Id. at 429; see also id. (in response to the trial court’s special inquiry, the jury foreperson stating, “[w]e do unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that … at the time of the commission of the current offense[, Appellant] was in physical possession or in control of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about his person or within his physical reach.”). The trial court deferred sentencing pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report. ____________________________________________ 14 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). - 11 - J-S36007-26 On August 22, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 9 months to 15 years of incarceration. Appellant did not file post- sentence motions. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents four issues for our consideration: I. Did the trial court err in admitting the YouTube video[,] as the video was an irrelevant [Pa.R.E.] 404(b) prior bad act used to illustrate [A]ppellant’s propensity to carry not just guns, but to carry this particular gun or a strikingly similar gun at some time in the past? II. Even if the trial court was correct in holding that the YouTube video was not [Pa.R.E.] 404(b) evidence, did the trial court err in permitting the jury to view the video[,] as it was unduly prejudicial given that the issue of identity of the possessor of the gun on the night of the [incident] was at issue in the trial, not whether [A]ppellant possessed it at some other time prior to the night in question? By holding that this undated video was admissible to show the identity of the gun possessor on the night in question[,] and the natural development of the facts, did the trial court err in its assessment of the prejudicial effect of the video given its limited probative value as to whether [A]ppellant possessed the firearm on the date in question? III. Did the trial court err in admitting the YouTube video, even without sound, given that [A]ppellant’s artistic expressions in the video evidenced a cavalier attitude toward guns which not only constituted [Pa.R.E.] 404(b) character evidence, but also was protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution? IV. Did the trial court err in precluding [A]ppellant from presenting a defense in the nature of an alternative suspect (juvenile T.M.) as the possessor of the firearm on the date in question[,] by precluding trial counsel from fully questioning the juvenile probation officer who supervised the alternative suspect (T.M.)[,] and who was aware of the charges for which - 12 - J-S36007-26 [T.M.] was adjudicated delinquent[,] and that [T.M.’s] DNA was on file, as it had been part of a dispositional order to place his DNA on file? Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (issues reordered for ease of disposition). Because each of Appellant’s issues challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we begin with our standard of review: “We review a challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Williamson, 330 A.3d 407, 414 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 398 (Pa. 2015) (stating that an “appellant sustains the ‘heavy burden’ to show that the trial court has abused its discretion.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, our standard and scope of review is narrow: The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous. Where the evidentiary question involves a discretionary ruling, our scope of review is plenary. Williamson, 330 A.3d at 414 (citation omitted). “Further, we will affirm a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if the result is correct on any ground, without regard to the grounds on which the trial court relied.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is well established that “[t]he threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether evidence is relevant.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 577 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001, - 13 - J-S36007-26 1023 (Pa. 2021) (“Evidence is to be liberally admitted at trial.”). Evidence is relevant if “it has the tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “In addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403; see also Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[A] trial court may exclude even relevant evidence if such evidence poses a danger of unfair prejudice that outweighs its probative value.”). “The overriding principle in determining if any evidence, including demonstrative, should be admitted involves a weighing of the probative value versus prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 357 A.3d 171, 196 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). “However, evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. Exclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial - 14 - J-S36007-26 that it would inflame the jury to make a decision upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.” Id. at 193 (emphasis in original; citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 501 (Pa. 1988) (“Not surprisingly, criminal defendants always wish to excise evidence of unpleasant and unpalatable circumstances surrounding a criminal offense from the Commonwealth’s presentation at trial. Of course, the courts must make sure that evidence of such circumstances have some relevance to the case and are not offered solely to inflame the jury or arouse prejudice against the defendant.”). A trial court “is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand.” Rivera, 357 A.3d at 193 (citation, ellipses, and brackets omitted). We begin by addressing Appellant’s first and second issues together, as they are closely related. In his first issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding the video, as it constituted improper propensity evidence under Rule 404(b)(1). See Appellant’s Brief at 40-44. Appellant asserts that because he was “legally barred from possessing a firearm by statute due to a prior adjudication …, [the] video was an uncharged prior bad act by definition,” i.e., since it undisputedly depicted Appellant holding a firearm. Id. at 42-43. Appellant contends that the video was of limited probative value under the circumstances: With at least four people in the vehicle [at the time of their flight from law enforcement on February 20, 2023,] and with at least - 15 - J-S36007-26 four people whose DNA contributed to the swab from the firearm, the fact that [A]ppellant possessed the firearm or a substantially similar firearm in a music video previously, as had other people in th[e] video, was of limited probative value to further the [Commonwealth’s] claim that [A]ppellant possessed the firearm on February [20], 2023. Id. at 43 (internal citation omitted). According to Appellant, “in the absence of clear bodycam video of which person discarded the firearm [during the incident], the presentation of the YouTube video was an attempt” by the Commonwealth “to claim that on February [20], 2023, [A]ppellant possessed this firearm to the exclusion of all others by using propensity evidence.” Id. at 43; see also id. (pointing out that Sergeant Arnold’s body-worn camera “did not show who threw the firearm.”). In his second issue, Appellant claims that even if the trial court was correct in ruling that the video was not Rule 404(b) character evidence, the court nevertheless erred in admitting the video, since it was unduly prejudicial to the defense and the prejudice outweighed any probative value the video may have had. See id. at 48-51. “[The video] was unduly prejudicial given that the issue of identity of the possessor of the gun on the night of [February 20, 2023,] was at issue in the trial, not whether [A]ppellant possessed it at some other time prior to the night in question.” Id. at 48 (underline omitted); see also id. at 50 (“[T]he Commonwealth proffered the undated video depicting [Appellant’s firearm] possession on a prior date as evidence that he possessed it on a later date, since there was no direct evidence that he possessed it on that later date.”). - 16 - J-S36007-26 The Commonwealth counters the trial court properly admitted the video, as it was relevant evidence, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the defense. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-12, 13-14. [T]he YouTube video of [Appellant] brandishing the very same firearm that was found in his path of travel eight days prior [to February 20, 2023], does not constitute character evidence. The thrust of the [video] evidence was not to show [Appellant’s] propensity to carry guns generally but [the video] was, in fact, substantive evidence that [Appellant] had the power and control over this gun specifically. Even if this did constitute evidence of a prior bad act, it fits squarely into [] exceptions [to R]ule [404(b)(1)], namely, to prove [the] identity of the possessor of the firearm [on February 20, 2023], and to res gestae, or the full story of the case. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original; some punctuation modified). The Commonwealth further asserts that the video was strong substantive evidence that [Appellant] had access to, and power and control over, the firearm in question. Even though the video itself was undated, it was posted eight days prior to the incident[.] [Appellant’s] appearance[, as depicted in the video,] was consistent with his appearance on the night of the incident and[,] in fact[,] he was wearing the same clothing as he was found [wearing] during the incident. If there was any prejudice [to the defense caused by Appellant’s] cavalier handling and display of [] firearms [in the video], it was lessened by the fact that the video was presented without sound and [any potential prejudice to the defense was] grossly outweighed by the [video’s] probative value. Id. at 13-14. Our Supreme Court recently explained the law surrounding Rule 404(b): Rooted in common law, Rule 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of a person’s other bad acts (including other crimes) for the purpose of demonstrating the person’s bad character — in other words, the Commonwealth cannot present evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts solely for the purpose of establishing - 17 - J-S36007-26 the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes (i.e., because he did it once, he probably did it again). See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, subsection (b)(2) clarifies that other bad acts evidence may be admissible if it is offered for another (legitimate) purpose. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b)(2) includes a non-exclusive list of other purposes, permitting other bad acts evidence when it tends to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. In a criminal case, regardless of the proffered exception, other bad acts evidence is admissible “only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Walker, 350 A.3d 54, 61-62 (Pa. 2026) (footnotes omitted). Our Supreme Court has further instructed that [e]vidence of separate or unrelated “crimes, wrongs, or acts[]” … has long been deemed inadmissible as character evidence against a criminal defendant in this Commonwealth as a matter not of relevance, but of policy, i.e., because of a fear that such evidence is so powerful that the jury might misuse the evidence and convict based solely upon criminal propensity. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007); see also Yale, 249 A.3d at 1014-15 (“At the heart of the … prohibition on propensity evidence is the threat of prejudice to a defendant caused by replacing the presumption of innocence with a presumption of guilt based on prior conduct.” (citation and footnote omitted)). “Additionally, when weighing the potential for prejudice, a trial court may consider how a cautionary jury instruction might ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence.” Dillon, 925 A.2d at 141 (citing Pa.R.E. 403, Comment). - 18 - J-S36007-26 In addition to the grounds enumerated in Rule 404(b)(2) allowing for the possible admission of prior bad acts evidence, our Supreme Court has created another special circumstance, known as the res gestae exception, under which prior bad acts evidence is admissible if the evidence is “part of the history of [the] case and formed part of [the] natural development of facts[.]” Commonwealth v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1178 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). “The res gestae exception permits the admission of evidence of other crimes or bad acts to tell the complete story.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 665 (Pa. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “With regard to the admission of weapons evidence, such evidence is clearly admissible where it can be shown that the evidence was used in the crime charged.” Owens, 929 A.2d at 1191 (citation omitted). However, “where a weapon can[]not be specifically linked to a crime,” “[t]he general rule is that … such weapon is not admissible as evidence.” Robinson, 721 A.2d at 351 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lee, 662 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 1995)). An exception to this general rule is the “similar-weapon exception,” which our Supreme Court has explained as follows: A weapon not “specifically linked” to the crime is generally inadmissible; however, the fact [that the] accused had a weapon or implement suitable to the commission of the crime charged … is always a proper ingredient of the case for the prosecution. Any uncertainty that the weapon is the actual weapon used in the crime goes to the weight of such evidence. The only burden on the prosecution is to lay a foundation that would justify an - 19 - J-S36007-26 inference by the finder of fact of the likelihood that the weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Christine, 125 A.3d at 400 (emphasis added; internal citations and some quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 535 (Pa. 2022) (“Courts routinely admit evidence that on another occasion, the defendant possessed the weapon used to commit the crime. …. This ‘other act evidence’—the defendant’s prior possession of a weapon—may be relevant to demonstrate the defendant’s access to the weapon and opportunity to commit the crime that is charged.”). However, the Christine Court further held that mere “similarity” of weapons is insufficient to satisfy the similar weapons exception. Christine, 125 A.3d at 401. Cf. Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 316 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (“Mere similarities between a defendant’s prior bad acts and the crimes for which he is being tried will not qualify for a Rule 404(b)(2) exception. Rather, to qualify for an exception to Rule 404(b)(1)’s general prohibition,