Com. v. Hoberek, C.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket241 WDA 2025
JudgeNichols
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-S36023-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CLARENCE HOBEREK :
:
Appellant : No. 241 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-CR-0002222-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CLARENCE HOBEREK :
:
Appellant : No. 242 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-CR-0000891-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: November 19, 2026
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant Clarence Hoberek appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgments
of sentence1 imposed following his conviction, on two separate dockets,2 of
one count each of theft by unlawful taking,3 receiving stolen property,
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, driving under the influence—refusal, and
two counts of driving while operating privileges suspended or revoked (third
or subsequent violation). Appellant’s counsel, Adam Yarussi, Esq. (Counsel),
has also filed an application to withdraw from representation on appeal and
an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After
careful review, we affirm the judgments of sentence and grant Counsel’s
application to withdraw.
The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
Around March of 2021, Bill Verelst invited Appellant, who had
recently fallen on[] hard times, to stay with him and his mother
at their residence . . . in Burgettstown. While Appellant was
staying at Bill Verelst’s residence, he was not given consent, either
by Bill Verelst or his fiancé[e], Michele Fisher-Rice, to use any of
the vehicles located at the residence, as Bill Verelst was aware
that Appellant did not possess a driver’s license. In October of
2021, Bill Verelst and [] Fisher-Rice traveled to Colorado, while
____________________________________________
1On April 1, 2025, our Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals. See
Pa.R.A.P. 513.
2 See CR-2222-2021 and CR-891-2022. The cases were consolidated for trial.
On CR-891-2022, Appellant was acquitted of simple assault, but was found
guilty, following a bench trial, of careless driving. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3925(a), 3928(a), 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1), and
1543(b)(1)(iii), respectively.
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Bill Verelst’s mother, Patsy Verelst, was away in Virginia, leaving
Appellant alone at the residence. Prior to Bill Verelst leaving for
Colorado, Appellant asked him if he would be able to use the
vehicle while he was gone, to which Bill Verelst again informed
Appellant that he was not able to drive the vehicle under any
circumstances.
While in Colorado, Bill Verelst became sick and had to return
home. After returning home, Bill Verelst and [] Fisher-Rice
encountered Appellant asleep on the couch. Upon waking up,
Appellant stated[,] “I didn’t have anything to do with anything. I
didn’t do anything[,]” and[,] “I didn’t do it. I wasn’t here all
week.” Unaware of what Appellant was talking about, Bill Verelst
and [] Fisher-Rice proceeded to scour the house, ultimately
discovering that the downstairs of the residence was “completely
destroyed” and “disheveled.” After returning upstairs, Bill Verelst
observed that Appellant was no longer in the residence and began
to search for him. Unable to find Appellant, Bill Verelst proceeded
to call the police and indicated to them that someone had broken
into his residence and rifled through his belongings. At this
juncture, all three vehicles were still present at Bill Verelst’s
residence.
After contacting the police, Bill Verelst and [] Fisher-Rice left to
attempt to return the[ir] rental car. Bill Verelst drove the rental
car, while [] Fisher-Rice accompanied him in the Jeep Compass,
leaving [a] Dodge Dart as the sole vehicle at the residence. Upon
returning home from attempting to return the rental vehicle, Bill
Verelst and [] Fisher-Rice noticed that the Dodge Dart was missing
and proceeded to call the police to report that the Dodge Dart had
been stolen.
At this point, [] Fisher-Rice left to go to work at the Dollar General
store near the residence. While driving to the Dollar General, []
Fisher-Rice encountered the missing Dodge Dart, which she
observed was being driven by Appellant. After seeing Appellant
driving the Dodge Dart, [] Fisher-Rice called the police and
informed them that she had just [seen] the missing vehicle. While
Bill Verelst was on the phone with the police, Appellant returned
to the residence, driving the Dodge Dart that had been missing.
Upon seeing Bill Verelst exit the residence, Appellant re-entered
the Dodge Dart and drove away. After Appellant drove away in
the Dodge Dart, that was the last time that Bill Verelst saw him
that day.
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Later that day, at 5:21 p.m., Trooper Fernando Abbondanza of the
Pennsylvania State Police visited Bill Verelst at his residence after
being dispatched in response to the phone calls that Bill Verelst
had made to police earlier in the day. Upon arriving at Bill
Verelst’s residence, Trooper Abbondanza observed that the house
was “in a bit of disarray.” Trooper Abbondanza then interviewed
Bill Verelst, through which Trooper Abbondanza learned that the
Dodge Dart was missing from the residence. Trooper Abbondanza
further learned, through his investigation, that Appellant was
observed driving the missing Dodge Dart on Paris Colliers Road.
Based upon his investigation, Trooper Abbondanza determined
that Appellant was a suspect as it pertained to the missing Dodge
Dart. As part of his further investigation into the matter, Trooper
Abbondanza queried the information for the Dodge Dart and
learned that the vehicle was registered to Patsy Verelst. Trooper
Abbondanza also obtained Appellant’s demographic information
and queried Appellant’s driver's license, through which Trooper
Abbondanza learned that Appellant’s license was DUI suspended.
Further utilizing Appellant’s information, Trooper Abbondanza was
able to provide a photograph of Appellant to Bill Verelst, who
identified Appellant [as] the suspect. After concluding his
investigation at the scene, Trooper Abbondanza entered the
Dodge Dart as a stolen vehicle into the National Criminal
Information Center.
Following his conversation with Trooper Abbondanza, Bill Verelst
contacted his neighbor, Dylan Wolanski, to inform him that
Appellant had stolen the Dodge Dart. The next day, [] Wolanski
learned that Appellant was seen driving the Dodge Dart near the
start of Paris Colliers Road, specifically, parked in a parking lot of
a nearby store. [] Wolanski then proceeded to the location where
Appellant was parked and[,] upon arriving at the location,
observed Appellant standing next to the Dodge Dart. Eventually,
Appellant entered the Dodge Dart and drove down Paris Colliers
Road. After Appellant began driving the Dodge Dart, [] Wolanski
called Bill Verelst to inform him of what was transpiring and
proceeded to follow Appellant down Paris Colliers Road. In
addition to calling Bill Verelst, [] Wolanski also called the police
and informed them that he was following Appellant.
After Appellant passed the Verelst residence, he became aware
that [] Wolanski was following him, at which point, Appellant
exited the Dodge Dart and yelled “I don't know who you are.
What's your problem? Why are you following me?” After []
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Wolanski yelled at Appellant in response, Appellant then
proceeded to re-enter the Dodge Dart and turned left onto
Bartleyville Road.
While on Bartleyville Road, Appellant again stopped the Dodge
Dart and exited the vehicle, at which point he approached []
Wolanski's vehicle and began banging on its windows, while also
attempting to open the door to the vehicle. Following Appellant’s
unfruitful attempt at opening the door to [] Wolanski's vehicle,
Appellant again re-entered the Dodge Dart and turned right onto
Hanlon Station [Road]. At the end of Hanlon Station [Road],
Appellant stopped the Dodge Dart for a third time, exited the
vehicle equipped with a walking cane, walked towards []
Wolanski’s vehicle, and pulled the cane into the air as if he were
going to smash the windows of [] Wolanski’s vehicle. At this point,
[] Wolanski cracked his window and pulled out his firearm,
resulting in Appellant running back to the Dodge Dart.
After re-entering the Dodge Dart once again, Appellant turned
right onto Eldersville Road. Eventually, Appellant turned onto a
secondary road, stopped and exited the Dodge Dart, and stated[,]
“You can have the car. Keep the car. I'm done. I give up” before
proceeding to walk down the road. [] Wolanski then proceeded to
go over to the Dodge Dart to see if the keys were in the ignition.
After failing to observe any keys, [] Wolanski yelled out to
Appellant to return the keys, at which point, Appellant ran into the
woods. [] Wolanski then re-entered his vehicle and began driving
down the road, ultimately spotting Appellant walking in the middle
of the road. As [] Wolanski followed, Appellant walked up a
nearby driveway. Spotting a lady standing on the front porch of
the house, [] Wolanski shouted at her to call the police, as he did
not have service at the time.
Throughout the incident, Appellant was continuously speeding,
reaching speeds of 65 miles per hour on a road with a speed limit
of 25 miles per hour[,] and [was] [driving] erratically, including
crossing the center line of the road and driving off of the road “20
or 25 times.” In addition to Appellant’s dangerous driving,
Appellant also smelled of alcohol and had watery eyes during his
interactions with [] Wolanski. Further, upon Appellant abandoning
the Dodge Dart, the interior of the vehicle was littered with cans
of beer and smelled of alcohol.
Shortly after Appellant abandoned the Dodge Dart, Trooper Jared
King of the Pennsylvania State Police arrived on the scene, having
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been dispatched in response to the calls made by Bill Verelst and
[] Wolanski regarding the stolen Dodge Dart. Upon arriving at the
scene, Trooper King was able to observe the Dodge Dart, as well
as meet with [] Wolanski. Through his discussion with []
Wolanski, Trooper King was informed that Appellant was the
driver of the Dodge Dart and was also provided with a physical
description of Appellant. [] Wolanski further informed Trooper
King about Appellant’s whereabouts at the time, stating that
Appellant had fled into the woods.
Following his discussion with [] Wolanski, Trooper King overheard
a dispatch from Washington County 911 regarding an individual
matching Appellant’s description [who] was seen walking in a field
near 460 Cedar Grove Road. Upon proceeding to the location,
Trooper King observed an individual matching Appellant’s
description walking in the field, at which point Trooper King
confronted the individual and placed him into handcuffs. After
placing the individual into handcuffs, Trooper King searched the
individual and discovered an identification card that confirmed the
identity of the individual as Appellant. During the aforementioned
interaction with Appellant, Trooper King smelled a strong odor of
alcohol emanating from Appellant. In addition to the odor of
alcohol, Trooper King further observed that Appellant appeared
disheveled, had watery eyes, and was verbally combative. Based
upon his observations of Appellant, along with his training and
experience, Trooper King believed that Appellant may have been
under the influence of alcohol and[,] therefore, was incapable of
safely operating a motor vehicle. Trooper King then proceeded to
place Appellant under arrest.
After Appellant was placed under arrest, he was subsequently
transported to the Pennsylvania State Police barracks located in
Moon Township. Once at the barracks, Trooper King requested
Appellant to submit to chemical testing of his breath and twice
read him Form DL-26. Following the first recitation of Form DL-
26, Appellant requested to speak with an attorney.[4] Trooper
____________________________________________
4 The implied consent warnings, as outlined in the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) DL-26 form, are as follows:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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King then read Appellant Form DL-26 a second time, at which
point Appellant became belligerent to a point that Trooper King
deemed his conduct to be a refusal to submit to the chemical
testing. At no point did Appellant sign Form DL-26.
As part of the investigation, Trooper Thomas Schuster of the
Pennsylvania State Police conducted an interview of Appellant that
same day. Prior to conducting the interview, Trooper Schuster
read Appellant his Miranda[5] warnings. Following the recitation
of his rights under Miranda, Appellant signed the Miranda Rights
Warning and Waiver form, indicating that he was willing to waive
his Miranda rights and proceed with the interview.
During the interview with Trooper Schuster, Appellant admitted to
driving the Dodge Dart and stated that he had been drinking
____________________________________________
1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol
or a controlled substance in violation of [s]ection 3802 of the
Vehicle Code.
2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood.
3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating
privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you
previously refused a chemical test or were previously convicted of
driving under the influence, your operating privilege will be
suspended for up to 18 months. If your operating privilege is
suspended for refusing chemical testing, you will have to pay a
restoration fee of up to $2,000[.00] in order to have your
operating privilege restored.
4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone
else before deciding whether to submit to testing. If you
request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after
being provided these warnings or you remain silent when
asked to submit to a blood test, you will have refused the
test.
Pennsylvania DOT Form DL-26B (6-22), “Chemical Test Warnings and Report
of Refusal to Submit to a Blood Test as Authorized by Section 1547 of the
Vehicle Code in Violation [of] Section 3802” (emphasis added).
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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alcohol during the incident. Throughout the interview with
Appellant, Trooper Schuster smelled an odor of alcohol emanating
from Appellant, which led Trooper Schuster to believe that
Appellant was under the influence of alcohol.
Trial Ct. Op., 11/28/23, at 6-12 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Following a jury trial, Appellant was charged and found guilty of the
above-enumerated offenses. On January 30, 2023, Appellant was sentenced6
on both dockets to an aggregate term of five to ten years’ imprisonment,
followed by twelve months of re-entry supervision. On February 8, 2023,
Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions challenging the sufficiency and
weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motions, by order, on
September 12, 2023.7 On October 2, 2023, Appellant filed a timely direct
appeal. On September 3, 2024, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence, concluding that he had waived his claims on appeal by failing to
specify what conviction(s) or elements thereof that he was challenging. See
Commonwealth v. Hoberek, 1187 WDA 2023, 2024 WL 4024559 (Pa.
____________________________________________
6 The trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report (PSI)
prior to sentencing that was admitted as Commonwealth Exhibit 1. See N.T.
Sentencing Hr’g, 1/30/23, at 5. At sentencing, the Commonwealth noted that
Appellant had previously committed the crime of vehicular homicide while
driving under the influence and since that offense he had committed eleven
DUIs. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 1/30/23, at 15.
7 Although Appellant’s post-sentence motions were technically denied by
operation of law in June 2023, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a), because the
trial court never entered an order deeming the motions denied on that date,
this Court found that, due to a court breakdown, Appellant’s appeal was timely
filed. See Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 138 (Pa. Super.
1995) (notice of appeal timely when filed within 30 days of the court’s
untimely order denying post-sentence motion).
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Super. filed Sept. 3, 2024). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of
appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
On December 4, 2024, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)8 claiming counsel was per se ineffective for
waiving all of his issues on direct appeal. On February 13, 2025, the PCRA
court granted Appellant’s petition and reinstated his direct appeal rights nunc
pro tunc. Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc notice of direct appeal and, in lieu
of filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal, Counsel subsequently filed a notice of intention to file an
Anders/Santiago brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). On April 11, 2025,
Counsel sent Appellant a copy of his Anders/Santiago brief,9 along with his
application to withdraw and a letter explaining Appellant’s right to proceed pro
se or with newly retained counsel, and to raise any additional issues he
believes might have merit. On June 23, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se
response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw, raising the following claims: (1)
the officer on the scene was not one of the officers that testified in court; (2)
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8 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
9 On April 15, 2025, Counsel filed his Anders/Santiago brief with this Court.
However, because Counsel failed to file a contemporaneous petition to
withdraw with an attached copy of the notice-of-rights letter sent to Appellant,
this Court ordered Counsel to complete those tasks within seven days. See
Order, 5/16/25. On May 20, 2025, Counsel complied with this Court’s order,
filing a motion for leave to withdraw with this Court which certified he had
sent the motion to Appellant and attached a copy of Counsel’s April 11, 2025
notice-of-rights letter he sent to Appellant.
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the title of the car he allegedly operated without permission was in his name;
and (3) with regard to his DUI conviction, he “gave a breathalyzer of 0.00” at
the scene.10 Appellant’s Pro Se Response to Anders/Santiago Brief,
6/23/25.
Prior to addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether Counsel has complied with the dictates of Anders and its progeny in
his request to withdraw from representation. See Commonwealth v.
Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (“this Court may
not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining
counsel’s request to withdraw”). In order to withdraw pursuant to
Anders/Santiago counsel must: (1) petition the Court for leave to withdraw,
stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record Counsel
has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to
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10 We have paraphrased Appellant’s issues for clarity. Appellant provides no
legal argument or analysis of the claims he includes in his response.
Accordingly, we find those issues waived. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch,
934 A.2d 81, 93-94 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted) (holding undeveloped
claims will not be considered on appeal). Even if not waived, we note that
Troopers Abbondanza, King, and Schuster all testified at Appellant’s trial, see
N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 28-47, 137-175, that the certificate of title for the
Dodge Dart, which was entered as Commonwealth Exhibit 2 at trial, lists Patsy
Ann Verelst as the owner of the vehicle, see id. at 50-51, and that Trooper
King testified that Appellant did not submit to a chemical breath test, id. at
151, and his conduct was interpreted as a refusal. Id.
Additionally, Appellant’s response to counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief also
states “the man following me, I only know hi[m] a[s] Dillon[,] had been
sho[o]ting at me with a [.]44 mag. That’s why 6 cops surrounded us.” See
Pro Se Response to Anders/Santiago Brief, 6/23/25. We can identify no
claim in this statement, let alone a non-frivolous claim, for purposes of appeal.
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anything that might arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble
a “no merit” letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief
to defendant and advise him or her of the right to retain new counsel, proceed
pro se, or raise any additional points that he or she deems worthy of the
court’s attention. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa.
Super. 2005). Further, in Santiago, our Supreme Court held that in order to
withdraw under Anders, counsel must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Instantly, Counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief in which he
states that he has examined the record, including the trial transcript,
Appellant’s post-sentence motion and related hearing, his sentencing order,
his first notice of appeal and Rule 1925(b) statement, his brief in his first
appeal, and his PCRA petition. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 8. Following
his review, Counsel concluded that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Id. at 14-
17. Counsel’s brief identifies two issues that would arguably support an appeal
and, pursuant to Santiago, explains why he believes the claims to be
frivolous. See id. at 10-14. Finally, Counsel indicates that he supplied
Appellant with a copy of the brief, along with his application to withdraw and
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a letter explaining Appellant’s right to proceed pro se or with newly retained
counsel, and to raise any additional issues he believes might have merit. See
id. at 17-18. Thus, Counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements for
withdrawal. See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290; see also Millisock, 873 A.2d
at 751; Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, this Court must now conduct
its own review of the proceedings and render an independent judgment as to
whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v.
Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Counsel finds that the “potential issues” he identifies “that may support
[an] appeal” were not preserved by trial counsel. See Anders/Santiago Brief
at 13; see also Commonwealth’s Brief at 19-21, 23-24, 26, 29. Thus, Counsel
states that these issues “should [be] raised in a PCRA [petition] against trial
counsel” unless they meet the Bomar11 exception. See Anders/Santiago
Brief, at 14-15. We agree with Counsel that any potential claims of
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11 In Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), our Supreme
Court created a limited exception to the general rule that ineffectiveness of
counsel claims should be deferred to collateral review. See Bomar, 826 A.2d
at 854. In Bomar, the Court found that ineffectiveness claims could be
brought on direct appeal where the claims had been properly raised and
litigated in the trial court, the trial court had held hearing on the claims, the
record on the claims had been developed in the trial court, and the trial court
addressed the merits of the claims in its opinion. See id. However,
subsequently in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our
Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that trial counsel ineffectiveness
claims should be deferred to collateral review except under the very limited
circumstance where record-based claims of ineffectiveness with apparent
merit are accompanied by a PCRA waiver. See Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576.
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ineffectiveness of counsel should be deferred to a timely filed PCRA petition
and the limited exception for consideration on direct appeal of a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel as recognized in Bomar does not apply here. See
Bomar, 826 A.2d at 854. Moreover, having conducted our own independent
review of the record, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s appeal is wholly
frivolous and, therefore, that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.12 See
Wright, 846 A.2d at 736.
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12 On September 11, 2026, Appellant filed a document with this Court, that
was docketed as a Jette letter. In Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032
(Pa. 2011), our Supreme Court rejected and disapproved of the “Battle
procedure,” wherein an inmate was entitled to remand for the appointment of
new counsel when the inmate alleged ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel for not
pursuing other issues on appeal. In Appellant’s letter, he asks why he “is still
waiting” on this appeal and whether he has a right to a bond “when [he] got
granted [his] appeal.” See Jette Letter, 9/11/26. Because Appellant’s right
to proceed pro se commenced upon the filing of counsel’s petition to withdraw,
see Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511-12 (Pa. Super. 2016),
the letter is not a Jette letter but rather is properly classified as a pro se
response to counsel’s Anders brief. In any event, we recognize the delay in
the matter was due, in large part, to the stay that was entered in January
2026. With regard to a bond pending appeal, Pa.R.Crim.P. 534 provides that
“[u]nless bail is revoked, a bail bond shall be valid until the full and final
disposition of the case, including all avenues of direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 534. Moreover, a request for bail
pending appeal must be made in the first instance to the trial court. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1762(a). In any event, as the trial court correctly informed
Appellant at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, “[i]f your sentence is
less than two years, you have the same right to bail as before a verdict of
guilt,” but, “[i]f your sentence is two years or longer, the filing of a post-
sentence motion or an appeal will not delay the start of your sentence.”
N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 1/30/23, at 30 (emphasis added).
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With regard to the first issue identified by Counsel—that the
Commonwealth elicited prejudicial testimony that Appellant had been
arrested—we note that under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime,
wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible, however, when
relevant for another purpose, including motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Our Supreme Court has also recognized the
res gestae exception, permitting the admission of evidence of other crimes or
bad acts to tell “the complete story.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 896 A.2d
523, 539 (Pa. 2006). Such evidence may be admitted “only if the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E.
404(b)(2).
Even if this claim were not waived due to trial counsel’s failure to object,
we would find it meritless. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not
raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal”). The record reflects that Appellant’s trial counsel, himself, brought
the arrest to light in his opening statement and closing argument. See N.T.
Trial, 10/18/22, at 26; N.T. Trial, 10/19/22, at 28. Additionally, Appellant’s
arrest was relevant under the res gestae exception of prior bad acts for the
purpose of explaining the history and course of events that occurred on
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October 22 and 23, 2021. See Williams, 896 A.2d at 539. Finally, the trial
court instructed the jury multiple times that Appellant’s arrest was not
evidence of guilt. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 11; N.T. Trial, 10/19/22, at
40. Based on the entire record, and in light of the trial court’s instructions,
we do not find that Appellant suffered undue prejudice with the mention of his
arrest. See Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657 (Pa. 2014) (when
examining potential for undue prejudice, court’s cautionary instruction may
ameliorate prejudicial effect of proffered evidence under Rule 404(b)).
With regard to Counsel’s next identified claim in his Anders/Santiago
brief—that the trial court’s jury sequestration order was violated—we note that
“[a]t a party’s request[,] the court may order witnesses sequestered so that
they cannot learn of other witnesses’ testimony.” Pa.R.E. 615. It is well-
established that
The selection of a remedy for the violation of a sequestration order
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. In exercising its
discretion, the trial court should consider the seriousness of the
violation, its impact on the testimony of the witness, and its
probable impact on the outcome of the trial. We will [] disturb the
trial court’s exercise of its discretion only if there is no reasonable
ground for the action taken.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 346 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. 1975) (citations omitted).
The court should also consider whether the party calling the witness procured
his or her disobedience. Commonwealth v. Rose, 172 A.3d 1121, 1127 (Pa.
Super. 2017). Further, a mistrial is only granted when the violation “is of such
a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial
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by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Instantly, Counsel alleges that trial counsel brought out on cross-
examination of Commonwealth witness Bill Verelst, Jr. (Bill), that
Commonwealth witness Patsy Verelst, Bill’s mother, violated the trial court’s
sequestration order13 during its case-in-chief when she spoke with Bill after
she testified at trial. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 77-78. However, the record
reflects that trial counsel did not make a specific objection or formally request
a mistrial or exclusion of the evidence and, accordingly, the claim is waived
on direct appeal. However, even if not waived, we would find no merit to the
claim.
When trial counsel asked Bill whether he had a conversation with his
mother after she testified, he acknowledged he did speak with her and that
she told him “that no one was allowed to drive [the] car but her.” Id. at 78.
On redirect-examination, Bill testified that he and his mother had never
discussed prior to trial what to testify to, that his mother never told him what
to say on the stand after she testified, and that he just testified to the “truth”—
that he, his fiancée, and his mother were the only individuals permitted to use
the car. Id. at 82-83.
Under these facts, we find that there is no merit to this sequestration
claim where any alleged breach by the Commonwealth witnesses did not
____________________________________________
13 During trial, trial counsel sought and was granted sequestration of the
witnesses. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 46.
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unfairly prejudice the outcome of trial. See Smith, 346 A.2d at 760. Bill
testified that his mother never told him what to testify to, that he had never
discussed what their testimony would be ahead of time, and that the truth
was that no one but he, his mother, and his fiancée were permitted to drive
the car. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 82-83. Moreover, Commonwealth
witnesses Michele Fisher-Rice, Bill’s fiancée, testified similarly that she never
gave Appellant permission to drive the Dodge and that he would never have
been permitted to drive any car because he was unlicensed. Id. at 90-91.
Finally, there was no testimony that the Commonwealth procured Bill’s or
Patsy’s disobedience in communicating with each other despite the witness
sequestration order. See Rose, 172 A.3d at 1127. Accordingly, this claim
fails.14
Stay lifted.15 Judgments of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw
granted. Jurisdiction relinquished.
____________________________________________
14 We herein deny Appellant’s application for relief.
15 On January 23, 2026, this Court stayed consideration of this appeal pending
the determination of this Court’s en banc decision, Commonwealth v.
Ramsey, 2026 EDA 2024. See Order, 1/23/26 at 1. On July 31, 2026, an
en banc panel of this Court decided Ramsey, wherein we quashed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction where the defendant’s PCRA petition was filed before
his judgment of sentence became final. See Commonwealth v. Ramsey,--
-A.3d---, 2026 WL 2209742 at *9 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2026) (en banc).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of filing
a PCRA petition, when the time expired for him to file a petition for allowance
of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on October 4, 2024. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1113; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Because Appellant filed his PCRA
petition on December 4, 2024, two months after his judgment of sentence
became final, Ramsey is not implicated.
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DATE: 11/19/2026
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