Com. v. McCoy, B.

J-S12037-26 2026 PA Super 212 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRANDON BER COREY-MCCOY : : Appellant : No. 1503 EDA 2025 : Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 30, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004821-2023 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2026 Appellant, Brandon Ber Corey-McCoy, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, assault of a law enforcement officer by discharge of a firearm, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, and firearms not to be carried without a license.1 Appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on the scope of cross-examination of a Commonwealth witness, the sufficiency of evidence for most of his convictions, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Upon careful review, we affirm. ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a)/2502(a), 2702.1(a), 2702(a)(1), 901(a)/3502(a)(1)(ii), and 6106(a)(1), respectively. J-S12037-26 On September 22, 2023, Appellant attempted to break into an occupied residence. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 15-16, 23. When responding police officers arrived, Appellant fired multiple shots at an officer, who injured himself while falling to avoid the gunshots, before fleeing the scene. See id. at 48-51. Appellant was apprehended shortly thereafter. See id. at 149-51. That same day, Appellant was charged with eleven counts of violating the Crimes Code, and all charges were held for trial following a preliminary hearing. See Bills of Information, 9/22/23; N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 10/11/23, at 71-72. On February 3, 2025, the Commonwealth proceeded on six counts, including the five above-reference offenses and resisting arrest, 2 in a four-day jury trial. See N.T. Trial, 2/3/25, at 8-11. The evidence at trial established that, on September 22, 2023, Alex Rogan was home with his grandmother at 118 Terrace Avenue (“Terrace Avenue”) in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 6-7.3 At approximately 1:00 a.m., Rogan received a notification from his Blink camera system4 which showed an individual trying to get into the back of his home. ____________________________________________ 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. 3 The residence on Terrace Avenue is a two-story, four-bedroom house, and when facing the property from the street, has a side-yard on the left, a driveway on the right leading to a detached garage, and a backyard with a public park behind it. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 7. On September 22, 2023, there were two vehicles parked in tandem in the driveway. See id. at 13. 4 The Blink camera system senses motion and sends the user a notification to their cellphone. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 14. The notification shows a video and then the user can open the Blink application (“Blink App”), to watch a live feed. See id. -2- J-S12037-26 See id. at 14-15. Rogan opened his Blink application on his cellular phone and observed an individual, wearing a hoodie and jeans, banging on the back door of the home, and trying to get in. See id. at 15. Then, Rogan grabbed his rifle and called 911 dispatch. See id. at 16. Rogan testified that he continued to observe the individual via the Blink camera system and spoke to a 911 dispatcher. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 16- 17; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-14 (911 Call). Shortly after Rogan called 911, police arrived at his home in the front driveway. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 18. Rogan noted that the Blink camera showed that the individual switched from trying to get into Rogan’s house to hiding from the police. See id. at 17- 19.5 The 911 dispatcher instructed Rogan to unarm himself and get his grandmother, then proceed to the front door of his house with his hands up. See id. at 25. Ultimately, Rogan and his grandmother were removed from the house. See id. at 26. Bill Green, a police detective from the Upper Darby Township Police Department, testified about the incident. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 37. At the time, Green was an officer in a marked patrol unit, and he was on duty when he responded to the 911 dispatch for Terrace Avenue. See id. He testified that the 911 call “originally went out as a prowler in a backyard lurking ____________________________________________ 5 At trial, the Commonwealth entered into evidence two clips of the Blink camera system videos and played them for the jury. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 26; Commonwealth Trial Exhibits C-15 (Blink Camera Footage 1) and C-16 (Blink Camera Footage 2). -3- J-S12037-26 around.” Id. at 39. However, as Officer Green drove closer to the address, the 911 call escalated and he heard a firearm was involved. See id. at 39-40. Officer Green detailed that he was in full patrol uniform with police patches on both shoulders. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 42. He had a police duty belt on with his firearm, two pairs of handcuffs, and a radio on his shoulder, along with a baton and yellow taser on the front of his vest. See id.; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-22 (Green Patrol Uniform Photograph). When he pulled in front of the residence, Officer Green exited his police vehicle and used a flashlight mounted on his firearm to search for the individual. See id. at 45-46. Officer Green then cleared both vehicles in the driveway and moved to the backyard without any cover due to the escalating call. See id. at 48. The 911 dispatch informed Officer Green that the individual was breaking a window on the side of the house. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 48. At trial, Officer Green identified the individual as Appellant. See id. at 49-51 (stating Appellant was about 5’11’’ and wearing a dark hooded jacket, a blue surgical mask, and a t-shirt with a light abstract logo). As Officer Green moved toward the rear of the residence, without cover, Appellant leaned around the corner and immediately shot at him. See id. at 49. Officer Green noted that Appellant had a tactical advantage because he remained concealed behind the corner of the residence and waited until Officer Green was out in the open before firing. See id. According to Officer Green, Appellant fired at least three to four gunshots at him. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 50. Although Officer Green was -4- J-S12037-26 able to reach cover alongside the residence, he fell and injured himself in the process. See id. He explained that he was bleeding and having difficulty walking, so he decided to disengage from the gunfight and retreat to the street. See id. Officer Green confirmed that he was not hit by the gunshots, but sustained injuries to his knee, back, and hand while fleeing. See id. at 51. As a result of his injuries, Officer Green was out of work for nearly a year and, at the time of trial, was still in “intense pain.” Id. at 52. Officer Green further testified that he was wearing a body-worn camera during the incident and the Commonwealth played the video for the jury. See id. at 56-62; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-32 (Officer Green Body-worn Camera Footage). Mark Dehoratious, a patrol sergeant of the Upper Darby Township Police Department, testified that he responded to the 911 dispatch on Terrace Avenue. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 73, 76. He confirmed that he was wearing his police uniform, a radio on his shoulder, and a standard duty belt with his firearm, handcuffs, and keys visible. See id. at 73, 77. When he arrived and exited his police vehicle, he heard several gunshots. See id. Briefly ducking, the sergeant drew his firearm and moved toward the driveway where he observed two officers, one being Officer Green. See id. at 77. Sergeant Dehoratious started covering the officers exiting the driveway with his firearm and, afterwards, the three men hid behind the rear of a parked car. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 77. Then, Sergeant Dehoratious spoke to Officer Green, “who had visible injuries to his hand and his knee,” and stated to the sergeant that “he was in a face-to-face shootout in the back of the house.” -5- J-S12037-26 Id. at 77-78. Sergeant Dehoratious immediately requested the assistance of a Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) helicopter as well as other police departments to search for the shooter. See id. at 78. As more officers responded to the scene, they created a perimeter across multiple streets to prevent anyone from entering or exiting. See id. at 79. Officer Andrew Jones, a patrol officer and member of the Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) team of Haverford Township, testified. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 102-03. He said he received a call and responded to Terrace Avenue to clear the back of the property. See id. at 104. Once the SWAT team began checking the backyard, Officer Jones testified that another officer found a handgun on the left side corner of the backyard. See id. at 105 (stating handgun was “near mulch” and “there were basement [] doors.”) The SWAT team reported their findings to their supervisors and stayed with the evidence while other officers continued searching. See id. at 105-06. Officer Jones also testified that he observed “numerous shell casings” and informed his patrol supervisors. Id. at 108. Corporal Ian Lloyd, a PSP helicopter pilot, testified that he arrived by helicopter, at approximately 2:48 a.m., to help locate the shooter. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 113-15.6 Corporal Lloyd used 911 to call on scene, locate the perimeter, and identify the residence on Terrace Avenue. See id. at 116. ____________________________________________ 6 Corporal Llyod was the tactical flight officer for the incident and assisted the pilot-in command. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 115. -6- J-S12037-26 Then, he developed a systematic approach to search the area, which involved using a forward-looking infrared (“FLIR”) camera to search for a heat source. See id. at 116-17. Within seven minutes, Corporal Llyod identified a heat source under a swing set, in a backyard near 215 Wadas Avenue (“Wadas Avenue”) and informed law enforcement on the ground. See id. at 118-19, 158.7 Philip Stephans, a sergeant for Yeadon Borough, was on the scene and received the PSP helicopter transmission that Appellant was found at Wadas Avenue. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 135, 140, 158. Sergeant Stephans and his team went to Wadas Avenue and found Appellant laying down with his arms tucked into his pants under the swing set. See id. at 146. Then, Sergeant Stephans instructed Appellant to put his arms out by his side and Appellant did not comply. See id. The police team surrounded Appellant, took his hands out of his pants, and placed them in handcuffs. See id. at 147. After determining that Wadas Avenue was an additional crime scene, the police recovered a white pair of shoes, a cigarette pack, a baseball cap, a water bottle, a black glove, and a blue surgical mask. See id. at 181-82; see also Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-32 (Wadas Avenue Backyard Photograph). Officer Wilson of the Upper Darby Township Police Department transported Appellant to the township police station. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, ____________________________________________ 7 The Wadas Avenue was six houses north of Terrace Avenue. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 158. -7- J-S12037-26 at 212-16. At the police station, Officer Wilson collected clothing from Appellant including a latex glove, a dark-green jacket, and a black t-shirt with a white logo. See id. at 217-19; Commonwealth Trial Exhibits C-35 (Latex Glove Photograph), C-36 (Green Jacket Photograph), and C-37 (Black Shirt Photograph). Detective Kevin Finnegan of the Upper Darby Police Department swabbed Appellant’s hand for gun residue after he was transferred to the police department. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 183, 186. He also obtained a buccal swab for Appellant for a later DNA comparison. See id. at 189. Later, Detective Finnegan also received information that Appellant was not licensed to carry a firearm. See id. at 190-91; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-34 (Certificate of Non-Licensure). Detective Robert Marvil of the Upper Darby Police Department testified that he arrived at the residence on Terrace Avenue and was assigned to crime scene and evidence processing. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 233-34. After photographing the Terrace Avenue and Wadas Avenue crime scenes, Detective Marvil began collecting the evidence. See id. at 240-46. He explained that, as he was collecting the evidence, he put on “six or seven” pairs of black latex gloves so that he would have a fresh pair of gloves for each piece of evidence. See id. at 246-48. On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired about the collection process that Detective Marvil used for the evidence. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 287-90. The Commonwealth objected twice for speculation, which the trial -8- J-S12037-26 court sustained. See id. at 288-89. After Detective Marvil’s testimony ended, defense counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s objection for speculation. See id. at 295-96. Detective James Reardon, a certified fingerprint examiner employed by the Delaware County District Attorney Office, also testified. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 6; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-64 (Crime Scene Report). He received a firearm with six live rounds in it, three brass casings, three silver casings, and two projectiles. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 11. Detective Reardon swabbed all the evidence received and processed the items for possible collection of fingerprints. See id. at 16-20. He concluded that no fingerprints were found on the evidence. See id. at 21. However, Detective Reardon also explained that a glove would “wipe off any suitable fingerprints or wash off fingerprints where they wouldn’t be suitable to identify a known print.” Id. at 22. Albert Lattanzi, a forensic scientist employed with the PSP, testified regarding his analysis of gunshot residue (“GSR”) evidence in his report prepared during the investigation. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 102-04 (confirming Lattanzi as expert in GSR analysis); Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-72 (Trace Evidence Report).8 Lattanzi explained that GSR particles will ____________________________________________ 8 Lieutenant William Sminkui of the Upper Darby Police Department testified that he personally collected the GSR samples from the evidence collected and used a GSR kit. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 28, 37-41. Then the GSR kit was transported to the Regional Crime Lab in Lima, Pennsylvania (“Lima Regional Crime Lab”). See id. at 41-42. -9- J-S12037-26 remain on an object until they are removed, however the particles can be removed easily with another item such as clothing or through washing. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 105-06. He detailed that he analyzes GSR samples with a GSR kit, which is comprised of aluminum stubs with an inch-wide disc with adhesive on it. See id. at 106. The adhesive is then analyzed for particles that are consistent with GSR, which are called characteristic particles. See id. at 107. Lattanzi’s analysis of the GSR kit collected from Appellant revealed characteristic GSR particles on swabs taken from Appellant’s right hand back and left palm. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 112. Lattanzi testified that these results were consistent with Appellant having discharged a firearm, having been near the firearm when it discharged, or contacting a surface containing GSR. See id. He further explained that each of these scenarios were likely to account for positive GSR results. See id. Positive GSR results were also obtained from swabs taken from Appellant’s jacket and gloves and the same conclusions applied to these items. See id. at 113-14. On cross-examination, Lattanzi acknowledged that GSR tests cannot determine how or when the residue was deposited on Appellant or the clothing items. See id. at 116. The Commonwealth established that the police sent the recovered evidence to the Lima Regional Crime Lab to be swabbed for potential DNA evidence. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 83-95. Britinni Andoloro, a forensic DNA scientist from the PSP Forensic DNA Division, testified that she received the buccal collection from Appellant and ten other items for DNA analysis. See id. - 10 - J-S12037-26 at 127-29, 134; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-73 (DNA Report). She was unable to obtain sufficient DNA from the swabs collected from the live rounds, cartridge casings, and the back-door handle analysis. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 136. However, the DNA profile obtained from the firearm, glove, and face mask matched Appellant’s buccal sample DNA. See id. The remaining items, including the magazine and rounds, a cut piece from the face mask, the magazine plate, and a pair of disposable gloves, contained a mixture of DNA profiles. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 138-45. Andoloro explained that DNA analysis identifies the DNA profiles present on an item but cannot determine how, when, or where the DNA was deposited. See id. at 153. She further testified that DNA may be transferred from one item to another, resulting in the same DNA profile corresponding with samples recovered on multiple items. See id. Detective Louis Grandizio, an expert in firearms and toolmark identification, testified that he examined ballistic evidence recovered from the crime scene. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 169-73 (stating he is a firearm examiner with the Delaware County Criminal Investigation Division); Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-70 (Ballistic Report). He testified that he used an impact discharge test, which determines whether the firearm was accidentally fired or triggered. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 178-79. Detective Grandizio concluded that the firearm that was recovered from Terrace Avenue would not discharge from an impact, instead requiring force to pull the trigger. See id. at 179. He also examined Officer Green’s firearm and magazine. See - 11 - J-S12037-26 id. Based on his examination of the two firearms, Detective Grandizio concluded that four of the fired cartridge cases came from the firearm recovered at Terrace Avenue and three came from Officer Green’s firearm. See id. at 182-84. On February 7, 2025, the jury found Appellant guilty of attempted murder, assault of a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and firearms not to be carried without a license. See N.T. Trial, 2/7/25, at 5-8; Verdict, 2/7/25, at 1-2 (unpaginated). However, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to resisting arrest, and the trial court declared a mistrial on that count. See N.T. Trial, 2/7/25, at 9. Afterwards, sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report. See id. at 10. On April 8, 2025, at the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth withdrew the resisting arrest count. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 4/28/25, at 4. Then, Officer Green gave a victim impact statement explaining the ramifications of Appellant’s actions. See id. at 4-15. The trial court heard oral argument from defense counsel and the Commonwealth for Appellant’s sentence recommendation. See id. at 15-20. Appellant made a brief statement thanking his family, the trial court, and defense counsel. See id. at 21. Afterwards, the trial court acknowledged that it considered two letters offered in support of Appellant, sentencing memoranda from both parties, the victim impact statement, and the recommendations of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 22. - 12 - J-S12037-26 Appellant was sentenced to twenty to forty years’ for assault on a law enforcement officer, ten to twenty years of incarceration for attempted murder, ten to twenty years’ for attempted burglary, and three and one-half to seven years’ for his firearms not to be carried without a license conviction. See Order (imposition of sentence), 4/28/25; N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 4/28/25, at 21.9 The trial court ordered that each of these sentences run ____________________________________________ 9 The imposed sentences were within the aggravated range for attempted murder and above the aggravated range for attempted burglary and firearms not to be carried without a license. Further, for assault of law enforcement officer conviction, Appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1 (setting a mandatory minimum term of “not less than 20 years” for a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a)). We note that Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction merged with his conviction for attempted murder for sentencing purposes. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 4/28/25, at 21-23; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20, 24 (Pa. 1994) (holding aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S. 2702.1(a) merges with attempted murder for sentencing purposes). For assault of a law enforcement officer, the mandatory minimum term is two hundred and forty months’ imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1; Guideline Sentence Form (7th ed., amend. 6), 5/7/25, at 1 (noting Appellant’s “mitigated” and “standard” ranges for a minimum term were “240” months)). For attempted murder, the recommended standard range is ninety months to one hundred and eight months’ imprisonment, plus or minus twelve months for mitigating and aggravating circumstances. See Guideline Sentence Form (7th ed., amend. 6), 5/7/25, at 2 (noting Appellant’s prior record score is two and the offense gravity score of thirteen); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (7th ed., amend. 6) (setting the offense gravity score of thirteen for attempted murder); 204 Pa. Code § 303.17(b) (7th ed., amend. 6) (applicable sentencing matrix for an offense involving the use of a deadly weapon). For attempted burglary in an occupied residence, the recommended standard range is twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, and the aggravated range is up to thirty-six months. See Guideline Sentence Form (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 13 - J-S12037-26 consecutively for an aggregate sentence of forty-three and one-half to eighty- seven years’ imprisonment. See Order, 4/28/25, at 1; N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 4/28/25, at 23. Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of sentence, and the trial court denied his motion. See Motion for Reconsideration, 5/8/25; Order (denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration), 5/19/25. Then, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Notice of Appeal, 6/11/25; Rule 1925(b) Order, 7/18/24; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/8/24; Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/25. Appellant raises the following questions for our review: I. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to defense cross- examination of Detective Robert Marvil regarding his testimony about best evidence collection practices and evidence contamination when such answers would not be ____________________________________________ (7th ed., amend. 6), 5/7/25, at 3 (noting Appellant’s prior record score of two and the offense gravity score of eight); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (7th ed., amend. 6) (setting the offense gravity score of eight for attempted burglary); 204 Pa. Code § 303.17(a) (7th ed., amend. 6) (applicable sentencing matrix for an offense involving the possession of a deadly weapon). For firearms not to be carried without a license, the recommended standard range is twenty-four to thirty-six months’ imprisonment, and the aggravated range is up to forty-eight months. See Guideline Sentence Form (7th ed., amend. 6), 5/7/25, at 4 (noting Appellant’s prior record score of two and the offense gravity score of nine); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (7th ed., amend. 6) (setting the offense gravity score of nine for firearms not to be carried without a license where the possessed firearm was loaded); 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (7th ed., amend. 6) (applicable basic sentencing matrix). - 14 - J-S12037-26 speculative and are based on the training and experience of the detective as introduced into evidence during the Commonwealth’s direct examination of this same witness[,] all in violation of [Appellant’s] due process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions? II. Whether evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish the crimes of attempted murder, assault of [a] law enforcement officer by discharging of a firearm, aggravated assault, attempted burglary, and carrying a firearm without a license because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the individual who committed these crimes and the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] is the unidentified man whose actions led to the crimes charged in this matter? III. Whether the evidence present at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for attempted murder where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] possessed a specific intent to kill Officer Green? IV. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for assault of [a] law enforcement officer by discharge of a firearm where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knew the individual was a law enforcement officer at the time of the exchange of gunfire? V. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for attempted burglary where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] took a substantial step towards entering the residence on [Terrace] Avenue or that [Appellant] intended to commit a crime within the residence on [Terrace] Avenue? VI. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for carrying a firearm without a license where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] carried a firearm concealed on his person? VII. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and violated the discretionary aspect[s] of sentencing, specifically the - 15 - J-S12037-26 requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. §[ ]9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, in that the trial court’s decision to impose statutory maximum consecutive sentences raises the aggregate sentence to a de facto life sentence causing the sentence to be excessive without justification and where the trial court did not place sufficient reasons on the record for sentences in the aggravated range for attempted burglary and carrying a concealed firearm without a license? Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (roman numeral prompts added and unnecessary capitalizations omitted). I. Admissibility of Evidence Appellant, in his first issue, argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the Commonwealth’s objections for speculation to defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Robert Marvil regarding his use of multiple sets of gloves in the evidence collection process, which Appellant characterizes as a violation of his constitutional right to confrontation. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-33. We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant has waived this argument. See Appellee’s Brief at 16-19.10 During the cross-examination of Detective Marvil, defense counsel posed a hypothetical question: “And if somebody was to wear one pair of gloves and touch three different pieces of evidence, what effect would that ____________________________________________ 10 We note the trial court did not find Appellant’s admissibility of evidence issue waived. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/25, at 7-8. However, it “is well[- ]settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a [trial] court’s decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the [trial] court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 520 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quotation omitted). - 16 - J-S12037-26 have on the evidence itself?” N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 288. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the question was speculative and the trial court sustained the objection. See id. Five questions later, defense counsel asked, “So[,] if anybody does it any other way, they’re going to transfer evidence from —” Id. at 299. The Commonwealth objected again on speculation grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. See id. At that time, defense counsel neither made an effort to respond to the court’s act of sustaining the objections, nor made a proffer as to the value of the testimony sought. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 288-89.11 At the conclusion of the testimony for the day, defense counsel again raised the issue about the scope of the cross-examination of Detective Marvil, but did not place specific grounds for the objection to the questioning on the record, stating: I want to reserve, I suppose, an objection to an objection. I asked specifically about his experience, Detective Marvil’s experience, if he knew a thing, and there was an objection there. … The objection came to a question where I asked about the process, his process of putting on the multiple gloves and whether or not it would cause contamination. It was an objection, I believe as to speculation. Your Honor granted it…But I want to preserve that. I disagree, obviously with that. Id. at 295-96. ____________________________________________ 11 If the ruling excludes evidence, the moving party must inform the court of the substance of the evidence by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context. Pa.R.E. 103(a)(2). - 17 - J-S12037-26 Appellant waived any confrontation claim, or any related grounds for opposing the trial court’s rulings on the Commonwealth’s objections, because he did not raise his Confrontation Clause argument at trial or state any specific grounds for this “objection to an objection.” See Commonwealth v. Reed, 347 A.3d 795, 807 (Pa. 2025) (“[D]efendant may not raise a new theory of relief that he did not present to trial court.”). Issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating trial courts “must be given the opportunity to correct errors at the time they are made;” “Even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant’s defense counsel did not offer any proof of substantive evidence that counsel sought through its proposed questions or object based on the Confrontation Clause. Instead, defense counsel merely disagreed with the trial court but offered no argument as to why. See N.T. Trial 2/5/25, at 295-96. Accordingly, we find Appellant has waived his first issue. II.-IV. Sufficiency of Evidence In issues two through six, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence sustaining all his convictions but aggravated assault. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-45. “A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence presents a question of law, and as such, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” See Commonwealth v. Headly, 242 A.3d 940, 943 (Pa. Super. 2020). Additionally: - 18 - J-S12037-26 We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). II. Identity Appellant, in his second issue, argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the shooting. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-36. “A victim’s in-court testimony, identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime, is by itself sufficient to establish the identity element of that crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted). [E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to sustain a conviction. Although common items of clothing and general physical characteristics are usually insufficient to support a conviction, such evidence can be used as other circumstances to establish the identity of a perpetrator. Out-of-court identifications are relevant to our review of sufficiency of the - 19 - J-S12037-26 evidence claims, particularly when they are given without hesitation shortly after the crime while memories were fresh. Given additional evidentiary circumstances, any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight. Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citations omitted). Appellant asserts that there is no additional in-court testimony that independently identifies him as the perpetrator. See Appellant’s Brief at 35. He thus reasons that the Commonwealth only relied on circumstantial evidence including ballistic evidence, gunshot residue, and DNA evidence to prove his identity as the perpetrator, which Appellant contends failed to establish that he was the individual who fired the weapon or committed the charged offenses. See id. Accordingly, he argues that the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the armed intruder and all his convictions must fail. See id. We disagree. Upon review, we find that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator. See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 740-41. Officer Green testified that Appellant was the individual with whom he engaged in the shoot-out. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 49; Johnson, 180 A.3d at 478. Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced surveillance video footage from Terrace Avenue, which allowed the jury to see the perpetrator, his actions, and his clothing. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 26; Orr, 38 A.3d at 874. Officer Green testified that the individual he observed shooting at him matched the person in the clothing depicted in the surveillance - 20 - J-S12037-26 footage. See id. at 50. Police subsequently recovered, near the location where Appellant was apprehended, a blue surgical mask and glove consistent with those worn by the individual shown in the surveillance video, and the mask matched the one described with Roger’s 911 description of Appellant . See id. at 181-82. In addition, Appellant’s DNA was found on the firearm and glove recovered from the backyard at Terrace Avenue and forensic evidence established that the fired cartridge casings fired from that gun were recovered from the same location. See N.T. Trial, 2/4/25, at 105-08. Further, GSR was also detected on Appellant’s hands and clothing, supporting the inference that he recently discharged a firearm. See N.T. Trial, 2/5/25, at 112. We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, this evidence permitted the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual depicted in the surveillance footage was Appellant. See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 740-41. Therefore, Appellant’s second issue is meritless. III. Attempted Murder Appellant, in his third issue, argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for attempted murder because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a specific intent to kill Officer Green. See Appellant’s Brief at 37-39. A criminal attempt occurs when a person, “with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the - 21 - J-S12037-26 commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). “[I]f a person takes a substantial step toward the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind to commit such an act, he may be convicted of attempted murder.” Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citation omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). Further, “[t]he Commonwealth may establish the mens rea required for first-degree murder, specific intent