Full Opinion

J-S36019-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOHN WESLEY MULDOR JR. : : Appellant : No. 1736 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000339-2024 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 John Welsey Muldor Jr. (“Muldor”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury conviction of terroristic threats. 1 We affirm. In December 2023, Muldor went to the home of Judith Downey (“Downey”), a friend who had pet-sat his dog, Polo, “for a long time[.]” N.T., 9/12/25, at 24. Downey told Muldor to leave; when he refused, she physically removed him from the house. Downey’s neighbor, Betty Wertz (“Wertz”), came to assist. During the confrontation, Muldor threatened to hit Wertz with his scooter and directed Polo to “bite her.” See id. at 38. Later that evening, ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). J-S36019-26 Muldor sent Downey Facebook messages stating, “[Y]ou’re lucky I didn’t punch you in your shit,” “I hope your next seizure is your last,” and “[W]hen I see you, just know I’m smacking the shit out of you . . . .” Id. at 33–34. The Commonwealth charged Muldor with terroristic threats, theft by unlawful taking, and defiant trespass.2 During the jury trial, Downey and Wertz testified consistently with the foregoing. Muldor testified in his own defense, denied making threats, and characterized Downey’s conduct as an assault. He acknowledged sending the Facebook messages but explained that he did so because he “was very upset that [he] had just been assaulted and attacked.” Id. at 66. The jury acquitted Muldor of theft and defiant trespass but convicted him of terroristic threats. On November 24, 2025, the trial court sentenced him to twelve months’ probation. Muldor filed a timely notice of appeal without first filing a post-sentence motion, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Muldor raises the following issue on appeal: “The evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [Muldor] intentionally terrorized another by communicating a threat to commit a crime of violence[.]” Muldor’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). This Court has held: ____________________________________________ 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a), 3503(b)(1)(i). -2- J-S36019-26 A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. We review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder. The crime of making a terroristic threat is defined by statute as follows: “[a] person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to [ ] commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1). To convict a defendant of terroristic threats, the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize another or with reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror. The Commonwealth does not have to prove that the defendant had the ability to carry out the threat or that the threatened individual believed the defendant would carry out the threat, as neither is an element of the offense. Rather, the statute seeks to prevent the psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another’s sense of personal security. The Official Comment to Section 2706 explains: “The purpose of th[is] section is to impose criminal liability on persons who make threats which seriously impair personal security or public convenience. It is not intended by this section to penalize mere spur-of-the-moment threats which result from anger.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706 cmt. See also Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 1996) (noting that the statute is not meant to penalize spur-of-the-moment threats arising out of anger during a dispute). However, this Court has held that just because a person is angry does not render them incapable of forming the intent to terrorize. Rather, this Court must consider the totality of the -3- J-S36019-26 circumstances to determine whether the threat was a result of a heated verbal exchange or confrontation.” Commonwealth v. Crosby, 226 A.3d 104, 107 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quotation marks and some citations omitted and emphases in original). Muldor argues that the “evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the offense of terroristic threats.” Muldor’s Brief at 9. He contends that the evidence “did not establish that [he] intentionally terrorized another by communicating a threat to commit a crime of violence.” Id. at 10. Muldor notes: In Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926 (Pa. Super. 2016) the Superior Court found insufficient evidence for a charge of terroristic threats, in a situation they categorized as [a] spur of the moment, heated confrontation. A review of the trial transcripts of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and . . . Muldor’s testimony would establish that what occurred in the present case is analogous to the Walls case. Anything . . . Muldor stated to anyone in this case was communicated in a heated confrontation in the spur of the moment. . . . Id. The trial court summarized that after hearing the testimony in this case, including that of Muldor and the two witnesses, and the court’s charging the jury with the appropriate jury instruction, the jury found the evidence was sufficient to convict Muldor of terroristic threats. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/26, at 2. The trial court discussed the evidence amounting to terroristic threats as follows: At trial the Commonwealth called [Downey,] who owned the subject home who testified that upon telling [Muldor] to vacate her home and then physically “dragging him out” of the home, -4- J-S36019-26 [Muldor] threatened to have his wife beat up the victim and he threatened to hit the neighbor. [N.T., 9/12/25, at 24. Downey] further testified that [Muldor] sent her [messages] on Facebook Messenger which stated, “I should have punched you in your shit. I hope your next seizure is your last[,”] and “When I see you, just know I’m smacking the shit out of you . . . .” [Id. at 33-34. Downey] further testified that when [Muldor] was forcibly removed from her home, [Muldor] referred to the neighbor, “[D]on’t make me hit you with my scooter” and he also said, “Polo[], go get her, go bite her.” [Id. at 38]. Id. The trial court highlighted the evidence that Muldor threatened to run over Wertz with his scooter and told his dog to “get” her. Id. at 3 (citing N.T., 9/12/25, at 53). Lastly, the trial court discussed Muldor’s testimony that: “I did send those text messages on my walk home because I was upset that I had just been assaulted and attacked.” Id. (citing N.T., 09/12/25, at 66). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we determine there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find every element of terroristic threats beyond a reasonable doubt. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); Crosby, 226 A.3d at 107. Downey testified that Muldor sent her messages which stated, “I should have punched you in your shit. I hope your next seizure is your last,” and “When I see you, just know I’m smacking the shit out of you . . . .” N.T., 9/12/25 at 33-34. Importantly, Muldor admitted that he sent the messages on his walk home because he was upset. See id. at 66. Wertz testified that Muldor threatened to hit her with his scooter and told his dog to attack her. See id. at 38. Based upon this record, we determine that: (1) Muldor made a threat to commit a crime of violence; (2) Muldor communicated that threat with the intent to terrorize another or with -5- J-S36019-26 reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror. See Crosby, 226 A.3d at 107. Finally, we note that Muldor also briefly asserts that “the jury instructions on terroristic threats did not mention a specific person that was threaten[ed].” Muldor’s Brief at 9. The trial court opined that it “properly instructed the jury on the elements of terroristic threats” and the credibility of witnesses. Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/26, at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 647 provides, in relevant part: “No portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). This Court has held that a criminal defendant waives a jury instruction challenge on appeal when they did not make a specific objection or exception, before the jury retires to deliberate, to the “instruction that was given.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 273 A.3d 1228, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court issued its final instructions to the jury, and Muldor did not raise any objection. Additionally, we note that Muldor also failed to allege this error in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement. Accordingly, we deem this issue waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C); Davis, 273 A.3d at 1246; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement . . . are waived”); Commonwealth v. Shreffler, -6- J-S36019-26 249 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that defendant/appellant “waived his first issue by failing to include it in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) Statement”). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/22/2026 -7-