Com. v. Clark, M.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket431 MDA 2026
JudgeMurray
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MACARIO URSEL CLARK :
:
Appellant : No. 431 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 17, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0000684-2025
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Macario Ursel Clark (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a jury convicted him of one count of carrying a firearm without
a license.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history underlying
this appeal, as follows:
On September 3, 2024, Sergeant Grant Cox (Officer Cox) of the
West Shore Regional Police Department was parked in his patrol
vehicle, observing traffic heading into Wormleysburg, when a grey
Nissan Altima drove past him. As the Altima passed by, Officer
Cox noticed the occupants look at him, look back, and then
forward, as they continued to the vicinity of the 400 block of
[North Second Street]. Officer Cox began to follow the vehicle,
and when he did, the Altima made a quick right turn onto Elm
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1) (providing that “any person who carries a firearm
in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his
person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid
and lawfully issued license … commits a felony of the third degree”).
J-S41021-26
Street. As Officer Cox turned right onto Elm Street, he observed
that the Altima had parked, and all its occupants had exited the
vehicle and began to walk away.
Officer Cox testified that he is familiar with the area; did not
recognize the individuals who had exited the Altima; and found it
odd that the individuals had parked so abruptly and got out of the
car. He added, specifically, that the Altima was parked
approximately three feet from the curb, and the front end of the
car was partially in the street, with the potential to obstruct the
flow of traffic.
Three occupants, including [] Appellant, exited the car.
Appellant had been in the driver’s seat. Officer Cox noted that all
the occupants looked young—perhaps in their late teens. Officer
Cox walked up to the Altima and looked in. He saw the extended
magazine of what appeared to be a pistol that occupied the space
between the front passenger seat and the center console. At that
point, he asked the individuals who had been in the vehicle, and
were, then, approximately 20 yards away from it, to come back—
which they did. Officer Cox asked the individuals about the gun,
and Appellant responded that he would “take the charge.” N.T.[,
12/15/25,] at 35. At that point, Officer Cox asked for, and
received, consent from Appellant to search the Altima.
Appellant was ultimately charged with carrying a firearm
without a license. At the jury trial on December 1[5], 2025,
Officer Cox was the only witness presented by the
Commonwealth, along with [exhibits including] the recovered
weapon and [body-worn camera] footage (from another officer)
of Officer Cox’s encounter with the Altima and its occupants.
Appellant proffered no evidence at trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 1-3 (some punctuation modified).
Additionally, “the parties stipulated that Appellant was under 21 years of age
at the time of the incident … and that the firearm was operational and capable
of firing a projectile.” Id. at 4 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6109(b) (providing that
an individual must be “21 years of age or older” to apply “for a license to carry
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a firearm concealed on or about his person or in a vehicle within this
Commonwealth”)).
Pertinently, as the trial court explained,
Appellant’s counsel requested a jury instruction regarding the
definition of possession, containing language about constructive
possession, including the ability and intent to control an item.
[The trial court did not give the requested instruction.] The court
instructed the jury about the elements of carrying a firearm
without a license. In that regard, the jury was informed that to
find Appellant guilty of the charge, it must determine he carried a
firearm in a vehicle, was not in his home or place of business, and
did not have a valid and lawfully issued license [to carry] a
firearm. …
During its deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court
requesting clarification of the term “carry” in the context of the
charge. Appellant’s counsel reiterated his previous position,
relying on … Commonwealth v. Magwood, 538 A.2d 908 (Pa.
Super. 1988), [for the proposition] that the [defendant] must be
found to have been in possession of the weapon. The court agreed
to inform the jury that, in order to carry a weapon, the
[defendant] must be found to be in possession of the weapon.
However, Appellant’s counsel indicated he stood by his initial
argument that the court should provide the jury with an
instruction that carrying a firearm without a license requires either
actual physical possession, or constructive possession, of the
firearm. [Appellant’s counsel requested an instruction that] while
actual possession necessarily involves control, constructive
possession requires the power and intent to control, and mere
presence [in a vehicle in which a firearm is found] is not, in and
of itself, enough to sustain a conviction.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 3-4.
In response to the jury’s question regarding the term “carry,” the trial
court further instructed the jury as follows:
[I]n 1988, our Superior Court said, in order to carry a
weapon, essentially, the [d]efendant must be found to have
been in possession of that weapon.
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In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court used this definition
of carry[:] … to possess and convey a firearm in a vehicle[,]
including the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car.
That was used in a case dealing with carrying a firearm, so
it was to possess and convey a firearm.
Now, convey means simply to take or carry from one
place to another, to transport. I hope that is helpful. Again,
there is the aspect of possession and to possess and convey
with respect to carrying. And conveying is to take or carry
from one place to another. So the definition of convey goes
back and uses the word carry. It’s a little bit circular, but I
hope that is somewhat helpful.
N.T., 12/15/25, at 89-90.2
The jury thereafter convicted Appellant of carrying a firearm without a
license. On February 17, 2026, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two
years’ probation.
Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following questions for our
review:
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by denying
[Appellant’s] requested jury instruction defining possession,
including constructive possession requiring the power and intent
to control, where the case involved a vehicle with three occupants
and the jury expressly asked for clarification of “carry”?
2. Did the Commonwealth fail to present evidence distinguishing
[Appellant’s] power and intent to control the firearm from that of
the two other occupants of the vehicle beyond proximity and an
ambiguous statement[,] which rendered the evidence insufficient
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2 Though not explicit in the record, it is apparent that
Muscarello v. U.S.,
524 U.S. 125 (1998), is the United States Supreme Court case the trial court
referenced.
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at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
“carried” the firearm?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
In his first issue, Appellant argues the word “carry,” as used in Section
6106, “has been repeatedly equated [with] the word ‘possess’ by Pennsylvania
[c]ourts[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Peters, 218
A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Townsend, 237 A.2d 192,
194 (Pa. 1968); Magwood, 538 A.2d at 910).3 Appellant relies on Justice
McCaffery’s dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 335 A.3d
1047 (Pa. 2025) (plurality), which suggested that “carry” is an ambiguous
term, and that it should be equated with “possess.” Id. at 1071-76
(McCaffery, J., dissenting);4 see also Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. Appellant
____________________________________________
3 The Commonwealth argues Appellant’s brief is substantially defective, as it
repeatedly cites strings of cases without distinguishing between them or
elucidating them in his argument. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11 (citing
Pa.R.A.P. 126(a) (“When citing authority, a party should direct the court’s
attention to the specific part of the authority on which the party relies”). Our
review confirms that Appellant repeatedly relies upon a string citation of
Peters, Townsend, and Magwood, without quoting language from any of
the cases, and it is not clear that they stand for the propositions for which
Appellant cites them. See Appellant’s Brief at 17, 18, 23. The Commonwealth
argues “this defect prevents the Commonwealth from directly responding to
[Appellant’s] purported claims and legal analyses.” Commonwealth’s Brief at
11. The Commonwealth asserts the defects in Appellant’s brief “prohibit any
meaningful review,” and urges this Court to dismiss the appeal. Id. at 12.
While we decline to dismiss the appeal, we agree with the Commonwealth that
Appellant’s use of string citations is unhelpful.
4 But see Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1074 (McCaffery, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that Pennsylvania precedent, including Peters, Townsend,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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further relies on Magwood, in which this Court rejected an appellant’s
challenge to a jury instruction that defined “carry” under Section 6106 as
“essentially” equivalent with possession, and included an instruction regarding
constructive possession. Magwood, 538 A.2d at 909; see also Appellant’s
Brief at 21-22. Appellant notes that, instantly, the trial court used part of the
jury instruction approved in Magwood, but did not include the portion
regarding constructive possession. Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. Appellant
maintains this was erroneous. Id. Appellant further asserts he was
prejudiced by the error, arguing he could have been acquitted if the jury had
been instructed regarding constructive possession. Id. at 22.
The Commonwealth counters that the trial court sufficiently and
accurately instructed the jury regarding Section 6106. Commonwealth’s Brief
at 12-15. The Commonwealth notes that this Court, relying on the plurality
opinion in Muhammad, has held that
to convict a defendant of carrying a firearm without a license,
“there were only three elements the jury needed to find beyond a
reasonable doubt: [First, that defendant] carried the firearm in a
vehicle…. Second, that [he] was not in his place of abode … or a
fixed place of business…. And, third, that [he] did not have a valid
and lawfully issued license to carry a firearm.”
____________________________________________
and Magwood, “is divorced from any explicit consideration of whether
‘carries’ is something distinct from ‘possesses.’”).
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Commonwealth v. Mumford, 353 A.3d 247, 259-60 (Pa. Super. 2026)
(quoting Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1053 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment
of the Court (OAJC)); see also Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14.
“In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the
outcome of the case.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 323 A.3d 13, 21 (Pa.
Super. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 326
A.3d 988, 994 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“Only where there is an abuse of discretion
or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.”).
A trial court has broad discretion in formulating and delivering
instructions to a jury. When reviewing the exercise of that
discretion, an appellate court must evaluate the trial court’s
instruction as a whole to determine if it was fair or prejudicial. A
trial court may use such language as it chooses, so long as the
law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for
its consideration. We will not rigidly inspect a jury charge, finding
reversible error for every technical inaccuracy, but rather evaluate
whether the charge sufficiently and accurately apprises a lay jury
of the law it must consider in rendering its decision. Error cannot
be predicated on isolated excerpts of the charge, but it is the
general effect of the charge that controls.
Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 634-35 (Pa. 2022)
(footnotes and quotation marks omitted). “The trial court is not required to
give every charge that is requested by the parties[,] and its refusal to give a
requested charge does not require reversal unless the appellant was
prejudiced by that refusal.” Jones, 323 A.3d at 21 (citation omitted).
In Magwood, the appellant argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instruction regarding
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“carrying” under Section 6106. Magwood, 538 A.2d at 908-09. Though the
Magwood Court did not set forth the facts underlying the appellant’s
conviction, it noted that “the Commonwealth based its case on a joint
constructive possession theory.” Id. at 909. The Magwood Court
determined the appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacked arguable merit,
reasoning as follows:
The trial court, in defining the term “carrying” as used in 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, correctly noted that, “In order to carry a
weapon, essentially, the defendant must be found to have been in
possession of that weapon.” The court then defined possession
as follows:
Mere presence in an automobile in which a weapon is
found does not establish possession of that weapon.
Rather, the Commonwealth must establish both the
defendant’s power of control over the weapon and his
intention to exercise that control, which intention
presupposes knowledge of the weapon’s presence.
This definition adequately and accurately reflects the law
regarding the definition of joint constructive possession. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 453 A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa.
Super. 1982) (to prove joint constructive possession,
Commonwealth must present evidence to show that defendant
had both power to control firearm and intent to exercise that
control; mere presence at scene where firearm was found is
insufficient) (citing Townsend, 237 A.2d 192 (regarding mere
presence)); Commonwealth v. Luddy, 422 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super.
1980) (regarding power to control and intent to exercise control)).
Magwood, 538 A.2d at 909-10 (record citations omitted; citations modified).
In Muhammad, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with, inter
alia, carrying a firearm without a license under Section 6106, and persons not
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to possess firearms under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). As our Supreme Court
explained,
a conviction under Section 6105(a) requires proof of a prior
conviction for an offense enumerated in subsection (b). At
Muhammad’s jury trial, to prevent the jury from learning of
Muhammad’s prior conviction and preclude the attendant
prejudice to him which might arise from this disclosure, the trial
court, with the agreement of the parties, did not instruct the jury
that he had been charged with persons not to possess firearms.
Instead, the court instructed the jurors [that] Muhammad was
charged with “[p]ossessing a [f]irearm,” which is not a crime
under Pennsylvania law. In addition, the verdict slip provided to
the jury included the following question: “Did the Defendant
Rasheed Muhammad on December 18, 2018 possess and have
under his control a firearm, to wit a Smith & Wesson 38 Caliber
Special?” Beneath this question were spaces for the jury to check
either “yes” or “no.” In the event the jury answered “yes” to this
interrogatory, the court intended to inform them there was a
stipulation Muhammad had a criminal history barring him from
possessing a gun under Section 6105, instruct them on this
offense, and have them determine whether or not he was guilty
of persons not to possess firearms. As it happens, however, the
jury checked the “no” space.
Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1049-50 (OAJC) (record citations omitted;
emphasis added). However, the jury convicted Muhammad of carrying a
firearm without license. Id. at 1050. On appeal, he argued the jury’s
response to the special interrogatory rendered the evidence insufficient to
support his conviction for carrying a firearm without a license. This Court
rejected that argument, noting that “consistency in a verdict is not required,”
and determined the evidence was sufficient to support Muhammad’s Section
6106 conviction. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 289 A.3d 1078, 1091 (Pa.
Super. 2023).
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Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and, in a plurality
opinion, affirmed Muhammad’s judgment of sentence. See generally
Muhammad, 335 A.3d 1047. While it disapproved of the use of special
interrogatories in criminal trials, the OAJC determined that
the jury’s “no” answer to th[e special interrogatory’s] compound
question did not constitute a specific finding [that] Muhammad did
not possess the firearm. Rather, the jury’s negative response
reflects their determination he did not both possess and control
the gun in question.
The crime of carrying a firearm without a license, however,
does not require a finding of possession and control of the weapon.
By its plain terms, Section 6106 applies to “any person who carries
a firearm in any vehicle[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1). Even
assuming “carries” means “possesses” for purposes of Section
6106, there is certainly nothing in the statute requiring that in
addition to carrying the firearm in a vehicle, the defendant must
also control the gun as well. See Commonwealth v. Wright,
609 Pa. 22, 14 A.3d 798, 814 (2011) (“[A]s a matter of statutory
interpretation, although one is admonished to listen attentively to
what a statute says[,] one must also listen attentively to what it
does not say.”), quoting Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 962 (2001). On the
contrary, as the trial court correctly recognized in instructing the
jury on this charge, to convict Muhammad of carrying a firearm
without a license there were only three elements the jury needed
to find beyond a reasonable doubt: “First, that [Muhammad]
carried the firearm in a vehicle…. Second, that [he] was not in his
place of abode … or a fixed place of business…. And, third, that
[he] did not have a valid and lawfully issued license to carry a
firearm.” Notably, this instruction, which tracks the statutory
language of Section 6106(a), omits any mention of “control.”
Likewise, Muhammad himself simply argues “[Section] 6106
requires possession of a firearm.” He does not insist there is an
additional, unstated element of control.
In sum, we find no actual inconsistency between the jury’s
answer to the special interrogatory and Muhammad’s conviction
for carrying a firearm without a license. The interrogatory posed
a conjunctive question asking whether Muhammad “possess[ed]
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and ha[d] under his control” a firearm. That made-up question,
pertaining to a made-up crime, does not reflect the elements of
the very real crime of carrying a firearm without a license. In fact,
as discussed, the words “possess” and “control” do not even
appear in Section 6106(a), let alone as a conjunctive phrase. We
thus detect no inconsistency here. The jury could have reasonably
concluded Muhammad failed to “possess and have under his
control” the firearm given that it was stashed away in the center
console and hidden from view, while simultaneously (and
properly) finding that he “carrie[d it] in any vehicle[.]” 18
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1).
Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1053-54 (OAJC) (footnotes and record citations
omitted; emphasis in original).
The OAJC responded to Justice McCaffery’s dissenting opinion as
follows:
While acknowledging “there is reason to question whether ‘carries’
is synonymous with ‘possession,’” the dissent nonetheless charges
us with “attempt[ing] to sub silentio overrule five decades of
precedent equating ‘carries’ with ‘possession.’” Dissenting
Opinion at 1066; see also id. at 1071 (“I thus turn to the [OAJC’s]
implicit overruling of fifty years of precedent that defines Section
6106 as a possessory offense.”). However, as the dissent
concedes, the precedent it cites “is divorced from any explicit
consideration of whether ‘carries’ is something distinct from
‘possesses.’” Id. at 1074. In any event, we are not overruling
any of these cases, “implicitly” or otherwise. On the contrary, as
expressly noted above, we assume for purposes of our analysis
that “carries” and “possesses” are synonymous in this context.
Our disposition turns not on whether there is a distinction between
“carries” and “possesses,” but rather on the incontrovertible fact
that Section 6106 does not require “control” of the firearm.
Id. at 1053 n.7; see also id. at 1053 n.6 (observing that, unlike Section
6106, “other provisions of the Uniform Firearms Act explicitly use the word
‘possess.’” (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a), 6110.1(a), 6110.2(a)).
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Instantly, the trial court opined that it sufficiently and accurately
instructed the jury, reasoning as follows:
Appellant asserts that the court erred by denying his request for
a jury instruction regarding the definition of possession, to include
language about constructive possession (including the ability and
intent to control an item). However, the court, in fact, did address
possession in the clarification it provided to the jury’s question
about the meaning of the term “carry.”
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 7. The trial court noted Muhammad’s
identification of the “three elements” necessary to support a conviction under
Section 6106, and asserted its instant jury instructions “track[ed] the
statutory language” of Section 6106. Id. at 8 (quoting Muhammad, 335
A.3d at 1053).
Our review discloses that the trial court “sufficiently and accurately
apprise[d]” the jury of the applicable law. Drummond, 285 A.3d at 635.
While Magwood suggests that a further instruction regarding constructive
possession would also have been an acceptable, accurate instruction, see
Magwood, 538 A.2d at 909-10,5 our evaluation of the “general effect” of the
instant jury instructions “as a whole” reveals no abuse of the trial court’s
“broad discretion” in its refusal to give the requested instruction.
Drummond, 285 A.3d at 634-35.
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5 See also, e.g., Mumford, 353 A.3d at 259-60 (holding the evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant’s Section 6106 conviction because, inter
alia, the jury could have reasonably inferred the defendant constructively
possessed the firearm in a vehicle).
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The trial court further opined that, even if the instruction was erroneous,
the error did not prejudice Appellant. Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 10-12.
Rather, the trial court suggested that an instruction regarding constructive
possession “would have underscored Appellant’s possession … of the weapon
and further supported his guilt on the charge of carrying a firearm without a
license.” Id. at 11. We agree.6 See Jones, 323 A.3d at 21. Appellant baldly
asserts that the lack of a constructive possession instruction “likely
contributed to the jury’s [guilty] verdict,” but fails to explain how this is the
case. Appellant’s Brief at 22. We emphasize the evidence established that,
when Officer Cox questioned the vehicle’s occupants about the gun, Appellant
immediately claimed responsibility for it, saying, “I’ll take the charge.” N.T.,
12/15/25, at 35; see also id. at 40-41 (same); Exhibit 3 (body-worn camera
footage depicting Appellant saying, “I’ll take the charge”).
For these reasons, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his Section 6106 conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. Appellant
maintains the Commonwealth presented no evidence “to refute that any of
the other passengers in the vehicle carried the gun.” Id. at 24. Appellant
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6 We observe that in Magwood, the defendant argued the trial court should
not have instructed the jury regarding constructive possession, and
maintained he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to object to the
instruction. See Magwood, 538 A.2d at 908-09.
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asserts this “resulted in competing inferences as to who carried the gun,” and
therefore rendered the jury’s verdict “a product of conjecture.” Id.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
presents a pure question of law and, as such, our standard of
review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. As a general
matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that
we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be
deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each
material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof
by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved
by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the
evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is
circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so
long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of
a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
convictions will be upheld.
Mumford, 353 A.3d at 256 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
In its opinion, the trial court rejected Appellant’s sufficiency challenge.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 11. As the trial court observed, the evidence
showed that
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Appellant was one of three occupants of the Altima, and the
operable weapon was recovered in the space between the
passenger seat and the center console—in close proximity to
Appellant as the car’s driver. At some point, after noticing Officer
Cox, Appellant abruptly parked the Altima, and all three occupants
began to walk away. Appellant was under 21 years of age at the
time, and when asked about the weapon by police, Appellant
immediately stated, “I’ll take the charge.”
Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 9. Noting Appellant’s reliance on the concept
of constructive possession, the trial court further concluded the evidence was
sufficient to show Appellant’s constructive possession of the gun. Id. at 10-
11 (stating “it is apparent [that] Appellant, as the driver of the vehicle, had
easy access to the weapon and, at the very least, would have shared joint
constructive possession of the gun with the individual who occupied the
passenger seat.”).
We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Appellant carried the firearm in a vehicle without a license. See
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a); Mumford, 353 A.3d at 259-60. With respect to
Appellant’s reliance on constructive possession, we observe that Appellant
neglects to mention the well-settled principle that “[t]o find constructive
possession, the power and intent to control the [item] does not need to be
exclusive to the [defendant,] … and may be found in one or more actors where
the item … is in an area of joint control and equal access.” Id. at 258 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 437-38 (Pa. Super. 2021)).
The evidence therefore did not have to refute the possibility that the vehicle’s
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other occupants also carried/possessed the gun. Accordingly, Appellant’s
second issue merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2026
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