Com. v. Collazo, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket744 EDA 2026
JudgeOlson
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHNNY COLLAZO :
:
Appellant : No. 744 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 22, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004791-2024
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Appellant, Johnny Collazo, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on December 22, 2025, following his guilty plea to third-degree
murder, aggravated assault, persons not to possess a firearm, and firearms
not to be carried without a license. 1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:
Around 3:26 p.m. on March 16, 2024, at [along] East Lippincott
Street [in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania], Appellant shot Julius
Panero twice in the chest, killing him, and [he also] shot Neureka
Fallas once in the left forearm. Appellant was arrested around
three hours later the same day and charged with [the
aforementioned crimes] and other related charges. Appellant
entered an [open] guilty plea [shortly before the commencement
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1),
respectively.
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of trial on July 22, 2025, wherein] the Commonwealth [entered]
the following factual findings in the record[:]
On March 16, 2024, Appellant, wearing a black hooded
jacket and black pants, was standing with his partner,
Destiny Flemings, next to a white 2008 Acura TSX on the
1800 block of Lippincott Street. Mr. Panero and Ms. Fallas,
his girlfriend, were standing on the opposite side of the
street. Appellant and Panero were arguing with each other,
prompting Appellant to approach Panero. Ms. Fallas tried to
push him away while the argument continued, leading
Appellant to take out a firearm and fire twice, striking Fallas
once in the forearm and Panero twice in the chest. Appellant
and Ms. Flemings immediately fled in their vehicle. [The
entire incident was captured on surveillance video.]
Panero was pronounced dead at Temple University Hospital
at 3:42 p.m. the same day. Two ballistic fragments were
recovered from Panero. Dr. Victoria Sorokin, an expert in
forensic pathology, determined Panero’s cause of death to
be two gunshot wounds to the chest [and concluded the]
manner [of death was] homicide. Fallas was treated at
Temple University Hospital for a single gunshot wound to
the left forearm and discharged the same day. At the crime
scene, Officer Edward Fidler recovered two [fired cartridge
casings (FCCs)].
Around three hours after the shooting, [two other police
officers] spotted the vehicle that fled the crime scene [near
the intersection of] 2nd Street and Allegheny Street. They
stopped the vehicle and arrested Appellant and his
girlfriend. Detectives obtained a search warrant for the
vehicle and recovered a black 9mm pistol, a black hooded
jacket, and black pants. These items were submitted to the
Office of Forensic Science [wherein it was] determined that
the two FCCs recovered from the crime scene were fired
from the same firearm[, which was] recovered from the
vehicle, and there was gunshot residue in multiple areas on
the jacket and front of the pants, indicating that the clothing
had been worn while firing a firearm.
On July 22, 2025, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and
entered an [open] guilty plea to [the above listed crimes].
Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw [his] guilty plea
on October 29, 2025. [The trial court held a hearing] on
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December 18, 2025, at which Appellant claimed that his counsel
[] had threatened [him] to accept the guilty plea and that [he]
had been intoxicated when he did so. [The trial court] denied the
motion [to withdraw] as Appellant had responded in the negative
to both the written and oral colloquy on July 22, 2025, when asked
if he was under the influence of any substance or being threatened
into entering the guilty plea. [The trial court] also observed
Appellant during the guilty plea and did not find him to be
intoxicated or otherwise unable to understand the proceedings.
On December 22, 2025, [the trial court] considered [a]
presentence [investigation] report [(PSI)], [a] mental health
evaluation, sentencing guidelines, [the] sentencing code, [a]
defense mitigation [report], testimony from Commonwealth and
defense witnesses, and counsels’ arguments. With these
considerations in mind, [the trial court] sentenced Appellant to 8
to 40 years [of imprisonment for] third-degree murder, two to
four years [of consecutive imprisonment for] aggravated assault,
five to 10 years [of] concurrent [imprisonment for carrying a
firearm without a license], and three to six years [of current
imprisonment for persons not to possess a firearm] for an
aggregate term of 20 to 44 years of state incarceration.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/19/2026 (headings, superfluous capitalization, and
record citations omitted). This timely, counseled appeal resulted. 2
____________________________________________
2 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on December 23, 2025. The
trial court did not rule on it. Instead, the clerk of courts prematurely entered
an order denying the motion by operation of law on February 27, 2026. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a) (a trial court must decide a timely post-sentence
motion within 120 days); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c) (unless a
one-time extension is granted, the clerk of courts shall enter an order deeming
the motion denied by operation of law after 120 days). Here, Appellant’s
motion should have been deemed denied on April 22, 2026. Regardless, on
March 2, 2026, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal within 30 days of the
date the clerk of clerks erroneously deemed the post-sentence motion denied.
See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the
entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(A)(2)(b) (where there is a timely post-sentence motion filed, the notice
of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order denying the
motion by operation of law). Thereafter, on March 6, 2026, Appellant filed a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues 3 for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in not allowing Appellant to withdraw his
guilty plea prior to sentencing because Appellant testified that
his plea was not voluntary and [] articulated his innocence and
the Commonwealth would not [have been] substantially
prejudiced by plea withdrawal?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant
to an aggregate sentence of 20 to 44 years of incarceration
because there was at least some provocation, Appellant comes
from a broken home and was surrounded by crime,
deprivation, and chaos, Appellant has a young child and
support in the community, Appellant has a history of drug
addiction, Appellant accepted responsibility indicating potential
for rehabilitation, Appellant saved [judicial] time and resources
by entering a plea, the partial maximum and aggregate
sentences imposed are excessive and violate the sentencing
norms in that there is a unitary and excessive focus on
retribution and protection of society, the sentence goes beyond
what is required to protect the public, and Appellant
respectfully requests that he be resentenced with increased
consideration for background, acceptance of responsibility, and
potential for rehabilitation?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Initially, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing
him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to trial. Id. at 14-16. He claims that he
entered his plea involuntarily and, subsequently, asserted his innocence at the
hearing on his motion to withdraw, where he made a colorable demonstration
that the withdrawal of his plea would promote fairness and justice. Id. at 14.
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on
March 19, 2026.
3 We reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of discussion.
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Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth would not be substantially
prejudiced if the matter were to proceed to trial. Id. Appellant suggests that
“[i]n the present matter, there was a least some pushing of Appellant by the
decedent and [] complainant Julius Panero [as] depicted on the video of the
underlying incident” to support “colorable claims of innocence via a potential
self-defense defense.” Id. at 15. As such, Appellant maintains that “the
matter should be remanded for trial or at least further testimony on the
innocence claim.” Id. at 16.
We adhere to the following standards:
We review the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea for abuse of discretion.
* * *
Where a defendant requests to withdraw his guilty plea before he
is sentenced, the trial court has discretion to grant the withdrawal
and that discretion is to be liberally exercised to permit withdrawal
of the plea if two conditions are present: 1) the defendant
demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea and
2) it is not shown that withdrawal of the plea would cause
substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.
* * *
A plausible claim of innocence, supported by some facts or
evidence in the record, constitutes a fair and just reason for
allowing pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Where,
however, the defendant merely makes a bare assertion that he is
innocent without any proffer of any supporting basis for that claim,
the trial court in its discretion may deny withdrawal on the ground
that the defendant has not shown a fair and just reason for
withdrawal of the plea.
Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 504–505 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(internal citations omitted).
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Additionally, this Court has previously determined:
Stated more broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration of such
a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some
colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that
permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and
justice. Trial courts have discretion to assess the plausibility of
claims of innocence.
We review that exercise of discretion as follows:
When a trial court comes to a conclusion through the
exercise of its discretion, there is a heavy burden on the
appellant to show that this discretion has been abused. An
appellant cannot meet this burden by simply persuading an
appellate court that it may have reached a different
conclusion than that reached by the trial court; rather, to
overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must
demonstrate that the trial court actually abused its
discretionary power. An abuse of discretion will not be
found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists
where the trial court has reached a conclusion which
overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse of that
discretion, an appellate court should not disturb a trial
court's ruling.
It is important that appellate courts honor [a] trial court's
discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique
position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and
measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants
have made sincere and colorable claims that permitting
withdrawal of their please would promote fairness and
justice.
The trial court's discretion, however, is not unfettered. The term
discretion imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so
as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of
the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to
the will of the judge. The trial court must be mindful that the law
requires trial courts to grant presentence plea withdrawal motions
liberally and make credibility determinations supported by the
record. [In exercising its discretion within the context of a request
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to withdraw a plea before the imposition of sentence, a trial court]
should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo a
waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right to trial—
perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our
constitution. Finally, this Court must not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court; rather, we must discern whether the
trial court acted within its permissible discretion.
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1023–1024 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(internal citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted).
Finally, this Court has recognized:
[O]nce a defendant enters a guilty plea, it is presumed he was
aware of what he was doing. A person who elects to plead guilty
is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under
oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea
which contradict the statements he made at his colloquy. In
assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we note the law does
not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his
decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that
appellant's decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently made.
Commonwealth v. Alameda, 339 A.3d 504, 510 (Pa. Super. 2025) (internal
citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted).
Here, in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court
opined:
Appellant claims that his counsel had threatened him and his
stepmother to accept the plea lest he be sentenced to life without
parole, that he was intoxicated when he accepted the plea, and
that the guilty plea [agreement] was “not truly beneficial” and
“based on misinformation.” For those reasons, he wished to
“claim his innocence.”
[The trial court] found that [Appellant’s] wish to claim innocence
[was] a bare assertion of innocence. No information [provided by
Appellant or his counsel supported] a colorable assertion [of
innocence], especially in light of surveillance footage capturing
Appellant’s actions, Ms. Fallas’s identification of Appellant [and her
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description of his conduct], the matching vehicle Appellant was
found in, and the clothing and firearm recovered from that vehicle.
Instead, Appellant’s argument relie[d] on alleged threats received
from counsel to accept the guilty plea, his alleged intoxication
while accepting the plea, and the unsatisfactory outcome of his
plea.
* * *
At his plea hearing, [the trial court] conducted an oral colloquy.
Appellant swore on the record that he understood fully the rights
that he was waiving, the charges he was pleading guilty to, was
satisfied with [] counsel representation, had not been threatened
by anyone to plead guilty, was pleading guilty of his own free will,
and was not under the influence of any substance. Moreover, [the
trial judge] observed Appellant during his plea hearing and found
no issue of understanding or intoxication on Appellant’s part nor
any issues between Appellant and his counsel. Thus, [the trial
court] did not find [Appellant’s] later claims of intoxication and
dissatisfaction with counsel to be credible. [Thus,] Appellant’s
claim is meritless and no relief is due.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/19/2026, at 10-11 (record citations omitted; brackets
supplied).
Based upon our standard of review, applicable law, and our review of
the certified record, we discern no abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea hearing, Appellant testified
that he fully discussed his decision to plead guilty with his attorneys and was
satisfied with their representation. N.T., 7/22/2025, at 5. He testified that
no one threatened him or promised him anything. Id. at 7. Appellant also
agreed that the decision to plead guilty was of his own free will and he was
not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or medication. Id. at 8.
Appellant simply cannot now say that he was untruthful during the plea
colloquy in order to support subsequent withdrawal. Moreover, Appellant did
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not present any evidence to support a colorable demonstration, under the
circumstances, that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness
and justice. Although Appellant currently argues that he had a potential
self-defense claim to support his claim of innocence, he did not advance that
argument at the plea withdrawal hearing or provide evidence for his
contention. Appellant cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The trial court properly exercised its discretion in assessing
the plausibility of Appellant’s claim of innocence. As such, Appellant is not
entitled to relief on this first issue.
Next, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and
sentenced him excessively with “an improper singular focus on retribution with
no consideration for Appellant’s background, mental health issues, and
potential for rehabilitation.” Appellant’s Brief at 8; see also id. at 11
(“Appellant received consecutive sentences on multiple counts [which] is also
indicative of a rigid, solitary focus on retribution with no consideration of
Appellant’s background or potential for rehabilitation because an excessive []
sentence was imposed without any consideration of the sentencing guidelines
and Appellant’s background.”). Appellant argues that he will “be at least 73
[years old] at the time of the expiration of his maximum sentences and stands
a limited chance of making that age.” Id. at 13. Finally, Appellant claims
“[t]here is too little consideration for those with mental health issues and
societal access to firearms.” Id. at 13. Appellant requests resentencing as a
result. Id. at 14.
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This Court has stated:
Generally, a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all defects and
defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the
legality of the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea. The
determination of whether discretionary aspects of sentencing may
be challenged after a guilty plea is entered depends upon the
actual terms of the plea bargain, specifically, to what degree a
sentence agreement has been reached.
Where the plea agreement provides specific penalties, an appeal
[challenging the discretionary aspects of a] sentence will not
stand; however, where the plea agreement provides for no
sentencing restrictions, the entry of a guilty plea will not preclude
a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
Alameda, 339 A.3d at 511 (internal citations, quotations, brackets and
ellipses omitted). Here, Appellant entered an open guilty plea that did not
purport to limit the sentencing court's discretion. Therefore, he may challenge
the discretionary aspects of the sentence.
We review discretionary sentencing challenges with great deference to
the sentencing court:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
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However, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence
must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the
right to pursue such a claim is not absolute. [4]
To invoke this Court's jurisdiction over this issue, [an appellant]
must satisfy a four-part test:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3)
whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that
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4 An appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the
sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable;
or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence
imposed by the sentencing court.
(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate court
shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)-(d).
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the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Id. at 511–512 (internal case citations, quotations, and original brackets
omitted; new brackets supplied). Here, Appellant has complied with the first
three procedural requirements. Moreover, an appellant’s “assertion that the
trial court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors, rendering his
sentence excessive, raises a substantial question.” Id. at 12 (citation
omitted).
In this case, before imposing sentence, the trial court noted that it
considered “the presentence investigation report, mental health record[s],
sentencing guidelines, sentencing code, mitigation report submitted by the
defense, and … the testimony from defense witnesses and the Commonwealth
witnesses, and the argument[s] of the lawyers.” N.T., 12/22/2025, at 50.
Initially, we note that where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI, this Court
must:
presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant's character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.
In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of
engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that
sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any
extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure.
Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the
sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. This is
particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can
be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of
the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that
the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would
be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in
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possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at
hand.
Alameda, 339 A.3d at 513 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the certified record belies Appellant’s sentencing claim. At
sentencing, the trial court heard all of the mitigation evidence that Appellant
currently relies upon in support of a lesser sentence. The trial court merely
rejected it. See id. (“The court's rejection of the mitigating evidence
presented to it is simply not equivalent with the court's failure to consider that
evidence.”). “Furthermore, sentencing courts are afforded broad discretion
in determining whether to run sentences consecutively.” Commonwealth v.
McIntyre, 2026 WL 2526576, at *5 (Pa. Super. 2026); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(a)(4) (In determining the sentence to be imposed, the trial court may
consider sentences of total confinement and may impose them consecutively
or concurrently). Based on our review of the certified record, the trial court's
findings set forth above, and our standard of review, we find no evidence or
reason to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/16/2026
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