Com. v. Berrios-Hernandez, R.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket20 MDA 2026
JudgeSullivan
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICARDO MANUEL BERRIOS- :
HERNANDEZ :
: No. 20 MDA 2026
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-38-CR-0001319-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Ricardo Manuel Berrios-Hernandez (“Berrios-Hernandez”) appeals from
the judgment of sentence following his conviction of aggravated assault –
causing serious bodily injury.1 Because we perceive no merit to Berrios-
Hernandez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm.
We glean the following facts from the trial court’s summary in its order
denying Berrios-Hernandez’s post-sentence motions. In June 2024, Berrios-
Hernandez and his friend, Reimundo Galarza, entered the Downtown Lounge
in Lebanon where M.N. (“the victim”), a woman, was working as a bartender,
with the assistance of two other bartenders/servers, Pita Cook (“Ms. Cook”)
and Gabrielle Bass (“Ms. Bass”). The victim instantly recognized Berrios-
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
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Hernandez, who wore a white t-shirt, as a man who had previously caused
issues at the bar by saying offensive sexual things to Ms. Cook. See Opinion
Denying Post-Sentence Motions, 12/17/25, at 3-4.
That night, after Berrios-Hernandez verbally harassed Ms. Cook, he was
ordered to leave the bar. Berrios-Hernandez and Galarza refused to leave and
declared they were going to play pool in the bar’s back room. M.N. told them
they had to leave and could not take their drinks with them because it would
violate the law. Berrios-Hernandez and Galarza began walking down the
hallway. Ms. Bass attempted, unsuccessfully, to take the drink from Berrios-
Hernandez’s hand. M.N. then grabbed the bottle, and, in response, Berrios-
Hernandez turned around and punched her in the face. See id. at 4-7.
M.N. blacked out and fell to the floor. When she regained consciousness,
blood was coming from her mouth. At the hospital, doctors determined the
left side of her jaw was shattered, the right side of her jaw was dislocated,
and her jaw had a second fracture. M.N. required surgery to repair her broken
and dislocated jaw. Her jaw was wired shut; the surgery also required the
placement of a permanent metal plate and screws. M.N. lived on a liquid diet
for two weeks and could not chew for an additional six to eight weeks. Nearly
one year later, she continued to suffer constant pain, numbness, and panic
and anxiety attacks. See id. at 5-7.
Surveillance footage revealed that Berrios-Hernandez and Galarza left
the bar and exchanged t-shirts. The next day, as a police officer spoke to
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Galarza at his home, a man matching Berrios-Hernandez’s description climbed
out of the back window of the residence. See id. at 8-9. The United States
Marshal’s Service later determined Berrios-Hernandez was in Chicago and a
task force arrested him there in July 2024. See id. at 9-10.
At trial, Galarza testified for the defense that M.N. grabbed Berrios-
Hernandez’s hand when taking the bottle from him. Berrios-Hernandez also
testified, and stated the three bartenders attacked him by striking him in the
neck and grabbing his wrist. Berrios-Hernandez testified he threw his arm out
in fear and self-defense, and he changed shirts with Galarza afterward
because he feared the women would make a renewed attack against him. See
id. at 10.
At trial, a jury convicted Berrios-Hernandez of aggravated assault –
inflicting serious bodily injury, and acquitted him of simple assault. The trial
court imposed a ten-to-twenty-year term of imprisonment. Both Berrios-
Hernandez and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
On appeal, Berrios-Hernandez raises one issue for our review:
Was the evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt on the charge of aggravated assault (18
[Pa.C.S.A.] § 2702 (a)(1), specifically as it pertains to the mens
rea for the offense?
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2 On February 25, 2026, the trial court entered an order adopting the Court’s
December 17, 2025, order denying Berrios-Hernandez’s post-sentence
motions as its opinion regarding Berrios-Hernandez’s challenge to his
aggravated assault conviction.
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See Berrios-Hernandez’s Brief at 6.
A sufficiency claim presents a question of law. As such, this Court’s
standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Berrios, 297 A.3d
798, 803 (Pa. Super. 2023). Our scope of review is limited to considering the
evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as the verdict winner. See id. When viewing the evidence in that light, this
Court must determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom is sufficient to establish every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 313 A.3d 458, 461 (Pa.
Super. 2024). The evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of
innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented. It is not within the province of the Court to re-weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. See
Commonwealth v. Bernarsky, 348 A.3d 304, 320 (Pa. Super. 2025).
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is defined
as bodily injury “which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes
serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
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A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or
hopes that they exist.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302 (b)(1). A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302 (b)(2). A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). For the purposes of Section 2701(a)(1), when a
person actually inflicts serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth need only
prove he does so recklessly, i.e., under circumstances which almost ensure
that injury or death will occur. See Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.3d
1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). A defendant acts recklessly for
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purposes of Section 2701(a)(1) when he waits until the victim is facing away
and hits him with another force to break his jaw and knock him unconscious.
See Interest of N.A.D., 205 A.3d 1237, 1240 (Pa. 2019).
Both the attempt to change one’s appearance and flight are admissible
as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 676
A.2d 1178, 1183 (Pa. 1996) (change of appearance); Commonwealth v.
Carter, 320 A.3d 140, 150 (Pa. Super. 2024) (flight).
Berrios-Hernandez concedes the victim suffered serious bodily injury but
asserts no reasonable person could find he acted intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly, in part because he testified he did not specifically attempt to break
M.N.’s jaw, and the Commonwealth presented no evidence to show he acted
intentionally or knowingly. See Berrios-Hernandez’s Brief at 12-14. He
further asserts that none of the factors identified in Commonwealth v.
Alexander, 383 A.3d 887, 889 (Pa. 1978), other than gender difference, was
present in the case that could make one punch an aggravated assault, and
notes he left the area “without doing additional damage, he had no weapon,
and he made no statements indicating an intent to inflict further injury[.]”
See Berrios-Hernandez’s Brief at 15. Berrios-Hernandez states the case
differs from Commonwealth v. Burton, 2 A.3d 598 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en
banc), a one-punch aggravated assault case, because there was no
provocation in Burton, while he, by contrast, was engaged in a physical
struggle the bartenders initiated, and further, unlike Burton, he did not
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celebrate his assault. See Berrios-Hernandez’s Brief at 16. Finally, he asserts
his conduct did not meet the required standard of recklessness, which requires
that life threatening injury is essentially certain to occur. See id. at 16.
The trial court found the evidence showed Berrios-Hernandez provoked
an altercation with three younger, smaller, female bartenders, disregarded an
instruction not to take his beer bottle with him, and after M.N. took it from his
hand, turned, and without hesitation punched the unsuspecting woman in the
face, then fled from the scene and attempted to alter his appearance. Finally,
the court noted that where a defendant inflicts serious bodily injury, the
Commonwealth need only prove recklessness.
Having reviewed the record, the case law, the parties’ arguments, and
the trial court’s opinion, we conclude the evidence sufficiently established
Berrios-Hernandez committed aggravated assault. Because there is no
dispute M.N.’s injuries constituted serious bodily injury, we are only called to
determine whether the evidence supported a finding Berrios-Hernandez acted
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Upon review, we do so based on an
examination of the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as the verdict winner, not to Berrios-Hernandez as he requests. See
Commonwealth v. Brunson, 347 A.3d 808, 820 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(rejecting appellant’s attempt to recast the evidence in the light most
favorable to himself on sufficiency review). The evidence shows that Berrios-
Hernandez responded to M.N. grabbing the bottle from his hand by turning
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and punching her in the face with such force that he broke her jaw in two
places and knocked her unconscious. We also note the facts that he fled the
scene, immediately changed shirts with his cohort, and fled to Chicago, are all
indicative of consciousness of guilt. See N.T., 4/23/25, at 239-40.
In light of the facts and circumstances surrounding Berrios-Hernandez’s
punch, the jury’s verdict and the facts they considered at trial there was
sufficient evidence to show Berrios-Hernandez consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious bodily injury to the victim,
constituting a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3);
Interest of N.A.D. 205 A.3d at 1240-41.3 There is, accordingly, no merit to
Berrios-Hernandez’s sufficiency claim.
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3 We find Berrios-Hernandez’s cite citations distinguishable. Alexander
involved a single punch that did not cause the victim to lose consciousness,
and the Commonwealth conceded the punch to the victim’s nose did not
constitute serious bodily injury. See Alexander, 383 A.2d at 889. Because
such injury was absent, the Supreme Court held that an aggravated assault
conviction could only be sustained if the appellant acted with the intent to
inflict serious bodily injury. See id. Here, Berrios-Hernandez does not dispute
he inflicted serious bodily injury and that the mens rea of recklessness suffices
to prove aggravated assault.
Burton also fails to support Berrios-Hernandez’s claim. In that case, the
appellant inflicted serious bodily injury. Although the Court recognized that
Burton’s guilt could be established with evidence of recklessness, it concluded
Burton intended to cause serious bodily injury because, inter alia, he was
younger than the victim, initiated a confrontation with him, and laughed after
inflicting the injury on the unprepared victim. See Burton, 2 A.3d at 603-04.
That the evidence in Burton was strong enough to prove the intent to inflict
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2026
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serious bodily injury is irrelevant to whether Berrios-Hernandez acted
recklessly against M.N., nor is his guilt negated by the fact he fled the scene,
conscious of his guilt, rather than celebrating over the unconscious victim’s
body.
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