Full Opinion

J-S35018-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KEITH WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 2898 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009635-2014 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 Keith Williams appeals from the order granting in part and dismissing in part his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 Williams asserts the PCRA court erred in finding his PCRA petition was untimely filed as he believes he presented a valid claim of newly-discovered evidence. After careful review, we vacate in part and affirm in part the PCRA order. Based upon the procedural posture of this case, we find it unnecessary to reiterate the factual background. 2 Briefly, we note that Williams was ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 2 For a detailed factual history, we refer to Commonwealth v. Williams, 240 A.3d 147 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 11, 2020) (unpublished memorandum). J-S35018-26 convicted after a bench trial of aggravated assault, person not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).3 The court sentenced Williams on December 1, 2016, to an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. Specifically, Williams was sentenced to 10 to 20 years of incarceration for aggravated assault, a consecutive sentence of 5 to 10 years of incarceration for persons not to possess firearms, and a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years of incarceration for PIC. The court imposed no further sentence on the charge of firearms not to be carried without a license. Williams filed a timely direct appeal to this Court, which affirmed his judgment of sentence on February 27, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 259 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 1062865 (Pa. Super. filed Feb 27, 2018) (unpublished memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on September 4, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 193 A.3d 344 (Pa. 2018). On September 6, 2018, Williams filed his first PCRA petition. After the PCRA court dismissed the petition, this Court affirmed the dismissal on August 11, 2020. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 240 A.3d 147 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 11, 2020). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on ____________________________________________ 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively. -2- J-S35018-26 February 8, 2021. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2021). Williams filed the instant, counseled PCRA petition on November 3, 2024. After multiple responses by the Commonwealth and Williams, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Williams’s PCRA petition on October 6, 2025. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Williams responded and the court granted in part and dismissed in part Williams’s PCRA petition on October 31, 2025. Specifically, the PCRA court held that Williams’s sentence for PIC was illegal and modified the sentence from 5 to 10 years’ incarceration to 2.5 to 5 years’ incarceration. All other terms of the sentence remained the same. The remainder of claims raised by Williams in his PCRA petition were dismissed. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. The PCRA court did not order Williams to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court referred this Court to the October 31, 2025, order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Williams raises three questions for our review: I. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Williams’[s] challenge to the February 28, 2017 corrected order of sentence on timeliness grounds when Williams established the newly discovered facts exception under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), in that notice of the sentencing correction was served solely upon prior counsel Louis Savino, Esquire, who had already been replaced as counsel of record by Donald Bermudez, Esquire, on January 24, 2017, more than a month before the correction was entered? II. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Williams’[s] claim that the February 28, 2017 corrected order of sentence was an unlawful and void modification of his original sentence, where (a) the trial -3- J-S35018-26 court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence after a timely notice of appeal had been filed; (b) the original sentencing transcript was ambiguous and therefore the original sentencing order, which was silent as to consecutive/concurrent structure, controlled under binding authority; and (c) the modification was accomplished without notice to Williams or an opportunity to he heard, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 and constitutional due process? III. Did the PCRA court err by simply modifying the illegal sentence imposed on the [PIC] conviction, rather than vacating the entire sentencing structure and remanding for a full resentencing, where the illegal sentence was inextricably intertwined with the overall sentencing scheme and the improper consecutive structure imposed by the February 28, 2017 correction further infected the aggregate sentence? Appellant’s Brief, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers omitted). We begin with our well-established standard of review: Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court is the record contains any support for those findings. We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Sargent, 359 A.3d 441, 447 (Pa. Super. 2026) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). We must first address Williams’s first claim as it involves the jurisdiction of the PCRA court and this Court. Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant PCRA petition was timely filed. The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. -4- J-S35018-26 Further, to confirm proper jurisdiction, it is appropriate for an appellate court to consider sua sponte the timeliness of a PCRA petition. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, and therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date that judgment of sentence becomes final. A judgment becomes final for purposes of the PCRA at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. The period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Additionally, for a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the petitioner must make a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. *** If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The statutory exceptions are colloquially known as exceptions for government interference, a newly-discovered fact, or a newly-recognized constitutional right which applies retroactively. Moreover, [an a]ppellant ha[s] to plead and prove that he filed his petition within one year of the date any claims for application of the statutory time-bar exceptions could have been presented. We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Giles, 357 A.3d 555, 559-60 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Williams argues he met the newly-discovered fact exception because he did not know the original sentencing order was silent as to whether the -5- J-S35018-26 sentences ran concurrently or consecutively, that the department of corrections sought clarification from the trial court regarding those sentences, and that the trial court entered a corrected sentencing order. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17. Williams, however, did not advise either the PCRA court, or this Court, of when he discovered these facts. See id. at 4-19; PCRA Petition, 11/3/24, at 1-24. Williams merely states that he did not learn of the corrected sentencing order “until many years later.” Appellant’s Brief, at 8. This Court has held: To invoke the newly-discovered fact time-bar exception the petitioner must establish that (1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and (2) they could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. The facts must be newly-discovered not merely newly-discovered or newly-willing sources that corroborate previously known facts or previously raised claims. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests; a petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Mickeals, 335 A.3d 13, 21 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hether a petitioner meets the requirements of the newly discovered facts exception ultimately turns on the petitioner’s knowledge of previously unknown facts, not new evidence of a known fact, related to his claim.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 350 A.3d 12, 25-26 (Pa. 2026). Here, Williams does not tell us when he discovered these alleged new facts nor does he explain why he could not have discovered these facts sooner -6- J-S35018-26 with the exercise of due diligence. Other than merely claiming his “claim first ripened when he discovered these specific predicate facts and [that he] promptly filed within one year of that discovery,” Williams does not provide us with anything to support his claim that he meets the newly-discovered fact exception to the time-bar. Appellant’s Brief, at 18. Our review of the PCRA court record fares no better. Williams did not allege in his PCRA petition when he discovered these alleged new facts. See PCRA Petition, 11/3/24, at 1-15. The Commonwealth responded to Williams’s petition, noting that Williams “does not explain when or how he first learned of the corrected sentencing order or the fact that his PIC sentence was illegal. Moreover, he does not explain why he could not have learned of his claims earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth’s Response, 5/23/25, at 7. We agree with the Commonwealth. Because Williams has not informed the PCRA court nor this Court when he learned of these alleged new facts, we find Williams failed to establish the newly-discovered fact exception to the time-bar. As such, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Williams’s claims. However, we must address one final issue. In his third claim, Williams asserts the PCRA court erred in modifying his illegal PIC sentence instead of vacating the sentence on all convictions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 27. The Commonwealth notes that “the PCRA court did not have the jurisdiction to correct [Williams’s] illegal sentence because [he] did not successfully plead -7- J-S35018-26 and prove an exception to the PCRA time-bar.” Appellee’s Brief, at 11 (footnote omitted). The Commonwealth is correct. Because Williams failed to establish a time-bar exception, neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims. Despite this, the PCRA court resentenced Williams on the PIC conviction, finding that the sentence imposed was illegal. The PCRA did not have jurisdiction to amend the illegal sentence, and we are constrained to vacate that portion of the order and reinstate the original sentence.4 The PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining collateral review of a judgment of sentence. A court may entertain a challenge to the legality of the sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the PCRA context, jurisdiction is tied to the filing of a timely PCRA petition. Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto. Thus, a collateral claim regarding the legality of a sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Balance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and brackets omitted). We have emphasized that “no court may disregard, alter, or create equitable exceptions to the timeliness requirement in order to reach the ____________________________________________ 4 We note that the alteration of the original sentence did not affect the overall sentencing scheme, as the 5-10 year sentence for PIC was ran concurrent to a 5-10 year sentence for person not to possess firearms. Similarly, our remand to reinstate the original sentence does not require remand for a new sentencing hearing because the aggregate sentence remains the same. See Commonwealth v. Given, 244 A.3d 508, 512 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that a remand for resentencing is unnecessary when the disposition does not upset the overall sentencing scheme). -8- J-S35018-26 substance of a petitioner’s arguments.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 324 A.3d 569, 576 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Since Williams never established a timeliness exception, the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to correct the illegal sentence. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the PCRA court erred in amending the sentence for PIC. That portion of the PCRA court’s order is vacated. Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 10/27/2026 -9-