Full Opinion

J-A20032-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOSE DIEGO ROMAN JR. : : Appellant : No. 1096 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 5, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000392-2023 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant, Jose Diego Roman Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his nolo contendere plea to seven sexual offenses committed against his ex-girlfriend’s daughter. Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing and that the Commonwealth failed to establish that it would have been substantially prejudiced if Appellant were permitted to withdraw his plea. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings. On November 28, 2022, East Hempfield Township Police Department Officer Ethan Etter filed a criminal complaint against Appellant. The attached affidavit of probable cause stated that Appellant, the victim’s mother (“L.L.”) J-A20032-26 and the victim (“Victim”)1 had previously resided together, and that Appellant committed multiple sexual assaults between 2017 and 2019, beginning when Victim was 13 years old. The police became involved after Victim’s boyfriend “encouraged her to stand up for herself, tell her mother, and make a report to the police.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/28/22, at ¶ 4. The affidavit detailed several specific instances of sexual contact. The Commonwealth filed its initial criminal information on February 10, 2023, followed by an amended information on March 5, 2024 charging Appellant with seven counts.2 On March 11, 2024, the parties appeared for jury selection. Appellant opted to enter a nolo contendere plea to the amended information. The Commonwealth offered the following summary of the evidence it intended to present if the matter proceeded to trial. Your Honor, this occurred approximately between 2017 and 2019 at two of [Appellant]’s households . . . . The victim in this case was . . . the daughter of [Appellant’s] girlfriend. The victim in this case was born in 2004. [Appellant] was born in 1985. They lived together at these two households. [Appellant] did intentionally, knowingly place his penis in the minor victim’s mouth. He also put his mouth on the minor victim’s vagina. He did knowingly and intentionally attempt to place his penis in the minor victim’s vagina. He slapped her buttocks on ____________________________________________ 1 We use this designation for ease of readability as the victim’s initials are also L.L. 2 The Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a victim under 16, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7); statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b), criminal attempt – statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a); indecent assault – victim under 16, indecent exposure, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3127(a); and corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. 6301(a)(1)(ii). -2- J-A20032-26 multiple occasions and touched her breasts. He masturbated in front of her and made her come into contact with seminal fluid. And this was the course of conduct which occurred while she was between the ages of 13 and 16 years old. N.T., 3/11/24, at 8. The trial court deferred sentencing pending the preparation of a presentence investigation report. On April 9, 2024, the trial court entered an order stating that the report had been completed and set sentencing for April 29, 2024; that proceeding was canceled for unexplained reasons by order dated April 15, 2024. On May 21, 2024, Shawn M. Dorward, Esq., entered his appearance for Appellant. Appellant, through counsel, then filed a petition to withdraw his plea pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 5913 on June 7, 2024. Appellant acknowledged that a “bare assertion of innocence” does not require a court to grant the motion. Motion to Withdraw Plea, 5/21/24, at ¶ 16 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103, 1107 (Pa. 2015)). Appellant supported his innocence claim with the following representations: Since the . . . no contest plea several individuals have come forward and prepared written statement[]s concerning the juvenile complaining witness’ truthfulness regarding her allegations against [Appellant]. Attached as Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of a notarized letter prepared by [L.L.], the complaining witness’ mother. Attached as Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of a notarized letter prepared by Lydoris Rosado. [L.L.] and the complaining witness moved in with Ms. Rosado and ____________________________________________ 3 “At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). -3- J-A20032-26 her family in July 2022 after the allegations in this case came out. Attached as Exhibit C, is a true and correct copy of [Rosado’s daughter]’s letter confirming conversations she had with the complaining witness where she explained she was not truthful with what she said [Appellant] did to her. Id. ¶ 26. L.L.’s letter stated that Victim “did not seem as bothered as I was . . . considering the accusations.” See id. (Exhibit A). L.L. wrote that in November of an unspecified year, L.L. moved to an apartment while her daughter “moved to Ohio with her dad.” Id. Next, on May 6, 2023, L.L. traveled to Ohio to meet her daughter, where the two discussed an “article that came out in the newspaper,” which was apparently about the accusations; the victim told L.L. that “the newspaper ‘is lying.’” Id. L.L. also wrote that the Commonwealth subpoenaed her for trial, but she informed the assistant district attorney “that I was not going to testify for them, I was going to testify for the defense. Because of the conversation I had with her in Ohio. Where she is admitting to me that the charges are not true.” Id. Rosado’s letter indicated that she told her oldest daughter, M.R., that she and L.L. planned to attend Appellant’s trial. Id. (Exhibit B). M.R. expressed surprise that the case was going forward, with M.R. informing Rosado that Victim told M.R. she did not like Appellant and believed L.L. “could find someone better.” Id. M.R.’s letter expanded on her conversations with Victim. M.R. stated that on one occasion Victim “brought up the subject, and stated that she had to keep pretending or her and her mother were going to get in trouble. [Victim] also stated that she was tired of going to the therapist -4- J-A20032-26 and keeping up the act.” Id. (Exhibit C). M.R. asked Victim to explain what she meant, and Victim mentioned that she was “pretending about the situation,” which M.R. interpreted “to mean she was lying.” Id. Appellant argued that these representations established more than a barebones assertion of innocence and therefore the court should apply the “liberal allowance of presentence withdrawal of pleas” and grant relief. Id. ¶ 9 (citation omitted). The trial court canceled sentencing and ordered the Commonwealth to file a response. The Commonwealth’s answer described the three letters as “character letters calling the victim a liar,” and represented that “[L.L.’s] stance on the case was well known to [Appellant] prior to his plea of guilty.” Commonwealth’s Response, 9/8/24, at 1; 2. Specifically, the Commonwealth explained: [L.L.] has been an adverse party to the case from its inception, has provided a statement asserting [Appellant]’s guilt to the police, and prior to trial represented that she lied to police and would lie on the stand. Aware that her lack of cooperation with a subpoena might result in a material witness warrant, [L.L.’s] private counsel advised her to appear for trial. A notarized statement after [the plea], crafted towards her previously admitted falsehoods, is hardly “new evidence” of innocence. Id. at 2. The Commonwealth also asserted that it would be prejudiced if the motion were granted, as Victim had moved.4 Moreover, the Commonwealth ____________________________________________ 4 It is not clear whether the Commonwealth was referring to the move to Ohio discussed in L.L.’s letter or another location. -5- J-A20032-26 asserted that it was also prejudiced because L.L.’s statements “have, for the third time, changed, creating further inconsistency which now needs to be investigated.” Id. On September 12, 2024, the trial court denied the motion without a hearing. See Order and Memorandum, 9/12/24, at unnumbered 2. The memorandum stated: “[A]s the Commonwealth points out, [Appellant] was aware of one witness’ two different statements before he entered the plea.” Id. Thus, “[n]o new evidence has been put forward to meet the standard of a fair-and-just reason to grant the withdrawal, especially when the Commonwealth has been substantially prejudiced.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that “[e]ven giving [Appellant] the liberal review he deserves, based on the facts before the court, the court concludes [Appellant] has not met his burden of coming forward with any new facts or allegations that he did not know at the time of his [p]lea.” Id. Alternatively, the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth would be prejudiced because Victim had moved and its witnesses were present and ready to testify had the case proceeded. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, L.L. “has now made a third different statement regarding the matter.” Id. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, raising a due process claim. Therein, Appellant argued that “[t]he private interest that will be affected by denying the . . . request to withdraw his guilty [sic] plea is the opportunity to have his case heard and decided by an impartial panel of Lancaster County.” Motion to Reconsider, 9/18/24, ¶ 17. He asserted that the trial court’s denial -6- J-A20032-26 of his motion to withdraw his plea “denied him the ability to correct a wrong and face his accuser,” and “denied him the ability to take advantage of all the constitutional protections and safeguards that our criminal justice system affords.” Id. ¶ 18. Appellant averred that the Commonwealth and trial court’s analysis misapplied the law, as Appellant “is unaware of any case law that suggests [Appellant] must establish ‘new evidence’ in order to withdraw his plea.” Id. ¶ 26. Ultimately, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced Appellant on March 5, 2025, to an aggregate period of 10 to 20 years of incarceration. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on March 14, 2025. On July 18, 2025, Appellant requested that the clerk of courts enter an order denying the motion by operation of law. The trial court issued an order on August 6, 2025, stating that the court had not received the motion and informed Appellant of his appeal rights. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 11, 2025, and complied with the trial court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.5 The ____________________________________________ 5 As Appellant noted in the motion, subject to exceptions not applicable here, if the trial court fails to decide the motion within 120 days the motion shall be deemed denied by operation of law. See Rule 720(B)(3)(a). In that case, the clerk of courts is required to enter an order on behalf of the trial court. Id. (B)(3)(c). The 120th day for purposes of the rule was July 14, 2025. Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely from the date the order should have been denied. See also Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that a breakdown in court operations may excuse an untimely appeal in cases where the governmental units fail to comply with Rule 720). -7- J-A20032-26 trial court issued an opinion responding to Appellant’s errors. Appellant presents two issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant]’s request to withdraw his no contest plea prior to sentencing as this denial violated his right to [d]ue [p]rocess as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution? 2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant]’s request to withdraw his no contest plea prior to sentencing as this denial was in direct contrast to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and our [a]ppellate [c]ourt’s [p]recedent? Appellant’s Brief at 1. In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by denying his motion to withdraw his plea. See id. at 11-12. The following excerpt summarizes his essential points: Determining the constitutional sufficiency of procedures implicating due process protection “requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected.” * * * The private interest that was affected by denying the Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was the opportunity to have his case heard and decided by an impartial panel of Lancaster County. In denying Appellant’s Petition, the trial court denied him the ability to correct a wrong and face his accuser. The trial court denied him the ability to take advantage of all of the constitutional protections and safeguards that our criminal justice system affords. Depriving [Appellant] of the ability to withdraw his plea prevented his case from being heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. -8- J-A20032-26 As indicated, Appellant reasons that the trial court’s failure to grant his motion acted to deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a jury trial. His argument overlooks that Appellant waived the various constitutional rights concerning a jury trial by entering his nolo contendere plea. See Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003) (explaining that a defendant routinely waives “a plethora of constitutional rights by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial by his peers, the right to have the Commonwealth prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and his right to confront any witnesses against him”).6 Our Supreme Court has explained: [T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair- and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291–92 (Pa. 2015) (footnote and citation omitted). The trial court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Consistent with the well-established standards governing trial court discretion, it is important that appellate courts honor trial courts’ discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants have ____________________________________________ 6 “[F]or purposes of a criminal case, a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty.” Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 114 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). -9- J-A20032-26 made sincere and colorable claims that permitting withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and justice. Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019). Additionally, we must “review[] the trial court’s actual holding to determine whether the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was the product of a misapplication of the law or whether the trial court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 299 (Pa. 2021).7 Because every denial of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea could be said to deny a defendant “the ability to correct a wrong and face his accuser,” crediting Appellant’s argument would eliminate the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny pre-sentence motions to withdraw pleas. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Thus, Appellant attempts to displace the abuse of discretion standard codified by Rule of Criminal Procedure 591. Appellant develops no argument that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to withdraw his plea pre-sentencing. Therefore, the germane question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his request. Indeed, the trial court must apply a liberal standard in these cases largely because of the importance of those rights. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 301 A.2d 829, 830 (Pa. 1973) (explaining that in ruling on a motion to withdraw a pre-sentence plea “courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo a waiver ____________________________________________ 7 The DiStefano case involved an admissibility of evidence question. However, the standard is logically applicable to any abuse of discretion decision. - 10 - J-A20032-26 of all constitutional rights that surround the right to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our Constitution”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we reject Appellant’s first issue. In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Appellant’s Brief at 15- 26. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the claim without an evidentiary hearing. Both parties maintain that Norton supports their respective positions. In that case, the Commonwealth charged Norton with sexual crimes involving the abuse of his paramour’s granddaughter, who was born in 2004, with the incidents taking place “on at least five occasions from September of 2008 through April of 2012.” Norton, 201 A.3d at 114. Norton filed a motion seeking “an order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting at trial evidence regarding sexual abuse [Norton] allegedly inflicted upon his now- adult daughter (‘Daughter’) when Daughter was a child in the late 1980s and early 1990s.” Id. at 115. The trial court denied the motion and on November 7, 2014, the matter “was scheduled to commence for purposes of jury selection. However, on that date, the parties informed the trial court that they had reached an agreement.” Id. Norton entered a nolo contendere plea to two counts, and the Commonwealth agreed to an aggregate term of two to six years of incarceration. Id. The trial court accepted the plea and, following postponements, scheduled sentencing for May 7, 2015. Approximately four - 11 - J-A20032-26 months after his plea, Norton filed on March 23, 2015, a motion to withdraw and proceed to trial. The trial court initially granted the motion; however, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration following the Carrasquillo decision. The trial court held a hearing, at which “the Commonwealth questioned the plausibility and sincerity of [Norton]’s assertion of innocence and suggested that [Norton] simply was seeking to delay the prosecution and the consequences that awaited him.” Id. at 117. Additionally, the Commonwealth “posited that strong evidence of record indicates that [Norton]’s assertion of innocence was implausible and that fairness and justice did not require the court to allow [Norton] to withdraw his plea.” Id. On appeal, Norton argued that he had always maintained his innocence, emphasizing that his nolo contendere plea did not equate to an admission of guilt to the crimes of which he was convicted. In this regard, Counsel also asserted that, when the [Sexual Offenders Assessment Board] interviewed [Norton] to assess his sexual offender status, he “refused to participate, maintaining his innocence.” N.T., 6/25/2015, at 7. Counsel further stated that, if permitted to withdraw his plea, [Norton] intended to contest the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial by attacking [the v]ictim’s credibility, as she answered, “I don’t remember,” at least 15 times during the preliminary hearing. Id. at 8. Id. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion. Applying Carrasquillo, the trial court determined that Norton failed to make the required “colorable demonstration” that withdrawal of his plea would promote - 12 - J-A20032-26 “fairness and justice.” Id. (quoting trial court order). In support, the trial court cited the fact Norton entered his plea “the day that the court and parties were set to pick a jury.” Id. Furthermore, Norton “simply averred that he was innocent and could not live with himself for taking a plea to offenses of which he is innocent.” Id. at 117-18 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Addressing the substantive claim of innocence by reference to the victim’s credibility, “the court found that [Norton] had ample time to discover and inspect the Commonwealth’s evidence well prior to his plea,” and presumed that Norton “and his counsel considered all of the evidence” in deciding whether to accept the plea. Id. at 118. Accordingly, the “bare assertion of innocence did not establish that withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice.” Id. at 119. Our Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s order affirming the trial court’s decision. We quote at length the Court’s application of the abuse of discretion standard: Turning to the circumstances of this case, in support of his presentence motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, [Norton] asserted in the trial court that: (1) he is innocent; (2) he cannot live with himself for taking a plea; and (3) he wants to test the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial. Simply put, the last two assertions add nothing to the first. [Norton]’s contention that he could not live with himself for entering his plea is self-serving makeweight and does not add any substantive support to the plausibility of his claim of innocence. [Norton]’s desire to test the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial is equally non-substantive. Generally speaking, trials are always proceedings in which the parties test each other’s evidence, and [Norton]’s belated wish for a trial fails to bolster his claim of innocence, particularly in light of the fact that any vulnerability in the Commonwealth’s evidence, - 13 - J-A20032-26 specifically [the v]ictim’s testimony, was well known to [Norton] prior to him entering his plea. In other words, for all intents and purposes, the reality is that [Norton] solely asserted his innocence in an attempt to withdraw his plea presentence. The trial court was intimately familiar with this case, having observed [Norton] throughout the various trial court proceedings. Additionally, the court demonstrated a studied understanding of the law in this area. For example, the trial court appropriately assessed the plausibility of [Norton]’s contentions supporting withdrawal of his plea when it considered the timing and entry of the nolo contendere plea, which occurred in chambers while a prospective jury pool waited in the courtroom. The trial court also properly factored into its exercise of discretion [Norton]’s knowledge of his available defenses when he pleaded and then inexplicably waited four months to file his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 121–22. In sum, “the trial court assessed the nature of the claim [Norton] offered in support of his motion to withdraw his plea, [and] the court reasonably determined that . . . [Norton] simply was presenting a bare assertion of innocence.” Id. at 122. In Commonwealth v. Garcia, we applied Norton and reversed an order denying a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. There, the Commonwealth charged Garcia with aggravated indecent assault after authorities responded to a sexual assault in progress at the home of Garcia’s ex-girlfriend. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Super. 2022). The police found Garcia in the bushes outside the victim’s apartment building and his DNA was found on a vaginal swab taken from the victim’s sexual assault examination. Garcia entered a plea on March 4, 2020, then filed a motion to withdraw on April 22, 2020, asserting his innocence. - 14 - J-A20032-26 The trial court held a hearing, at which the victim testified consistently with the basic allegations set forth at Garcia’s guilty plea hearing. The victim testified that she had invited Garcia to her apartment about one week before the assault. Additionally, she had obtained a Protection From Abuse order against Garcia in 2017 based on an alleged sexual assault, which was not prosecuted in criminal court due to the victim’s reluctance to proceed. Id. at 1022. Garcia, who did not testify or offer any evidence at the hearing, “argued that, because the victim and [Garcia] had been in a relationship over many years, and because the victim permitted [Garcia] into her apartment a week before the assault, [Garcia] had a viable consent defense.” Id. The Commonwealth argued that “there was no viable claim of innocence” because Garcia “made incriminating statements to police regarding the 2019 allegations and that he had confessed to police regarding the 2017 allegations.” Id. The trial court denied the motion. Garcia then filed a second pre-sentence motion to withdraw, “this time asserting newly discovered evidence.” Id. Garcia asserted that during proceedings to determine whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator “he received police reports he had not seen any earlier. The reports referenced the two text messages the victim allegedly sent to her sister during the assault.” Id. However, the police “never followed up or attempted to obtain evidence of the messages in question.” Id. The Commonwealth responded that Garcia “was aware of the text messages, based on the victim’s - 15 - J-A20032-26 preliminary hearing testimony.” Id. at 1022-23. Moreover, “the police reports in question had been provided earlier.” Id. The Commonwealth “argued that the alleged after discovered evidence would, at most, challenge the victim’s credibility and thus was not a valid basis for plea withdrawal. The trial court denied the second motion without conducting a hearing.” Id. at 1023. We reversed, explaining that “despite repeated promptings from the trial court” Garcia declined to testify at the hearing, precluding the trial court from “assess[ing] his credibility.” Id. at 1026. Nevertheless, “the record is not completely bereft of evidence,” as the record supported “a plausible consent defense” based on a “consensual visit to the victim’s apartment just prior to the alleged assault, as well as a prior relationship with the victim, in support of a consent defense.” Id. That was “more than the bare, ‘makeweight’ assertion of innocence at issue in Norton.” Id. Furthermore, “there is no strong evidence to undermine the plausibility of [Garcia]’s consent defense.” Id. While the Commonwealth cited in its brief “contemporaneous confessions to police,” we pointed out that those “were not a part of the proffer at the guilty plea hearing, and the Commonwealth did not produce them, or any other evidence, at the withdrawal hearing.” Id. at 1026-27. “Because . . . the strength of the Commonwealth’s case, in relation to the nature of the defendant’s claim of innocence, is relevant to our analysis, the Commonwealth would have done well to develop a record in opposition to plea withdrawal, regardless of [Garcia]’s limited evidence.” Id. at 1027. - 16 - J-A20032-26 Here, applying the abuse of discretion standard in light of the preceding cases, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable, as it relies on an incomplete record. The inquiry is “whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. The policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, consistent with the affordance of a degree of discretion to the common pleas courts.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292. The trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing has left this Court with a diminished record, which does not, as explained infra, support the trial court’s conclusion. We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred by refusing to consider the primary evidence cited in support of his innocence claim—the allegations contained within the notarized letters—on the grounds that Appellant knew of those facts when he entered the plea.8 Appellant repeats the claim raised in his motion to reconsider, i.e., settled caselaw does not “suggest[] [Appellant] must establish ‘new evidence’ in order to withdraw his plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. ____________________________________________ 8 The trial court also concluded that the content of the letters were inadmissible. Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/25, at 3 (stating that “the contents of these letters were inadmissible hearsay, if not double or triple hearsay”). Because we remand for further proceedings, we decline to address the admissibility of the statements and what role that issue should play in the application of the governing standards of law. The parties are, of course, free to address that point on remand. - 17 - J-A20032-26 First, the facts surrounding Appellant’s personal knowledge, as opposed to the information known by his attorneys, appears to be a matter of dispute best resolved by credibility findings following a hearing. The Commonwealth’s reply at the trial court level cited Appellant’s opportunity to consult with plea counsel, Heather Reiner, Esq., regarding the information set forth in the notarized letters. See Commonwealth’s Response, 9/8/24, at 3 (“On the plea colloquy, [Appellant] indicated he had ample opportunity to consult with his attorney before entering his plea.”). This response ignores the fact that Appellant retained new counsel, and Attorney Dorward’s petition alleged that if Appellant “knew these witnesses possessed this information he would have never entered a plea and he would have went to trial.” Motion to Withdraw Plea, 5/21/24, ¶ 27. Appellant’s brief similarly asserts that the “trial court also relied upon the Commonwealth’s contention that [Appellant] was aware of one witness’ two different statements before he entered his plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. See also id. (“Even if [Appellant] was aware of [L.L.]’s belief that her daughter was lying about the allegations, there is nothing of record, other than the letters attached to his motion to withdraw his plea, that would suggest he had any knowledge or information about Lydoris Rosado and her juvenile daughter.”). Whether Appellant lacked knowledge of the letters’ contents is relevant to the assessment of whether Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea should be granted. Regardless, even if Appellant knew of the information and opted to enter the plea despite that knowledge, the trial court erred by concluding those - 18 - J-A20032-26 points were irrelevant to the legal assessment of whether Appellant presented something more than a “barebones” assertion of innocence. In Norton, the appellant “highlighted the extent to which [the victim’s] testimony at the preliminary hearing was riddled with ‘I don’t remember’ responses to questions about the alleged incidents.” Norton, 201 A.3d at 129 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Majority concluded that the “trial court also properly factored into its exercise of discretion [Norton]’s knowledge of his available defenses when he pleaded and then inexplicably waited four months to file his motion to withdraw his plea.” Id. at 122. In Garcia, we did not interpret Norton to announce a per se rule that a defendant cannot point to previously known facts to support a claim of innocence. Here, as in Norton, [Garcia] was aware of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony well in advance of his plea. Thus, he entered his plea well after the basis for his subsequent withdrawal motion was readily apparent. In other respects, however, we find Norton distinguishable. There, the defendant waited four months to withdraw his plea, and the Norton Court characterized his claim— that he could not live with himself for entering the plea and that he wanted to test the Commonwealth’s evidence—as non- substantive. Instantly, [Garcia]’s withdrawal motion was much more prompt, and he relies on a consensual visit to the victim’s apartment just prior to the alleged assault, as well as a prior relationship with the victim, in support of a consent defense. Thus, [Garcia] has made more than the bare, “makeweight” assertion of innocence at issue in Norton. Garcia, 280 A.3d at 1026. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Islas we held that the trial court erred in denying a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. We summarized the circumstances presented by Islas at his evidentiary hearing: - 19 - J-A20032-26 At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, Islas testified that: he did not engage in the charged conduct; he had maintained his innocence when interviewed by law enforcement; had the conduct occurred as alleged, it would have been witnessed by other campers and counselors in the cabin at the time; the victim had a motive to fabricate the charges; the victim had delayed in reporting the first incident; and Islas was of good character, had no criminal record, and had never received a similar complaint in the many years he had been working in the field. Islas further testified that his new counsel had explained to him, as prior counsel had not, his available defenses, including his ability to call character witnesses on his behalf. Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2017). In that case, Islas necessarily knew that he had maintained his innocence and he presumably had knowledge of many of the other cited facts when he entered his plea. Furthermore, the quoted portion indicates that failures by counsel relative to trial preparedness or advice may be appropriately considered at the pre-sentence stage.9 Therefore, knowledge of the information is appropriately considered in ruling on the motion, but it cannot as a matter of law outright bar relief. However, the trial court opinion appeared to attach dispositive effect to Appellant’s (disputed) knowledge of those facts. ____________________________________________ 9 To the extent this point suggests a lurking ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to trial counsel’s preparedness, we note that Appellant did not specifically claim any inadequacy in that regard. While we are mindful that ineffectiveness claims are generally deferred to collateral review, Islas suggests that a court may incorporate ineffectiveness considerations into the “fair and just” calculus. Furthermore, it is not clear whether counsel advised Appellant to enter a nolo contendere plea or if Appellant chose to do so on his own volition. - 20 - J-A20032-26 Turning to the role of timing, that Appellant waited approximately three months to file the motion to withdraw after entering the plea is a factor, and Norton suggests that the timing of the actual plea is also a factor. Indeed, the Commonwealth points to the fact Appellant, like the appellant in Norton, entered a plea on the day of trial as a reason to affirm. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 21 (arguing that “[t]he facts in Norton are very similar to the facts in the instant case” because, inter alia, both appellants wished to attack the victim’s credibility and both entered a plea on the day of trial), 23 (distinguishing Garcia from this case based on “the timing and nature of the innocence claim”). As previously explained, the record is not clear on what Appellant knew and when. If Appellant knew of the potential attacks on the victim’s credibility when he entered his plea, then that fact may be material to credibility assessments on remand regarding any motivation for pursuing withdrawal.10 ____________________________________________ 10 In Norton, the Commonwealth argued that the circumstances “suggested that [Norton] simply was seeking to delay the prosecution and the consequences that awaited him.” Norton, 201 A.3d at 117 (summarizing Commonwealth’s argument to trial court). The Norton Court did not squarely address that point. However, in Carrasquillo, former Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, remarking that “Trial courts must be permitted to evaluate the credibility of an accused’s assertion of innocence, including the evidence of guilt, of delay, and of ulterior or illicit motive in ruling upon an accused’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1293 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Islas, we approvingly quoted that concurring opinion, and remarked that “neither the Commonwealth nor the trial court identified any (Fo