Full Opinion

J-S33024-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DONALD M. GUY : : Appellant : No. 1042 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 10, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002434-2009 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DONALD M. GUY : : Appellant : No. 1043 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 10, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002439-2009 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026 Appellant, Donald M. Guy, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 We vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. We also grant the ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S33024-26 petition to withdraw filed by appointed counsel, George S. Yacoubian. On September 14, 2012, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses at two different docket numbers. That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 7, 2014, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on April 22, 2015. See Commonwealth v. Guy, 108 A.3d 104 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 746, 114 A.3d 1039 (2015). Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on April 15, 2016. The court appointed counsel (“first PCRA counsel”), who filed a motion to withdraw and brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). On June 30, 2017, the court provided Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se response to the Rule 907 notice on July 17, 2017. On August 4, 2017, the court removed first PCRA counsel and appointed second PCRA counsel to assist Appellant. Second PCRA counsel filed an amended petition on January 25, 2018. On February 8, 2019, the court entered an order granting an evidentiary hearing for two of Appellant’s issues concerning after-discovered evidence. The court conducted the evidentiary hearing on July 9, 2019. Nevertheless, -2- J-S33024-26 Appellant’s co-defendant, Thomas Foggy, “was not brought down” from state prison. (N.T. Hearing, 7/9/19, at 4). This witness was critical because one of Appellant’s claims centered on Mr. Foggy’s recantation of his trial testimony implicating Appellant. The court conducted a second evidentiary hearing, with Mr. Foggy, on September 22, 2022.2 On November 8, 2022, second PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw. In it, second PCRA counsel claimed that Appellant had retained a new attorney (“third PCRA counsel”) “to take over the pending PCRA proceedings….” (Motion to Withdraw, filed 11/8/22, at 1). Third PCRA counsel entered his appearance that same day. The court permitted second PCRA counsel to withdraw on January 19, 2023. On March 24, 2023, the court conducted a third evidentiary hearing and received testimony from the prosecutor who participated in Appellant’s trial. Following the hearing, the court ordered the parties to submit additional briefs. The court subsequently continued the matter.3 Ultimately, the Commonwealth filed its post-hearing brief on September 23, 2024. At some point after the Commonwealth submitted its brief, third PCRA ____________________________________________ 2 Between the two hearings, second PCRA counsel filed a supplemental PCRA petition on July 26, 2021. 3 Although third PCRA counsel informed the court that he would not be filing a brief, the Commonwealth needed additional time due to the unavailability of certain transcripts, as well as its intent to file “its brief in conjunction with the post-hearing brief of co-defendant Foggy.” (Order, filed 3/8/24, at 1 n.2). -3- J-S33024-26 counsel expressed his desire to withdraw.4 The court permitted third PCRA counsel to withdraw on November 22, 2024. On January 10, 2025, the court appointed fourth PCRA counsel, Attorney Yacoubian. The court also granted a continuance and scheduled a March 2025 Zoom hearing to determine “whether the petition is ripe for review by the court.” (Order, filed 1/10/25). Before Attorney Yacoubian took any action, however, new private counsel (“fifth PCRA counsel”) entered his appearance on February 6, 2025. On February 8, 2025, fifth PCRA counsel filed a motion for an extension. In it, counsel explained that: 1) Appellant had retained counsel’s firm two days earlier; 2) counsel was in the process of obtaining Appellant’s files from Attorney Yacoubian; 3) counsel needed to conduct a full review of the files; and 4) counsel requested a continuance of the next Zoom hearing. On February 11, 2025, the court denied fifth PCRA counsel’s motion. On February 19, 2025, fifth PCRA counsel filed another motion for an extension of time to file an amended PCRA petition. In the alternative, counsel requested the court’s permission to withdraw. On February 25, 2025, the court denied fifth PCRA counsel’s request for an extension, granted the request to withdraw, and reappointed Attorney Yacoubian. ____________________________________________ 4 A formal motion to withdraw does not appear in the record. Instead, the record includes an order scheduling a November 2024 hearing to address third PCRA counsel’s request. (See Order, filed 10/8/24). -4- J-S33024-26 On March 19, 2025, the court reissued Rule 907 notice. 5 Despite being represented by Attorney Yacoubian, Appellant filed a pro se response to the Rule 907 notice on March 31, 2025. On April 10, 2025, the court entered its order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. On April 16, 2025, Attorney Yacoubian timely filed a notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf. Following some delays, the court permitted Attorney Yacoubian to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal on September 28, 2025. On January 14, 2026, Attorney Yacoubian filed a Turner/Finley brief in this Court. The next day, Attorney Yacoubian filed an application to withdraw as counsel. On May 19, 2026, new private counsel, Attorney Goldstein, entered his appearance in this Court. That same day, Attorney Goldstein filed an application to file a replacement brief. Specifically, Attorney Goldstein sought to withdraw and replace the filings that Attorney Yacoubian had submitted on Appellant’s behalf. On June 23, 2026, this Court denied Attorney Goldstein’s application. Further, we permitted Attorney Goldstein to file a response to Attorney Yacoubian’s Turner/Finley brief. Attorney Goldstein filed a response to Attorney ____________________________________________ 5 The Rule 907 notice also crystallized the final form of the collateral issues Appellant had litigated. Specifically, Appellant presented: 1) a claim of after- discovered evidence alleging that Mr. Foggy had recanted his trial testimony; 2) a claim of after-discovered evidence alleging a pattern and practice of coercion by Philadelphia homicide detectives; 3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for providing deficient advice about Appellant’s right to testify at trial; 4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call certain witnesses; and 5) cumulative prejudice due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. -5- J-S33024-26 Yacoubian’s Turner/Finley brief on August 17, 2026. As we will discuss infra, Attorney Goldstein wishes to raise new ineffectiveness claims pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 669 Pa. 107, 261 A.3d 381 (2021). As a prefatory matter, we address Attorney Yacoubian’s application to withdraw. Before counsel can be permitted to withdraw from representing a petitioner under the PCRA, Pennsylvania law requires counsel to file a “no- merit” brief or letter pursuant to Turner and Finley. Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940 (Pa.Super. 2003). [C]ounsel must then submit a “no-merit” letter to the [PCRA] court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting permission to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007). Counsel must also send to the petitioner a copy of the “no-merit” letter or brief and motion to withdraw and advise the petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel. Id. “Substantial compliance with these requirements will satisfy the criteria.” Karanicolas, supra at 947. Here, Attorney Yacoubian filed an application to withdraw and a Turner/Finley brief detailing the nature of his review and explaining why Appellant’s issues lack merit. Counsel notified Appellant of the request to withdraw and advised Appellant regarding his rights. Thus, counsel substantially complied with the Turner/Finley requirements. See Wrecks, supra; Karanicolas, supra. Accordingly, we proceed to an independent -6- J-S33024-26 evaluation. See Turner, supra at 494-95, 544 A.2d at 928-29 (stating that reviewing court must conduct independent analysis and agree with counsel). Attorney Yacoubian presents the following issues for this Court’s review: Recantation of co-defendant Thomas Foggy[.] * * * Coercive tactics of Philadelphia detectives[.] * * * Ineffectiveness of trial counsel regarding [Appellant’s] testimony[.] * * * Ineffectiveness of trial counsel regarding Wilson Rodriguez[.] * * * Cumulative effect[.] (Turner/Finley Brief at 14, 16, 17, 19). “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218 A.3d 850 (2019). “[W]e review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 672 Pa. 30, 268 A.3d 386 (2021). “A PCRA court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations should be -7- J-S33024-26 provided great deference by reviewing courts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 356, 966 A.2d 523, 539 (2009). To obtain relief based upon after-discovered evidence under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish: (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict. Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 715, 927 A.2d 586, 595-96 (2007). If the after-discovered evidence is incredible, it would not compel a different outcome, and the PCRA court must deny the request for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Small, 647 Pa. 423, 451, 189 A.3d 961, 977 (2018) (explaining PCRA court needed to, in first instance, assess credibility of after- discovered recantation in light of evidence as whole; unless PCRA court is satisfied that after-discovered evidence is credible, it should deny new trial). Further, counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020). [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is -8- J-S33024-26 a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011). “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has forgone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)). “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95). The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be -9- J-S33024-26 considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may have taken. Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Sandusky, supra at 1043-44). “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “A criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 33, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)). For claims of ineffectiveness based upon counsel’s failure to call a witness: A defense attorney’s failure to call certain witnesses does not constitute per se ineffectiveness. In establishing whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses, a defendant must prove the witnesses existed, the witnesses were ready and willing to testify, and the absence of the witnesses’ testimony prejudiced petitioner and denied him a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 267-68, 983 A.2d 666, 693 (2009) (internal citation omitted). A petitioner “must show how the uncalled - 10 - J-S33024-26 witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 441, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (2008). Additionally, the decision on whether to testify on one’s own behalf is to be made by the defendant after full consultation with counsel. Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 869 (Pa.Super. 2013). In order to sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Nieves, 560 Pa. 529, 533, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (2000)). After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude the record supports the PCRA court’s denial of relief. See Prater, supra; Beatty, supra. The opinion of the Honorable Linda A. Carpenter, filed on April 10, 2025, adequately disposed of the issues that Appellant has been litigating since 2016. Regarding Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claims, the PCRA court found Mr. Foggy’s recantation to be incredible. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed 4/10/25, at 12) (unnumbered). We cannot say that the court erred by denying Appellant’s requested relief that was based upon incredible evidence. See Small, supra. To the extent that Appellant also raised an after- discovered evidence claim related to the purported coercion of one of the - 11 - J-S33024-26 preliminary hearing witnesses, Vanessa Delvalle, the court found that the police witness credibly testified that Ms. Delvalle’s statements were not coerced. (See PCRA Court Opinion at 16). The record supports the court’s determination. Specifically, Detective Greg Singleton participated in Ms. Delvalle’s interview, and he did not recall that he or his partner told Ms. Delvalle “that if she didn’t cooperate … she could go down with” Appellant. (N.T. Hearing, 7/9/19, at 20). Absent more, we grant great deference to the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. See Johnson, supra. Regarding Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims, the PCRA court noted that Appellant failed to make a proffer regarding the purportedly deficient advice that trial counsel provided about Appellant’s decision not to testify. (See PCRA Court Opinion at 20). Our review confirms that Appellant failed to establish how trial counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that trial counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision by Appellant. (See Amended PCRA Petition, filed 1/25/18, at 17-22; N.T. Hearing, 9/22/22, at 106-114).6 Further, the court correctly determined that Appellant’s on-the-record colloquy at trial demonstrated his knowing waiver of the right to testify. (See N.T. Trial, 9/13/12, at 78-79). Appellant also claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses: Rasheed Clover and Wilson Rodriguez. Appellant’s amended ____________________________________________ 6 Appellant did not address this issue at the PCRA hearing. Instead, his testimony dealt with his discovery of Mr. Foggy’s recantation. - 12 - J-S33024-26 PCRA petition did not include an affidavit from Mr. Clover. Although the amended petition included an affidavit from Mr. Rodriguez, it was unsigned. (See Amended PCRA Petition at Exhibit P5). Subsequently, these witnesses did not testify at the evidentiary hearings. In disposing of this claim, the court again cited Appellant’s on-the-record colloquy at trial, where Appellant indicated that there were no additional witnesses that he wanted to present. (See N.T. Trial, 9/13/12, at 77-78). Appellant is bound by these statements, and he cannot assert that trial counsel was ineffective on these bases. See Commonwealth v. Paddy, 569 Pa. 47, 82, 800 A.2d 294, 316 (2002) (explaining that defendant who makes knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision concerning trial strategy cannot later complain that trial counsel was ineffective on basis of that decision).7 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude there is no merit to the claims that Appellant has been litigating in the PCRA court. Our review of the record also leads us to agree with Attorney Yacoubian that Appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims. Consequently, we grant Attorney Yacoubian’s ____________________________________________ 7 “[N]o number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually. When the failure of individual claims is based upon a lack of prejudice, however, then the cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may properly be assessed.” Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236, 294, 80 A.3d 415, 450 (2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 828, 135 S.Ct. 50, 190 L.Ed.2d 54 (2014) (internal citations omitted). Here, we have rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims based upon the arguable merit prong of the test for ineffectiveness. Thus, there can be no aggregation of prejudice from multiple ineffectiveness claims, and Appellant’s claim of cumulative error also fails. See id. - 13 - J-S33024-26 petition to withdraw. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the new ineffectiveness claims advanced by Attorney Goldstein. While our Supreme Court’s holding in Bradley allows PCRA petitioners to raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, “[i]t is not an appellate court’s function to engage in fact-finding.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 665 Pa. 126, 141, 247 A.3d 1008, 1017 (2021) (quoting BouSamra v. Excela Health, 653 Pa. 365, 386-87, 210 A.3d 967, 979-80 (2019)). The PCRA court is “the appropriate—and, indeed, the only—forum for the evidentiary and factual development” of PCRA claims. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Koehler, 658 Pa. 658, 695, 229 A.3d 915, 937 (2020)). In Bradley, our Supreme Court also acknowledged that remand is proper in certain cases where ineffectiveness claims are raised on appeal in the first instance: In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness …; however, where there are material facts at issue concerning [claims challenging counsel’s stewardship] and relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be afforded[.] Bradley, supra at 142-43, 261 A.3d at 402 (internal citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). - 14 - J-S33024-26 Instantly, Attorney Goldstein challenges all prior counsels’ effectiveness.8 These claims, however, have not been developed outside of the arguments included in Attorney Goldstein’s filing. Although Attorney Goldstein’s filing addresses all three parts of the test for ineffectiveness, Appellant has not had the opportunity to proffer input from prior counsel regarding the “strategic basis” for their actions. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 21, 79 A.3d 595, 606-07 (2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 829, 135 S.Ct. 56, 190 L.Ed.2d 56 (2014) (explaining petitioner offered no affidavit or other evidence as to what trial counsel did or did not investigate; petitioner provided no explanation for absence of affidavit from trial counsel and proffered no evidence as to what actions trial counsel took or failed to take; thus, any assertion that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for inaction was speculative). Likewise, the PCRA court did not have the opportunity to assess prejudice in the first instance. See Shaw, supra at 140-41, 247 A.3d ____________________________________________ 8 Attorney Goldstein is Appellant’s sixth PCRA counsel. Therefore, Appellant must now present “layered” claims of ineffective assistance, referring to trial counsel and all prior PCRA counsels’ ineffectiveness. “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010). Here, Attorney Goldstein raises layered claims of all prior PCRA counsels’ ineffectiveness for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to object to the trial court’s instruction on character evidence; 2) failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument; 3) failing to present any theory of defense; and 4) agreeing to a jury instruction regarding an absent witness’s prior testimony. (See Response to Turner/Finley Brief, filed 8/17/26, at i). - 15 - J-S33024-26 at 1017 (holding petitioner did not waive challenge to stewardship of PCRA counsel and observing that Superior Court should have provided PCRA court with opportunity to assess prejudice in first instance). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the record before us is insufficient to allow for disposition of the newly raised ineffectiveness claims. See Bradley, supra. The most prudent course of action is to vacate the order denying PCRA relief and remand this case to the PCRA court for Appellant to create an evidentiary record in conjunction with his new ineffectiveness claims. See id. See also Koehler, supra at 696, 229 A.3d at 937 (explaining appellate review requires “development of a record as warranted and, where a hearing is appropriate, an assessment of the facts by the trial court hearing the evidence”). Upon remand, Attorney Goldstein should file an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf, wherein he can fully develop the claims advanced on appeal. Thereafter, the court must decide whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the new claims. Order vacated; case remanded with instructions. Attorney Yacoubian’s petition to withdraw is granted. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Date: 11/19/2026 - 16 - Circulated 10/29/2026 10:33 AM 0125_Memorandum_Opinion