Full Opinion

J-S37023-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : TONY AUSTIN ECKHART : No. 737 EDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County Criminal Division at No: CP-13-CR-0000014-2025 BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 2, 2026 The Commonwealth contends in this interlocutory appeal that the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County (trial court) erred in allowing Appellee, Tony Austin Eckhart, to introduce evidence of his mistaken belief that his ownership interest in a vehicle permitted him to damage it. Appellee had been charged with one count of criminal mischief for damaging the vehicle and he planned to rely on the evidence to show his lack of criminal intent to commit the offense. The Commonwealth asserts that this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of its claims under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). However, Rule 311(d) does not authorize interlocutory review of an order admitting defense evidence. The Commonwealth’s appeal must therefore be quashed. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows: On October 25, 2024, [Appellant] was charged . . . with one count of Criminal Mischief (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(6)), a summary offense. These charges stemmed from an incident which allegedly J-S37023-26 occurred on or about September 12, 2024, when [Appellant] was accused of smashing the windows out of a 2023 black Chevrolet Trailblazer . . . which was registered solely in the name of his estranged wife, Torey Eckhart, and possessed and used by only her at that time, but purchased during the marriage. On February 4, 2025, [Appellant] filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that he could not be charged with criminal mischief for damaging property that was "marital property" in nature. After [the] hearing, this Court . . . denied that motion on the basis that even though the vehicle was a marital asset, it was still "property of another," therefore, [Appellant] could still be charged with criminal mischief. **** Prior [to trial], the Commonwealth filed two separate Motions in Limine. The first motion . . . requested that the Court "Preclude Defense from Introducing Issue of Whether 2023 Chevrolet Blazer Owned Exclusively by Torey Eckhart was Marital Property at Trial." . . . . [T]he Commonwealth filed its second Motion in Limine where it sought to exclude the testimony of certain witnesses anticipated to be called by the defense at trial, namely Detective David Roberts, Divorce Master Debra A. Smith, Esquire, Jane Zellner, Esquire and Vincent Seaton, a Progressive Insurance employee. This was also set for hearing on March 9, 2026, at 9:00 A.M. At the hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth proffered that it would be "substantially prejudiced" if the Court were to allow there to be reference to the vehicle as "marital property" . . . on three bases: 1) res judicata; 2) misstatement of the law; and 3) confusion to the jury. [Defense counsel] for [Appellant], countered that it is necessary to allow this vehicle to be referenced as marital property because it furthers the defense proposed by [Appellant], that being, one of mistake of fact in that since [Appellant] understood the vehicle to be marital property, he believed he had the right to damage it. On this issue and based upon counsel's argument, the Court informed counsel that it intended to allow the use of the phrase "marital property" if it is part and parcel of the defense [Appellant] intended to raise, however, that the Court also intended to give the jury a cautionary instruction that just because the vehicle may -2- J-S37023-26 be marital property is not an exception to the criminal mischief liability statute if the jury finds it is "property of another." Additionally, at that hearing, counsel for both sides argued about- what witnesses [Appellant] may call and whether their testimony would be permitted, specifically as it relates to Detective David Roberts (hereinafter "[Detective] Roberts"). [Appellant] proffered that it would be his intent to call [Detective] Roberts to testify about an open investigation into the victim taking money from a joint bank account, not so much as to the veracity of the merits of the investigation, but rather to corroborate any testimony presented by [Appellant] that, if his wife can "thieve" money from a joint account, he can damage a marital asset, to wit, the Trailblazer. In other words, [defense counsel] proffered that this testimony would "go to the reasonableness of the belief that which is marital property is marital property" and further to establish his client's mistake of fact defense. After arguments on [Detective] Roberts' testimony, this Court determined that at the pre-trial stage it would not make a ruling prohibiting [Detective] Roberts from testifying, but rather would hold that decision in abeyance depending upon how the trial proceeded. After issuing on the record our decision on both of these Motions in Limine, counsel for the Commonwealth verbally stated, "that he was going to file an interlocutory appeal because he believe[d] that allowing evidence and testimony in about marital property, [he] think[s] that it is going to substantially handicap the prosecution of this case." As a result, the jury trial was stayed in this matter. Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 4/17/2026, at 1-4. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal of (1) the trial court’s denial of its motion in limine to exclude Appellee’s evidence that he believed the subject vehicle was marital property, and (2) the trial court’s lack of a ruling on its motion in limine to preclude Detective Roberts from testifying about Appellee’s allegation that his ex-wife had misappropriated marital -3- J-S37023-26 funds. In its brief, the Commonwealth now raises two issues for our consideration: A. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Commonwealth's Motion in Limine to preclude the defense from introducing the issue of whether the 2023 Chevrolet Blazer owned by the victim and intentionally damaged by [Appellant] was marital property at trial, thereby allowing [Appellant] to misstate the law, cause juror confusion, and violate the principle of res judicata[.] B. Whether the Trial Court erred in not immediately granting the Commonwealth's Second Motion in Limine to preclude the testimony of Franklin Township Police Detective David Roberts at trial on the bases of non-relevance and highly prejudicial to the Commonwealth[.] Commonwealth’s Brief, at 3 (suggested answers omitted). Both of the Commonwealth’s claims concern the proposed admission of defense evidence. The threshold issue here – which we find to be dispositive – is whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of those claims in an interlocutory appeal. “[T]he appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Mother's Rest., Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)). “In this Commonwealth, an appeal may only be taken from: 1) a final order or one certified by the trial court as final; 2) an interlocutory order as of right; 3) an interlocutory order by permission; or 4) a collateral order.” Id. (quoting Mother’s Rest, 861 A.2d at 331). -4- J-S37023-26 As to the Commonwealth’s first claim, the order on review is indisputably non-final. The rule invoked by the Commonwealth to establish this Court’s jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), provides that: In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (authorizing interlocutory appeal by permission if specified conditions are met). The Commonwealth has satisfied Rule 311(d) in part by including a certification in its notice of appeal that the trial court’s order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. Crucially, though, the Commonwealth cannot establish that this Court has jurisdiction to review that order because it will have the effect of introducing at trial the defense’s evidence: [B]inding Supreme Court of Pennsylvania authority holds that application of Rule 311(d) is limited to circumstances in which “a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.” Commonwealth v. Shearer, 882 A.2d 462, 467 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 836 A.2d 871, 877 (Pa. 2003) (emphasis added)). As both the Cosnek and Shearer opinions make clear, Rule 311(d) does not confer jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal from an order filed by the Commonwealth to preclude the introduction of defense evidence. Id. at 467; Cosnek, 836 A.2d at 877. Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1066–67 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some citations abridged, emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Brister, 16 A.3d 530, 534 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (same). -5- J-S37023-26 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction because the trial court ruled here that the defense could introduce evidence that Appellee believed he could lawfully damage the subject vehicle. See Minich, 4 A.3d at 1066–67. Rule 311(d) does not permit interlocutory review of such a ruling, and the Commonwealth has invoked no alternative jurisdictional grounds. The Commonwealth’s second claim is that the trial court erred in deferring a ruling on whether the defense may admit the testimony of Detective Roberts. As to this claim, much like the first, Rule 311(d) does not apply to pretrial rulings admitting defense evidence, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of its admissibility in an interlocutory appeal. See id. Alternatively, even if Rule 311(d) could authorize this Court to exercise jurisdiction as to the Commonwealth’s second claim, it would arguably not be ripe for immediate appellate review. The trial court deferred ruling on the admissibility of Detective Roberts’ testimony, reasoning that our resolution of the Commonwealth’s first claim would be dispositive. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 4/17/2026, at 13-14. An issue not yet decided by the trial court cannot be appealed because “[t]here is no order decided this issue one way or another that we are able to review.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 822 A.2d 716, 732 (Pa. Super. 2003). Thus, as there is no valid basis on which this Court may exercise jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory claims, this appeal must be quashed. -6- J-S37023-26 Appeal quashed. Date: 11/2/2026 -7-