Com. v. Kinley, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket617 MDA 2025
JudgeNeuman
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A07015-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JARRETT ALVIN KINLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 617 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 28, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal
Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000801-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and NEUMAN, J.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2026
As the Majority recognizes, “[t]he decision to declare a mistrial is within
the sound discretion of the court and will not be reversed absent a flagrant
abuse of discretion.” Majority Memorandum at 12 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 266 (Pa. Super. 2009)). Considering the totality
of the circumstances, I do not believe the court committed a flagrant abuse
of discretion in determining a mistrial was manifestly necessary. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
“In accordance with the scope of our review, we must take into
consideration all the circumstances when passing upon the propriety of a
declaration of mistrial by the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Boyer, 347
A.3d 689, 696 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted). In my view, the following
circumstances demonstrate that the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was
not an abuse of discretion.
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First, I would conclude Attorney Fees’ remarks in her opening statement
violated the court’s pretrial ruling to exclude the victim’s journal entries. In
its motion in limine, the Commonwealth sought to preclude the journal entries
on the grounds that they violated the Rape Shield Law and/or were irrelevant.
See Motion in Limine, 1/24/17, at unnumbered 1-2. At the hearing on the
motion, Attorney Fees explained the victim’s journal entries were written as
letters to “Dennis” discussing, among other things, how “she wants to sleep
with him, have his kids, and all of that stuff.” N.T. Hearing, 2/6/17, at 2.
Attorney Fees seemingly conceded certain information contained in the
journals was inadmissible, acknowledging she did not “plan on sharing with
the jury the 900 times” the victim said she wanted “to sleep with” Dennis. Id.
Counsel nonetheless argued the journal entries were admissible to show that
“not once within a two[-]year period of time [did the victim] ever say[]
anything” in her journal about Appellant’s abuse. Id. at 4. Counsel also
sought to introduce entries in which the victim stated “she’ll do anything to
make sure” Appellant does not have Dennis arrested for having a relationship
with her when he was 20 and she was 15, contending those statements were
relevant to show the victim’s motive for accusing Appellant of abuse. Id. at
5-6. Ultimately, the court entered an order on February 7, 2017, ruling “the
journals are not relevant[;] however, they may be referred to as being kept
by the alleged victim and the fact they contain nothing about the alleged
criminal incidents involving [Appellant].” Order, 2/7/17, at 1 (single page).
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In her opening statement, Attorney Fees went beyond this ruling. She
discussed the victim’s desire to have a relationship with Dennis, “a much older
man, [who] … was in [his] 20’s when she was 15.” N.T. Mistrial, 5/8/18, at
16.1 Counsel also stated the victim “wanted to date” Dennis, id., and she
“wanted to be with someone much older, that she was not allowed to be
with[,]” id. at 18. According to the trial court, Attorney Fees made these
remarks “while standing before the jury with the excluded journal of the victim
in counsel’s hands.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/12/25, at unnumbered 3.
Although the record does not confirm counsel was actually holding the journal,
her statements about the victim’s desire for a relationship with a much older
man were plainly drawn from the journal entries the court had deemed
inadmissible prior to trial. Attorney Fees’ opening statement therefore
violated the court’s pretrial ruling.2 Moreover, because the Commonwealth
had sought the exclusion of the victim’s journal entries on Rape Shield Law
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1 I acknowledge the court’s pretrial ruling also provided that, “[s]hould the
testimony at trial require us to revisit this ruling we will do so and consider
[the] same if properly raised at trial.” Order, 2/7/17, at 1 (single page). That
reservation, however, is not relevant here. Attorney Fees’ opening statement
was not testimony, and she did not seek reconsideration of the pretrial ruling
before addressing the jury.
2 I also note my disagreement with the Majority’s reliance on the fact that the
court permitted evidence of the victim’s relationship with Dennis — offered to
prove motive —at Appellant’s second trial. See Majority Memorandum at 18.
In my view, events that occurred at the second trial have no bearing on
whether the court properly declared a mistrial at the first trial, and it is
inappropriate to consider those subsequent proceedings in conducting that
analysis.
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grounds, and the court granted that motion in part, I view the court’s
invocation of that law in declaring a mistrial as an implicit determination that
counsel’s remarks violated the pretrial order.3
Second, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that “the trial court
neglected to consider alternative remedies before granting the
Commonwealth’s request for a mistrial over Appellant’s objection.” Majority
Memorandum at 18. As an initial matter, Attorney Fees did not object to the
mistrial on Appellant’s behalf. Instead, she argued her statements did not
____________________________________________
3 I also believe it is inappropriate for this Court to assess the validity of the
trial court’s pretrial ruling precluding admission of the journal entries, whether
on Rape Shield Law grounds or any other basis. As the Majority aptly explains,
in Commonwealth v. Walker, 954 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc),
the trial court permitted certain testimony by several Commonwealth
witnesses over defense counsel’s objection, but the following day concluded
that its ruling had been incorrect, and the testimony should not have been
admitted. See Majority Memorandum at 17-18 (discussing Walker, supra).
Significantly, in examining whether a manifest necessity supported the trial
court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, we began our analysis by stating:
[W]e will not review the soundness of the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings because they are not truly at issue in this case. This Court
is an error-correcting court; it is not an error-finding court. See
Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740, 748 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citation omitted), affirmed, … 862 A.2d 589 ([Pa.] 2004).
Accordingly, we will follow the logic of the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings in our determination of whether manifest necessity existed
for the trial court to declare a mistrial sua sponte.
Walker, 954 A.2d at 1255. Thus, the Walker Court declined to examine
whether the underlying evidentiary ruling was correct; it assessed only
whether a mistrial was necessary, with that ruling as its premise. In this case,
we also must not inquire into whether the trial court properly excluded the
victim’s journal entries as irrelevant or violative of the Rape Shield Law. Our
sole inquiry is whether a mistrial was manifestly necessary once Attorney Fees
violated the pretrial ruling that excluded them.
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violate the Rape Shield Law, without addressing whether a mistrial was
warranted even if they did. See N.T. Mistrial, 5/8/18, at 19. When the court
declared a mistrial, Attorney Fees remained silent. Id. at 20. Thus, Appellant
did not object to the mistrial.
I would also conclude the record sufficiently demonstrates the court
considered alternative remedies. After the Commonwealth requested a
mistrial and the parties presented their arguments, the court announced a
recess of “about 15, 20 minutes.” N.T. Mistrial at 19. The court’s opinion
explains that, “after taking the oral motion of the Commonwealth under
advisement, [it] reviewed the trial transcript and determined that a
curative instruction would be insufficient to ensure a fair trial….” TCO at
unnumbered 3 (emphasis added). To the extent the Majority suggests the
court was required to consider alternative remedies on the record, I have not
found authority explicitly imposing that requirement. Rather, the court must
simply
consider all surrounding circumstances before finding that
curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme remedy of
a mistrial is required. The circumstances which the court must
consider include whether the improper remark was intentionally
elicited by the Commonwealth, whether the answer was
responsive to the question posed, whether the Commonwealth
exploited the reference, and whether the curative instruction was
appropriate.
Manley, 985 A.2d at 266–67 (cleaned up). Here, the improper remarks were
not elicited by the Commonwealth, were not made in response to a question,
and were not exploited by the Commonwealth. To the contrary, they were
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volunteered by defense counsel during her opening statement — a fact the
court expressly acknowledged in explaining its decision to declare a mistrial.
See N.T. Mistrial at 20 (stating it “played back the part of [Attorney Fees’]
opening where [she] stated that [the victim] had a relationship with a guy in
his 20’s” which the court viewed as improper). The court further stated it had
considered a curative instruction and found it insufficient. See TCO at
unnumbered 3. I therefore conclude the court did consider alternative
remedies before declaring the mistrial.
In sum, Attorney Fees violated the court’s pretrial ruling by disclosing,
during her opening statement, the contents of the victim’s journal entries
pertaining to the victim’s desire for a relationship with an older man. The
Commonwealth requested a mistrial, and defense counsel offered no
argument as to why a mistrial was unnecessary. When the court declared a
mistrial, neither party challenged the court on its ruling, indicating they
accepted what the court said as sufficient to warrant a mistrial. However,
once challenged, the court was able to explain in its instant opinion that it had
reviewed the record, considered the alternative remedy of a curative
instruction, and determined a mistrial was necessary. Considering all of these
circumstances, see Boyer, supra, and mindful that the decision to declare a
mistrial sua sponte is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, see
Walker, 954 A.2d at 1256, I would conclude there was no abuse of discretion
in the court’s determination that a mistrial was manifestly necessary.
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Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to reverse
Appellant’s convictions and discharge him.
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