Full Opinion

J-A20013-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN JAMES HAMILTON : : Appellant : No. 1718 MDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000099-2013 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN JAMES HAMILTON : : Appellant : No. 1719 MDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 19, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003751-2012 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: OCTOBER 21, 2026 Shawn James Hamilton appeals pro se from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, denying his ninth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After review, we affirm. ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-A20013-26 The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this case as follows: On October 24, 2012, [Hamilton] was charged with three counts of criminal homicide, one count of criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide, and four counts of robbery in connection with a shooting [that] occurred on July 7, 2012 in Plymouth Borough, Luzerne County[.] Hamilton was subsequently charged with one count of criminal homicide on December 13, 2012[,] in connection with a shooting which occurred on July 6, 2012[,] in the City of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County[.] Trial was scheduled to commence on January 6, 2014[,] in connection with the July 7, 2012 incident. If [Hamilton] proceeded to trial, the Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty. On December 20, 2013, Hamilton pled guilty to three counts of first-degree murder and one count of criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide on [the charges arising from the shooting on July 7, 2012]. Hamilton also pled guilty to one count of first- degree murder on [the charge arising from the shooting on July 6, 2012]. He waived his right to a pre-sentence investigation and proceeded to immediate sentencing. Four life sentences were imposed on the first-degree murder pleas[,] along with a twenty[- ] to[-]forty year sentence on the criminal attempt plea. All sentences were to run consecutively. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 1-2. Following sentencing, Hamilton did not file a direct appeal. On April 24, 2014, Hamilton filed a pro se PCRA petition, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 151 A.3d 1149, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Table). Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied his petition on May 18, 2015, and this Court affirmed the denial of Hamilton’s first PCRA petition on May 17, 2016. Id. at *5. Since early 2020, Hamilton filed numerous documents with the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, including, but not limited to, PCRA petitions, -2- J-A20013-26 requests for discovery, objections to the dismissals of his petitions, and notices of appeal. All filings were dismissed. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 303 A.3d 780, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2023) (Table). On March 24, 2022, Hamilton filed a PCRA petition that the PCRA court characterized as his eighth petition. The PCRA court denied this petition as untimely and this Court affirmed. Id. Hamilton filed the instant PCRA petition on August 26, 2024.2 The PCRA court filed a notice of intention to dismiss Hamilton’s PCRA petition on August 28, 2025. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 2. Rather than file a response, Hamilton filed a petition for leave to amend on September 18, 2025, which the PCRA court granted on October 1, 2025, and provided Hamilton with 45 days to file an amended PCRA petition. Id. On October 28, 2025, Hamilton filed an application to proceed informa pauperis, a motion to appoint counsel, with attachments, and an amended PCRA petition. However, it appears that Hamilton’s amended PCRA petition was not docketed separately from the other documents. On November 18, 2025, Hamilton filed a notice with the Luzerne County clerk, stating that he had not received a time-stamped copy of the amended PCRA petition and resubmitted his amended PCRA petition. ____________________________________________ 2 Hamilton failed to serve the PCRA petition on the PCRA court. The PCRA court became aware of the petition on August 25, 2025, as a result of the petition for writ of mandamus and/or extraordinary relief filed by Hamilton. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 2. -3- J-A20013-26 As the PCRA court had not received the amended petition within the 45- day time limit, the PCRA court dismissed Hamilton’s ninth PCRA petition on November 19, 2025. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 2. However, the PCRA court ultimately received the amended PCRA petition on November 20, 2025. Id. In its opinion to this Court, the PCRA court reviewed the amended petition and concluded it was untimely and lacked merit. Id. at 2, n.3. On December 9, 2025, Hamilton filed a notice of appeal and court- ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On appeal, Hamilton raises the following claims: [1.] Did the PCRA court [e]rr when it dismissed [Hamilton’s] PCRA [p]etition after granting [l]eave to [a]mend[,] but before considering the [a]mended [p]etition? [2.] Did [Hamilton] timely file [an] amended PCRA petition[] and raise[] genuine issues of material fact, thus pleading and proving [an exception under] 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1)(ii)? [3.] Did the sentencing [j]udge impose an illegal sentence under [] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2505 alone? Appellant’s Brief, at 6. “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283-84 (Pa. 2016) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Further, a PCRA court may dismiss a petition “without an evidentiary hearing if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. (citations omitted). -4- J-A20013-26 In his first issue on appeal, Hamilton claims that the PCRA court erred by dismissing his PCRA petition prior to reviewing his amended petition. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-10. He submits that his amended PCRA petition was filed within the 45-day deadline and the PCRA court, which permitted the amendment, must review the amended petition prior to determining the merits of his claims. Id. at 9. The PCRA court dismissed Hamilton’s PCRA petition prior to reviewing the amended petition because it erroneously determined Hamilton failed to file his amended petition within the 45-day deadline set by the court. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 2; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(D) (“All amended petitions shall be in writing . . . and shall be filed and served within the time specified by the judge in ordering the amendment.”) (emphasis added). However, although it was docketed as part of two other motions, Hamilton filed his amended petition on October 28, 2025, which was within the 45-day deadline. Cf. Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 334 A.3d 412, *4-8 (Pa. Super. 2025) (Table)3 (petitioner’s amended PCRA petition, which was filed 23 days beyond PCRA court’s deadline, was untimely and PCRA court did not need to address merits of claims). Nonetheless, we find no merit to Hamilton’s first issue. It is well-established that “the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address ____________________________________________ 3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (this Court may rely on unpublished memorandum decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for persuasive value). -5- J-A20013-26 the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review. Id. at § 9545(b)(3). In the present case, Hamilton’s judgment of sentence became final on January 20, 2014, after the expiration of time to file a direct appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, he had until January 20, 2015, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The instant petition was filed over nine years later, on August 26, 2024, and, thus, is facially untimely. However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions enumerated in section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the petitioner’s inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or (3) a newly recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See id. at §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). While the PCRA court dismissed Hamilton’s PCRA petition prior to reviewing his amended petition, the PCRA court also reviewed Hamilton’s -6- J-A20013-26 amended PCRA petition for the purposes of this appeal and found it both untimely and meritless. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 2 n.3. Moreover, “to confirm proper jurisdiction, it is appropriate for an appellate court to consider sua sponte the timeliness of a PCRA petition[.]” Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143 (Pa. 2020). The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, and therefore “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, we shall review Hamilton’s petition, including any additional claims raised in his amended petition, to determine whether he has successfully pled and proven one of the timeliness exceptions. Hamilton asserts he meets the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, contending there are new facts regarding the crimes committed on July 7, 2012. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13. The newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA time bar “renders a petition timely when the petitioner establishes that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A PCRA court must first determine “whether the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner[.]” Id. at 1282 (quotation marks omitted). “The focus of the exception is on [the] newly discovered facts, not -7- J-A20013-26 on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words, the fact that a petitioner has “discovered yet another conduit” for a claim previously presented “does not transform his latest source into evidence falling within the ambit of [subsection] 9545(b)(1)(ii).” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the PCRA court concludes that the facts were unknown, then the PCRA court must next examine whether “the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, including an assessment of the petitioner’s access to public records.” Small, 238 A.3d at 1282. Further, “[d]ue diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Due diligence “requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.” Id. at 1071. “A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). Instantly, Hamilton claims that, on April 14, 2024, he discovered new information from a fellow inmate named Joshua Ovalles. See Appellant’s Brief, at 14. Hamilton submitted a declaration by Ovalles, in which Ovalles -8- J-A20013-26 states that, on the morning of July 7, 2012, Bradley Swartwood and Nicholas Maldonado4 asked Ovalles to rob a guy named “Shiz from Philadelphia”5 at Maldonado’s house and that Swartwood and Maldonado were in possession of one .40 caliber pistol and one .22 caliber pistol. Ovalles Declaration, 4/10/24, at 1. Hamilton also claims that, upon receiving a “Pennsylvania State Police homicide investigation action report” on May 3, 2025, he learned that there was a record of two sales of firearms to Swartwood, particularly a .22 caliber pistol, on June 21, 2012. Id. at 16-17. He claims he was unable to obtain this report “prior to trial[] and during [the] Post[-]Conviction process” and only was able to obtain it following a motion to compel his previous attorney to surrender the case file. Id. at 17. The PCRA court found that Hamilton did not meet the burden to satisfy the newly discovered fact exception under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/25, at 4-5. We agree. Regarding Ovalles’s declaration, Hamilton failed to prove how these facts were unknown to him. The actual “facts” for purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) are that Swartwood and Maldonado were allegedly going to rob Hamilton and that the victims had firearms on them. These are not newly discovered facts. Hamilton, who was present during the entirety of the ____________________________________________ 4 Swartwood and Maldonado were two of the victims of the July 7, 2012 shooting. 5 In his declaration, Ovalles does not clarify who “Shiz” is, but Hamilton claims that it refers to him. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15. -9- J-A20013-26 shooting, would have been aware of both of these facts at the time of his plea. See Commonwealth v. Christine, 217 A.3d 375, *7-8 (Pa. Super. 2019) (Table) (holding petitioner claiming self-defense failed to establish how he had not known facts when he was present at scene of crime and presumably knew or should have known that witness statement was untrue and earlier PCRA petition reveals petitioner was aware of self-defense argument before he entered his guilty plea). In fact, in a “supplemental” PCRA petition filed February 4, 2020,6 Hamilton raised similar facts, claiming they too were newly discovered, arguing he acted in self-defense when Swartwood and Maldonado attempted to rob him. See Supplemental PCRA Petition, 2/4/20, at 2 (unpaginated). Thus, Ovalles’s statement is merely a newly willing testimonial source of information that confirmed facts and claims of which Hamilton was already aware of and which he previously raised. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa. 2008) (“[t]he fact appellant discovered yet another conduit for the same claim of perjury does not transform his latest source into evidence falling within the [newly discovered facts exception]”). Similarly, regarding the information about Swartwood purchasing firearms, particularly the .22 caliber pistol, Hamilton again failed to prove this fact was previously unknown to him. As stated above, Hamilton would have been aware that Maldonado and Swartwood possessed firearms when they attempted to rob him. Significantly, Hamilton previously claimed he wrestled ____________________________________________ 6 This supplemental PCRA petition is dated by Hamilton as March 23, 2016, but is marked as filed on February 4, 2020. - 10 - J-A20013-26 a firearm from Swartwood. See N.T. Omnibus Hearing, 11/6/13, at 90. Thus, this information is simply another newly discovered source, not a newly discovered fact. See Maxwell, supra. Therefore, Hamilton failed to successfully plead and prove the newly discovered fact exception. Accordingly, because Hamilton’s amended PCRA petition is untimely and he does not successfully plead and prove an exception,7 we affirm the order dismissing his petition.8 See Mitchell, supra. ____________________________________________ 7 Hamilton also challenges the legality of his sentence. “[W]hile challenges to the legality of a defendant’s sentence cannot be waived, they ordinarily must be raised within a timely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999). Therefore, “when a petitioner files an untimely PCRA petition raising a legality-of-sentence claim, the claim is not waived, but the jurisdictional limits of the PCRA itself render the claim incapable of review.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 932 A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. Super. 2007). Here, Hamilton failed to satisfy any of the PCRA timeliness exceptions. See Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Super. 2013) (collateral claim regarding legality of sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in timely manner under PCRA) (citations omitted). As such, the PCRA court nor this Court have the jurisdiction to review the merits of Hamilton’s amended PCRA petition, including his sentencing claim. 8 “This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012). - 11 - J-A20013-26 Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/21/2026 - 12 -