Com. v. Dooley, L.

J-S27018-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LEREX R. DOOLEY : : Appellant : No. 2468 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 5, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008960-2007 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant, Lerex R. Dooley, appeals from the September 5, 2025 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. This Court previously summarized the factual circumstances which led to Appellant’s underlying convictions as follows: In 2008, a jury convicted [Appellant] of robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm prohibited, and possession of an instrument of crime.[1 Appellant’s] convictions stem[med] from the robbery of a courier transporting money for a clothing retailer, Dr. Denim. At trial, Kevin Hiller (“Hiller”) testified that he and [Appellant] committed the robbery. [Hiller] had come forward with information about the robbery while seeking a favorable sentencing recommendation from federal authorities in an ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 2702(a)(1), 6105(a), and 907(a), respectively. J-S27018-26 unrelated case. The trial court gave the following summary of these events: On February 5, 2007, [Hiller], in an unrelated case, was convicted in federal court of robbing an armored [vehicle]. In May [] 2007, Hiller met with [Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)] agents for a proffer session in which he was to offer federal authorities any information he may have had on other crimes in exchange for possible leniency at sentencing [in the federal case]. During that meeting, Hiller described to the [FBI] agents how he and [Appellant] planned and executed the robbery of a courier for Dr. Denim on November 21, 2005. According to Hiller, on the day of the robbery, he and [Appellant] were in a [vehicle] following the Dr. Denim courier [when Appellant] jumped out of their vehicle and took the bag of money from the [victim]. The FBI gave this information to [Philadelphia Police] Detective [Kenneth] Roach, who then created a photo[graphic] array to show to the victim that included [Appellant’s] picture and seven others with similar facial features. Trial Court Opinion, [] 5/18/10, at 3 (citations omitted). Before trial, the Commonwealth [provided Appellant] a redacted copy of a [3-page] summary of Hiller’s proffer session. [A jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned criminal charges on December 2, 2008.] [On September 17, 2009, the trial] court sentenced [Appellant] to [an aggregate term of] 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. 2 ____________________________________________ 2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten to 20 years’ incarceration for his robbery conviction. For his aggravated assault conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of 7½ to 15 years’ incarceration with the sentence set to run concurrently to the sentence imposed on the robbery conviction. Appellant was sentenced to five to ten years’ incarceration for his possession of a firearm prohibited conviction with the sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on the robbery conviction. For his possession of an instrument of crime conviction, Appellant was sentenced to one to two years’ incarceration with the sentence set to run concurrently to the sentence imposed for his robbery conviction. Appellant’s aggregate sentence was 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. -2- J-S27018-26 Commonwealth v. Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *1 (Pa. Super. filed Jul. 30, 2024) (non-precedential decision) (original brackets omitted). Appellant filed a post-sentence motion in which he requested a new trial on, inter alia, the ground that the Commonwealth failed to produce, during pre-trial discovery, an unredacted version of Hiller’s 3-page proffer statement as mandated by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).3 N.T., 1/14/10, at 22. During a hearing on Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the parties stipulated that the 3-page proffer statement the Commonwealth disclosed to Appellant during pre-trial discovery had been provided to the Commonwealth by the FBI in its redacted format and that the Commonwealth did not redact ____________________________________________ 3 The dictates of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Brady, supra, have been summarized previously by our Supreme Court as follows: In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused and that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853-854 (Pa. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). -3- J-S27018-26 the 3-page proffer statement. Id. at 23-24. The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 14, 2010, and an appeal followed. On January 19, 2011, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Dooley, 23 A.3d 1084, 2011 WL 1665264 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 19, 2011) (non-precedential decision). Appellant did not seek discretionary review with our Supreme Court. As such, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on February 18, 2011, upon the expiration of time in which to file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (stating, “a petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of [our] Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the order of [this Court] sought to be reviewed”). On March 24, 2011, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. In his pro se petition, Appellant asserted that he was entitled to collateral relief based on a violation of his constitutional rights, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and after-discovered evidence. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 3/24/11, at 4-5. PCRA counsel was appointed to represent Appellant. Counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on July 23, 2014. On September 11, 2014, at the -4- J-S27018-26 request of Appellant and after conducting a Grazier4 hearing, the PCRA court permitted Appellant to proceed pro se in the matter. On December 12, 2014, Appellant filed a second amended PCRA petition. In his second amended PCRA petition, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights when it failed to disclose, under the mandates of Brady, an unredacted version of the 3-page proffer statement. Second Amended PCRA Petition, 12/12/14, at ¶ 10. Appellant also claimed that the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights when it failed to correct Hiller’s allegedly false testimony at trial as required by Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).5 Id. at ¶ 9. On April 14, 2015, the PCRA court provided Appellant notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 notice on April 30, 2015. On May 11, 2015, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. This Court affirmed the order that denied Appellant’s petition on January 31, 2017, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s request for discretionary review. Commonwealth v. Dooley, 2017 WL ____________________________________________ 4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1999). 5 It is well-established that, pursuant to Napue, supra, and its progeny, the Commonwealth “may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction.” Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 383 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1978), citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269). Under Napue, the Commonwealth has an affirmative duty to correct the testimony of a witness which [it] knows to be false.” Hallowell, 383 A.2d at 911 (citations and original quotation marks omitted). -5- J-S27018-26 416094 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 2017) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 1058 (Pa. 2017). On January 10, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a second PCRA petition. This Court previously summarized the averments of Appellant’s petition as follows: [Appellant] asserted that he had come into possession of “newly[-]discovered facts[,” namely] “two federal proffer notes outlining Hiller’s confession/involvement regarding a robbery/homicide perpetrated by Hiller and two other men sometime in 2006.” Citing the PCRA provisions affording relief for after-acquired evidence and constitutional violations, [Appellant] maintained that the proffer notes showed “Hiller’s purported involvement in a homicide/s [(sic)].” [Appellant] asked the PCRA court to determine “whether the omission of any evidence in correlation with[ the two federal proffer notes]” constituted after-acquired evidence or a constitutional violation. [Appellant] also maintained that he met the [newly-discovered] facts [jurisdictional] time-bar exception. Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *1 (record citations and original brackets omitted). As such, Appellant predicated jurisdiction over his January 2022 petition, which alleged constitutional violations and claims of after-acquired evidence, on the newly-discovered facts exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (stating that, a second or subsequent PCRA petition shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence became final unless the petitioner alleges and proves that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). On April 20, 2022, the -6- J-S27018-26 Commonwealth responded to Appellant’s petition, requesting that it be dismissed as untimely and without exception to the jurisdictional time-bar. On April 29, 2022, the PCRA court notified Appellant, pursuant to Rule 907, of its intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the ground the petition was untimely and without exception. On May 5, 2022, Appellant responded to the Rule 907 notice.6 In his response, Appellant stated that he employed efforts over “the past decade” to obtain the proffer statements, but his efforts were to no avail until September 2021. Rule 907 Response, 5/5/22 at 1 (unpaginated) (stating, “[Appellant] can also demonstrate he explored retaining these proffer notes by means of his own over the past decade[ (]see attached: [Appellant’s] letter to the FBI, [the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Agency], and [the PCRA court] requesting[, via the federal Freedom of Information Act,] the unredacted proffer portions[)] with no results other than a showing of reasonable interest in the claim as required under the due diligence standard.” (emphasis omitted)). On June 10, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely and without exception. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on June 24, 2022, which the PCRA court subsequently denied ____________________________________________ 6 Appellant’s response was received, and docketed by, the PCRA court on May 5, 2022. Appellant also sent a copy of his response to the “motions court” for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which was received, and docketed, on May 11, 2022. -7- J-S27018-26 on July 1, 2022. On July 11, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal that challenged the order dismissing his second PCRA petition. 7, 8 On appeal, this Court noted that the PCRA court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, agreed that, upon further review, Appellant satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the one-year jurisdictional time-bar in view of his acquisition of a 2-page unredacted copy of a proffer statement in September 2021, that, according to Appellant, showed Hiller provided false ____________________________________________ 7 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a) requires a notice of appeal to be “filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). The filing of a motion for reconsideration, unless expressly granted by the PCRA court within the 30-day appeal period, does not toll the time period in which to file an appeal of the order dismissing a petition for collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Powell, 290 A.3d 751, 755 (Pa. Super. 2023). As such, Appellant had until July 11, 2022, to file a timely notice of appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that, whenever the last day of any period of time referred to in a statute “shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation”). Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2022, was timely. 8 On October 4, 2023, Appellant filed pro se a third PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the third petition on December 8, 2023, on the grounds that the appeal of the order dismissing Appellant’s second petition was still pending. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that, a PCRA court lacks “jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the denial of the petitioner's prior PCRA petition in the same case is still pending”), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2019). In his third PCRA petition, Appellant claimed that he recently received an affidavit from Hiller’s brother, Charles Hiller. PCRA Petition, 10/4/23, at ¶ 7. According to Appellant, Hiller’s brother would testify at an evidentiary hearing, in accordance with the affidavit, that Hiller informed him that he and another individual (not Appellant) were involved in the Dr. Denim robbery. Id. at 2 (unpaginated); see also id. at Attachment (Affidavit). -8- J-S27018-26 testimony during cross-examination at Appellant’s trial. 9 Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *2; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 6; ____________________________________________ 9 As the PCRA court explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, to obtain a benefit at sentencing for unrelated federal charges, Hiller provided a proffer to the FBI in which he disclosed information regarding other criminal activities. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 5. “During that proffer, he described how he and [Appellant] committed the robbery of the Dr. Denim courier that is the subject matter of [Appellant’s underlying criminal conviction.]” Id. “Hiller’s proffer was memorialized by the FBI in a report of interview (FBI Form 302), which was provided by the FBI to the [Commonwealth], and turned over to [Appellant] as [part of] discovery, but in a heavily redacted form.” Id. In his second PCRA petition, Appellant alleged that “an inmate named Christopher Knight sent a 2-page unredacted copy of a proffer statement provided by Hiller to [Appellant’s] mother” in July 2021, and the proffer statement was subsequently forwarded to Appellant by his mother in September 2021. Id. Appellant further asserted in his petition that “the unredacted [proffer statement] undermine[d] Hiller’s credibility [at trial] and prove[d] the Commonwealth knowingly allowed Hiller to commit perjury at [Appellant’s] trial.” Id. The PCRA court stated that, based on Appellant’s representations regarding acquisition of the 2-page unredacted proffer statement, he satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the one-year jurisdictional time-bar. Id. In other words, the PCRA court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, accepted as true Appellant’s averments that he only learned of the newly-discovered facts, namely the 2-page unredacted proffer statement, in September 2021, and that he could not have learned of the existence of the proffer statement early through due diligence. The PCRA court further explained that it initially dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely because Appellant, who had been in possession of the 3-page redacted version of the proffer statement since 2008 and, therefore, knew of the existence of an unredacted version, “failed to aver any efforts to uncover the unredacted version” of the proffer statement. Id. at 8. The PCRA court noted, however, that in his response to the Rule 907 notice, Appellant “attached evidence of various unsuccessful attempts to obtain the unredacted statement.” Id. “These submissions convinced the [PCRA court] that [Appellant] could not have obtained the unredacted statement earlier through the use of due diligence.” Id. As such, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception and, in its Rule -9- J-S27018-26 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Nonetheless, the PCRA court concluded, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, that Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and that the claims raised in his second PCRA petition were without merit. Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *2; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 10-11. On appeal, the Commonwealth represented to this Court that, “in preparing its [appellate] brief, it found ‘multiple copies of an FBI report, which appear[ed] to be a copy of the same FBI report that was the basis for [Appellant’s] Brady claim.’” Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *2 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth’s Brief (1802 EDA 2022) at 5. The Commonwealth further represented that “the report it discovered, while preparing its appellate brief[, was] different from the redacted summary that the Commonwealth turned over during pretrial discovery.” Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *2 (citation omitted). The Commonwealth pointed out “that the document it recently discovered was not simply an unredacted version of what it provided [to Appellant] before trial, but rather[,] appear[ed] to be an entirely different FBI report that was not disclosed, summarizing additional information about Hiller’s involvement in a separate double homicide.” Id. (citation, original quotation marks, and original brackets omitted). The Commonwealth conceded that it received the 2-page ____________________________________________ 1925(a) opinion, considered the merits of Appellant’s petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 8-13. - 10 - J-S27018-26 unredacted proffer statement on May 21, 2007. Commonwealth’s Brief (1802 EDA 2022) at 5.10 This Court, without addressing whether, or not, Appellant satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the one-year jurisdictional time-bar based on the Commonwealth’s disclosures on appeal, found that the “undisclosed summary that the Commonwealth recently discovered facially support[ed Appellant’s] claim that the Commonwealth had unredacted FBI summaries related to Hiller at the time of [Appellant’s] trial.” Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *3. This Court vacated the June 10, 2022 order that dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition and remanded the case “for the PCRA court to conduct further proceedings to determine in the first instance whether [Appellant] is entitled to PCRA relief for his Brady claim.” Id. The ____________________________________________ 10 In its brief, the Commonwealth stated that [t]he copy [of the proffer statement] in the Commonwealth’s file was prepared by [FBI] Agent Vincent on May 7, 2007. It summarizes a proffer session with cooperating witness Hiller that occurred on May 7, 200[7] – i.e. the same date as the proffer session described in the redacted FBI report prepared by Agent Vincent and provided to the defense prior [to A]ppellant’s trial. The unredacted FBI report is stapled to a [facsimile] coversheet addressed by an Assistant United States Attorney to the Chief of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Homicide Unit. The [facsimile coversheet] is dated May 21, 2007 – one and a half years before [Appellant’s] trial. In this unredacted summary, Hiller admitted his role in a[n unrelated] robbery that resulted in the death of two victims. Commonwealth’s Brief (1802 MDA 2022) at 5 (emphasis in original). - 11 - J-S27018-26 PCRA court was also instructed to “consider on remand [Appellant’s] claim that his counsel during his first PCRA proceeding was ineffective.” Id. As such, this Court limited the scope of the remand to whether, or not, Appellant was entitled to collateral relief on his Brady claim involving the unredacted proffer statement and his claim that PCRA counsel, who represented Appellant on his first PCRA petition, provided ineffective assistance. On remand, PCRA counsel for Appellant filed a memorandum of law in support of the second PCRA petition on December 19, 2024. In the memorandum of law, Appellant explained that [o]n remand, the Commonwealth invited [PCRA] counsel to conduct [a] file review. On October 24, 2024, [PCRA] counsel did so. During [the] file review, [PCRA] counsel was able to view the unredacted version of the proffer [statement] referenced by the Commonwealth. . . . In addition, [PCRA] counsel located an envelope containing[,] inter alia[,] the eight full-page photographs placed into the photo[graphic] array admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5 during trial. The photograph of [Appellant found in the manilla envelope] contains the signature and initials of the [victim]. However, another photograph [discovered in the manilla envelope] also contains handwriting of the [victim], indicating that he began to write his name on that photo[graph] but stopped for some reason. This is evidence of another identification procedure during which the [victim] misidentified his assailant. [The full-page photographs contained in the manilla envelope were] never turned over to the defense [at the time of trial.] - 12 - J-S27018-26 Memorandum of Law, 12/19/24, at 3-4 (emphasis omitted). 11 In his memorandum of law, Appellant raised the Brady claim, concerning the 2-page unredacted proffer statement that was the subject of the remand proceeding, as well as a claim under Napue, based on the Commonwealth’s admission that it possessed the 2-page unredacted proffer statement at the time of Appellant’s trial and, therefore, according to Appellant, knew or should have known that Hiller provided false testimony. Id. at 4 (stating, “not only does it appear that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory information, it also appears that the Commonwealth allowed [Hiller] to offer perjured testimony and failed to correct it or otherwise bring it to the attention of the [trial court]”). In addition, Appellant raised a second Brady claim based on the sealed manilla envelope discovered in the district attorney’s files that contained “large, full-page pictures of several [individuals that appeared] in the photo[graphic] array that was admitted during the trial.” 12 Id. at 18. ____________________________________________ 11 In a letter dated December 22, 2024, and addressed to the PCRA court, PCRA counsel referred to his memorandum of law as an “amended PCRA petition.” The PCRA court referred to Appellant’s memorandum of law as “an amended [s]econd [p]etition” in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/14/25, at 3. PCRA counsel, however, did not seek permission from the PCRA court before filing what he represented was an amended PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012) (stating that, while amendments to PCRA petitions, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 905, are to be “freely allowed to achieve substantial justice[,]” amendments are not “self-authorizing” and are “permitted only by direction or leave of the PCRA court”). 12 The crux of Appellant’s Brady claim regarding the photographs was that, at trial, the victim testified he was presented with a photographic array - 13 - J-S27018-26 Appellant alleged that, prior to trial, he was never informed that these full-page photographs existed or provided copies of the same as required under Brady. Id. Appellant also raised an after-discovered evidence claim based on an affidavit he obtained from Hiller’s brother, Charles Hiller. 13 Id. at 23-24. According to Appellant, Hiller’s brother stated, in the affidavit, that Hiller “confided in him that another individual was involved in the Dr. Denim robbery[,]” for which Appellant was convicted. Id. at 23. On February 25, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s memorandum of law. In its response, the Commonwealth recited the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the 2-page unredacted proffer ____________________________________________ containing the photographs of several individuals as part of the police investigation, and he identified Appellant as his assailant by circling Appellant’s photograph on the array. Memorandum of Law, 12/19/24, at 20-21. At trial, Appellant’s trial counsel “unquestionably attacked the accuracy of the [victim’s] identification [of Appellant as the assailant in the photographic array by] bringing up the shaky nature of the [victim’s prior] identifications made at the preliminary hearing and during the pretrial line up procedure” in which the victim was uncertain as to the identify of his assailant. Id. at 21. According to Appellant, the full-page photographs, which Appellant had only recently discovered, showed that the victim placed a mark on a photograph of a person other than Appellant. Appellant asserted that this evidence demonstrated that the victim identified another individual as the assailant or, at a minimum, was uncertain as to the identity of the assailant, thereby supporting the defense strategy employed at trial to undermine the victim’s credibility. Id. at 18. 13Appellant does not indicate the date on which he received the affidavit authored by Charles Hiller. Memorandum of Law, 12/19/24, at 23-24. Appellant, however, first asserted the after-discovered evidence claim based on the brother’s affidavit in a third PCRA petition that was filed pro se on October 4, 2023, as discussed supra. It may be inferred that Appellant obtained the affidavit some time prior to October 4, 2023. - 14 - J-S27018-26 statement, along with the facsimile coversheet, in its files. Commonwealth’s Response, 2/25/25, at 10-11. The Commonwealth argued, however, that the information included in [the 2-page unredacted proffer statement] mirrors the information contained in a 5-page [unredacted] proffer statement [Appellant] attached to his September 27, 2017[] habeas corpus petition – with the exception of the [facsimile] coversheet suggesting that the unredacted 2-page proffer [statement] acknowledging Hiller’s involvement in a robbery-turned-murder was, in fact, in the Commonwealth’s possession prior to [Appellant’s] trial. Thus, it is unclear whether [Appellant’s] claim can meet an exception to the PCRA [jurisdictional] time-bar. Id. at 16. Appellant filed a reply to the Commonwealth’s response on March 14, 2025, and a supplemental memorandum in support of his PCRA petition on May 15, 2025. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 16, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court afforded both parties the opportunity to file post-hearing briefs. Appellant filed his brief on June 30, 2025, and the Commonwealth filed its brief on August 7, 2025. On September 5, 2025, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. The PCRA court found that Appellant satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar with regard to his claims involving the photographic array and the affidavit but, ultimately, concluded that these claims were meritless. PCRA Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 9/5/25, at 3-5, 9-11. In finding that Appellant’s Brady and Napue claims concerning the 2-page unredacted proffer statement failed to satisfy the newly-discovered facts exception and were, therefore, untimely, the PCRA court explained - 15 - J-S27018-26 The Commonwealth proved at the evidentiary hearing that [Appellant] attached to a federal habeas corpus petition[,] that he filed on September 27, 2017, unredacted versions of the Hiller proffer that included the exact same information regarding the homicide as the alleged Brady material. In addition, [Appellant] also attached unredacted reports of the proffer to a civil suit that he filed on March 12, 2018, against two of his prior [attorneys], in which he claimed that his attorneys were liable to [him] for breach of contract for not obtaining the unredacted versions of the Hiller proffer. Because [Appellant] knew all of the information that had been redacted from the report of the Hiller proffer no later than September 2017[,] and failed to file the instant petition until January 10, 2022, this claim is time-barred. Id. at 6. As such, the PCRA court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the Brady and Napue claims, but went on to consider, in the alternative, the merits of the Brady and Napue claims. Id. at 6-8. Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Id. at 12. This timely appeal followed.14 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Appellant’s] claim under [Brady, supra,] by concluding that [Appellant] failed to prove the suppressed photographs were exculpatory and [] the defense was prejudiced by the suppression? 2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in concluding that [Appellant’s] claims under [Brady, supra,] and Napue[, supra,] pertaining to the [2-page] unredacted proffer statement were time-barred? 3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s] claims [regarding the 2-page unredacted proffer statement] ____________________________________________ 14 Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. - 16 - J-S27018-26 under [Brady, supra,] and [Napue, supra,] by concluding [Appellant] failed to establish prejudice? 4. Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion [or] commit an error of law in its materiality analysis of [Hiller’s brother’s] testimony and in its application of the hearsay rule to [the] claim? Appellant’s Brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization). This case presents a complex procedural posture. On June 10, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s second PCRA petition. On July 20, 2024, this Court vacated the June 10, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s second petition and remanded the case for further proceedings concerning Appellant’s Brady claim as set forth in the second PCRA petition. 15 As discussed supra, this Court limited the scope of the PCRA court’s authority on remand to assess whether, or not, Appellant was entitled to collateral relief for his Brady claim concerning the 2-page unredacted proffer statement. 16 Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *3. Neither party sought discretionary review of this Court’s remand order by our Supreme Court. As such, this Court’s order that vacated the dismissal of Appellant’s second PCRA petition and remanded ____________________________________________ 15 This Court’s memorandum also relinquished jurisdiction. Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *3. 16 This Court also limited the PCRA court’s authority to addressing whether, or not, Appellant’s first PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance. Dooley, 324 A.3d 1271, 2024 WL 3580435, at *3. Our review of the record reveals that, on remand, Appellant withdrew his ineffective assistance claim. See PCRA Court Docket at 12/19/24 entry (stating, Appellant’s “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel withdrawn”); see also N.T., 5/16/25; Appellant’s Post-Hearing Brief, 6/30/25. - 17 - J-S27018-26 the case for further proceedings became final on August 29, 2024, and jurisdiction over Appellant’s second petition for collateral relief returned to the PCRA court. On remand, Appellant filed a memorandum of law that addressed the jurisdictional issues surrounding his Brady claim, which alleged nonproduction or concealment of a 2-page unredacted proffer statement Hiller provided to the FBI. Appellant also addressed the substantive merit of those contentions. In addition, Appellant raised three new claims for collateral relief. First, Appellant raised a Brady claim based on nonproduction of certain photographic images used during a line-up proceeding conducted with the Dr. Denim courier. Appellant also raised an after-discovered evidence claim based on an affidavit from Hiller’s brother. Finally, Appellant raised a claim that the Commonwealth violated his constitutional rights to due process under Napue, supra, because, based on its possession of the 2-page unredacted proffer statement at the time of trial, it knew, or should have known, that Hiller provided false testimony concerning his involvement in an unrelated homicide and failed to correct or alert the trial court to the false testimony. On May 16, 2025, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s claims for collateral relief, as Appellant outlined those contentions in his memorandum of law. On September 5, 2025, the PCRA addressed the merits of the claims raised by Appellant in his memorandum of law, as discussed supra and, ultimately, dismissed Appellant’s petition. - 18 - J-S27018-26 In those instances where a PCRA court has fully adjudicated a petition for collateral relief and, on appeal, an appellate court has vacated that final order and remanded the case for a limited purpose, i.e., limited the subject matter of proceedings on remand to consideration of one or more of the issues raised in the PCRA petition, the petitioner “is not entitled to raise new claims following [the appellate court’s] remand for further PCRA proceedings” absent explicit permission from the appellate court. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 144 A.3d 1270, 1279 (Pa. 2016). In other words, “a PCRA court does not have discretion to treat new claims raised by a PCRA petitioner as an amended PCRA petition following remand from this Court unless such amendment is expressly authorized in the remand order.” Id. at 1280. A petitioner, upon remand, is permitted, however, to file a subsequent, independent petition setting forth new claims for collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (stating that, “nothing bars a PCRA court from considering a subsequent petition, even if a petition is pending, so long as the prior petition is not under appellate review”), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134 (Pa. 2018). For the reasons that follow, we shall treat Appellant’s December 19, 2024 memorandum of law (and subsequent submissions) as a separate and independent petition for collateral relief that validly triggered the PCRA’s newly-discovered facts exception. As discussed supra, during the pendency of a prior appeal from a fully-adjudicated PCRA petition (Appellant’s second PCRA petition), the Commonwealth admitted that it discovered a 2-page - 19 - J-S27018-26 unredacted proffer statement in its file, which included a facsimile coversheet indicating that the statement had been received by the Commonwealth on May 21, 2007. This prompted a remand for further proceedings during which Appellant discovered a manila envelope in the Commonwealth’s files that contained photographic evidence that had not been previously disclosed during trial discovery. Additionally, while the appeal of his second PCRA petition was pending, Appellant received an affidavit from Charles Hiller that, according to Appellant, indicated that Hiller and a third-party (not Appellant) committed the incident for which Appellant was convicted. On December 19, 2024, Appellant filed a memorandum of law that raised several claims for collateral relief based on alleged constitutional violations and after-discovered evidence that were predicated upon newly-discovered facts Appellant learned during the pendency of the appeal involving his second PCRA petition and following remand. Appellant could not raise these new collateral challenges until the completion of appellate review of his second PCRA petition. See Beatty, 207 A.3d at 961. Appellate review of Appellant’s second PCRA petition bec