Full Opinion

J-S38027-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DWAYNE WRIGHT : : Appellant : No. 511 MDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 24, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004113-2018 BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2026 Appellant Dwayne Wright appeals pro se from the February 24, 2026 Order denying as untimely his second petition filed pursuant to the Post- Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. He challenges the stewardship provided by his first PCRA counsel. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not excuse Appellant from compliance with the PCRA’s one-year time bar, we affirm. We glean the relevant factual and procedural history from the PCRA court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. Following a stipulated bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of, inter alia, firearm and drug possession violations, as well as receiving stolen property. The court sentenced him to 7½ to 20 years’ incarceration. This Court affirmed, and on May 12, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Wright, 241 A.3d 461 (Pa. Super. 2020)(non-precedential), allocatur denied, 253 A.3d 222 J-S38027-26 (Pa. 2021). Appellant did not seek further review from the U.S. Supreme Court and his sentence, thus, became final on August 12, 2021.1 Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition timely. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Wright, 289 A.3d 79 (Pa. Super. 2022), allocatur denied, 296 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2023). On December 16, 2025, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition pro se,2 alleging ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for failing to include in the counseled amended PCRA petition a claim that he had raised in his first pro se PCRA petition. Appellant contended that PCRA counsel failed to assert that (1) the Commonwealth knowingly presented false testimony at his suppression hearing, in violation of his right to due process provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s “serially improper remarks.” PCRA Petition (supplemental), 12/16/25, at 11. Appellant asserted ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13(1). 2 The certified record contains two documents titled PCRA petitions filed on December 16, 2025. One is on a standard form petition in handwriting; the second is a typed petition. The PCRA court construed these documents together as one PCRA petition. Our review indicates these documents, filed on the same day, raise essentially identical issues, with the handwritten PCRA petition raising PCRA’s timeliness exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Because these documents were filed together, we will consider the handwritten pro se document to be a second PCRA petition and the typed pro se document to be a supplemental second PCRA petition. -2- J-S38027-26 that this second PCRA petition met the government interference and newly- discovered facts exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss this second petition without a hearing as untimely, explaining that Appellant failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Appellant did not respond. The PCRA court dismissed this petition on February 24, 2026. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) Opinion. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to properly raise and preserve claims that were raised in [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA petition, because of client’s protected autonomy? 2. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to allege that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a Veracity Challenge to Affidavit to Warrant[s]? Appellant’s Br. at 2. We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether its order is otherwise free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007). “We give no such deference, however, to the court's legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2017). -3- J-S38027-26 We first address whether we have jurisdiction to address the claims Appellant attempts to raise in this second PCRA petition. To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed within one year from the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “[T]he PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however, if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time-bar: government interference, newly-discovered facts, and a new constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. Id. at § 9545(b)(2). Most relevant here, “there is no statutory exception to the PCRA time- bar applicable to claims alleging the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel[,]” and the Supreme Court “has never suggested that the right to effective PCRA counsel can be enforced via an untimely filed PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (“[A] claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits.”). In this second PCRA petition asserting PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, Appellant attempted to invoke the government interference and newly- -4- J-S38027-26 discovered facts exceptions. To establish the government interference exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021). To establish the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s one- year time bar, a petitioner must plead and prove that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “[T]he focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Due diligence requires a petitioner to make reasonable efforts to uncover facts that may support a claim for relief. Commonwealth v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 449 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc). “A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant’s second petition failed to meet either of the asserted timeliness exceptions. The court observed that Appellant “altogether fails to allege that a government official interfered with his ability to pursue his PCRA claims at any time.” PCRA Ct. Op., 5/18/26, at -5- J-S38027-26 8. The court noted that although Appellant referred to alleged dilatory actions by the state court clerk in certifying a “copy of order” and transmitting a record, “he does not specify the order or portion of the record to which he is attempting to refer.” Id. at 8-9. “Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain whether any alleged interference was at all related to the untimely filing of the instant Petition.” Id. at 9. The PCRA court, which also presided over Appellant’s pre-trial and trial proceedings, further noted that Appellant’s false allegation that the court failed to file an opinion to support the denial of his motion to suppress, “would have been entirely irrelevant to his ability to timely assert a claim for relief under the PCRA.” Id. With respect to Appellant’s attempt to assert the newly-discovered facts exception, the PCRA court observed that Appellant failed “to provide essential information about the nature of the facts, how said facts are related to the instant Petition, and when he learned about the facts.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the court found Appellant failed to meet either timeliness exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. In his brief to this Court, Appellant does not address the court’s finding that Appellant failed to satisfy any timeliness exception. Appellant’s Br., at 10-20. Rather, he focuses his brief on the claims he wanted PCRA counsel to raise and why he believes those claims have merit to support the first prong of the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claim. Based on our review and precedential case law holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel -6- J-S38027-26 is not itself a timeliness exception, we conclude the PCRA court properly dismissed this second petition as untimely.3 Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/27/2026 ____________________________________________ 3 See Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2011) (reiterating that “this Court may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis.”). -7-