Full Opinion

J-S35034-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DENNIS KENNETH MADISON : : Appellant : No. 364 EDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 7, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007654-2010 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2026 Appellant, Dennis Kenneth Madison, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County denying his “Motion to Compel Specific Performance of Plea Agreement and Award Time Credit.” After our careful review, we affirm. This Court has previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural history, in part, as follows: Shortly before midnight on September 1, 2009, Kymeen Bennett was shot and killed while he was standing next to the open window of a truck occupied by Michael Lane on Tenth Street near the intersection with Booth Street in Chester City, Pennsylvania. He sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the back of the head. Mr. Lane located his firearm and returned fire. He identified Appellant, whom he had known for more than fifteen years, as the shooter, and he stated that he was wearing a black hoodie and black jeans and holding a semi-automatic weapon. Mr. ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S35034-26 Lane saw two other persons with Appellant, but he could not identify them. Near the victim’s body, police found three 9mm shell casings, consistent with Mr. Lane’s weapon. On the corner of Tenth and Booth Streets, the investigators located twelve 7.62 shell casings, which are typically fired from assault weapons, and twelve .22 caliber shell casings. This evidence was submitted for ballistic analysis. One week later, Detective Eugene Solgeugene, III, of the Wilmington Delaware Police Department, was conducting a search of a house at 510 East Ninth Street in Wilmington. Kevin Martin was present at the time of the search. Police recovered several firearms, including a .22 caliber JC Higgins rifle that ballistics linked to the .22 caliber shell casings found at the scene of the Chester City homicide. Thereafter, Mr. Martin gave a tape- recorded statement to police in which he implicated himself and Appellant in the shooting, and he identified Appellant as the shooter. There was a third person involved, whom he knew only as Appellant’s cousin, but who was identified later as Amir Tucker. Martin’s statement confirmed Mr. Lane’s account of the shooting. A criminal complaint was filed charging Appellant, Martin, and Tucker with criminal homicide, criminal conspiracy, and other related offenses, and warrants were issued for their arrest. Appellant and Martin were scheduled for a joint trial. Appellant filed a motion to suppress his oral and written statements to police, as well as a photographic identification. Co- defendant Martin filed a motion to suppress the .22 rifle that was obtained pursuant to a search warrant and connected through ballistics to the homicide herein. At a hearing on August 8, 2011, all motions were either withdrawn or denied. Appellant’s counsel moved to sever his case from co-defendant Martin’s case based on the Bruton[1] issue presented by his statement implicating Appellant. The court intimated that Martin’s statement would be redacted to remove all references to Appellant, but the court did not formally rule on the severance motion. On September 30, 2011, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy to ____________________________________________ 1 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (precluding admission at a joint trial of the co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant as violative of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). -2- J-S35034-26 commit murder, and the agreed-upon [aggregate] sentence of seventeen and one-half years to forty years in prison was imposed.[2] Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion nor seek to withdraw his plea. He did not file a direct appeal. Almost two years later, on July 2, 2013, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied as untimely by order that same day.[3] Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on November 10, 2016, which was treated as his first petition. Counsel was appointed. In lieu of an amended petition, counsel prepared and served upon Appellant a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). [Counsel also] filed an application to withdraw as counsel. On June 16, 2017, the PCRA court, following review of counsel’s no-merit letter, granted counsel’s application to withdraw, and the court issued notice to Appellant of its intent to dismiss his petition without a hearing in twenty days. Appellant objected to the proposed dismissal, and he alleged that, after filing his pro se petition, he “uncovered potentially exculpatory after-discovered evidence which was unavailable to Petitioner during his trial, by means of a signed unsworn affidavit from Petitioner’s co-defendant, Keith Martha,[4] which in essence, outlines recantation testimony and exonerate[s] Petitioner of any involvement in the incident in question.” Defendant’s Objections to the Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition Without a Hearing, 6/30/17, at 1-2. He averred that this newly-discovered fact was discovered in June 2017. Appended to his Objections was an “Unsworn Affidavit” purportedly signed by Kevin Martha, in which the affiant ____________________________________________ 2 In exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth withdrew a charge of first-degree murder. 3 As this Court noted previously, the trial court should have treated the motion for reconsideration as a PCRA petition, and counsel should have been appointed to file an amended petition. However, the petition was facially untimely. 4 Appellant’s co-defendants were Kevin Martin and Amir Tucker. In his objections, Appellant referred to his co-defendant as “Keith Martha” and “Kevin Martha.” It is unclear if “Keith Martha” or “Kevin Martha” is, in fact, Kevin Martin; however, Kevin Martin was Appellant’s co-defendant, and he made incriminating statements about Appellant to the police. -3- J-S35034-26 stated that his statements implicating Appellant were false, that they were made in retribution for Appellant’s involvement with Kevin Martha’s girlfriend, and that Appellant was not with him or involved in the shooting. Appellant asserted that this affidavit from his co-defendant recanting his prior statement constituted a newly-discovered fact for purposes of the timeliness exception. On July 10, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant [appealed]. Commonwealth v. Madison, No. 2357 EDA 2017, at *1-5 (Pa.Super. filed 6/18/18) (unpublished memorandum) (footnotes added) (footnotes omitted). On appeal, this Court concluded Appellant’s PCRA petition was facially untimely, and although Appellant sought to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception based on the “Unsworn Affidavit” from someone identified as “Keith Martha” or “Kevin Martha,” he failed to prove his entitlement to the exception. See id. Accordingly, we affirmed the PCRA court’s order. See id. On February 10, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition claiming that he met the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar based on exculpatory evidence that was “not available until 2021 and did not come to light until after [he] pled guilty.” Appellant’s Brief in Support of PCRA Petition at 5. On March 25, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, and Appellant filed a pro se response. Therein, he abandoned his newly- discovered fact claim, and, instead, he argued he was entitled to the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time bar. On May 15, 2022, -4- J-S35034-26 the PCRA court issued an order dismissing Appellant’s petition, and Appellant appealed. On appeal, this Court found Appellant’s PCRA petition to be facially untimely. See Commonwealth v. Madison, No. 1415 EDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed 3/22/23) (unpublished memorandum). Further, we noted that Appellant claimed he was entitled to the governmental interference exception due to the Commonwealth allegedly withholding “Brady[5] materials favorable to Appellant, that was based on ballistic evidence, and a forensic analysis report that the prosecution alleges ‘was not available,’ or ‘wasn’t in their possession’ during the pre-trial stage.” Id. at *7 (footnote added). While this Court recognized that a Brady claim may fall within the governmental interference and newly-discovered fact exceptions to the PCRA time bar, we concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his failure to raise the underlying Brady claim earlier was the result of interference by government officials. We further concluded that the record reflected that Appellant was aware of the alleged Brady materials at the time his criminal proceedings began in 2011, and he failed to explain why he waited until 2021 to obtain copies of the reports. Accordingly, we affirmed the PCRA court’s order. On or about September 23, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se document entitled “Motion to Compel Specific Performance of Plea Agreement and Award ____________________________________________ 5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). -5- J-S35034-26 Time Credit.” Therein, Appellant averred that, on September 30, 2011, he entered a negotiated plea agreement, and, “[a]s part of the plea agreement, [he] was to receive credit for all time spent in custody on unrelated cases from November 28, 2009, up to the time of sentencing in this case[.]” Appellant’s Petition, filed 9/23/25, at 1. Appellant averred that he was never given credit for “the time spent in custody on the unrelated cases from 11/28/2009 through 12/15/2010 as envisioned by the plea agreement.” Id. Appellant contended that he is entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement, and, thus, he should be given credit for time served from 11/28/2009 to 12/15/2010. On November 25, 2025, the lower court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to treat the petition under the auspices of the PCRA and to dismiss it as untimely. On December 15, 2025, Appellant filed a response. Specifically, Appellant averred that he is “seeking performance of a term of the plea agreement, i.e., time credit for all time spent in custody on the instant matter and unrelated case as agreed upon by the parties as accepted by the [trial] court.” Appellant’s Response, filed 12/15/25, at 1. Accordingly, he averred that his petition should not be treated under the auspices of the PCRA. By order filed on January 7, 2026, the lower court dismissed Appellant’s petition as an untimely PCRA petition. This timely pro se appeal followed, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met. -6- J-S35034-26 On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of the Questions Presented” (verbatim): A. Did the trial court err by treating Appellant’s Motion to Compel Specific Performance of Plea Agreement and Award Time Credit Nunc Pro Tunc as an untimely PCRA petition and dismissing it for failing to plead and prove a timeliness exception? Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answer omitted). On appeal, Appellant contends that, on November 29, 2009, he was arrested and charged at an “unknown docket number” with robbery and theft in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and, as a result thereof, he was incarcerated from November 28, 2009, to January 20, 2010. Id. at 5. He avers these charges were “dismissed on or about January 20, 2010,” but he was then arrested and charged on November 29, 2010, in the instant case for the murder of Mr. Bennett. Id. Thereafter, he remained in prison because of the instant charges. Id. Appellant contends that he entered the negotiated guilty plea in the instant case and “said plea was conditioned upon Appellant receiving credit for all time spent in custody at both dockets.” Id. at 6. He claims that the trial court “breached the agreement” by giving him credit for solely the time he spent in custody for the instant case (i.e., from November 29, 2010, to September 30, 2011) as opposed to including the time he spent in custody for his previous charges “at an unknown docket number” (i.e., from November 28, 2009, to January 20, 2010). Appellant avers he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement, and, thus, he is seeking to enforce the plea agreement. -7- J-S35034-26 Initially, we agree with Appellant that, inasmuch as he has phrased his issue as seeking to enforce a negotiated plea agreement, he raises a claim outside the ambit of the PCRA. Specifically, as this Court has previously held: “[A] collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual enforcement theory of specific performance.” Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607, 611-13 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations omitted). Regarding the legal standards applicable to such a claim, we held as follows in Kerns: Contract interpretation is a question of law, so “[o]ur standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary.” Plea bargains play a critical role in the criminal justice system of this Commonwealth[.] *** Accordingly, it is critical that plea agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining system. The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused,...is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. In this Commonwealth, the practice of plea bargaining is generally regarded favorably, and is legitimized and governed by court rule....A “mutuality of advantage” to defendants and prosecutors flows from the ratification of the bargain. Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when the parties enter the plea agreement and the court accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms of the agreement. Specific enforcement of valid plea bargains is a matter of fundamental fairness. The terms of plea agreements are not limited to the withdrawal of charges, or the length of a sentence. Parties may agree to—and seek enforcement of—terms that fall outside these areas. -8- J-S35034-26 Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law standards. Furthermore, disputes over any particular term of a plea agreement must be resolved by objective standards. A determination of exactly what promises constitute the plea bargain must be based upon the totality of the surrounding circumstances and involves a case-by-case adjudication. Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement will be construed against the Government. Nevertheless, the agreement itself controls where its language sets out the terms of the bargain with specificity. Regarding the Commonwealth’s duty to honor plea agreements, well-settled Pennsylvania law states: Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that duty in order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a defendant might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give up the very valued constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury. Whether a particular plea agreement has been breached depends on what the parties to the agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement. *** [T]he convicted criminal is entitled to the benefit of his bargain through specific performance of the terms of the plea agreement. Thus, a court must determine whether an alleged term is part of the parties’ plea agreement. If the answer to that inquiry is affirmative, then the convicted criminal is entitled to specific performance of the term. Kerns, 220 A.3d at 612-12 (citations, quotation marks, and quotations omitted). We have reviewed the record and the transcripts in the case sub judice. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, there is no evidence that, as part of his negotiated plea agreement, the parties agreed Appellant would receive credit -9- J-S35034-26 for time he spent in custody from November 28, 2009, to January 20, 2010, related to an “unknown docket number.” Rather, the written plea agreement provides that, in exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing a charge of first-degree murder, Appellant would plead guilty to third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Regarding credit for time served, the written plea agreement provided: “The defendant shall receive such credit for time served as he is entitled by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Written Guilty Plea, filed 9/30/11. During the guilty plea hearing, the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) set forth the following terms of the negotiated guilty plea: It is the Commonwealth’s understanding that [Appellant] will be entering a Negotiated Plea of Guilty[.] The terms are as follows: On Information A, Third Degree Murder, a Felony of the First Degree, recommended sentence of 17½ to 40 years in SCI. The Defendant is not RRRI eligible. And on Information B, Count One, Criminal Conspiracy to Third Degree Murder, a Felony of the First Degree, with a recommended sentence of 17½ to 40 years in SCI, no RRRI, and this sentence to run concurrently with the sentence on Information A. N.T., 9/30/11, at 3. Appellant’s counsel indicated the Commonwealth had correctly set forth the agreed upon plea agreement, and Appellant understood the terms. Id. at 4. Appellant’s counsel asked Appellant the following question: Now, you heard the recommendations of the District Attorney when he put forth the negotiations, and you understand if the Judge accepts it, accepts those negotiations, you are to be sentenced to 17½ years to 40 years as to Murder in the Third Degree and the same sentence, 17½ years to 40 years as to - 10 - J-S35034-26 Conspiracy to that charge, those sentences to run concurrent, or at the same time. Do you understand that? Id. at 9. Appellant answered affirmatively. Id. After the trial court concluded Appellant was voluntarily pleading guilty to third-degree murder and conspiracy, the trial court asked if Appellant wished to proceed immediately to sentencing or whether he wished to continue sentencing for the preparation of a presentence investigation report. Id. at 21. Appellant indicated a desire to proceed immediately to sentencing. Id. During sentencing, the following exchange occurred: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, he has been in custody continuously in reference to this matter since November 28th of 2009, so I would ask that he be given credit from that date forward in reference to the guilty plea and sentence. THE COURT: The sentencing sheet routinely reflects, and it’s already printed on the sheet that— [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Thank you. THE COURT: -- he'll be provided with appropriate credit as calculated. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor,….I would ask that you sentence in accordance with the plea negotiations, please. I've advised [Appellant] of his right to allocution this morning, and he does not wish to address the Court. THE COURT: Thank you. [ADA]: Judge, I'm sorry -- THE COURT: Mister -- [ADA]: I'm sorry to interrupt, but there's -- I believe [Appellant’s counsel] said November 28th of 2009. My notes indicate it’s November 2[9]th of 2010. THE COURT: November 20th, 2010? MR. DOHERTY: 20 -- - 11 - J-S35034-26 [APPELLANT]: No, it's not. THE COURT: Well -- [ADA]: [Appellant] on this -- THE COURT: -- frankly, I don't intend to -- [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Yeah. THE COURT: -- put a specific date…on the sentencing sheet. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: His bracelet says 9[.] THE COURT: I don't intend to put a specific date -- [ADA]: This wasn't filed until 2010. THE COURT: Listen to me. I don't intend to put a specific date on the sentencing sheet. I'm going to give him all appropriate credit that he is legally entitled to. [APPELLANT]: Yes. THE COURT: So, it can be dealt with by the Department of Corrections. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Very well, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. [Appellant], is there anything you want to say? [APPELLANT]: Uh-uh. THE COURT: Nothing at all? [APPELLANT]: No. Id. at 23-24. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to 17½ years to 40 years in prison for third-degree murder, as well as 17 ½ years to 40 years in prison for conspiracy. The sentences were imposed concurrently. The trial court stated: “We’ll give you all appropriate credit for time served as appropriately calculated.” Id. at 31. Based on the aforementioned, there is no evidence that Appellant’s guilty plea agreement contained a specific term that he would receive credit - 12 - J-S35034-26 for time he spent in custody from November 28, 2009, to January 20, 2010, related to an “unknown docket number.” Thus, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief.6 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 7 Order affirmed. Date: 10/20/2026 ____________________________________________ 6 We note there is no dispute the trial court ordered credit for time served. To the extent Appellant’s claim may be construed as a challenge to the Department of Corrections’ calculation of his credit for time served: This Court [has] held that a PCRA petition is not the proper method for contesting the [Department of Corrections’] calculation of sentence. If the alleged error is thought to be the result of an erroneous computation of sentence by the Bureau of Corrections, then the appropriate vehicle for redress would be an original action in the Commonwealth Court challenging the Bureau’s computation. Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394–95 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). 7 We may affirm on grounds other than those relied upon by the court below. See Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 314 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc). - 13 -