Com. v. Gerber, G.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket3276 EDA 2025
JudgePanella
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GARY LEE GERBER JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 3276 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 21, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000112-2007
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2026
Gary Lee Gerber, Jr., appeals from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Monroe County denying his third petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Gerber argues
that the PCRA court erred in concluding that two of his Brady1 claims were
untimely for failing to satisfy the government interference exception and that
his one timely raised Brady claim was meritless. After careful review, we
affirm.
This Court previously summarized the facts underlying Gerber’s 2010
conviction.
On December 16, 2006, police charged Gerber with criminal
homicide and related charges following an incident that resulted
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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in the death of Robert Hagan (“the victim”). When addressing
Gerber’s direct appeal, we cited the trial court’s detailed summary
of the pertinent facts and trial proceedings as follows:
The majority of the facts are not in dispute: in the
early morning hours of August 13, 1993, Gerber was
alone with the victim in the victim’s vehicle while
parked along Rimrock Road in Monroe County. At
some point while inside the vehicle, Gerber “lashed
out” on the victim stabbing him four times in the
back[,] Gerber admitted stabbing the victim. Gerber
also cut the victim’s throat in a manner that showed
no sign of hesitation; the victim’s neck wound was
characterized as a superficial wound because no major
arteries were cut, but the area had many blood
vessels which have resulted in fairly profuse bleeding.
These stab wounds were potentially lethal because of
the amount of hemorrhaging and blood loss the victim
suffered, as well as his collapsed lung.
At trial, Gerber testified he was inebriated and parked
his pickup truck in a parking lot. Two men
approached, told him he could not park there and they
would give him a ride, and helped him into what he
believed was the victim’s car. The next thing Gerber
remembered was waking up in the victim’s car, his
pants and his underwear were pulled down, somebody
was on top of him and trying to force something into
him, and he felt excruciating pain. On appeal, Gerber
claims the victim was trying to homosexually rape
him.
After being stabbed, the victim exited the car and fled.
The victim’s body was eventually found on a bridge on
Rimrock Road approximately 290 feet away from
where Gerber stabbed him. Blood drops were found in
various locations along the road leading toward the
bridge on Rimrock Road. It was determined the victim
had suffered massive injuries to his head, i.e., a
crushed skull and brain, and massive injuries to his
torso, i.e., a crushing injury to his entire side of his
chest. These injuries were consistent with him being
run over by a car.
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Gerber stated that, after he stabbed the victim, he got
into the driver’s seat of the victim’s vehicle and drove
up Rimrock Road toward Route 611, which is the same
direction where the victim’s body was found.
Thereafter, Gerber drove the vehicle to his father’s
junkyard and wiped down the interior of the car to
clean off the blood. Gerber stated that he only cleaned
off the steering wheel and the shifter of the vehicle,
but also noted that the “car was like forensically clean
like somebody knew what they were doing did it.”
Although Gerber only admits having wiped down the
interior of the vehicle, Gerber’s father testified that he
also observed Gerber wiping down the car from the
outside. Additionally, wipe marks were found on the
passenger door window of the victim’s vehicle and
blood was present on the front license plate of the
vehicle in a manner that was consistent with someone
wiping the license plate. Finally, Gerber admitted
“getting rid of the car” by dumping it along Schaffer’s
School House Road.
Gerber testified that he never felt an impact of hitting
a body that night, but he did admit that he could have
driven through a “brick wall because he was so
expletive scared that night.”
In his closing argument, Gerber’s trial counsel made
clear that the majority of these facts were not in
dispute. However, the Defense argued that Gerber
stabbed the victim in self-defense, believing that he
was being sexually assaulted by the victim. Gerber
claims that he began driving the victim’s car, but
never knew that he hit the victim because of his
emotional state after being sexually assaulted and
because of the foggy weather conditions that
morning. Finally, Gerber claims that he dumped the
vehicle on Schaffer’s School House Road because his
father told him to and that he never came forward to
the police with his self-defense claim because he was
ashamed of being sexually assaulted.
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Commonwealth v. Gerber, No. 2067 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 5232441, at **1-
2 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 10, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 277 A.3d 1106 (Pa. 2022) (brackets, ellipsis, and citation omitted).
On July 14, 2010, Gerber was found guilty of first-degree murder and
he was sentenced to life in prison. Gerber filed a post-sentence motion, which
was denied, and he appealed.2 On January 7, 2015, this Court affirmed
Gerber’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gerber, No. 1415
EDA 2013, 2015 WL 7573047 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 7, 2015) (unpublished
memorandum). He did not seek further review.
On July 27, 2015, Gerber filed a counseled PCRA petition raising multiple
claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. After holding evidentiary hearings, the
trial court denied Gerber’s petition. On November 27, 2017, this Court
affirmed the court’s denial and on May 29, 2018, our Supreme Court denied
his petition for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Gerber, No.
3201 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 5943221 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 21, 2017)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 186 A.3d 938 (Pa. 2018).
On July 30, 2018, Gerber filed his second PCRA petition. After a hearing,
the PCRA court entered an order finding that Gerber’s second PCRA petition
was untimely filed and he failed to establish a timeliness exception. See
____________________________________________
2 Initially, we vacated his judgment of sentence and remanded for the trial
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and consider newly discovered DNA
evidence. After the hearing, the trial court denied Gerber’s motion and
resentenced him to life in prison.
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Gerber, 2021 WL 5232441, at *3. This Court affirmed on November 10, 2021,
and our Supreme Court denied Gerber’s petition for allowance of appeal.
On July 8, 2024, Gerber filed his third PCRA petition and later amended
that petition on December 19, 2024. Therein, he raised Brady claims based
on three pieces of evidence he had obtained since the conclusion of his prior
appeal: (1) bench notes of Pennsylvania State Police scientist George Surma;
(2) bench notes of PSP Lieutenant Dennis Loose that included twelve
photographs of tire casts; and (3) a map and report of the crime scene
prepared by Trooper Tolan one week before trial. He argued that his claims
were timely under the government interference exception, that the due
diligence requirement is unconstitutional, and alternatively, that he exercised
due diligence. Evidentiary hearings were held on April 22 and 23, 2025, and
argument was held on October 24, 2025.
On November 21, 2025, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order that
dismissed the Surma and Loose Brady claims as untimely for lack of due
diligence (and alternatively finding that the underlying Brady claims were
meritless), and finding the Tolan Brady claim timely but meritless.3 Gerber
____________________________________________
3 We commend the Honorable Arthur L. Zulick for aiding our appellate review
with his detailed and well-reasoned opinion.
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timely appealed. Both Gerber and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).4
Gerber raises the following issues for our review.
Did the lower court err, abuse its discretion and deprive Appellant
of due process of law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, §9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, when it:
1. imposed a diligence requirement regarding the
governmental interference exception to the time bar?
2. found that [Gerber] was not adequately diligent to
meet the time bar exception?
3. found that none of the withheld exculpatory or
impeachment evidence was material?
4. failed to assess the cumulative impact of all the
suppressed evidence, but instead considered
materiality item by item?
5. found the conclusions in Surma’s lab report and his
trial testimony to be equivalent to his suppressed
bench notes, therefore rendering the bench notes
immaterial?
6. required [Gerber] to produce an expert in tire tread
analysis, in order for the court to take notice of the
obvious difference between tire tread designs
recorded in the suppressed Loose photos (depicting
tire impression casts); and trial photo exhibit (C-20)
____________________________________________
4 At the end of 2025, then-President Judge Zulick retired and the matter was
reassigned to the Honorable Jonathan Mark. President Judge Mark wrote a
brief 1925(a) statement referring to the reasons stated in the November 21,
2025, opinion which it summarized as Gerber “reasonably could and should
have raised his claims relating to the Surma bench notes [and] the Loose
notes and photographs . . . in prior proceedings—at the latest, during the
proceedings on his second PCRA petition. He did not.” 1925(a) Statement,
1/12/26, at 2-3.
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depicting a tire track next to alleged blood, from
where lay witness Trooper DeAndrea purportedly
collected the casts?
7. found that a lay witness can testify that a substance
appeared to be blood, even when the sample in
question was analyzed by a scientist who determined
blood was not present?
Appellant’s Brief, at 1-2.
Gerber’s issues are interrelated and contest the PCRA court’s ruling that
his Surma and Loose Brady claims were untimely and meritless, and that his
Tolan Brady claim was meritless.
In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the findings of
the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s
hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Because most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we
employ a mixed standard of review. We defer to the PCRA court’s
factual findings and credibility determinations supported by the
record. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions
de novo.
Commonwealth v. Isaac, 205 A.3d 358, 362 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted).
“The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and
must be strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues
raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,
941 A.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted). A PCRA petition,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including
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discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking
review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
As this Court previously established, Gerber had until February 8, 2016,
to file a timely PCRA petition. See Gerber, 2021 WL 5232441, at *3. Here,
he did not file his third PCRA petition until July 8, 2024. Therefore, his third
PCRA petition is facially untimely, and he must satisfy a timeliness exception.
Three statutory exceptions exist to the PCRA’s time bar. To invoke an
exception, a petition must allege and a petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or the law of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or law of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
“It is the petitioner’s burden to allege and prove that one of the
timeliness exceptions applies.” Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268 (citation
omitted). Additionally, “[a]ny petition invoking an exception . . . shall be filed
within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
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§ 9545(b)(2).5 “In order to establish the governmental interference exception,
a petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the failure to previously raise the claim
was the result of interference by government officials, and (2) the petitioner
could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due
diligence.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citing Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268).
At the outset, Gerber argues that the due diligence requirement for the
government interference exception to the PCRA time bar conflicts with the
statutory language of the PCRA and is unconstitutional. See Appellant’s Brief,
at 35-38. However, Gerber does recognize that existing Supreme Court
precedent establishes that, to satisfy the government interference exception,
a petitioner must demonstrate he exercised due diligence, see id. at 36 (citing
Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268), and that this Court rejected this claim in his
prior appeal. See id. at 3 (citing Gerber, 2021 WL 5232441, at *6).
It is a core tenant of our judicial system that, as an intermediate
appellate court, we are “bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of
stare decisis and continue[] to follow controlling precedent as long as the
decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court.” Commonwealth
v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
____________________________________________
5 Previously, Section 9545(b)(2) only set forth a sixty-day period. For claims
arising on or after December 24, 2017, the period for presenting the claim is
one year.
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we are bound by our Supreme Court’s precedent that a PCRA petitioner raising
a claim under the government interference exception must establish that the
claim could not have been raised earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
Alternatively, Gerber invites us to stay resolution of his appeal pending
our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wyant, wherein the
Court granted review to decide “[w]hether, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s one-
year jurisdictional time-bar, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §9545(b)(1)(i), requires a
petitioner to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in ascertaining the
information underlying his claim?” Commonwealth v. Wyant, 356 A.3d 746
(Pa. 2026).6 Again, “because our Supreme Court has not yet decided this
issue, we remain bound by existing precedent.” Commonwealth v. Hind,
304 A.3d 413, 417 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). Therefore, we
decline to stay the matter.
Next, Gerber argues that he exercised due diligence in seeking the
Surma bench notes and Loose notes and photographs. He argues that he first
became aware of “bench notes” and questions surrounding Surma’s training
in late 2017, after Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617 (Pa. 2017), was
decided. See Appellant’s Brief, at 39-40. He asserts that from that point, until
he received the material in January 2024, he attempted to obtain the material
____________________________________________
6 According to the publicly available docket sheets, it appears that briefing has
been completed but the case has not yet been scheduled for oral argument.
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through filing letters to the Commonwealth, right to know law requests with
the state police, a federal habeas corpus action, and a civil action.7 See id.
Regarding the Surma and Loose notes, the PCRA court reasoned that
although Gerber was “persistent” with his efforts, he ultimately failed to
establish why he could not have obtained them sooner before he first
requested them on May 10, 2018.
His civil suit was filed on September 17, 2021, at a time when he
was represented by counsel in his second PCRA proceedings. He
could have used the civil rules to obtain the production of
the Surma and Loose bench notes and photographs, which
he eventually did, but he waited [over two years later] until
December of 2023 and March of 2024 to obtain them. He
obtained the December 2023 subpoena before a hearing
scheduled for February 5, 2024. The March 26, 2024 subpoena
requested the materials be produced for a May 13, 2024 hearing
before the court. He had the right to seek production of documents
in his civil case promptly after he filed the complaint, which he did
not do. See Pa.R.C.P. 4009.21. Instead, he waited more than two
years to seek that discovery, which ultimately led to his ability to
obtain the documents. If this was a priority, his attorney could
have assisted him in complying with the civil discovery rules. He
ably used the subpoenas when he focused on them two years
later. This was not reasonable diligence to obtain evidence during
the one-year period after he became aware of the bench notes.
The PCRA petition will be denied due to lack of jurisdiction as it
relates to the Surma [and Loose] notes.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/21/25, at 28-29 (emphasis added).
We agree with the PCRA court. Further, as the Commonwealth points
out, Gerber failed to present any evidence that the government interfered with
____________________________________________
7 For a detailed timeline of Gerber’s actions, see the PCRA Court Opinion at
21-24.
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him requesting and obtaining the Surma notes before May 7, 2018. See
Appellee’s Brief, at 29. Therefore, because Gerber has failed to plead and
prove a timeliness exception, the PCRA court did not err in finding that
Gerber’s Brady claims related to the Surma and Loose notes were untimely.
Similarly, Gerber failed to establish due diligence in obtaining the Loose
photos. The PCRA court reasoned that because Loose testified at trial about
the existence of the photos, Gerber was aware of their existence, and
therefore, failed to exercise due diligence by not seeking them until over ten
years later. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/21/25, at 30-32 (citing N.T.,
7/12/10, 35). Gerber argues that he should not be found to be on notice about
the existence of the Loose photos because he was provided hundreds of
photographs in discovery and was operating on the reasonable belief that all
the photographs were disclosed to his attorney. See Appellant’s Brief, at 43-
44. Further, he argues that appellate counsel for the Commonwealth was
unaware whether the Loose photos were turned over in discovery and
“diligence does not require a petitioner to know things that the prosecutor
either did not know.” Id. at 43. We are unpersuaded.
Gerber was aware of the photos based on Loose’s trial testimony and
failed to explain how he was prevented access from obtaining them. As we
have previously explained, “knowledge of the files, absent action to obtain
them, precluded a finding of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Smallwood,
155 A.3d 1054, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis and citation omitted); see
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also Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 123 (Pa. 2017)
(“information that was clearly available to [the petitioner] at the time of trial
cannot be cloaked as a claim of governmental interference to circumvent the
PCRA timeliness requirements.”) (citation omitted). Because Gerber was
aware of the existence of the photos at the time of trial, he did not exercise
due diligence by first attempting to obtain them over eight years later.
Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in finding that Gerber’s Brady claim
related to the Loose photos was untimely. 8
Next, Gerber asserts that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s
failure to provide the Tolan report of the crime scene created a week before
trial and seventeen years after the murder. See Appellant’s Brief, at 68-69.
Gerber argues that had it been disclosed, he could have called Tolan to testify
at trial that a report was not made because the crime scene measurements
were lost, which would have undermined the integrity of the investigation.
See id.
The PCRA court thoroughly and aptly explained why, although Gerber’s
Tolan Brady claim was timely, it still did not entitle him to relief because it
was meritless.
[] Gerber also challenges the Commonwealth’s failure to provide
him with a copy of the Tolan Report before trial as a Brady
violation. The Commonwealth concedes that Trooper Todd Tolan
____________________________________________
8 Because we agree with the PCRA court that Gerber’s Brady claims based on
the Surma notes and the Loose notes and photos were untimely, we need not
assess the underlying merits of his claims.
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mapped the scene of the crime on June 29, 2010, using a Leica
Total Station and standard measuring tapes “to document the
roadway geometry and the parking lot geometry for the area of
Rimrock Drive south of State Route 611” in Hamilton Township,
Monroe County, Pennsylvania. Defendant’s Exhibit 11. Trooper
Tolan signed the report (which included the map) on June 30,
2010. The report was filed with the PSP and his supervisor signed
the report on July 27, 2010[, almost two weeks after the verdict
was rendered]. Id. At the time Trooper Tolan prepared the map,
the crime scene had changed in significant respects. At the time
of the murder in 1993, the area was an open lot. At the time of
the mapping in 2010, a building had been constructed on the lot.
N.T., 4/23/25, at 9. Attachment 4 of the report was information
about a base model 1992 Chevy Cavalier two-door coupe, which
was the model of the Hagen vehicle. Id. at 94. Trooper Tolan did
not do an accident reconstruction of the murder scene. Id. at 98.
The evidence established that the Tolan report was never turned
over to the prosecution. The prosecutors were unaware of it. Id.
at 118. The State Police did not bring it to [the prosecution’s]
attention. The report and mapping were not turned over to the
defense. The court does have jurisdiction over this claim because
the report was in the possession of the State Police when the trial
began on July 10, 2010. [] Gerber could not have known about
the Tolan Report because neither he nor the Attorney General’s
prosecutors knew about it until the PSP turned it over to Gerber
in the civil action in 2024. He amended his PCRA petition to include
it within one year of its discovery.
However, even though the court has jurisdiction over this claim, .
. . Gerber is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Due process
requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to
the defense and is material. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995). There are two components to a Brady claim: (1) the
government suppressed favorable evidence either intentionally or
inadvertently; and 2) the suppressed evidence was material to the
outcome of the trial. Favorable evidence includes impeachment
evidence and exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). A prosecutor’s failure to disclose Brady
material requires relief when the exculpatory evidence would have
been material to the trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
The Tolan mapping was done almost 17 years after the murder.
In 1993, the lot was bare dirt being used by construction vehicles.
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In 2010, the lot had been paved over, and a building had been
constructed on it. Obviously no particular crime scene
measurements could be done in 2010 with these changes, and
Trooper DeAndrea testified at the trial in 2010 that the State Police
had lost his specific crime scene measurements. The Tolan
mapping would not have proven anything relevant at the
time of the trial other than to establish the geographical
location of the crime scene.
[] Gerber argues that if he had known about the report, he could
have called Trooper Tolan as a witness and shown that an accident
reconstruction could have been done if DeAndrea had not lost his
measurements. He could have also established that State Police
protocol required an accident reconstruction if a vehicle crash
resulted in a fatality. His trial counsel could have used this fact to
“undermine the integrity of the investigation” citing the Kyle[s]
case. However, nothing prevented [] Gerber’s trial counsel
from pointing out that the Commonwealth had not done an
accident reconstruction at the time of the trial, because the
Commonwealth didn’t prove that it did one. [] Gerber has not
established that the Tolan report and map was material evidence
favorable to the defense. This claim will be denied.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/21/25, at 36-38 (emphasis added) (record citation
format altered).
Gerber argues that the PCRA court’s analysis misses the mark because
his claim is not that the investigation could have been undermined by an
accident reconstruction not being done before trial, but “[r]ather, the claim
relies on Tolan’s post-conviction admission that such a reconstruction could
have been done, but for the fact that [Trooper DeAndrea] lost his
measurements – as Tolan testified, those measurements were needed to do
the reconstruction.” Appellant’s Brief, at 69-70 (emphasis omitted). As the
PCRA court recognized, Trooper DeAndrea testified at trial that the crime
scene measurements were lost. Accordingly, at the time of trial, the defense
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was aware that the crime scene measurements were lost and that an accident
reconstruction was not performed and had the opportunity to bring it to the
jury’s attention. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in finding that Gerber’s
Tolan Brady claim was meritless.
Lastly, in conclusory fashion, Gerber asserts that the PCRA court failed
to conduct a cumulative materiality analysis for the Brady claims. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 70. This claim does not merit relief. It is well-settled that
“no number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so
individually.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 8 A.3d 294, 321 n.22 (Pa. 2014)
(brackets and citation omitted). As explained above, none of Gerber’s Brady
claims merit relief. Two Brady claims were untimely, with no exception
pleaded and proven. The third claim, although timely, lacks substantive merit.
Therefore, Gerber’s argument is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/20/2026
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