Com. v. Goodman, J.

J-S24021-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JERMAINE I. GOODMAN : : Appellant : No. 1615 WDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000998-2022 BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: October 27, 2026 Jermaine I. Goodman, a/k/a Zahid Abdul-Muqeet (“Appellant”), appeals pro se from the order entered by the Erie County Court of Common Pleas denying his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 After careful review, we affirm. Following a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of three counts of Conspiracy to Commit Contraband/Non-controlled Substances pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a)(1) and 5123(a) based on the following facts. In September 2021, three packages of mail marked with an attorney control number (“ACN”) associated with Jose and Associates, a law firm owned by Donald Jose, Esq., arrived at SCI-Albion addressed to an inmate, Timothy ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. J-S24021-26 Gains (“Co-Defendant”). Agent August Floyd, who checked mail at the prison, described the packages as soiled, thick, and moist. He conducted ”[a] preliminary assessment of the [packages] using an electronic drug detection device [which] returned a positive reading.” Commonwealth v. Goodman, 331 A.3d 651, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision). Agent Floyd believed that the packages were laced with a synthetic cannabinoid, which prompted further testing. Id. Chemical testing eventually revealed that the packages contained papers that had been sprayed with the bug repellant Diethyltoluamide (“DEET”). Investigators traced the purchase of postage for the tainted packages to a credit card associated with a bank account that Appellant held jointly with his mother. Additionally, the evidence revealed that Appellant had access to Mr. Jose’s computer and thus, access to Mr. Jose’s ACN. In particular, Appellant’s mother worked for and lived with Attorney Jose, and Mr. Jose had represented Appellant when Appellant was incarcerated at SCI Albion. Appellant went to Attorney Jose’s office and home to use the copy machine and computer. Attached to the computer was Attorney Jose’s password, which gave Appellant access to Attorney Jose’s password. Additionally. Mr. Jose and Appellant’s mother denied sending the three packages. Of most significance to the trial court’s conviction and our analysis, after ascertaining the documents had been tainted, further investigation conducted by the DOC agents revealed phone calls recorded on the prison telephone system between Appellant and Co-Defendant as well as between Appellant -2- J-S24021-26 and another inmate. In these recorded calls, the parties used coded language referring to contraband, such as synthetic cannabinoid (“K2”), and discussed the steps Appellant was taking to smuggle the contraband into the prison.2 The police filed a criminal complaint against Appellant based on the allegation that pursuant to an agreement with Co-Defendant, Appellant had mailed the three packages and that they contained papers sprayed with DEET. The criminal complaint noted that although DEET is a non-controlled substance, Section 5123(c) of the Crimes Code prohibits individuals from sending into the prison documents laced with it.3 In particular, the criminal complaint charged Appellant under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c) entitled “Contraband other than controlled substance,” supplying legal documents tainted with DEET,4 and Conspiracy to deliver legal documents tainted with DEET.5 On May 27, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellant with, inter alia, three counts of “committing the crime of ____________________________________________ 2 N.T. Trial, 5/9/23, at 88, 97 (Testimony of Lieutenant Augustus Floyd). 3 Paper sprayed with DEET is considered “contraband” within the prison. N.T. Trial, 5/9/23, at 52-53. Also known as “KD,” prisoners cut the paper into strips to smoke “just as they do with paper laced with synthetic cannabinoid.” Id. at 94. 4 Section 5123(c), titled “Contraband other than controlled substance,” provides, in relevant part, “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he sells, gives or furnishes to any convict in a prison, . . . or employee thereof, any kind of spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine or poison.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c) (emphasis added). 5 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 902(a), and 903. -3- J-S24021-26 Contraband, Controlled Substance Contraband to Confined Person Prohibited,” pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c); three counts of Conspiracy to commit the crime of Contraband by delivering legal documentation tainted with DEET to Mr. Gains at SCI Albion, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5123/903; and three counts alleging that Appellant distributed a “non-controlled substance, to-wit, that has a stimulant or depressant effect of humans, other than a prescription drug, . . . and upon the express or implied representation that the substance is a controlled substance . . . in violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Possession of a Non-Controlled Substance[,]” specifically 35 P.S. 780-113(A)(35)(ii). Appellant retained Nathanial Strasser, Esq., to represent him. At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth clarified that the conspiracy charge pertained to smuggling DEET-infused paper into the prison. At trial, both Appellant and Co-Defendant testified. Appellant testified that he had received the papers in the package from the family of the Co- Defendant and admitted that he had mailed them to Co-Defendant at SCI- Albion using Attorney Jose’s ACN. Appellant, however, denied that when he spoke to Co-Defendant on the phone at the prison, he had used coded language to plan to smuggle contraband into the prison. Defense counsel presented evidence indicating that the EPA no longer classifies DEET as a poison. The court convicted Appellant of three counts of Conspiracy based on the telephone calls using coded language which established plans to distribute -4- J-S24021-26 contraband within the prison. The trial court, however, found Appellant not guilty of the charges involving sending three DEET-infused packages into the prison as well as the Use of a Communication Facility. On June 29, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant on the three conspiracy convictions to an aggregate term of 12-24 months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. On July 23, 2023, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking judgment of acquittal, which the court denied on October 17, 2023. In its order denying the post-sentence motion, the court emphasized that it only convicted Appellant of conspiracy to smuggle contraband into the prison and not guilty of the charges based on mailing DEET-infused packages to the prison: The fact that someone ‘on the outside’ may have changed the substance, either intentionally or by mistake, is irrelevant. There was sufficient evidence to prove that [Appellant] and [Co- defendant] Gains had agreed to bring an illegal substance/contraband into the prison. The failure to actually possess the controlled substance/contraband in the prison was the basis of this Court’s determination that [Appellant] was not guilty of all the other charges besides the three criminal conspiracy charges. Order, dated 10/17/23, at 5 (emphasis added). On November 6, 2023, Appellant pro se filed a notice of appeal. On December 11, 2023, Emily Merski, Esq., entered her appearance as appellate counsel. After the grant of several requests for extensions, Attorney Merski filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement challenging the sufficiency -5- J-S24021-26 of the evidence underlying Appellant’s conspiracy convictions. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgments of sentence on November 26, 2024, observing that the trial court, “sitting as a finder of fact in the non-jury trial, determined that Appellant and [Co-Defendant] had carried out this elaborate scheme not to smuggle mere DEET into prison but, instead, to smuggle a liquified cannabinoid.” Goodman, 331 A.3d 651, at *4. The panel agreed and concluded that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a conspiracy between Appellant and Co-Defendant to smuggle contraband into SCI-Albion. Id. 6 On May 8, 2025, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition together with a “Motion to Proceed Pro Se and In forma Pauperis” raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and annexing an affidavit from Ms. Goodman in which she denied telling the agent that Appellant used his own paper in the copier. Following a Grazier7 hearing, the PCRA court permitted Appellant to proceed pro se and granted him permission to amend his PCRA Petition. On September 5, 2025, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, limited to ____________________________________________ 6 This Court further observed that “the trial court acquitted Appellant on all underlying charges of Contraband/Non-Controlled, Distributing or Selling a Non-Controlled Substance, and Use of a Communication Facility, because the substance actually sprayed on the documents was DEET, which does not qualify as a non-controlled substance[,] was designated as contraband.” Id. 7 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). -6- J-S24021-26 whether counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present Ms. Goodman as a witness. Appellant and Attorney Strasser testified. On November 24, 2025, the PCRA court filed an opinion and order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, once again highlighting that Appellant’s trial counsel persuaded the trial court to find Appellant not guilty of seven charges and noting that counsel had raised that Appellant now raises: In the instant case, this Court finds that both counsel vigorously and zealously advocated for [Appellant] during the course of the proceedings from the preliminary hearing to the appellate proceedings. . . . This [c]ourt must stress that Atty. Strasser filed a number of pleadings to preserve the rights of [Appellant] and reasonably argued the case of his client during the jury trial (that was concluded on a mistrial) and the non-jury trial and in the post- sentence motions (and new trial motion). As a result of that advocacy, Atty. Strasser was able to obtain "Not Guilty" verdicts for seven (7) out of the 10 offenses for which [Appellant] was charged. Likewise, as earlier indicated, Atty. Strasser raised the same issues [Appellant] asserted in this PCRA [petition], as did his appellate counsel. Opinion and Order, dated 11/24/2025, at 11 (emphasis added). Pro se Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) Statement. The PCRA court referred this Court to its November 24, 2025 opinion and order. Appellant pro se raises the following questions for our review: 1. Was Appellant denied his [c]onstitutional right to be secure from arrest without probable cause, when Agent Daniel Cuiffi falsely swore in the criminal complaint that DEET, the object of the conspiracy charges, is a poison prohibited under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c)? -7- J-S24021-26 2. Was Appellant denied his constitutional right to due process when the charges in the criminal information were substantially different from the offenses alleged in the complaint? 3. Was Appellant denied his constitutional right to due process and formal notice of charges when the trial/PCRA court abused its discretion by replacing DEET with [s]ynthetic cannabinoids as the object of the conspiracy, although synthetic cannabinoids was never charged? 4. Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective for failing to file pre- trial motions challenging the criminal complaint and information? 5. Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., when the Commonwealth alleged a drug/synthetic cannabinoid trafficking conspiracy at trial although Appellant was never charged with such? 6. Was Appellant’s direct appeal counsel ineffective for failing to assert Appellant’s constitutional right to be secure from arrest without probable cause, right to due process and formal notice, and for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness? 7. Was direct appeal counsel ineffective for failing to properly notify Appellant of the Superior Court’s decision and for her premeditation to not file a re-argument/reconsideration? Appellant’s Br. at 6-7. This Court reviews the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court's determination and whether its order is otherwise free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). While we grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings of fact if supported by the record, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 324 A.3d 551, 564 (Pa. Super. 2024). “We -8- J-S24021-26 view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Sandusky, 324 A.3d at 564 (citation omitted). To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011). These circumstances include a violation of the Pennsylvania or United States Constitution, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i), (ii); Paddy, 15 A.3d at 442. An issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). In addition, the PCRA requires that a petitioner “must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Further, a PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. “It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no support either in the record or other evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super.2014) (citation omitted). “It is the responsibility of the reviewing court -9- J-S24021-26 on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it” to ascertain whether the court correctly “determined that were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.” Id. *** Appellant’s pro se brief is a mishmash of conclusory statements, case citations, and repetitive, nearly incomprehensible summary arguments rooted in the fact that DEET is not a “poison.” See Appellant’s Br. at 17-20. We attempt to decipher Appellant’s arguments below. Before addressing Appellant’s issues, however, we highlight the fact that the trial court found Appellant not guilty of the charges involving the mailing of the documents containing DEET and guilty only of the charges involving the conspiracy to distribute contraband into the prison. Challenges based on alleged violation of constitutional rights Appellant first alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when the magistrate issued the arrest warrant because the affidavit of probable cause (1) misidentified DEET as a poison when charging Appellant with violating Section 5123(c),8 and (2) incorrectly summarized Ms. Goodwin’s ____________________________________________ 8 Section 5123(c), titled “Contraband other than controlled substance,” provides, in relevant part, “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he sells, gives or furnishes to any convict in a prison, . . . or employee thereof, any kind of spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine or poison.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c) (emphasis added). - 10 - J-S24021-26 statements that she allegedly made to Agent Cuffi. Appellant’s Br. at 14-23. This issue is waived. An appellant must preserve a challenge to his arrest in a pre-trial motion to suppress. Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A), (D). The failure to do so will result in waiver. Id. at subsection (B). As noted above, for purposes of PCRA review, an issue has been waived “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state post[-]conviction proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b)). Our review of the certified record reveals that although Appellant could have challenged the constitutionality of the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant, Appellant did not do so and, thus, waived this issue. See also infra (discussing same claim in the context of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and finding no prejudice). *** In his second issue, Appellant makes a bald assertion that his right to due process was violated because the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing added the charge of violating the provision that prohibits the sale of a non- controlled substance while representing it as a controlled substance.9 In other words, Appellant baldly claims that his due process rights were violated because the Commonwealth added a charge based on the allegation that ____________________________________________ 9 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(35)(ii), - 11 - J-S24021-26 Appellant represented that the DEET infused paper was a controlled substance. We reject this challenge for several reasons. First, Appellant fails to provide any legal support for his position that the trial court’s grant of an amendment to the criminal information at the preliminary hearing violated his due process rights and, thus, Appellant waived this challenge. Second, the trial court found Appellant not guilty of this charge that he now challenges and thus, Appellant cannot assert any prejudice from the trial court’s grant of the motion to amend the criminal information. Third, even if Appellant could establish prejudice, the trial court properly granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the criminal information and, thus, Appellant was not deprived of his due process rights. A trial court may grant a motion to amend a charge in a criminal information when the defendant is “placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct.” Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 18 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). Since the new charge was based on the same basic elements and evolved out of the same factual situation as the crimes specified in the amended indictment or information,” Appellant has failed to establish that his due process rights were violated. Id. Moreover, Appellant was aware at the preliminary hearing that there was evidence that he had been conspiring with others to smuggle controlled substances, i.e., liquid cannabis and other drugs. There was also evidence presented at the preliminary hearing that prisoners smoked paper soaked in bug spray to get high and that testing - 12 - J-S24021-26 revealed the substance on the paper was DEET. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the amendment violated his due process rights warrants no relief. *** In his third issue, Appellant avers that his “constitutional right to due process and formal notice was violated when [the trial court] changed the object of the conspiracy charges from DEET to synthetic cannabinoids and convicted Appellant based on this uncharged object.” Appellant’s Br. at 32. He argues that the “verdict is objectionable” because the court did not reference the information, the information did not reference “synthetic cannabinoid,” and the Conspiracy conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 33-34. As noted above, this Court has already determined that the Conspiracy conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. It has, thus, been previously litigated and it is not cognizable under the PCRA, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2) and (3). Further, “the essence of a criminal conspiracy ... is the agreement made between the co-conspirators.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238 (Pa. 2004). The agreement to commit a criminal act is the object of the conspiracy charge. As this Court concluded, the phone calls between Appellant and Co-Defendant established a conspiracy to smuggle contraband into the prison. Moreover, Appellant fails to adequately explain exactly what “due process” he was denied. He had notice that he was charged with conspiracy - 13 - J-S24021-26 and he had a preliminary hearing at which the Commonwealth presented evidence he and his co-defendant had phone calls discussing smuggling controlled substances into the prison. Appellant’s due process claim, thus, warrants no relief. *** Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In issues four through six, Appellant alleges that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s error. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s claim. Id. To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012). *** - 14 - J-S24021-26 In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s denial of his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file pre-trial motions challenging the police complaint and criminal information and for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence pertaining to DEET. Appellant’s Br. at 40. He argues that because the trial court recognized that DEET “‘is not a controlled substance and not classified as a poison,’ [ ] there is a more than ‘reasonable probability’ that the DEET would have been suppressed and the Conspiracy charges dismissed before trial.” Id. at 42. Finally, he avers that counsel “should have filed a motion to quash the information[.]” Id. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Strasser testified that he did not challenge the affidavit of probable cause or the criminal information because he presented evidence at the preliminary hearing that DEET was not a poison. N.T. PCRA Hr’g at 30. When specifically asked by the Commonwealth, “You did not believe that there was a reasonable basis or reason to challenge the affidavit of probable cause or the information,” Attorney Strasser answered “no, because . . . Agent Ciuffi’s testimony that it’s a poison is enough to get past the preliminary hearing. . . .. You don’t prove anything about DEET at a pretrial motion.” Id. at 30-31. In its opinion and order, the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel had “some reasonable basis in effectuating” his client’s interests and concluded that trial counsel “vigorously and zealously advocated for [Appellant] during - 15 - J-S24021-26 the course of the proceedings from the preliminary hearing to the appellate proceedings.” Opinion and Order at 11. While a motion to quash the information was arguably a viable option and Appellant’s claim with different advocacy might satisfy the first two prongs of the ineffectiveness test, we cannot conclude that Appellant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s omission—for the simple reason that the trial court did not convict Appellant on the charge based on Appellant’s mailing the DEET-infused documents to the prison. Instead, Appellant was convicted based on his agreement with Co-Defendant to smuggling prohibited substances into the prison. Having failed to prove the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test, we conclude this claim is without merit. *** In his fifth issue, Appellant alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct when the prosecutor argued during trial that the object of the conspiracy was to smuggle synthetic cannabinoid into the prison. Appellant’s Br. at 44-45. Appellant fails to cite to the trial record to support his claim that the prosecutor used the term “synthetic cannabinoid.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (briefing requirements). Without “reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears,” we are unable to meaningfully address this issue. Rule 2119(c). “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss - 16 - J-S24021-26 the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010)(citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has waived his fifth issue. *** In his sixth and seventh issues, Appellant claims appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Br. at 50. He avers that Attorney Merski should have argued that he was denied his “right to be secure from arrest without probable cause, due process and formal notice, while being subjected to prosecutorial misconduct and judicial abuse of discretion.” Id. He acknowledges that Attorney Merski challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conspiracy convictions on direct appeal, but argues that she should have asserted that his constitutional rights were violated with an “unlawful” criminal information. Id. He also contends that appellate counsel should have raised a claim the trial court abused its discretion “for allowing and facilitating [the Commonwealth’s] misconduct by disregarding the Section 5123(c)[10] underlying substantive offense of the conspiracy charges.” Id. Last, he asserts that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to notify him timely after this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Id. at 51. ____________________________________________ 10 As noted above, Section 5123(c), in relevant part, that “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he sells, gives or furnishes to any convict in a prison, . . . or employee thereof, any kind of spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine or poison.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(c) (emphasis added). - 17 - J-S24021-26 In order to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must prove, inter alia, that “but for appellate counsel's ineffectiveness, the result on direct appeal would have differed.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88, 94 (Pa. 2004). In addressing Appellant’s challenge to appellate counsel’s assistance, the PCRA court opined: The [c]ourt believes that Attorney Merski’s actions were reasonably appropriate and not without basis. This [c]ourt underscores that a counsel’s refusal to abide by a client’s wishes will not be deemed ineffective when the counsel refuses to pursue a meritless claim, which is what the appellate counsel did in this case. Thus, this [c]ourt finds no reasonable basis for the claim of ineffective assistance of . . . appellate counsel. Opinion and Order at 12. The trial court rejected Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel on the grounds that Appellant raises frivolous issues regarding appellate counsel’s stewardship. Appellant has failed to address this finding, let alone provide legal support for his conclusion that the issues appellate counsel should have raised have merit or that this Court would have granted him a new trial. Moreover, our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the issues that Appellant argues that appellate counsel should have raised are frivolous. Finally, Appellant’s assertion that appellate counsel deprived him of his right to file a motion for reargument—because she sent this Court’s memorandum deciding his direct appeal to him untimely—is meritless. As the - 18 - J-S24021-26 PCRA court noted, Attorney Merski mailed the decision to Appellant within 10 days of its issuance and later informed Appellant that he still had the option of seeking review from the Supreme Court. Opinion and Order, 11/24/2025, at 11-12. Counsel cannot be found ineffective based on the pace with which the mail systems operate. *** In sum, having concluded Appellant’s issues are either waived, undeveloped, or meritless, we affirm the denial of the PCRA Petition. Order affirmed. DATE: 10/27/2026 - 19 -