Com. v. Cole, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket162 EDA 2026
JudgeKing
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHNATAN COLE :
:
Appellant : No. 162 EDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0010313-2009
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2026
Appellant, Johnatan Cole,1 appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition filed
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 2 We affirm.
This Court has previously set forth some of the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case as follows:
On December 10, 2008, the victim, Antonio Villacorta,
was a club manager at a popular Kensington nightclub
and he normally carried large sums of money on his
person. The victim was getting out of his car at his
girlfriend’s home ... when he was approached by
[Appellant]. [Appellant] was holding a 9mm handgun
and said “Don't move, poppy” and shot the victim
twice in the stomach. The victim was also shot in the
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1 We note that Appellant’s first name is also spelled “Johnathan” on several
documents contained in the certified record. However, Appellant’s brief
reflects the spelling of his first name as “Johnatan.”
2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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back with the spray of a sawed off shotgun by
[Appellant's] co-conspirators from across the street.
The victim and [Appellant] began to physically fight
on the sidewalk when the victim, who legally
possessed a gun, pulled it out and shot [Appellant],
wounding him ... The co-conspirators fled the scene,
taking [Appellant’s] gun with them.
(Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/12, at 2).
Police arrested Appellant and charged him with attempted
murder, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, two
firearms violations, simple assault, and recklessly
endangering another person. On October 6, 2011, following
a three-day non-jury trial, the trial court found Appellant
guilty of the above-stated offenses. On March 22, 2012,
Appellant filed a “Presentence Motion for a New Trial as a
Result of a Reversibly Defective Jury Waiver Colloquy and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,” which the trial court
denied on May 18, 2012, following a hearing. On June 8,
2012, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term
of no less than thirty-three and a half nor more than sixty-
seven years’ incarceration.
Commonwealth v. Cole, No. 1944 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 29, 2013)
(unpublished memorandum) (footnotes omitted). Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal, and on April 29, 2013, this Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence. See id.
Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 13, 2013,
asserting that counsel was ineffective in failing to tell him that the Superior
Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, and in so doing, caused Appellant to
miss the deadline for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court appointed counsel, who filed an
amended petition on February 5, 2016. On August 3, 2017, the PCRA court
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reinstated Appellant’s right to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro
tunc. Appellant filed his petition for allowance of appeal, and our Supreme
Court denied review on January 8, 2018.
On April 11, 2018, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The
court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on July 28, 2018,
asserting that Appellant’s sentence was illegal based on the imposition of
consecutive sentences for attempted murder and conspiracy, and claiming
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call two exculpatory
eyewitnesses, his cousins Malika McCain and Alexis McCain, who would have
testified that Appellant was not involved in the shooting. On April 22, 2019,
Appellant filed a supplemental petition adding a claim that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by incorrectly advising Appellant of the
maximum sentence he faced. On July 2, 2019, Appellant filed a second
supplemental PCRA petition asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for not
seeking to quash the attempted murder sentence, and that direct appeal
counsel was ineffective for not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on
direct appeal.
On August 24, 2020, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition with
respect to Appellant’s claim that he had been improperly sentenced for two
inchoate crimes, and the court ordered an evidentiary hearing as to
Appellant’s claim involving trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses. The court
did not address the remaining claims raised in the supplemental and second
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supplemental petitions.
On September 12, 2022, the trial court resentenced Appellant to 20 to
40 years of incarceration for attempted murder and imposed a concurrent
sentence of 3½ to 7 years’ imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a
license.
Appellant retained present counsel who entered his appearance on
September 5, 2024. On November 4, 2024, Appellant filed a purported
amended PCRA petition claiming that 1) trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in cross examining witnesses who corroborated the
Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellant had a gun, 2) trial counsel was
ineffective for introducing inadmissible hearsay testimony, and 3) trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to appeal the sentence of 20 to 40 years for
attempted murder where Appellant was not charged with the serious bodily
injury version of that offense. Appellant asserted that because the PCRA court
had not ever ruled on the remaining claims in the PCRA petition raised when
it granted resentencing on the illegal sentence claim, his 2018 PCRA petition
remained unresolved.
On November 25, 2025, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to
dismiss without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In the notice, the PCRA
court explained that Appellant’s counsel “advised the court that [Appellant] is
no longer pursuing an ineffective claim based on a failure to call witnesses and
that the two ineffective claims raised in the amended petition are the only
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remaining claims that are being pursued by [Appellant].” (Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, filed 11/25/25, at 5 n.8). Appellant did not respond to the Rule 907
notice. On December 24, 2025, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal on January 6, 2026, and, pursuant to the court’s
order, filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on
January 27, 2026.
Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:
I. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting
inadmissible hearsay from Officer Ronald Fred on cross-
examination: specifically, that an unknown person took
Appellant’s gun from the scene after the shooting, where
the entire defense was that Appellant never possessed a
gun, no Commonwealth witness testified to this fact on
direct examination, the hearsay directly undermined the
sole defense theory, and the PCRA court itself acknowledged
that the cross-examination was “far from perfect” and that
counsel “may have been better served” not asking the
questions at issue?
II. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting
inadmissible hearsay from eyewitness David Matos on
cross-examination: specifically, a prior statement to police
that he saw Appellant walk up to the complainant and begin
shooting, where Matos’s direct testimony supported the
defense – and whether the cumulative prejudice of both
errors requires a new trial where the combined effect was
to undermine the sole defense theory and the prosecution
relied on this evidence in closing argument?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
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and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,
207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218
A.3d 850 (2019). This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of
the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 249 A.3d 1229 (Pa.Super. 2021). “[W]e review
the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d
1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021).
In his issues combined, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective in his cross examination of two witnesses. Specifically, Appellant
argues that counsel elicited inadmissible hearsay evidence in his cross
examination of Officer Ronald Fred. Appellant asserts that the most powerful
piece of evidence in support of his defense theory that the victim had confused
him for another individual was that he did not have a gun. Appellant explained
that neither the victim nor the eyewitness had testified that they saw anyone
take Appellant’s gun and get rid of it until trial counsel’s cross examination of
Officer Fred, which elicited hearsay testimony from the officer that someone
told the officer that another individual came and took Appellant’s gun and got
rid of it. (See Appellant’s Brief at 28). Appellant insists that counsel did not
have a reasonable basis for this line of questioning on cross examination,
noting that even the PCRA court found it “far from perfect” and that “counsel
‘may have been better served in not questioning Officer Fred about what he
was told happened to Appellant’s gun.’” (Id. (quoting Notice of Intent to
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Dismiss at 17-18)). Appellant further maintains that he was prejudiced by
counsel’s action because this information would not have been admitted but
for counsel’s cross examination that elicited it. Appellant insists that Officer
Fred’s testimony in this respect was the key piece of evidence that made
possible the Commonwealth’s theory that Appellant was the shooter.
With respect to the second witness, Mr. Matos, Appellant contends that
counsel’s cross-examination of Mr. Matos corroborated the Commonwealth’s
version of events. Appellant argues that Mr. Matos’s direct testimony was
consistent with the defense theory that Appellant did not have a gun because
he did not mention having seen Appellant with one. However, in an attempt
to impeach Mr. Matos with inconsistencies between his testimony and his
statement to police, counsel read Mr. Matos’s statement to police into the
record. Appellant avers that this statement mirrored the victim’s account of
the shooting, and suggested that Appellant had a gun, which Mr. Matos had
alleged he saw the victim kick away from Appellant. Appellant claims that
there was no reason to try to discredit Mr. Matos because his direct testimony
did not harm the defense, and by reading his statement to police into the
record, counsel introduced evidence that instead supported the
Commonwealth’s position. Appellant insists that counsel had no reasonable
basis for this cross examination of Mr. Matos and he suffered prejudice
because Mr. Matos’s story corroborated the Commonwealth’s version of
events and made it more likely that the trial court would find him guilty.
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Finally, Appellant complains that even if neither error individually
satisfies the prejudice prong, the cumulative effect of both errors satisfies the
prejudice requirement. Appellant concludes the PCRA court erred in denying
Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on these grounds, and
this Court must grant relief. We disagree.
“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.”
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal
denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).
[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),
appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
“We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim in any
particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong that an appellant
cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the applicable facts and
circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 355 A.3d 394, 414
(Pa.Super. 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 303 A.3d 175, 182
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(Pa.Super. 2023)). “A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is
fatal to the claim.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 250 A.3d 1253, 1258
(Pa.Super. 2021) (citations omitted). “As a general and practical matter, it is
more difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim litigated through the lens
of counsel ineffectiveness, rather than as a preserved claim of trial court
error.” Hunter, supra at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94
A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2014)).
Our Supreme Court has explained that to satisfy the prejudice prong, a
petitioner must prove
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s lapse,
the result of the ... proceeding would have been
different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)]. “In
making this determination, a court hearing an
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of
the evidence before the judge or jury .... Moreover,
a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the
record is more likely to have been affected by errors
than one with overwhelming record support.” Id. at
695–96, 104 S.Ct. 2052[.] Ultimately, a reviewing
court must question the reliability of the proceedings
and ask whether “the result of the particular
proceeding [was] unreliable because of a breakdown
in the adversarial process that our system counts on
to produce just results.” Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052[.]
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 15 A.3d 345, 383
(2011) (emphasis in original). “A reasonable probability is
a probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the proceeding.” Commonwealth v.
Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 244 (2008). “Such a
determination necessarily requires an assessment of the
trial evidence as a whole, measured along with what is
proffered on collateral attack.” Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 628 Pa. 193, 104 A.3d 267, 285 (2014).
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Commonwealth v. Crispell, 648 Pa. 464, 486-87, 193 A.3d 919, 932
(2018).
Furthermore, “[w]hen the failure of individual [ineffectiveness of
counsel] claims is grounded in lack of prejudice, then the cumulative prejudice
from those individual claims may properly be assessed.” Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 146, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (2011). See also Commonwealth
v. R. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 345, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (2009) (stating “if
multiple instances of deficient performance are found, the assessment of
prejudice properly may be premised upon cumulation”).
Instantly, the PCRA court first determined that Appellant failed to
establish that trial counsel lacked a reasonable strategic basis for his cross
examination of Officer Fred and Mr. Matos. With respect to Mr. Matos the
PCRA court explained:
At trial, the Commonwealth called Mr. Matos, an eyewitness
to the shooting, who testified through a Spanish interpreter.
On direct examination, Mr. Matos testified that prior to the
shooting, he was walking to his sister’s house and saw [the
victim], who is a friend of Mr. Matos’s niece. Mr. Matos
testified that he greeted [the victim] and then decided to go
to the store to buy cigarettes. (N.T. Trial, 8/29/11 at 75).
Upon returning from the store, Mr. Matos testified that he
saw [the victim] standing by the side of a school, and also
noticed someone coming from the schoolyard but did not
pay close attention to him as he was lighting his cigarette
(Id.) While he was lighting his cigarette, he heard gunshots
and saw [the victim] fist-fighting with a bearded man whose
face he could not see. (Id. at 76–77, 84). Mr. Matos
testified that he saw blood on [the victim’s] sweater and saw
[the victim] pull out his gun during the fight with this man.
(Id. 77–78). Mr. Matos testified that he saw a “tall” man
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shoot from across the street and then run off, and did not
see the tall man go over to where [the victim] was. (Id. at
79). After the shooting, Mr. Matos approached [the victim]
and saw that he was bleeding from the stomach.
On cross-examination, trial counsel questioned Mr. Matos
with a prior written statement he provided to detectives on
the evening of the shooting as follows:
Q. Sir, I am going to go over the statement with you
about some of the things you told the detectives that
night, okay? I am going to read along in the first
paragraph, okay?
Do you remember telling the detectives on December
10, 2008, at approximately 7:10 p.m., I was in my
sister’s house when she asked me for a cigarette.
Is that true?
A. No, I didn’t say that.
Q. Okay.
A. I was the one who went to buy the cigarettes.
Q. Next sentence, I told her that I didn’t have any. So
I decided to go to the corner store to buy a pack
before the store closed.
A. Yes, that’s true.
Q. When I stepped outside, I saw [the victim] across
the street waiting for his girlfriend. I said hi to him
and continued to the store.
Is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. As I was walking back, I kept to the sidewalk where
[the victim] was standing.
Is that true?
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A. Yes.
Q. It was raining, so I walked next to the school so
the awning could keep me dry.
True?
A. Yes.
Q. As I was approaching the end of the school, I saw
a black male come out of an alley in front of me.
Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. He approached [the victim] and began shooting. I
froze about 15 feet away.
Is that true?
A. Yes, 15 or 20 feet.
Q. [The victim] grabbed the black male and started
fighting.
A. Yes, too strong.
Q. [The victim] was able to get his gun out and they
started exchanging gunfire.
A. Yes.
Q. True?
A. Yes, that’s true.
Q. I saw the black male go down; that’s when the
second male appeared from across the street.
Correct?
A. Yes.
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Q. He shot at least one time towards [the victim].
[The victim] shot at him and the male ran away.
Right?
A. Yes.
Q. My sister came out of the house and told me to get
out of there.
A. Yes.
Q. That’s when I realized I was in danger and I am
crossing the street
Now here is a question for you. You said, I saw [the
victim] kick the gun away from the black male that
was on the ground.
Is that true or not true?
A. No.
Q. It is not true; you never saw [the victim] kick the
gun away from the black male on the ground?
A. No, no, I didn’t see that.
(N.T. Trial, 8/29/11, at 85–88).
(Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 12–13) (citation formatting provided).
The court explained that although the cross examination elicited some
favorable testimony to the extent that Mr. Matos did not see the victim kick a
loose gun away from Appellant, other aspects of the cross examination
“suggested unfavorable facts for the defense that Mr. Matos had not previously
mentioned.” (Id.) Ultimately, the court concluded that while Appellant argues
it would have been a better strategy to avoid this line of questioning in its
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entirety, trial counsel’s re-cross examination asked Mr. Matos to clarify and
explain inconsistencies in his prior statements to police and achieved “a
measure of success in re-establishing the fact that Mr. Matos only heard
gunshots and saw [the victim] involved in a fight with an unidentified black
man which was consistent with the defense strategy that [Appellant] never
actually possessed a gun and that [the victim] shot the wrong person.” (Id.
at 14-15).
With respect to Officer Fred, the PCRA court explained:
At trial, the Commonwealth called Officer Fred, who testified
that when he arrived at the scene of the shooting, he saw
[the victim] standing in the street and [Appellant] lying on
the ground. (N.T. Trial, 8/29/11, at 99). Officer Fred also
testified that he observed bullet holes in vehicles, in the
school window, windows shot out, blood on the street, and
casing[s] everywhere. (Id. at 106–107).
Officer Fred testified that he saw [the victim] had been shot
in the stomach and [the victim] informed the officer that he
had a gun. Officer Fred saw two bullet holes in the
complainant’s shirt when he arrived, and then he retrieved
a .40 caliber handgun from [the victim’s] hip holster. (Id.
at 99-100, 108, 114). Officer Fred testified that [the victim]
told him that “three black males had attempted to rob him
and had fired upon him, and, once they fired upon him, he
defended himself and returned fire.” (Id. at 103). Officer
Fred memorialized the information that [the victim] told him
in a 75-48 incident report he prepared, which was marked
as Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-22. (Id. at 102-103). Officer
Fred testified that [Appellant] was arrested based on [the
victim’s] statement that [Appellant] shot him. (Id. at 103).
Officer Fred and his partner then transported [the victim] to
the hospital. (Id. at 103-04).
On cross-examination, trial counsel questioned Officer Fred
about whether he saw a weapon near [Appellant] when he
responded to the scene of the shooting, and then engaged
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in an exchange about whether he was told that one of
[Appellant’s] co-conspirators took [Appellant’s] gun from
the crime scene prior to his arrival, apparently in an attempt
to highlight an inconsistency in [the victim’s] trial
testimony:
Q. The only weapon you recovered on the scene was
the one the victim gave you; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. When you saw … my client laying on the street,
there was no weapon near him; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you told that one of the males took the gun
from this male, allegedly?
A. Correct.
[Q. That was one of the three shooters took the gun
from this person?
A. Correct.]
Q. And fled in a gray colored vehicle with tinted
windows?
A. Correct.
Q. So if the victim in this case had come in here and
testified that he saw a male shooting from across the
street walk off down, walk off across the other side of
the street, that would be incorrect?
A. I wasn’t there.
(Id. at 109-110).
On re-direct examination of Officer Fred, the prosecution
sought to counteract the suggestion that [the victim] had
provided conflicting trial testimony on this issue, and then
specifically questioned Officer Fred about the content of a
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statement he made to detectives, which was marked at trial
as Exhibit C-23, in which he indicated what [the victim] told
him at the crime scene about what happened to
[Appellant’s] gun: “[the victim] did state to me that there
were three other males involved and one male took the gun
from the male who was shot by [the victim] and these males
fled in a gray colored vehicle with tinted windows.” (Id. at
116).
(Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 15–17) (citation formatting provided).
The PCRA acknowledged that trial counsel’s cross examination was far
from perfect, and that counsel “may have been better served in not
questioning Officer Fred about what he was told happened to Appellant’s gun.”
(Id. at 17-18). Nevertheless, the court concluded that counsel’s strategy had
“a reasonable basis to reveal inconsistencies and impeach [the witness’]
credibility.” (Id. at 18–19). Hence, the court found that Appellant had not
established the second prong of the test for ineffectiveness. 3
Additionally, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant failed to prove
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3 We note that the PCRA court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in this case.
Generally, an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s strategy is preferred before the
PCRA court decides if counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions.
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 210, 30 A.3d 426, 442 (2011),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1091, 133 S.Ct. 835, 184 L.Ed.2d 662 (2013).
Nevertheless, the PCRA court may assess the reasonable basis prong of the
test without holding an evidentiary hearing in cases where the reasons for
counsel’s conduct are clear and apparent from the record. See id.
Here, we need not address whether the reasons for counsel’s conduct were
apparent from the record because, as discussed infra, we agree with the PCRA
court’s alternative rational for denying relief based on Appellant’s failure to
establish that that he was prejudiced as a result of trial counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance.
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that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Specifically, the
court concluded that Appellant “has not established that counsel’s
ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have reasonably had an
adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings or that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s conduct, the outcome of the case would have
been different.” (Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 19). The court explained:
[Appellant’s] concern that he suffered prejudice from
counsel’s alleged deficient cross-examination of a kind and
to an extent that undermined the truth-determining function
and fundamental fairness of his trial, such that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place, is
much less convincing. The court confidently presumes here
that [the trial court] understood the purpose of counsel’s
cross-examination of Mr. Matos and Officer Fred, that [it]
not only “ignored” but “disregarded” any inadmissible or
prejudicial hearsay testimony, and that [it] was not
improperly influenced by evidence or testimony which may
otherwise have been considered too prejudicial for a jury to
hear.
With that in mind, and viewing the record as a whole and in
proper context, the court also agrees with the
Commonwealth that the evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt was
convincing and compelling, and further finds that the
possible prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s alleged deficient
cross-examination of Mr. Matos and Officer Fred was
insignificant and paled in comparison, such that it could not
have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of
the proceeding.
At no point in these proceedings did [the victim] ever waver
in his identification of [Appellant] as the person who shot
him. He testified that [Appellant] approached and ordered
him not to move, produced a handgun and shot him two
times in the stomach at point blank range. [The victim’s]
testimony was, by itself, sufficient to sustain [Appellant’s]
conviction for attempted murder. Commonwealth v. K.
Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“we hold
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that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so
long as that testimony can address and, in fact, addresses,
every element of the charged crime”). To buttress the
testimony of [the victim], the Commonwealth also
presented the corroborating eyewitness testimony of Mr.
Matos as well as the testimony of several police witnesses,
along with recovered physical evidence, including the gun
used to shoot [the victim]. Accordingly, [Appellant’s] claim
that he sustained “actual prejudice” by trial counsel’s
deficient cross-examination is undermined by the
substantial evidence of his guilt.
Moreover, [Appellant’s] prejudice argument disregards the
fact that the outcome of this case essentially turned on
credibility findings of [Appellant] and the victim. [The trial
court] was presented with directly competing stories and
conflicting testimony about [Appellant’s] role and
involvement in the shootout which he was required to
reconcile in order to reach a verdict.
Juxtaposed against the testimony of [the victim],
[Appellant] testified on his own behalf and, although he
admitted that he was in the street during the shootout with
[the victim], [Appellant] testified that he was not the
shooter, that he did not have a gun and that [the victim]
attacked him after confusing him with the actual culprit.
Specifically, [Appellant] testified that he was walking home
when he heard a commotion and multiple gunshots. (N.T.
Trial, 10/6/11, at 30-31, 35-36). [Appellant] decided to
walk toward the area where the gunshots had come from,
and was confronted by [the victim] who was holding his
stomach and bleeding. (Id. at 32-34, 38, 40). [Appellant]
testified that [the victim] had a gun in his hand and accused
[Appellant] of robbing him. (Id. at 32-34, 37-40).
[Appellant] testified that he wrestled with [the victim] and
was shot multiple times by him. (Id. at 38). [Appellant]
also testified that two other men approached and held him
down while [the victim] ran to look for others, and that after
[the victim] left, one of the other men shot him again in the
hip while he was on the ground. (Id. at 47-48).
In the end, [the trial court] rejected [Appellant’s] testimony
and found him guilty of the attempted murder of [the
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victim], concluding that [Appellant’s] story was simply not
credible as it would have required him to believe that
[Appellant] had deliberately walked toward the sound of
gunfire, was mistakenly confronted and shot multiple times
by [the victim], and then was held down by unidentified men
and shot in the hip by one of them for no apparent reason.
(Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 21-23). Thus, the PCRA court concluded that
Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness. Because the PCRA concluded that Appellant established
neither the second nor the third prong of the test for ineffective assistance of
counsel, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition.
Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s
finding that Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by trial
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. 4 See Crispell, supra; Sandusky, supra.
Our review of the record makes clear that even if counsel had elected not to
cross examine Officer Fred and Mr. Matos, the evidence at trial would have
established Appellant’s guilt. At trial, the victim identified Appellant as the
shooter and testified that Appellant shot him. (See N.T. Trial, 8/29/11, at 14-
15) (stating: “When I got out of my Toyota, I was parked and I walked toward
my ex-girlfriend house and I seen [Appellant] walking. He said, don’t move,
____________________________________________
4 Because “[a]failure to satisfy any of the three prongs of [the test] requires
rejection of the claim of ineffective assistance” we need not decide whether
counsel had a reasonable basis to cross examine Mr. Matos and Officer Fred.
Furthermore, we note that “we may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if
there is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action; this is so
even if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.” Commonwealth
v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2009).
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poppy, and he shot me”). The victim explained that after Appellant shot him
the first time, they started fighting with their fists. (Id. at 19). Eventually
the two separated and started shooting at one another when they were about
four or five feet apart. (Id. at 20). The victim testified that Appellant had a
gun, but he did not see what happened to it and did not know if it was there
when the police arrived. (Id. at 27-28).
Appellant testified in his own defense at trial, claiming that the victim
charged at him and accused Appellant of trying to rob him. (See N.T. Trial,
10/6/11, at 32-33). Appellant testified that he wrestled with the victim and
got shot “for no reason at all.” (Id. at 33). Appellant testified that, as he was
lying on the ground, the victim returned with other people, one of whom shot
him in the hip. (Id. at 34). Appellant claims he did not have a gun that night.
(Id. at 35). Appellant stated that he did not know the victim and had never
met him before, but Appellant suggested that his family sold drugs and that
he was likely involved in drug dealing. (Id. at 40-42).
The trial court, as factfinder, credited the victim’s testimony and
rejected the testimony of Appellant. As the PCRA court acknowledged, the
testimony of the victim, itself, is sufficient to support an attempted murder
conviction. See K. Johnson, supra. Even without the challenged testimony
elicited in the cross examination of Officer Fred and Mr. Matos, the evidence
at trial established that Appellant fought with and shot the victim. Therefore,
viewing the totality of the circumstances, Appellant has failed to prove
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prejudice arising from counsel’s alleged errors either individually or
cumulatively to sustain Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
See Crispell, supra; R. Johnson, supra; K. Johnson, supra. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/17/2026
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