Full Opinion

J-S36021-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM JOSEPH MOONEY : : Appellant : No. 716 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 17, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000865-2025 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2026 William Joseph Mooney (“Mooney”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction for defiant trespass.1 Additionally, Mooney’s court-appointed counsel, Kent D. Watkins, Esquire (“Attorney Watkins”), has filed a petition to withdraw from representation and a brief styled pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant Attorney Watkins’ petition and affirm the judgment of sentence. We glean the following factual and procedural history from the evidence and testimony presented at trial. On March 14, 2025, Deborah Hurst (“Hurst”), the community manager for Mahanoy Elderly, a privately-owned apartment complex, encountered Mooney, a non-resident, within the building. ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). J-S36021-26 During this encounter, Hurst informed Mooney “that he was no longer permitted in the building.” N.T., 11/10/25, at 41. In an effort to formalize this notice, Hurst additionally wrote Mooney a letter (hereinafter “the trespass letter”), advising him that he was “no longer permitted on the property known as Mahanoy Elderly for any reason[.]” Id. at 36. However, because Hurst did not have Mooney’s address, she enlisted the assistance of police for the official service of the trespass letter. As such, Officer Frank Gallo (“Officer Gallo”) located Mooney later that same day and served him with the trespass letter. In doing so, Officer Gallo explained to Mooney the contents of the trespass letter as well as its impact, and Mooney in turn signed the trespass letter acknowledging his receipt thereof on March 14, 2025. Despite his receipt of this letter, Mooney continued to intrude into the Mahanoy Elderly complex. Pertinently, during her routine review of the apartment complex’s security camera footage “to make sure that none of the people that are banned from [the] building [were] coming in off hours[,]” Hurst discovered Mooney’s unauthorized presence within Mahanoy Elderly on four separate occasions during the month of April 2025. Id. at 32. Hurst reported each of these instances to police. Thereafter, on May 20, 2025, Officer Jordan Smith (“Officer Smith”) was responding to a medical emergency at Mahanoy Elderly when he spotted Mooney, with whom he “had numerous encounters with . . . over the years[,]” once more within the apartment complex. Id. at 47. As Officer Smith was aware of the trespass letter and its -2- J-S36021-26 effect, he engaged Mooney in conversation and informed him “that he was in violation of the trespass order[.]” Id. at 45. Although Mooney responded that “he had received no notice” of the fact that he was “trespassed in the building[,]” he nevertheless accompanied Officer Smith out of the apartment complex. Id. During this interaction, Officer Smith informed Mooney “that he would be charged in relation to the [instant trespass] offense.” Id. The Commonwealth subsequently charged Mooney with defiant trespass. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, during which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Hurst, Officer Gallo, and Officer Smith, as well as evidence in the form of the trespass letter signed by Mooney on March 14, 2025, Officer Gallo’s body-worn camera footage depicting his service of the trespass letter, and four dated pictures showing Mooney within the apartment complex in April 2025, as captured by the building’s security cameras. Mooney did not testify in his defense. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mooney of defiant trespass. On April 17, 2026, the trial court imposed a sentence of two to twelve months’ imprisonment. Mooney filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. However, in lieu of filing an appellate brief, Attorney Watkins filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders brief. Mooney did not respond to the petition to withdraw or the Anders brief. Before we may address the merits of the issue raised in the Anders brief, we must first assess the petition to withdraw from representation to -3- J-S36021-26 determine whether it meets certain procedural requirements. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). An Anders brief that accompanies a request to withdraw must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders brief to the client, and a letter that advises the client of the right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). If counsel has satisfied these requirements, we then conduct “a full examination” of the record “to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 271 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). In the instant Anders brief, we observe that Attorney Watkins provided a procedural and factual history of the case with citations to the record, discussed the issue arguably supporting the appeal, and explained why he concluded that it was frivolous. See Anders Brief at 7-9. Additionally, Attorney Watkins mailed a copy of the Anders brief to Mooney, and in a letter -4- J-S36021-26 advised him that he could raise any additional issues before this Court either pro se or with private counsel. See Certificate of Service, 6/16/26, Exhibit A. As Attorney Watkins has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago, we will conduct an independent review to determine whether the appeal is frivolous. In the Anders brief, Attorney Watkins identifies the following issue for our review: “Did the Commonwealth produce sufficient evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt?” Anders Brief at 4. The sole issue raised in the Anders brief presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Mooney’s conviction for defiant trespass. Preliminarily, we note that to preserve a sufficiency issue for our review, an appellant must identify within his concise statement “the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 381 (Pa. Super. 2022). Accordingly, where an “appellant does not specify such elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed waived.” Id. Here, the sole sufficiency claim within Mooney’s concise statement does not specify the element or elements for which the evidence was insufficient, but instead only generally avers that “[t]he Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Concise Statement, 5/28/26. Ordinarily, such a deficiency would require this -5- J-S36021-26 Court to find Mooney’s sufficiency issue waived. See McFarland, 278 A.3d at 381. However, because in the Anders context, “this Court has a duty to independently review the record to determine whether, in fact, the appeal is wholly frivolous,” we are nevertheless bound to overlook counsel’s “deficient framing of the issue in the concise statement[,]” and review it on the merits. Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2020) (instructing that we have a duty to review an appellant’s sufficiency claim on the merits despite Anders counsel’s failure to specify within the concise statement which of the appellant’s convictions, or elements thereof, went unsupported). Thus, despite the deficient framing of the sufficiency claim by Attorney Watkins in the concise statement, we may review the merits of the issue. See id. When addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, our Court adheres to the following standard of review: [W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner[,] giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence -6- J-S36021-26 coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations marks, citations and original brackets omitted). Relevantly, the Crimes Code defines defiant trespass as follows: “A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by . . . actual communication to the actor[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i). Instantly, the trial court determined that Mooney’s sufficiency claim was without merit, reasoning as follows: Here, the [defiant trespass] charge was supported by the evidence. [Mooney] was provided personal notice on March 14, 2025[,] by a police officer that he was not to enter the Mahanoy . . . Elderly apartment building. He was also provided personal notice by the community manager of this complex. The police body camera of providing this notice to [Mooney] was played to the jury. Photographs of [Mooney] in this building were identified and showed to the jury [on four separate dates in April], 2025. Additionally, on May 20, 2025[,] Officer . . . Smith . . . saw [Mooney] in the building. There is absolutely no doubt that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence in this case for the criminal trespass (defiant trespass) conviction. Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/26, at unnumbered 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization and citations omitted). -7- J-S36021-26 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom, we likewise conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish each element of defiant trespass. Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Mooney was within the Mahanoy Elderly apartment complex on multiple occasions throughout April and May, 2025. This evidence consisted of dated screen captures taken from Mahanoy Elderly’s surveillance footage depicting Mooney within the complex on four separate dates in April 2025, as well as direct testimony by Officer Smith that he encountered Mooney within the apartment building in May 2025. As to whether Mooney knew, by actual communication, that he was not licensed or privileged to be within the apartment complex at these times, the Commonwealth’s evidence is similarly robust, as: Hurst testified that, on March 14, 2025, she told Mooney “that he was no longer permitted in the building[;]” Officer Gallo testified that he served a corresponding trespass letter on Mooney that same day and informed him of its impact; Officer Gallo’s body-worn camera footage captured this service; and the trespass letter itself depicts Mooney’s signature acknowledging his receipt and understanding of said service on March 14, 2025. N.T., 11/10/25, at 41. Accordingly, on this record, we agree with Attorney Watkins’ conclusion that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict Mooney of defiant trespass. Additionally, our independent review of the record discloses no further meritorious issues that counsel might have missed. See Dempster, 187 A.3d -8- J-S36021-26 at 271. Consequently, we grant Attorney Watkins’ petition to withdraw and affirm Mooney’s judgment of sentence. Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/30/2026 -9-